Situado and Sabana

SPAIN'S SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE PRESIDIO AND MISSION PROVINCES OF FLORIDA



Amy Turner Bushnell

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SITUADO AND SABANA: SPAIN'S SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE PRESIDIO AND MISSION PROVINCES OF FLORIDA

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This monograph is third in the series entitled
The Archaeology of Mission Santa Catalina de Guale

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Front cover illustration taken from a 1593 plan of a fort and warehouse in St. Augustine (Archives of the Indies, Seville). Cover design by Betty Palmer McDaniel.

FOREWORD

DAVID HURST THOMAS

This monograph, the third in our series, is an outgrowth of long-term archaeological research at Mission Santa Catalina de Guale. The project began in 1972, when the American Museum of Natural History entered into an agreement with the Edward John Noble Foundation to encourage and facilitate scientific research on St. Catherines Island, a barrier island off the coast of Georgia. The resulting long-term program has enabled hundreds of scientists and students to carry out research on various aspects of the natural and cultural history of the island. Each year since 1974, field crews from the AMNH have conducted intensive and extensive archaeological investigations as part of this research. The results of these inquiries have been published in the *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*. The first volume in this series (Thomas et al., 1978) provides an overview of the natural and cultural history of St. Catherines Island, and can be viewed as a backdrop for this monograph as well.

EXCAVATIONS AT MISSION SANTA CATALINA DE GUALE

In 1977, we began our search for Mission Santa Catalina with an extensive program of reconnaissance and site evaluation for all of St. Catherines Island (see Thomas 1987, 1988, 1991). We have been excavating the 16th- and 17th-century archaeological deposits ever since. Yet, despite our 15 years of archaeological investigations, the human story played out at Mission Santa Catalina is still very much a work in progress. The first monograph in this series dealing with the archaeology of the mission describes our motivation for seeking Santa Catalina, and sets out our overall research strategy (Thomas, 1987).

The second volume (Larsen, 1990) describes the biocultural and bioarchaeological study of the Native American inhabitants of St. Catherines Island and the Georgia coast during the 17th century. The human remains recovered from Mission Santa Catalina de Guale represent one of the best documented and most extensive series of human remains from an early contact site in North America. The study of these remains and comparisons made with other late precontact populations in the region, provide an important opportunity to examine the impact of the arrival of Europeans on American Indians.

Both of these volumes attempted to articulate the results of on-going archaeological investigations with the available historical and ethnohistorical documentation for the same period. And in both cases, it became increasingly clear that the tempo of archaeological excavations had far outstripped the available historical contexts.

To correct this situation, the present volume, the third in our series on the archaeology of Mission Santa Catalina de Guale, deals with the extant historical documentation. But before examining this, it is necessary to look briefly at the larger issues raised by juxtaposition of the archaeological and documentary records.

BACKGROUND: SOME UNEASY ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN HISTORIAN AND ARCHAEOLOGIST

> Despite what might seem to be a community of interest, archaeologists and historians tend to appreciate each other the way that Vandals appreciated Romans. They regard each other's research as so much booty to be plundered, and they pay little attention to how or why it was originally assembled (White, 1992: 155–159).

For a century, the paths of American historians and American archaeologists have frequently crossed. But more often than not, these interdisciplinary encounters have been something less than constructive.

The potential problems are manifold and complex. Archaeologists have often viewed historians as particularizers, whose research has only limited application in the search for general laws of cultural systematics (Cleland and Fitting, 1968; Schuyler, 1979: 201–202; South, 1977: 5–13).

And, for their part, historians have often viewed archaeology not as a discipline, but

rather as a set of techniques used to recover information, which is then rightfully passed on to historians for appropriate analysis and synthesis (Frost, 1970; Wilderson, 1975; Deagan and Scardaville, 1985: 32). Archaeologists have been (and still are) chastised for attempting to "write history," the assumption being that archaeologists—by definition not being trained professional historians—will inevitably abuse the documentary database: This assumption is as distressing to some archaeologists as is the assumption that "if one can use a shovel, one can do archaeology" is to others (Deagan and Scardaville, 1985: 33).

John Griffin likewise took note of the long-standing friction between archaeological and historical viewpoints, but from a distinctly archaeological perspective (1990: 405–406):

> All of us who are archaeologists know that historians were slow to recognize the possible contributions of archaeology to their studies. . . . It was in the 1960s that significant numbers of historical archaeologists began to disparage the relevance of documentary sources to their understanding of archaeological sites and materials. I know that more than once I heard 'all history is a lie' seriously espoused by some of my colleagues. It is certainly true that many questions that archaeologists would like historians to answer are not ones that seem pertinent to the historian, and vice versa. . . .
>
> But as more and more historians have been exposed to anthropology . . . it has become easier for them to understand our concerns, if not necessarily adopt them. I also get the impression that more archaeologists are understanding the stance of the historian, appreciate the real potential of documentary context for archaeology, and perhaps are even coming to enjoy narrative history for its own sake.

What are these concerns?

Why do some archaeologists feel that "all history is a lie?"

SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORICAL ARCHAEOLOGY

As a discipline, historical archaeology is a late bloomer. In 1968, Cleland and Fitting wrote of a "crisis of identity" in historical archaeology, a dilemma which persists to some extent even today.

What is the appropriate focus of archaeological research in the historical period? To write cultural history (to particularize)? Or should historical archaeologists be engaged in the search to uncover timeless, spaceless cultural processes (to generalize)? Are these extremes the only options?

Americanist historical archaeology began in the 1940s and 1950s, concentrating on a very few selected sites, particularly houses of the rich and famous, forts, and other military sites. Colonial Williamsburg long served as a model for this early-stage historical archaeology. The initial research there was largely in the hands of architectural historians, with little attention paid to middens and lesser structures. As historic documents were exhausted for clues to dating, historical archaeologists spent much of their time developing independent, artifact-based methods for dating sites and components.

This group—called by some the Handmaiden-to-History school (after Noël Hume, 1964)—argues that historical archaeology should function primarily to supplement the historical record of the past. Writing 25 years ago, Noël Hume defined the historic site archaeologist as "a new breed . . . actually a historian with a pen in one hand and a trowel in the other" (1964: 215).

Today, this particularist perspective is manifested mostly by those involved with large, continuing projects closely connected with historic reconstruction and restoration. At such public centers as Plimoth Plantation, Colonial Williamsburg, Little Bighorn, and Fort Michilimackinac, extensive archaeology has been conducted specifically to recover data necessary to restore and interpret the sites.

Such traditional approaches link up the documentary and archaeological records in decidedly asymmetrical fashion. In many cases, the documentary record is viewed as a literary time machine: the archaeologist first digs things up, then combs the documents to see what things mean. Or, one begins by writing document-based history and then excavates to fill in the gaps and add detail.

In either case, the archaeological record is viewed as secondary to and dependent upon the documentary testimony. When unexpected findings or inconsistencies between the

archaeological and documentary evidence turn up, these "exceptions" or "anomalies" are discarded or explained away. This long-established approach—on the part of archaeologists and historians alike—effectively crushes any hope of fresh insight from the archaeological record per se.

Although some historical archaeologists still maintain that writing culture history is the primary objective—keeping the "handmaiden" imperative alive—most today view such research as merely a necessary first step toward more important goals. While admitting that the debate about the proper orientation of historical archaeology has not been fully resolved, today most historical archaeologists espouse more anthropological perspectives.

Viewed on this broader scale, historical archaeology pertains to the entire range of human behavior—spoken word, written word, preserved behavior, and observed behavior (Schuyler, 1977)—neatly straddling the traditionally discrete fields of historical archaeology, ethnohistory, and anthropology. This recent revolution in historical archaeology is especially relevant for those grappling with America's borderlands experience because it provides a new and independent perspective from which to view the events of the past.

This shift in perspective has also led some to redefine the relationship between the archaeological and historical records. Leone and Potter (1988) suggested that historical archaeologists can make greater contributions if they approach the archaeological and documentary records as *equally valid yet independent lines of evidence*. Rather than simply writing off differences between the records as "exceptions" or "noise," this approach seeks out and emphasizes such "ambiguities," valuing the unexpected as a way to expand our knowledge.

From this framework, historical archaeology transcends the Handmaiden-to-History approach, becoming instead an overarching "study of human behavior through material remains, for which written history in some way affects its interpretation" (Deagan, 1982: 153). This breed of historical archaeologist deemphasizes what Noël Hume (1969: 10) once called a "Barnum and Bailey" infatuation with the "oldest," "largest," and "most historically significant." The search instead is to place past lifeways into an integrated social context, whether or not presently viewed as "historical."

Although many historical archaeologists see generalizing, processual objectives as important to their field as well, most such studies remain rooted in "cultural processes operating at specific times and places, and are thus, strictly speaking, particularizing in result. They provide, however, the building blocks on which more general processual questions about human culture may be investigated" (Deagan, 1982: 162).

It is unfortunate that one particular aspect of the human condition—the history of the powerless, the inarticulate, and the poor—has remained largely unwritten. At times, it seems that these groups have been treated no more fairly by historians than they were treated by their contemporaries. Such parochialism was rampant among earlier generations of historians working in the Spanish Borderlands.

In their concerted and laudable attempt to overcome negative Anglo-American images of Spanish activities in North America, historian Herbert Bolton and his students were drawn toward more positive aspects of borderlands development (Weber, 1987: 336). But while combating one simplistic textbook image, the Boltonians inadvertently promulgated another, developing a particularly specious perception of the Native American. To Bolton, the mission system was an arm of the Spanish Crown reaching across the frontier to pacify and civilize an otherwise intractable population. Too often, our historian colleagues simply lumped Native Americans into John Francis Bannon's opprobrious catchall category of "Borderland Irritants" (1974: chapter 8). So viewed, Native Americans became only peripheral participants in the borderlands experience, largely discredited and dismissed. For decades, historians, cultural anthropologists, and ethnohistorians have discounted the possibility of learning anything useful from archaeologists, and until recently, they were justified.

This, then, is one important role for the new historical archaeology. The so-called "archaeology of the inarticulate" has been an attempt to uncover the archaeological roots

of historically disenfranchised groups: African American black culture, Asian-American culture, Hispanic-American Creoles, and in the research at hand, Native Americans during the historic period.

HOW THIS MONOGRAPH EVOLVED: SEEKING ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORKS FOR INTERPRETING LIFE AT MISSION SANTA CATALINA

With this as background, it was with some reluctance and trepidation that I thought of bringing a full-fledged Borderlands historian on board to join our Mission Santa Catalina team. Fortunately for us all, the fractious aspects of the historian-archaeologist relationship have been avoided. We have enlisted the services of a distinguished historian of the period, a specialist in the study of Hispanic American peripheries.

Dr. Amy Turner Bushnell was previously historian with the Historic St. Augustine Preservation Board, and has taught in the Departments of History at the Universities of South Alabama and California (Irvine). Before turning to the specifics presented here, let me sketch something of the ontogeny of this monograph.

I first met Amy Turner Bushnell at a party in St. Augustine hosted by Dr. Kathleen Deagan, then and now the preeminent archaeologist of Spanish Florida. I was already quite familiar with her important book, –*The King's Coffer: Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury, 1565–1702* (Bushnell, 1981). In this major addition to the historiography of Spanish Florida, Bushnell had evaluated the original correspondence between the Spanish Crown and its Florida representatives, defining the workings of Spain's colonial treasury in the St. Augustine outpost. Beyond describing the bald economics and endless power struggles, she sketched the social structure of Hispanic St. Augustine, and set out the framework of the complex interactions between Spaniard and Native American. The first detailed analysis of a Spanish colonial treasury office, *The King's Coffer* provided important guideposts to understanding the supervision of the Indies in general.

Over the next few years, Dr. Bushnell and I corresponded about several historical matters. Of particular note is her intriguing letter of May 12, 1982 in which, among other items of historical interest, she listed numerous references to "Documentary Information on St. Catherine's Island," a chronologically ordered compilation of available tidbits relevant to our on-going mission excavations:

1576 *There is a mission of Santa Catalina in Guale somewhere*
1597 *A mission in Santa Catalina is destroyed in Guale*
1604 *Santa Catalina mission is rebuilt on St. Catherines's Island*

. . .

1728 *There is a Santa Catalina mission connected with Nombre de Dios near St. Augustine*

Although many of Bushnell's references mentioned already available historical documentation, many entries were entirely new (at least to me).

Not long after this, she came to visit our on-going excavations on St. Catherines Island. We were able to show her firsthand the new archaeological evidence coming to light at Mission Santa Catalina de Guale; in return, we asked innumerable questions about the life and times of the Franciscan missions of Spanish Florida.

Quick to exploit Bushnell in her new role as informal consulting historian, I quizzed her about the documentary sources, particularly about the possibility of finding more relevant historical data concerning the specifics of what we were excavating at Mission Santa Catalina.

Although our excavations and analysis have progressed considerably since Dr. Bushnell's visit to Santa Catalina, the basics of the mission settlement were quite apparent even then. Literally dozens of questions came to mind as we walked around the Santa Catalina excavations, questions which could, perhaps, be answered by a directed re-reading and reinterpretation of the relevant documentary records.

We showed Dr. Bushnell, for instance, that the entire mission complex and the Guale *pueblo* that surrounded it were laid out following a rigid grid system, with the long axis of the mission church oriented 45° west of magnetic north. The central plaza was rect-

angular, measuring 23 m by approximately 40 m. While this site plan had emerged clearly from our exploratory remote sensing and subsequent excavations, the structured town plan raised many larger questions:

What were the primary Hispanic strategies for controlling the northern New World? What lessons had the Spanish learned from earlier experiences in Middle and South America?

What specific tactics were employed at the assorted missions, presidios, and pueblos to implement the overall Hispanic strategies?

Together, we viewed the ruins of the mission church, which defined the western margin of the central plaza. Once the church at Santa Catalina had been completely exposed, we recognized two sequential buildings. The late 16th-century *iglesia* which was destroyed by fire, probably in September 1597 and a second church structure which was erected over these ruins in the early 17th century; it was abandoned shortly after the British siege of Santa Catalina in 1680. The nave portion of the church was 16 m long and decorated, in places, with figures sculpted in clay.

With our historian in tow, we wondered aloud:

How were the mission buildings constructed? And of what? And by whom?

What were the economic relationships between the mission friars and their neophytes? How did the Indians support the church? With offerings? Did they pay for religious services and indulgences? If so, with what?

And who actually built the mission churches and other sacred buildings? What supplies were imported, and what was locally procured? Did the colonists of St. Augustine supply their own craftsmen, or rely upon Native American artisans?

How were the Indians paid for public works? With food, in kind, or through some form of currency?

How, specifically, were the mission churches of Guale decorated? With strictly traditional Hispanic motifs or were Native American elements also incorporated?

Under what exact conditions was Mission Santa Catalina abandoned? Was it a hasty or a well-orchestrated retreat? Did they take everything portable with them, or did they expect to return soon? Was the site left intact, or deliberately torched to keep the supplies away from the hands of the enemy from Charles Town?

Were the valuables—like church furnishings—hidden for anticipated return? Or were they taken along by those abandoning Santa Catalina de Guale?

Who came to live in the post-1680 Mission Santa Catalina? Were they squatters or settlers?

We then led Dr. Bushnell to the clearly demarcated *sacristy*, built on the Gospel side of the 17th-century church. In this room, the Franciscans presumably stored vestments, linens, candles, processional materials, and other ritual paraphernalia essential to celebration of the Mass. Below the sacristy floor, we found a cache of charred wheat grains (*Triticum* spp., probably destined to be baked into the "host," the flatbread used in the Eucharist).

Although the available archaeological records show that wheat never assumed great dietary importance to Spaniards living in *La Florida*, this modest cache suggested to us the effectiveness of the Franciscan Order in obtaining the supplies necessary for the proper conduct of Church ritual—even on the most remote northern frontier of the Guale province.

The wheat cache also raised a number of larger questions about the practice of religion on the Hispanic frontier:

With respect to religious ritual, what specific practices were considered to be adaptable to frontier conditions, which church rituals, observances, and traditions were considered inviolable? What was required to conduct a Mass in Spanish Florida? What substitutions were permitted in the necessities of proper worship?

We moved on to the cemetery. Beneath the nave and sanctuary of the mission church at Santa Catalina were buried at least 431 individuals. Clark Spencer Larsen supervised the complete excavation of this cemetery between 1982 and 1986; the extensive biocul-

tural evidence from Santa Catalina has been discussed elsewhere (see Larsen et al., 1990).

Clearly, these Guale neophytes had been encouraged to bury their dead in good Christian fashion, according to prevalent church teachings—in unmarked graves beneath the floor of the church, hands crossed on the chest with feet toward the altar.

And yet, the *campo santo* at Santa Catalina also contained a truly astounding array of associated grave goods—obviously not a Christian practice. Among these grave inclusions were crosses, medallions, small medals, finger rings with sculpted Sacred Heart emblems, and a cast figurine depicting the infant Jesus with a cross in one hand and the other raised in a gesture of blessing. Other grave goods included complete majolica vessels, several projectile points, a chunky stone, a rattlesnake shell gorget, glass cruets, mirrors, hawks bells, shroud pins, copper plaques, a clay tablet (with depictions of saints on both sides), and one large piece of shroud cloth. The cemetery also contained literally tens of thousands of glass beads which are currently being analyzed. Most were embroidery beads sewn onto clothing and sashes; others were portions of jewelry and ornaments. Rosary beads were also found in profusion. The remainder of the beads are aboriginal shell beads and lapidary beads.

These grave goods—the clear-cut juxtaposition of Christian and "pagan" practices operating in the mission contexts—raised still more questions:

What, specifically in material culture terms, was involved with the rites of baptism, marriage, and burial?

What inducements—material or otherwise—were offered to encourage Native Americans to receive baptism and burial?

Did the Indians of La Florida participate in a system of tithes? If so, how was such tribute collected? How and in what proportion were the proceeds distributed?

What role, if any, did traditional aboriginal practices and beliefs play in the mission setting? To what extent were Native American customs and technologies "baptized" into the mission lifeway?

What was the relationship of the missionaries and neophytes of Mission Santa Catalina de Guale to the garrison supposedly based on St. Catherines Island?

Given the well-known antipathy between secular and sacred authorities, were the soldiers stationed at the mission proper, or some distance away?

How was the garrison to be provisioned? From the mission stores, or directly from St. Augustine?

Who were the soldiers stationed at the garrison? Were they single or married? Did they take Spanish or American Indian wives? Did their wives and children live with them in the garrison or elsewhere?

How, physically, were goods passed into and out of Santa Catalina? What were the routes of commerce—strictly maritime, or were there overland trails as well? Where was the docking area, and what did it look like? How large were the ships they had?

What was this stuff transported in? Pots, boxes, baskets, or kegs? And who transported these things? Paddlers, peddlers, or packers? Were they men or women? How were they paid? Or were they "volunteered"? Where did they live? Were they full- or part-time?

Which way did the trade move? As tribute from mission to capital? As support from presidio to outpost? Maybe both?

How much, literally, were the bearers to carry? Enough to impact them physically?

Each question has important biocultural ramifications to be considered when pondering the meaning of these 431 Guale remains buried beneath the church floor.

Leaving the church excavation, we crossed the shell-covered subplaza, an *atrio* probably enclosed by a low wall demarcating the public entrance to the church. Walking eastward across the plaza, I showed Dr. Bushnell our excavations in the *convento* and *cocina* complex.

At least two superimposed *conventos* (usually translated as monasteries, convents, or friaries) existed at Santa Catalina. The earlier structure was probably built in the late 1580s shortly after the Franciscans arrived. Second only in size to the church itself, this earlier *convento* was probably burnt by rebellious Guale in the fall of 1597. When Fray Ruiz supervised the reconstruction in 1604, the southeastern wall of 17th-century *convento*

was directly on top of its 16th-century counterpart. Because the later structure was somewhat smaller, and because the long axis of the 17th-century *convento* differed by 15° from the earlier structure, the two buildings only partly overlapped.

The western *convento* wall was enclosed by an arcade, probably a colonnaded porch marking the eastern margin of the central plaza. At least three doorways faced the church to the west. As we looked westward, several questions arose about Franciscan lifeways in Spanish Florida:

Although in St. Augustine the cloister was large enough so that the formal Franciscan lifestyle could still be fully practiced, what about those Franciscans stationed at missions like Santa Catalina? To what extent could they practice "the routine of the cloister," and what would such a routine, if indeed practiced, look like in the archaeological record?

What, exactly, comprised the royal alms of the Florida Franciscans: travel grants, stipends, allowances for food, clothing and medicine, and allotment of sacramental supplies? What form did these payments take? How did they get there? How scarce and/or sacred were they? (and, by extension, what should be expected to show up in the archeology of such missions?)

What about personal belongings of the Franciscans? What does a "vow of poverty" look like archaeologically? What, specifically, did the Franciscans wear? What, exactly, did they give the Indians as gifts?

Inside the later *convento*, we found a curious feature in the central room: a rectangular clay foundation set into the floor, scooped out to receive an oval, metallic receptacle.

Could this floor font have held holy water? Or was it employed for personal hygiene. Could it have been used to bathe the aching feet of barefoot Franciscan friars? Is there a modern analog in the friaries of today?

Immediately behind the *convento*, we recovered nearly four dozen bronze bell fragments. When examined microscopically, punch and axe marks left little doubt that these bells had been deliberately destroyed.

Could these be fragments of bells broken by rebellious Guale during the uprising of 1597? Were the bell fragments deliberately saved, perhaps to be later recycled into new bells?

What was the role of the bell in daily mission life? Did it just call people to Mass, or was it used to structure other aspects of mission life?

Where did the mission bells come from?

Although the later friary was about 15 percent smaller than its predecessor, this size differential was more than counterbalanced by the new *cocina* (kitchen) built 20 m to the northwest. The 17th-century kitchen, measuring 4.5 m by 6 m, was constructed of wattle and daub on three sides. These walls were supported by squared-off pine posts, placed in pits. The southern end of the kitchen was apparently left open, presumably to facilitate both access and ventilation. Inside the kitchen were rich deposits of discarded food bones; Elizabeth J. Reitz and her students have been identifying and analyzing these nonhuman bones from the *cocina* to learn more about dietary patterns at Mission Santa Catalina.

What did the friars eat? Where did they get their food? How much was locally produced, how much imported (from where, and in what)?

Did they dine on traditional Spanish foods, or did they "go native?" Did the kind or quantity change through time? How much did food cost? What sold cheap in St. Augustine? What was expensive and/or rare? How were supplies and foodstuffs stored (in the ground, on the ground, in boxes or bags)?

Two mission wells were found on the eastern side of the plaza. The first, initially located by the magnetometer survey, was a simple barrel well, consisting of seven decomposing iron rings above the well-preserved remains of an oak casing. This well had a relatively short use-life, and we think it likely that it dates from the 16th century.

A second, much larger well was encountered later, directly between the *cocina* and the *convento*. When first recognized, the large circular construction narrowed downward, with distinct "steps" on both sides. The well was originally much smaller, having been first constructed with standard barrels. It was sub-

sequently renovated using a casement constructed of two U-shaped cypress logs which were lowered into the construction pit, then nailed together. This later handmade well casing was considerably larger than any other mission-period wells encountered in Spanish Florida.

This well clearly crosscuts surrounding features in the *convento/cocina* complex; it was one of the last features built at the mission and was probably in use until the final mission abandonment in the 1680s.

Were these everyday wells, supplying the mission with its drinking water? Or were these wells the source of the Holy water necessary to conduct appropriate Franciscan ritual?

At the time of Dr. Bushnell's visit, most of what we knew about Santa Catalina came from a decade of digging around the plaza in the central part of Santa Catalina—the church, *convento*, and *cocina* complex—an area of about 5000 m^2. But in more recent years, we have shifted the archaeological focus from the Hispanic core to the Native American outskirts. Today, we are exploring the site structure of the surrounding Guale *pueblo*, which covers at least 10 ha. Not surprisingly, a host of new questions accompany our new excavations:

What do the Spanish documents say about the Indians of Santa Catalina and nearby Islands? What did they wear? How were they organized?

What did the Spanish obtain from the Indians? How were such tributes levied? How often? Where were they delivered? By whom (by land or sea)?

Why, and to what degree, did the ruling Guale elite choose to Hispanicize?

The one or two Franciscan priests stationed at Mission Santa Catalina de Guale were always surrounded by hundreds of natives who—as events in 1597 dramatically underscored—could rise up at a moment's notice and send these missionaries to immediate martyrdom. Why, we often wondered, did the Guale caciques *and* cacicas *play along with the Franciscan formula? What was in it for them?*

So it was that we showed Amy Bushnell many of the so-called archaeological "facts" during her visit to Mission Santa Catalina: the rigid plaza-and-grid system (*Did it reflect the idealized Hispanic system for promoting colonization and laying out civil settlements throughout 16th-century Spanish America?*), the charred wheat grains from the sacristy (*Were they raw materials for the Eucharist "host"?*), the 431 Guale neophytes buried beneath the nave accompanied by a remarkable quantity of grave goods (*Did mortuary practices reflect a syncretism between Christian and aboriginal belief systems?*), the Franciscan foot font inside the late *convento* (*Was it secular or sacred in function?*), the broken bronze bell cache behind the *convento* (*Was it still-consecrated scrap, to be cast into new bells?*), the food bones left in the mission kitchen (*Do they reflect a surprisingly rich diet of the friars?*), the mission wells (*Did they produce drinking and irrigation water, or were they a source of the Holy water necessary to practice Franciscan Catholicism?*).

While always suggestive, these "facts" are incapable of speaking for themselves. What we needed was an alternative to the archaeological record, a contrasting and equally valid, independent picture drawn from the extant records of the period. Rather than seeking to discount differences between these two records as "exceptions" or "noise," we were looking for "ambiguities" between the historical and archaeological evidence.

THE FINAL PRODUCT

Our formal collaboration evolved not long after Dr. Bushnell's visit to Santa Catalina. In March 1986, I proposed that she join our team in a more formal role, to collaborate more intensively by providing the documentary back-up for the mission excavations. Dr. Bushnell enthusiastically agreed, and we defined a set of mutually agreeable research priorities (as set out in my own letter of April 2, 1986):

> We are willing to leave the specific research directions entirely up to you. As you know, we badly need a picture of life at Santa Catalina as reflected by contemporary historic documents. Given how little we know right now, almost anything would help: maps, site descriptions, material culture lists, economic transactions, population estimates, a listing of friars who

served at Mission Santa Catalina, building descriptions, *anything* about the location and appearance of the presidio on St. Catherines Island. Of course, given our archaeological bent, the more Santa Catalina-specific, the better.

In November 1986, Dr. Bushnell proposed a series of relevant research topics, collectively tied together under the rubric of a "material culture/ethnology series," basically translations revolving around topics of mutual interest: "the alms (*limosnas*) to friars, religious services and their costs, firearms and firearm control, . . . wheat flour and lamp oil: the production of religious supplies."

We agreed to develop such a volume, explicitly oriented toward the material culture needs of archaeologists, and made plans to publish it in our on-going series dealing with the archaeology of Mission Santa Catalina, as a volume in the *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*. With this monograph in mind, the American Museum of Natural History appointed Dr. Bushnell as a Research Associate in the Department of Anthropology in December 1986. I am now pleased to present the tangible fruits of nearly a decade of collaboration between historian and archaeologist.

NEW VIEWS OF MISSION SANTA CATALINA AND SPANISH FLORIDA

Amy Turner Bushnell's extraordinary volume deals with the Spanish support system for their mission chain, the northward terminus being Mission Santa Catalina de Guale. In order to deal with the Spanish economic structure, the Native American communities, and the struggles between the two, she has expanded the scope of this study to embrace all of Spanish Florida.

Dr. Bushnell's monograph provides us with a varied spectrum, from narrative and specific illustration to full-blown historiographic analysis. The narrative chapters provide the historical backbone of this monograph, and they constitute the first real attempt to write a general history of the provinces of La Florida. The analytical and illustrative sections provide the detail needed by archaeologists encountering the archaeological record of Spanish Florida.

Sometimes, we are presented with fresh, first-hand accounts of actual doings in Spanish Florida. In some instances, despite diligent search, Bushnell has turned up no relevant documentation from the province of La Florida; she bridges such documentary gaps with additional information from similar contexts elsewhere in the contemporary Spanish realm, from the northern frontiers of New Spain and Alta California, from the Sierra Zapoteca of Oaxaca to Brazil, the Peruvian montaña, and the far-away Philippines.

To the archaeologist, the greatest benefit of this and related documentary studies may be the thorough and complete reappraisal of the economic basis of the Franciscan missions of Spanish Florida. As historian Eugene Lyon (1992) has recently put it, "There is today a long-held, deeply ingrained interpretation of the nature of colonial St. Augustine. It has been developed over time by a number of writers and historians, and has been strongly imbedded in St. Augustine folklore. It is even heard on the street in the spiels of carriage and tour-train drivers. Individual phrases stand out: 'isolated military outpost' 'starving garrison town.'"

To many, St. Augustine was a hardship post—"a struggling, military outpost on the fringe of empire with few of the amenities of civilization" (TePaske, 1964: 104), and residents who complained bitterly about the frontier conditions encountered there.

This depressing picture of life in St. Augustine and its outliers has recently brightened. Lyon (1992) points to a spate of newly accessible archival sources, documents that "now provide the matrix for new knowledge and fresh interpretations." According to Lyon, historians are "now less concerned with 'drum-and-trumpet' history—the recounting of grand events; instead, we are more interested in the lifeways of the Hispanic peoples who came here in the sixteenth-century and their interaction with the Florida Indians" (1992: 7).

Bushnell takes exception to the so-called "declensionist view" of Spanish Florida, a view that minimizes Crown investment and downplays the success of local economic activities. Rather, she situates Mission Santa Catalina not only within La Florida, but also

within Spain's overarching colonization scheme for the entire New World. The view of "poor little St. Augustine," which emphasized the colony's poverty and isolation, is no longer tenable.

While historians have recognized an economic function for the Spanish mission, many passed over evidence for the survival of preconquest trading networks and for the postconquest siphoning off of Native American labor and agricultural produce toward Spanish settlements. This conventional, Boltonian view of mission economics has, in the past, seriously underestimated the neophyte Native American contributions to the mission's economic survival.

Bushnell probes the earliest Crown involvement in Spanish Florida, documenting the support available to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to start up his fledgling enterprise. She tracks in detail how the available military and nonmilitary support was employed in both the presidial town of St. Augustine and on the frontier, how Spanish Florida evolved from Pedro Menéndez's proprietorship to a Crown colony. She explores how nonmilitary resources were utilized by the missionaries and by the local Indian *caciques*; she likewise documents the extent to which Native American labor was enlisted in support of the convents and the presidio at St. Augustine. Bushnell also examines how the Hispanic hierarchy—*hidalgos*, soldiers, and farmer-settlers—was transplanted to Florida soil, and how this hierarchy interacted with the equally stratified Native American hierarchy.

In other words, Bushnell paints a fresh picture of mission life, from a perspective that meshes well with other now-emerging notions of 16th-century Spanish Florida: a "culturally rich and complex society, rather well-equipped and supplied for its tasks of colonization and for implanting of Castile in North America . . . . In cultural as well as economic terms, sixteenth-century Spanish Florida was far richer than we have been led to believe" (Lyon 1992: 16–17).

This monograph is a rich mine of relevant detail and original assessment—not only to the archaeologist sorting the thousands of mission pottery sherds, but also to the paleoarchitect trying to piece together a 300-year-old building from stains in the sand, to the zooarchaeologist pondering the food bones recovered from the mission kitchen, to the physical anthropologist analyzing the bones of those who lived there, to the modern Franciscan scholar weighing the issues of canonization and martyrdom in the missions of Spanish Florida.

I will gladly leave to the reader (and the reviewer) the final judgment of how well Dr. Bushnell has fulfilled her commission. But, let me clearly state that—from the perspective of this dirt archaeologist—it seems that we have a powerful new synthesis of the relevant documentary evidence here. The challenge is to compare and contrast these views with the independent, yet complementary data rapidly becoming available from our own on-going mission excavations.

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ABSTRACT

This is an analysis of the mixed support system by which Spain maintained an economically unprofitable but strategic presidial colony on the contested east coast of North America for two centuries. The system was an open-ended one which combined private enterprise, royal subventions, and drafted labor, the relative share of each fluctuating as a function of the changing levels of external pressure, whether of threat or opportunity. The Peripheries Paradigm that emerges from an examination of the 17th-century Spanish Southeast is dynamic and essentially secular, little resembling the Borderlands Paradigm derived some 70 years ago from a study of the isolated mission presidios of the 18th-century Southwest. Spanish or Indian, the inhabitants of the *presidio* and mission provinces of Florida knowingly pursued their individual interests across an international arena.

The captaincy general of Florida passed through five distinct support phases between its founding in 1565 and its cession to the British in 1763, an interval that historians call the First Spanish Period. In the first phase, the colony was founded as a cooperative venture between the Crown and a private conqueror, as Philip II reinforced the expedition of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés in order to eliminate a rival colony of Frenchmen. When it became clear that corsairs and Indian resistance would prevent the Spanish from exploiting the inland centers of Southeastern population and production and thus becoming self-sufficient, the king institutionalized a set of annual treasury transfers, the *situado*, to meet the presidio payroll and other expenses.

In the second phase, Franciscan missionaries supported by royal stipends began to provide the colony with a hinterland, starting on the Atlantic coast with the provinces of eastern Timucua and Guale. Soldiers ensured that the Indian lords of the land would fulfill their sworn contracts of conversion, trade, mutual defense, and allegiance, and the Crown rewarded the chiefs' obedience with regular gifts. They in turn acted as brokers of the *sabana* and *repartimiento* systems, transferring provisions and labor from Indian towns to the Spanish presidio and convents and from Indian commoners to Spanish and Indian authorities.

When, in the 1620s and 1630s, Spain's wars with the Dutch made delivery of the situado uncertain, soldiers and Franciscans again moved forward, expanding the hinterland to take in the Gulf coast provinces of Apalache and western Timucua. In this third phase the colony acquired new sources of native support and enlarged its slim financial base by the sale of provisions to the rapidly growing city of Havana.

In the 1680s, as the amount of non-Spanish shipping in the Atlantic rose sharply, external pressures reached dangerous levels. English and French pirate attacks became seasonal, while Southeastern Indians beyond the Spanish sphere of influence gained access to firearms and began raiding the Christian towns for Indian slaves and altar ornaments. Spain's response was to strengthen the presidial center at the expense of the peripheries. During the building of the Castillo de San Marcos, in this fourth phase, increased royal investment and a rising population in St. Augustine encouraged the growth of cattle ranches in central Florida. Mounting demands for labor, provisions, and local defense fell on a native population that was already reduced by epidemics and fugitivism.

In the early 1700s, Indian commoners took advantage of Florida's war with Carolina to abandon their towns and chiefs altogether. The Spanish retained effective control only of St. Augustine, which became an entrepôt of intercolonial trade. During the fifth phase, which ended with the colony's cession in 1763, the mixed support system was back where it started, depending on a mixture of royal subsidies and private enterprise: the situado and the sea. The laborers had walked out of the model.

INTRODUCTION

St. Augustine—earliest permanent settlement of Europeans in the mainland United States of America—was first and last a military outpost. By Spanish standards it was a poor place, a far cry from the splendors of Mexico City or Lima, City of Kings, and a departure from the implicit imperial policy that an American colony should not only sustain itself but contribute substantially to the support of the metropolis (TePaske, 1993: 1). Governor Juan de Salinas once apologized to a patron: "In this *presidio* few things present themselves to relate to Your Grace, for there are so few of us that we make no sound" (Salinas, 1620). Up to the time that the colony of Florida was ceded to Great Britain in 1763, its non-Indian population did not exceed 3000; and after the ravages of Queen Anne's War, the number of Indians under Spanish rule was smaller than that of non-Indians.

In textbook histories of either English or Spanish America the colony of Florida figures little; it remained Spanish too long to be thought of as American, yet not long enough to be Latin American, as those fields are currently defined—and between the two, as Charles W. Polzer once observed, academia has "drawn the line that is never to be crossed" (1989: 180). Popular history slights it, for its biodegradable missions left none of the stone or adobe ruins that nurture romance (Thomas, 1988a: 24; 1991b). Even the genealogists are indifferent, for the colony was literally wiped off the map, its people vanishing into exile or, worse, slavery.

As an historical field, Spanish Florida suffers from further deficiencies. Wars, natural disasters, and changes of flag have left the colony with an uneven documentary base, little of which has seen publication. The early literature is Eurocentric. Either it concentrates on activities in the Spanish capital to the exclusion of the Indian hinterland, or it focuses on the French and English-speaking intruders. The later literature, mainly monographic, stands in need of synthesis and interpretation. The most urgent need of all is for a simple narrative history of the colony that will give the provinces their due.

To the historian of colonial Latin America, however, Spain's captaincy general on the East Coast of North America has an importance that goes beyond head counts or diplomatic dispositions. The colony of Florida is a place where the process of negotiation and adjustment between royal policies and provincial necessities may be examined over an unusually long period of time, a manageable microcosm for the proving of paradigms.

The subject of this monograph is Spain's support system for a maritime periphery. As analyzed in Chapter 20, it is a flexible system which combines viceregal subsidies and Indian services in varying proportions within a changing total, the variations being functions of changes occurring over time in royal policies and resources, foreign threats and options, and economic opportunities.

This analysis represents an attempt to make whole cloth out of several separate strands of research. In *The King's Coffer: Proprietors of the Spanish Florida Treasury, 1565-1702* (Bushnell, 1981), I concentrated on the operations of a presidial branch of the royal treasury, the economic privileges of officers and officeholders (fees, salaries, pensions, gifts, monopolies and monopsonies, and access to land and labor services), and the power struggles that went on within their circle. The reader with questions about Florida's 17th-century political economy and bureaucracy, its Inquisition, *cabildo*, royal officials, *protector de indios*, notaries, and *casas reales*, should start with that monograph.

Since writing *The King's Coffer*, I have become increasingly conscious of Indian elites and of the multiple functions of Indian towns under Spanish rule as centers of indoctrination, defense outposts, labor enclaves, nodes in the provincial transportation network, units of agricultural production, and places of refuge. This interest has led me to a reexamination of the structure and operation of the system of viceregal subsidies, this time concentrating on the subsidies to the missions and missionaries, the chiefs, and the religious institutions of St. Augustine.

Interdisciplinary scholarship is by nature homeless. For anthropologists and archaeologists, this study is likely to have too many events and particulars and too little site-spe-

cific information; for social historians, it will have too much material culture and too little analysis and the citations will be distracting. It careens from text to text too superficially for specialists in comparative literature; it has too many stories and too little data for sociologists. Apologists and assailants of Spain in America who search the book for ammunition will each accuse me of giving aid and comfort to the other.

As one of the historical consultants for the St. Catherines Island project of the American Museum of Natural History, I have for several years interested myself in a particular group of Christian Guales who occupied the border town of Santa Catalina de la Frontera in 1680, tracking them forward and backward through the patchy documentary record. I have fitted the yield of this research into a nested set of pictures of (1) the province of Guale, (2) the colony of Florida, (3) the North American Southeast, and (4) the centers and seaways of the Spanish empire. The advantage of this approach is that it allows, as it were, several levels of magnification. For greater detail, one can switch lenses downward from Florida to Guale Province, to the migrating community of Santa Catalina, or even to the individual. Opting for larger scope, one can see the colony as a whole, or in increasingly larger contexts, the largest being that of all the early modern peripheries.

I have dispensed with a glossary, choosing to define an unfamiliar term on the page where it first appears and list that in the index. In some cases I have retained a Spanish term for the sake of precision. The English word "Indian," for example, carries no information about hierarchy or gender. In Spanish, by contrast, native commoners or vassals were called either "*indios*" or "*indias*"; native rulers were known as "*indios*" and "*indias principales*," "*señores naturales*," or *caciques* and *cacicas*. In other cases, the English counterparts to Spanish terms have too many connotations. "Infidel," "pagan," and "heathen" are not equivalent to "*infiel*," which means no more than a non-Christian native.

I likewise avoid the terms "African," "African-American," and "black." The first two require a knowledge of origins that is seldom available, and the other is too imprecise for a society that recognized numerous color gradations in the "*castas*," including "*negro*," "*pardo*," "*mulato*," and "*moreno*." I use the general term "Spanish" or "*español*" for all those who lived in a Spanish manner and were accepted as such. The word "Spaniard" is reserved for an español born in Spain; "*floridano*," for one born in Florida. Before the Bourbons came to the throne, Spanish Americans seem to have used "*criollo*" in two ways, to refer to their American-born black slaves or to make rude references to someone from another colony. The word "creole" has proven so convenient, however, that historians of the Hapsburg era have adopted it, and I am no exception.

The term "Florida" as used herein does not refer to the present State of Florida, two-thirds of which remained outside European control throughout the time of Spanish occupation, nor yet that part of the North American Southeast which Spain claimed and Spaniards explored from 1513 to 1587, then known as "La Florida" and now as "Greater Florida," so named by ethnohistorian Charles Hudson (Hudson, 1990: 125, 169; Milanich, 1990: 3–29).

Contemporaries routinely identified the colony as the sum of its provinces, calling it "las provincias de la Florida." Sometimes they included within that total the colony's past or potential provinces: regions like Agua Dulce, where during the epidemics of the late 16th and early 17th centuries Christianity literally died out, or Apalachicola, whose chiefs were willing to exchange gifts and conduct trade but were unwilling to accept conversion and vassallage and whose territory more properly fell within the Spanish sphere of influence or trading network. Herein, "Florida" may be taken to mean the presidio, or headquarters of the Spanish garrison, wherever it was, and the presidio's hinterland, whenever it had one. The colony's largest territorial extent coincided with the mission provinces of the 17th century: Timucua in the northern third of the Florida peninsula, Guale on the present Georgia coast, and Apalache[1] in the Red Hills region around present Tallahassee.

[1] Although most other historians and anthropologists have adopted Colonel James Moore's orthography and write "Apalachee," I resist the trend, as I would resist adding an "e" to "Apache." "Yamasee" is entrenched.

Archaeologist Kathleen A. Deagan described this same area as "the northern, subtropical regions of the peninsula, where agricultural productivity and population densities were greatest" (Deagan, 1990a: 236). Ethnohistorian William W. Fitzhugh defined it by exclusion as that portion of the East Coast south of Virginia where native cultures were less politically fragmented and less subject to border vulnerability than were those cultures which occupied an insular or peninsular environment that, unlike Florida, lacked either an extensive hinterland or environmental barriers to disease and military intervention (Fitzhugh, 1985: 271–272). Historical geographer Brian George Boniface called it simply the "Florida ecumene," which he defined as the "territory effectively controlled by the Spanish authorities at St. Augustine," the "small core area in which were found the military garrisons, the mission villages, the farms and cattle ranches, all of which were linked by a network of trails and waterways" (Boniface, 1971: 52).

The provinces were language-based. Missionaries in the Southeast were unable to spread the use of a single native language as their predecessors had done in Mexico and South America (Robertson, 1931: 164, 170). Apalache and Guale were mutually unintelligible languages of the Muskhogean family. Timucua was a language isolate with structural and lexical ties to the Warao of northern Venezuela (Deagan, 1978: 89; Larson, 1978: 120; Milanich, 1978: 60–62; Granberry, 1987: 26–55; Hann, 1988c: 118–125). Archaeologists David Hurst Thomas and John W. Griffin recently summarized the literature on all three linguistic groups (Griffin, 1990; Thomas, 1990b).

Chronologically, this study extends from 1565 to 1764, with emphasis on the time of mission provinces. In terms of ethnohistorian William C. Sturtevant's periodization of Indian-European relations in La Florida, it begins in the middle of the later "Exploration Period," at the moment when the primary motive of Spanish efforts in the region, from the Crown's point of view, became defense against foreign encroachment. The marker events are the founding of St. Augustine and the expulsion of the French. Progressively narrowing focus, as Spain itself did, it continues through Sturtevant's Co-existence Period in the peninsula and on the Georgia coast, during which Spaniards and Indians attempted to influence each other's behavior through trade, diplomacy, and war, and on through the Mission Period of north central Florida, when, although the Crown's motive remained strategic, the principal agents of Spanish control were missionaries.

In the 18th century, when by the Sturtevant model most of La Florida was passing through periods of Depopulation or Diplomacy, I introduce the concept of the refugee pueblo, which carried the name of mission without the substance (Sturtevant, 1962). The study ends in 1764, when floridanos and fewer than a hundred Christian Indians gathered up the outward evidences of their faith and transported them to Cuba, little suspecting that after a 20-year British Interregnum, Florida, much changed in character, would be Spain's until 1821.

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One's professional and personal debts are intertwined. My father, Clyde Gilbert Bushnell, was a man enchanted by languages. He took his family to live in Texas, Mexico, Florida, Colombia, and Puerto Rico and administered dollops of German, Spanish, and English grammar like treats. Anything he read, he read aloud for the amusement of whatever child happened to be around. At the age of fifteen, I typed his dissertation in Mexican history. No one dreamed that I would follow his lead. At the small college where he taught and I learned, women majored in nursing, education, secretarial, music, or home economics. When I took a history elective and the teacher said to the class of mostly ministerial students, "There's a *girl* in here who's doing better than you!" it sounded like an accusation. Then, when I was a housebound young mother, my brother Vinson and sister-in-law Anne towed me into the world of ideas on a stream of secondhand books from the Coop in Cambridge, and nothing was ever the same again.

My thesis director at the University of Florida was Lyle N. McAlister, a Scot and a gentleman. His interests in cross-colonial comparison, the roots of institutions, histo-

riography, geography, social structure, and labor systems stay with me, and so do his incomparable stories. Other historians who have been generous with their time and bibliographies are Eugene Lyon, Paul Hoffman, David J. Weber, Michael V. Gannon, Peter Wood, Susan Parker, Luis R. Arana, John J. TePaske, John L. Kessell, Richard Ahlborn, James Saeger, Jane Landers, and John H. Hann. Anthropologists and historical archaeologists interested in the Southeast long ago took me under their wing. They include Kathleen A. Deagan, John W. Griffin, Patricia Griffin, Jerald T. Milanich, David Hurst Thomas, Elizabeth J. Reitz, Rochelle Marrinan, Rebecca Bateman, and Gregory A. Waselkov.

Librarians and archivists who have been helpful to this particular project include Elizabeth Alexander and Bruce Chappell of the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History; Jacqueline Fretwell of the Saint Augustine Historical Society; and Dorothy Lyon, cataloger of St. Augustine's research libraries.

This monograph has had a long gestation. In 1986, at the crucial point when I decided to reenter the academic world after five years as a public historian and administrator, a Rockefeller Foundation fellowship from the Program in Atlantic History, Culture, and Society at Johns Hopkins University provided me with a year of support for research and writing. Soon after, David Hurst Thomas, Curator of Anthropology at the American Museum of Natural History, commissioned a series of consultant reports for use in interpreting the Museum's archaeological excavations on St. Catherines Island. Completed on December 15, 1988, the reports addressed the following subjects:

The Bells of Spanish Florida
The King's Alms to Franciscans
The Demands of Decent Worship
The Supplies for the Sacraments
Missionary Travel and Transportation
Establishing a Mission
The Parish of Indians
The Religion of the Laity
Indian Resources and the Missions
Migrating Towns and Displaced People

Thanks to Thomas's unusual understanding of the concerns that drive historians, these have been absorbed into a work of historical analysis three times as long as they were. The delays have been enough to try a curator's soul. For three years, a heavy teaching load at the University of South Alabama slowed my progress on the manuscript. The easier schedule that I have enjoyed in the past three years at the University of California, Irvine, and at The Johns Hopkins University has enabled me to complete it.

I gratefully acknowledge the generous funding from the St. Catherines Island and Edward John Noble Foundations for the larger project to which the reports contributed and through which the book is being published. Mr. and Mrs. Frank Y. Larkin deserve special thanks for their long-term commitment to anthropological and historical research on St. Catherines.

David Weber, at work on *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (1992), shared his extensive bibliography and took the time to read and comment on the first draft of this manuscript. John Kessell, one of the Museum's readers, supplied his expertise on New Mexico. Another reader, so familiar with the documentary sources that he could only be John Hann, saved me from a swarm of little errors. My husband, Jack P. Greene, read the manuscript with an eye to historical structure, analysis, and argument and served as a sounding board. Only he knows how much, in every way, I owe him.

Margot Dembo, of the Museum's Anthropology Department, and Brenda Jones, of Scientific Publications, ushered the manuscript through press, handling with equal ease 17th-century Spanish and 20th-century word processors. Dennis O'Brien drew the maps. Thank you, everyone. I stand on your shoulders.

Amy Turner Bushnell

CHAPTER 1. THE PURSUIT OF PARADIGM

When St. Augustine was founded in the mid 1560s, the High Conquest in Spanish America was coming to a close. With 70 years of New World experience behind them, Spaniards had become more realistic in their ventures. No longer flocking to any banner, they had learned to measure a leader's expectations and capabilities against his followers' odds of coming out of the experience with honor and profit. Florida had gained a reputation as "a land of constant wars." In fruitless navigations of its mangrove swamps and pine barrens, five successive conquistadores—Juan Ponce de León, Lucas Vázquez de Ayllón, Pánfilo de Narváez, Hernando de Soto, and Tristán de Luna y Arellano—had died, leaving legacies of financial ruin. It held none of the riches for which fresh conquerors would risk their fortunes and farm couples their savings: no silver mines, no precious woods, no mantle-weaving women.

Yet establishing a manifest presence on the Atlantic coast of North America was vital to Spain's interests. The return route of the convoyed Fleet of the Indies, carrying bullion to replenish the king's empty coffers, ran for hundreds of leagues along the untamed Florida coast. Experience showed, however, that no colony was likely to be planted in so unpromising a place except by royal initiative, nor maintained without steady infusions from the royal exchequer. The stimulus for the first came in the form of a rival colony of French Huguenots. Philip II, realizing that he must either back up his claims to Southeastern North America or forfeit them, named a challenger, don Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, and underwrote a bold campaign to drive off the French. When it became clear that Indian hostility and foreign assaults would continue to inhibit settlement and productivity in the new captaincy general, the king reluctantly instituted, one by one, a cumulative series of subsidies, charged against royal revenues that would otherwise have been remitted to Spain. These subsidies were designed to support a military garrison and a set of government officials, to supply potential Christians with missionaries and other Christians with secular priests, and to guarantee and extend Indian alliances.

In the early 17th century, Spanish soldiers, friars, and settlers enlarged this financial base through conquest and conversion. Possession of a hinterland brought a degree of security to the colony and modified the pattern of support. St. Augustine became a minor metropolis with its own peripheries. Towns of Christian natives supplied the Spanish city with provisions and labor, while the mission provinces acted as buffer zones of defense and early warning. With Indian chiefs acting as brokers, Indian commoners contributed to the support of soldiers and missionaries, and their aid was indispensable when the viceregal treasury fell behind on subsidies, as it often did. Economic opportunities began to appear in the colony, and with them ranches, secondary garrisons, and pockets of Spanish settlement. Again, these depended on the good will of chiefs and the stalwart services of Indian commoners.

In the late 17th century escalating foreign threats brought heavier subsidies to the captaincy general, but also heavier demands on Indian labor and production. When, for the first time in 80 years, Southeastern Indians outside the Spanish sphere of influence obtained access to regular supplies of European trade goods, including firearms and ammunition, the mission provinces rapidly collapsed under the double weight of slave raiders and rebelling commoners. Deprived of the resources of its hinterland, 18th-century Florida, reduced to the walled city of St. Augustine, returned to its 16th-century status of a military base dependent on remittances.

A MISSION TYPOLOGY

In the literature of religious history, produced over centuries, the word "mission" has acquired a rich set of connotations for scholars to disentangle. "As originally conceived in the history of the church," Daniel S. Matson and Bernard L. Fontana explained, a "'mission' was not a building or place; it was an activity" (1977: 10). Coming from the Lat-

in verb *mittere*, meaning "to send," it was applied, as Charles Polzer pointed out, to groups of men who were *sent* from Christian Europe to places that were religiously alien and to peoples regarded as barbarous (Polzer, 1976: 4).

Those who went forth on a mission were ordinarily members of the "regular" clergy, subject to the *regula*, or Rule, of a particular order. The first mission to Mexico consisted of 12 members of the Franciscan Order who arrived in 1524 hard on the heels of Hernán Cortés. The Twelve Apostles, as they were called, had a *modus operandi* like that of tent evangelists. They entered a region, preached, founded churches, baptized Indians, and moved on, alternating periods of public ministry with periods of conventual study and prayer. A similar system was followed in Peru. Once the spiritual conquest of the imperial peoples of the core, central regions was complete, itinerant bands of preachers gave way to friars who went out from centrally placed monasteries to visit their converts, guarding them against a relapse into old habits. These small residential communities of religiosos, developing first in central Mexico, were imitated in the central Andes and other parts of America (Tibesar, 1953: 37–51).

Historian Robert Ricard, in *The Spiritual Conquest of Mexico*, first published in 1933, grouped 16th-century missions into three categories. "Missions of occupation" were characterized by a dense network of convents grouped around a center. "Missions of liaison" were strings of convents belonging to a single order, spaced to function as hostels. "Missions of penetration," sporadic and impermanent, were located in places made difficult by topography, climate, or hostile natives. These were throwbacks to the conquest and were found only on the frontiers (Ricard, 1966: 77–78). Other institutions that survived on the peripheries of empire were the religious *entradas*, or friars' reconnaissance expeditions, and the "*misiones volantes*," or "flying missions." The basic unit of "fixed" as opposed to "flying" evangelization was the *doctrina*, which originated alongside the encomienda.

Polzer divided the process of frontier evangelism into four stages. During the *presencia* stage, contact took the form of an entrada or an outpost. The object of presencia was to gain an invitation to begin conversions; to that end the friars and their backers offered the natives material benefits and military alliances. After the Indians agreed to accept a missionary, evangelism entered the brief stage of *conversión*, or *conversión viva*. As soon as conversion showed signs of permanence, it proceeded to the phase of doctrina, a kind of preparochial grace period during which the neophytes, or catechumens, were exempt from civil and ecclesiastical taxes and their ministers were free from the investigations and claims of bishops. Intended to last no longer than ten years, the doctrina phase, for various reasons, was often extended. The final phase, *parroquia*, or parish, was reached when the Indians, well advanced in the arts of civilization, entered the ranks of native Christians and subjects ready to support the diocese with their tithes (Polzer, 1976: 5–6, 47–54) and the central government with their tributes.

An Indian congregation metamorphosed into an Indian parish when it was secularized, that is, subordinated to the nearest diocese. At this point, the *doctrinero* appointed by the order was supposed to retire from the scene to be replaced by a *cura*, or beneficed secular priest, who was appointed by the bishop and remitted a quarter of his income from sacramental fees to the diocese. Here, however, the process broke down. Whether it was because few members of the secular clergy came forward to spend their lives on poor and perilous frontiers, or because the semisedentary denizens of the frontiers took longer than the imperial peoples to acquire the characteristics of Spanish civility, or because the orders had reasons of their own for retaining control of their converts, the replacement of regular with secular clergy was deferred, and the doctrineros' temporary assignments became converted into entitlements. The result in many places was an enclave of natives in a state of perpetual minority under the guardianship of a standing doctrinero from one of the religious orders.

This doctrina, developmentally stunted and segregated from the outside world, is the "mission" of most historians, who tend to apply the term to any native frontier community or compound under the wardship of

one of the missionary orders (Bolton, 1917). For George Kubler, this definition of the mission as "a Christian congregation, permanently housed near a church built by the natives in a land beyond the jurisdiction of any bishop," and "an ecclesiastical outpost . . . constituting an economic unit capable of supporting itself and its spiritual head by means of its own resources and labor" obscures the mission's interesting variety (Kubler, 1983: 369).

In 1795, Diego Miguel Bringas, a product of the Franciscan missionary college of Querétaro,[1] made an attempt to clarify evangelical procedures for the king by associating "the care of souls," that is, Indian souls, with three institutions. "*Misiones, reducciones*, and *conversiones*," he explained, were "essentially the same institution," dedicated to propagating the faith. "Completely different from each other as well as from the former," the two institutions in which the faith was preserved were the doctrina and the *curato*, the main difference between the two being that the doctrina could not support a *ministro* but had to be provided with one by royal patronage. Each of these three institution corresponded to "a specific spiritual condition": the mission/reduction/conversion to the "pagan," the doctrina to the "new Christian," and the curato to the "Catholic instructed in the qualities of a good vassal who is useful to church and state" (Bringas, [1796–1797]: 43–48).

As Father Bringas's first category shows, contemporaries overlaid the terms for spiritual conquest—"*misión*" and "*conversión*"—with parallel terms for directed settlement—"*población*," "*congregación*," and "*reducción*." The first one, población, signified the process of populating new territory, often by having trustworthy Christian Indians move in to found new *pueblos*, or *poblaciones*. The Crown encouraged Indian *pobladores*, as it did *español* settlers, with ten-year tax exemptions and outright subsidies.

The second type of directed settlement, congregación, involved collecting the inhabitants of remote or depopulated settlements into fewer, more accessible, aggregate settlements called *congregaciones*. Although the Spanish encouraged, directed, and took credit for the amalgamation process, it could happen with or without their initiative. As archaeologist Marvin T. Smith demonstrated, a similar aggregation occurred in southeastern North America, as a consequence of the 16th-century population crash, in societies that lay within the range of Old World pathogens but were as yet beyond the pale of Spanish influence (Smith, 1987; 1989; see also Thomas, 1991a: 429–586).

The third type, reducción, was roughly equivalent to congregación except when the term was applied to the nomadic or semisedentary people who did not naturally live "*políticamente*," or in polities. When "wild people" accepted fixed settlement and the constraints of municipal government they were said to be "reduced" to "*pueblos en forma*." Here again, the settlement process and the resulting settlement carried the same name. A *reducción*, according to Polzer, is "an incipient community where the Indians have been gathered together for more efficient and effective administration, both spiritual and temporal," as they "learn the rudiments of Christian belief and the elementary forms of Spanish social and political organization" (Polzer, 1976: 7). No Spaniard other than a missionary was supposed to reside in a reducción (Matson and Fontana, 1977: 4).

All three types of directed settlement lent themselves to social engineering, paternalism, and racial segregation. The 16th-century Christian humanist Vasco de Quiroga applied Sir Thomas More's blueprint for Utopia to communities in Michoacán for 20 years. Gerónimo de Mendieta, 16th-century Franciscan missionary to New Spain, advocated a system of segregated republics—the Republic of Indians and the Republic of Spaniards, each having its own language—that foreshadowed the isolationist *Siete Misiones* of the Platine river system. The Jesuits modelled their 17th- and 18th-century absolutist reductions in Paraguay, Brazil, and Baja California after the pre-Columbian Incaic community as they understood it. In 1769, two years after the Jesuit Order was expelled from New Spain, Franciscan missionaries extended the reduction model into Alta California, where it lasted until the secularization of the missions in 1834, sufficiently different from its predecessors that Charles Polzer could argue that the California mission was "post-

typical" and represented "a total shift in Spain's cultural policy in the Americas" (Phelan, 1970; Warren, 1971; Kubler, 1983: 372–375; Costello and Hornbeck, 1989: 303; Polzer, 1989: 180).

In Florida, población usually referred to the proposed planting of a planned and subsidized community of Spaniards or Canary Islanders in some strategic spot—a favorite bureaucratic pipe dream. Reducción was used more loosely, sometimes referring to the settlement of semi-nomadic people in a proper town where it was hoped that they would turn into farmers, and at other times meaning the return of fugitive native Christians to their deserted towns and responsibilities. During periods of population loss, the three terms—reducción, congregación, and población—were used more or less interchangeably to indicate the consolidating of two or more small towns of Indians, usually in order to sustain a garrison, operate a ferry, or provide some other public service (Fernández de Florencia, 1670).

It is often assumed that any native community having a member of the regular clergy for a priest would remain under wardship indefinitely, subject to the beneficent governance of the missionary order. Although in several corners of the New World missionaries did keep their charges in the *conversión* stage, segregated from settlers and soldiers, exempt from taxes, and subject to a godly authoritarianism in their temporal as well as spiritual lives, this kind of paternalism was by no means universal. More commonly, the *conversión* progressed to the next stage and bogged down there.

The "evolved doctrina," as distinguished from the "encomienda-doctrina," was, according to Matson and Fontana, "half-mission" and "half-secular parish or curacy." On the one hand, the doctrinas came under the patronato real. They enjoyed no temporal authority. Some bishop was entitled to visit them, examine their priests, and receive a share of their tithes. On the other hand, the doctrineros were appointed by their own superiors and the royal treasury covered their stipends (Matson and Fontana, 1977: 14). Had the secularization of the doctrinas resulted in a wholesale replacement of ministers, Bringas's doctrinas would have evolved into curatos, but that replacement did not occur. In the minds of most people, a "curacy" with a priest from the regular clergy instead of a proper "cura" from the secular clergy was a contradiction in terms. Canonic technicalities aside, Indian parishes continued to be called doctrinas and parish priests from the teaching orders, doctrineros.

THE BORDERLANDS PARADIGM

A review of the historiography of Florida missions reveals as much about the preconceptions of scholars working on the Southwest as it does about the historical study of change and process in the Southeast.[2] In the early 20th century, Berkeley historian Herbert Eugene Bolton popularized the study of Spain in North America with the two concepts of a "Greater America" and of the "Spanish Borderlands." The latter has shaped the direction of research on the Spanish frontier for generations.

Bolton and his students of the "Spanish Borderlands School" invested their subject with an aura of oldfashioned adventure and romance. They reacted to the Anglocentric Black Legend with a Hispanocentrism which "exalted and romanticized Spaniards in general and missionaries in particular" (Weber, 1990: 431). In this vein, the first 20th-century historians of the Florida missions—John Tate Lanning (1935), Maynard Geiger (1937), and Félix Zubillaga (1941)—faithfully reflected the hagiographic tone of their sources. In historian David J. Weber's words, "no murky cultural relativism" dimmed their theme of "Christophilic triumphalism" or raised "disturbing questions about the morality of evangelism" (Weber, 1990: 430–431).

A second legacy of the Borderlands School was its emphasis on institutions. Historians and archaeologists learned to think in terms of the mission, the presidio, the hacienda, or the mining camp, rather than of society as a whole (Polzer, 1989: 181). In a field-shaping article, "The Mission as a Frontier Institution in the Spanish-American Colonies," Bolton put forward the bold thesis that, secularly speaking, the mission was a successful agent of borderland control (Bolton, 1917).

Although Bolton claimed Florida as part of the Spanish Borderlands (Bolton, 1925;

Bolton and Ross, 1925), few of his followers ventured east of the Mississippi. Florida historians seeking validation looked westward for models (Weber, 1987: 339–341), trimming a maritime periphery to fit the Borderlands Paradigm. Confident that the missions in Georgia had left tabby ruins comparable to the adobe ruins of New Mexico and California, Bolton, Mary Ross, John Tate Lanning, and Jeanette Thurber Connor all let their interpretations of site be influenced by where such ruins were found. When archaeological research revealed the tabby ruins to be those of sugar mills and other 19th-century structures, the Bolton School retreated from the eastern borderlands with embarrassment all around (Bolton, 1925: frontispiece; Ross 1926: 179–180; Lanning, 1935: 1–8, 237–238; Coulter, 1937).

Reinterpretations of the Bolton thesis as applied to Florida did not emerge until 1965, when St. Augustine was celebrating its Quadricentennial. In an essay which Michael V. Gannon, an able apologist for the hagiographic tradition (Gannon, 1965a), completed for him posthumously (Weber, 1990: 432; Gannon, 1992: 328), Church historian Charles W. Spellman disputed Maynard Geiger's millennialist concept of a "Golden Age" of Florida missions based upon outward conformation and soul counts. "The idyllic picture of Indians living prosperously with their friars in pleasant mission compounds," Spellman declared, was a fantasy that the 17th-century record did not support: "the 'Golden Age' never really happened" (Spellman and Gannon, 1965: 355).

In the early 1970s, Florida historian Robert Allen Matter further challenged Bolton's picture of the mission as a successful frontier institution. In Matter's view, the Florida missions served no useful secular purpose. An economic backwater, Florida had little of value to offer, nor for some time after 1566 was foreign intrusion a problem. The only reason he could discover for Spain's abiding interest in the colony was, as the Crown itself said, to convert and protect the Indians. Yet he found that evangelism was "not properly integrated into the overall administration of Florida, and what success the missionaries enjoyed did little to prepare the vulnerable colony for its own defense and perpetuation." Far from defending the frontier, the missions were "the weakest link in the colony's defenses." The friars themselves "made a major contribution to the decay of their installations and the loss of the Spanish frontier" by their "bitter, uncompromising feud" with the governors (Matter, 1972; 1990: 174). Although Matter acknowledged that Indian uprisings triggered the episodes in this conflict, on his stage the only actors were Spaniards:

> For over a hundred years the pawns in the game—the Christian Indians of Florida—considered and treated as inferior by the Spaniards, secular and religious, had little choice in selecting their masters or in determining the outcome of the church-state feud about them that swirled around their heads (Matter, 1990: 154).

David Hurst Thomas remarked on the contrast in Florida between the late 16th century, when Jesuits and Franciscans tried to protect their charges from abusive soldiers, and the late 17th century, when governors and officers defended the Indians from abusive missionaries. What appears to be a major shift in attitude was partly a function of source survival. In the archives, much of the early Florida correspondence concerns mission administration, while the later correspondence is heavily gubernatorial and military. Nonetheless, as Thomas observed,

> Such disputes over military and religious priorities reflected deep-seated differences in perception about the true role of the mission system: as strictly agent of the Church or as an ingredient of a presidio system designed to conquer and safeguard new frontiers (Thomas, 1990b: 388–389).

Michael Gannon came to the missionaries' defense. Their loss of zeal in the late 17th century could, he said, be attributed to the "constant pressure on the friars to defend themselves and their native charges" from interfering governors. When "the friars acted on their own behalf," he asserted, they were also safeguarding "the welfare of their converts." The "rights and dignity of the missions" were tantamount to the "rights and dignity of the native peoples" (Gannon, 1990: 457).

David Weber, taking a larger view of Spanish-Indian relations, wrote:

> Whatever their spiritual successes, then, missionaries failed to advance permanently, defend effectively, or Hispanicize deeply Spain's North American frontiers of the seventeenth century. . . . The mission did not fit Bolton's model of a successful "frontier institution," and it failed in large part because Indians did not wish it to succeed (Weber, 1990: 439).

Viewing Florida in the context of cultural contact on the Atlantic seaboard from Greenland to Hispaniola and trying to account for its lack of colonists, William W. Fitzhugh observed that Spanish "interest in La Florida was primarily strategic and military" and that, accordingly, "very little Spanish investment was made in this area, which was turned over to Jesuit and Franciscan friars and a handful of military men scattered in posts along the Georgia and Carolina coasts" (Fitzhugh, 1985: 174–175). The Crown's subsidies to friars and soldiers were not, it seems, Spanish investments. Fitzhugh continued:

> Because of the poverty of these missions located in an economic backwater of the Spanish Empire, the emphasis on religious rather than economic activity, the collapse of native political and military infrastructure, and the gradual depopulation resulting from the European epidemics, these missions were weakened and fell prey to incursions by Yamasee and Creek Indians and others armed and encouraged by expanding English settlement in the Charleston area. Retreating to the safety of St. Augustine, these remnant groups existed as refugee communities until they were evacuated to other Spanish centers in the Caribbean in 1763 (Fitzhugh, 1985: 175).

This declensionist view, minimizing royal expenditures and local economic activity in the colony and emphasizing its poverty and isolation, reflects the impression of most historians and archaeologists examining Spanish Florida's missions, military posts, and native societies. Many of the letters from Florida's royal officials and religious authorities to the Crown were written to convey that very impression, and as historian Engel Sluiter pointed out, the writers succeeded—not with the knowing Crown, but with present-day scholars, trustingly accepting sources that Sluiter dismisses as "literary" and "non-enumerative" (Sluiter, 1985: 1–2).

The consequent emphasis on mission isolation and self-sufficiency fell comfortably in line with the Boltonian picture of the Spanish Church on the "rim of Christendom" and with the Borderlands Paradigm which combined the religious history of missionary orders with the secular history of the frontier (Block, 1980: 161). In the words of historian David Block:

> Professional historians, following the diaries and letters of the missionary fathers, have placed priests, neophytes, and—in North America—presidial soldiers beyond the aid or control of metropolitan authority, touched only by an occasional *visita* or supply train (Block, 1980: 162).

Although scholars understood that the mission had an economic dimension, they tended to recognize only the internal one, passing over the evidence for the survival of preconquest trading networks and for the postconquest flow of Indian labor and agricultural produce toward Spanish settlements.

Architectural historian George Kubler called attention to the mission as "an economic unit capable of supporting itself and its spiritual head by means of its own resources and labor." In Kubler's view, there were "on the northern periphery of the Spanish world in America" two ways of achieving self-support, the absolutist and the humanistic, which he illustrated by the contrasting mission architecture of California and New Mexico. In the "complex industrial mission" of California, the "human group occupying the buildings existed in a quasi-military state of being, subject to the strict regulation of a conventual discipline," their village "subordinate to the vast enclosure of the religious buildings." In the "monastic plan" of New Mexico, "the church and its accessory buildings occupied a subordinate position with relation to the great Indian towns." The church was massively fortified; the convent was "merely a residence for the missionaries and their personal servants," and the Indians carried on their economic activities elsewhere (Kubler, 1983: 369–370).

That a mission might be forced into commerce in order to survive was shown by Franciscan historian Antonine Tibesar in the case of the missions of 18th-century eastern Peru, a region known as the *montaña*. With the encomienda long since abolished there were

no encomenderos to finance the work of conversion; the local treasury had insufficient taxable revenues to assume the burden; and the Crown did not come to the rescue because the montaña was not a strategic, threatened frontier. Franciscans assigned to the montaña had to choose between sustaining their missions with a cash crop of *coca* or abandoning them to the jungle. Sheer necessity turned the mission into a plantation and the friar into an overseer (Tibesar, 1983: 147–148).

Bolton himself did not claim that the frontier mission was self-sufficient. On the contrary, he emphasized the role of the royal treasury in sustaining the friars. The Franciscan missions fanning out from New Spain in the 18th century, he pointed out, had four principal means of government support: the annual stipends (*sínodos*) of the friars; the wages (*sueldos*) of two to five mission guards detached from nearby presidios; the ordinary grants (*ayudas de costa*) of 1000 pesos per mission "for bells, vestments, tools, and other expenses of the founding;" and the extraordinary grants for construction or other purposes. "The royal pocketbook was not readily opened to found new missions," he cautioned, "unless there was an important political as well as a religious object to be gained." This was why the French threat led to mission foundings in eastern Texas, and the Russian threat, to missions in California.

What Bolton failed to acknowledge—perhaps because members of religious orders did not hold title to property, and he himself measured economic value in terms of money and accumulation—was the contribution of converts to missionary maintenance. Although the mission Indians were expected to support themselves and in many cases came to prosper through stock-raising and agriculture, "not a penny of this," he said, "belonged to the missionaries" (Bolton, 1917: 54–56).

THE PERIPHERIES PARADIGM

David Block blazed a new trail into the topic in 1980 in an essay on the tropical missions of the Moxos region of Peru. Hypothesizing on the basis of his research that "a frontier mission system depended heavily upon material provided by the core economy," and that "the image of missions as self-contained theocracies" stood in need of revision, he surveyed the literature and found parallels to the Moxos mission support system in Paraguay, Baja California, New Mexico, Texas, and Sonora. "The frontier mission was never a world apart," Block concluded. Although the ties between the missions and the center "are often difficult to recognize on the documentary landscape," there was "an essential union between the parts of the Spanish colonial world" which "overcame the obstacles of distance and time to link the periphery with the center" (Block, 1980: 176–178).

Conscientiously, Block reported two exceptions. Missionaries in the Peruvian montaña were plagued by "the irregular delivery of Crown bequests" and had to struggle to make ends meet. And in Florida, he understood from an article by Robert Matter on the economic basis of the 17th-century Florida missions, the "Franciscans, suffering from a chronic absence of their Royal subsidies, came to depend upon the Indians' generosity for their very sustenance" (Matter, 1973; Block, 1980: 177–178).

The Florida exception stood in need of revision. While royal support of Florida's soldiers, friars, and Indian allies was intermittent and unpredictable during the wars of the mid 17th century, this condition did not hold for the entire colonial period. Paul E. Hoffman and Eugene Lyon, viewing the defenses of Florida and the Caribbean from the other side of the Atlantic, separately quantified and documented the Crown's heavy initial investment (Hoffman, 1973; 1980: 109–174; Lyon, 1976: 91–92, 226). Engel Sluiter showed that from 1595, when the principal treasury of New Spain assumed sole responsibility for the Florida garrison's payroll and other expenses—together known as the "*situado,*" or "assessment"—"at least through 1635, the Mexico City treasury paid Florida substantial sums and on time." The acute problems that arose when an occasional situado was lost to storms or to pirates should not, Sluiter argued, be laid at the viceroy's door (Sluiter, 1985: 3–9).

As the findings of these scholars show, Florida researchers have begun to position the colony in its eastern, maritime contexts, with fresh sets of characteristics to explore.

Seen as part of the Caribbean, the Gulf, the Atlantic world, or the Eastern Woodlands, Florida ceases to be the misfit of the Borderlands and becomes a prototype of the maritime periphery.

In his work on Puerto Real, a 16th-century Spanish port on Hispaniola, archaeologist Charles R. Ewen distinguished two kinds of periphery settlements: those that were commercial outposts on the economic fringes of empire, like Puerto Real, and those that were defensive outposts on the geographic fringes, like St. Augustine. Out of fiscal necessity, the Crown abandoned the former, and out of strategic necessity, maintained the latter (Ewen, 1990: 266–267).

Reporting on an 18th-century settlement of fugitive slaves near St. Augustine, Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mose, historian Jane Landers made the point that

> the Africans of the Spanish "borderlands" . . . often lived on the periphery of Spanish society—sometimes between the Spanish and their enemies. The interstitial location of settlements such as Mose paralleled the social position of their inhabitants—persons who straddled cultures, astutely pursued their own advantage, and in the process helped shape the colonial history of the circum-Caribbean.

Approaching Florida as part of the "Negroid littoral" of the Caribbean basin clarified the colony's situation as a peripheral yet strategic component of the Spanish American empire (Landers, 1990: 324).

"If there were parts of the new world which offered little or no returns on heavy expenditures and where, despite that fact, the Spaniard established and maintained himself," wrote Borderland historian Lansing S. Bloom long ago, "it would be . . . reasonable to recognize the presence of some motive very different from the lust for gold" (Bloom, 1944: 4). That motive may well have been evangelical in the landlocked borderland of New Mexico, as Bloom went on to conclude, but in the maritime peripheries another took precedence.

"Defense of the realms was always more important than Christianization of natives," declared Spanish colonialist Howard F. Cline. Spain's two viceregal capitals, Mexico City and Lima, were the nerve centers of two inner rings of defenses. In both viceroyalties, permanent settlements protected the land routes that connected capital cities to ports and centers of production. But both centers of power were also concerned with Atlantic sea communications, which involved them in an outer ring of Caribbean defenses. "Present Central America, Yucatán, Cuba, Florida, and the Gulf littoral formed a secondary area of highest strategic importance" which Cline dubbed the "Gulf Borderlands." These were "deficit areas whose human and natural resources warranted little or no major imperial investment once the initial foothold had been secured and their defenses established." From the point of view of the viceroys of New Spain, the great plains and deserts of North America—Bolton's "Spanish Borderlands" and Silvio Zavala's "Aridamérica"—were less important than the Gulf peripheries until late in the 18th century, when Russia, Great Britain, and the United States became Spain's rivals in the Pacific. Until then, the "outer boundaries" with native people who were capable of being civilized were left to the missionary Orders, while those with inveterately hostile natives were written off as lands of "perpetual war" (Cline, 1962: 170–171).

Kathleen Deagan found no trace in the Caribbean of the Boltonian mission, which "evolved along the frontiers of Spanish America" as a center "not only of Christianity, but also of Spanish political presence, labor organization, economic production, and defense." That mission represented "an accommodation to the need to secure and control a vast and isolated territory inhabited by a large but dispersed Indian population." In the Caribbean, friars did not build missions, but instead "traveled to the Indian settlements or worked with caciques." "The mission as it was known in the northern borderlands areas," Deagan concluded, "was not an Antillean phenomenon" (Deagan, 1990a: 230).

On the continuum of institutions for native conversion, Southeastern missions were closer to the Antillean extreme than to the Borderlands one. In Florida, the friars made their headquarters in dominant native towns, from which they visited lesser ones, and Florida caciques played a major and recompensed role in organizing labor, economic produc-

tion, and defense (Bushnell, 1979; 1989a). The great council house excavated at the provincial capital of San Luis de Apalache substantiates the chiefs' continuing power (Shapiro and Hann, 1990).

The Florida mission, like the Boltonian one, was a canonically erected church congregation, coterminous with an Indian town that was under obedience to "both Majesties" and observed the same "laws of the realm" and "law of God" as a Spanish one. A *doctrinero* from the Franciscan Order was assigned to the congregation to say its Masses, administer its sacraments, and supervise its instruction in the dogmas of Roman Catholicism. A kind of teaching pastor, the doctrinero lived with a coterie of male assistants in a monastery-like *convento* close to the town's *iglesia*, or church structure containing a sanctuary to hold and display the Blessed Sacrament. The Crown paid the doctrinero's stipend, or *sínodo*, and underwrote his church expenses, as it did the expenses and salaries of the colony's one parish church of Spaniards.

But the Florida mission was no theocracy. It was a fully functioning native town governed by an interlocking set of hereditary and elected native leaders: the *cacique,* who represented the town in councils and was its military leader, and the *principales,* who advised him and handled local government. Both levels of leaders were accountable to the governor and not to the *padre provincial,* or superior of the Franciscan Order in the colony. While Christian Indians in the Southeast played an important part in supporting the Spanish friars, soldiers, and settlers, they did so with comparatively little change to their own material culture and political organization.

A Florida governor took seriously his duties as vice-patron of the Church. Advised by the royal officials of the treasury and the officers of the garrison, he approved or disapproved the Franciscan province's plans for expansion in the form of spiritual entradas; he controlled the number of doctrineros under royal patronage; and he oversaw their assignments and reassignments. The reams of documentation generated during the periods of high controversy between the colony's civil and religious authorities have obscured an important fact: in Florida, as elsewhere, the clergy was a branch of the civil service (see Farriss, 1968: 15–38). The hundreds of Franciscans who were transported to the provinces of Florida and there maintained in frugal respectability for the rest of their lives were reminded at every turn that they were in America to promote *Crown* Catholicism.

NOTES

1. Santa Cruz de Querétaro, founded in 1682, was the first Franciscan apostolic college of *Propaganda Fide* in the New World. It trained an elite corps of missionaries for Texas and other mission fields (Tibesar, 1967: 455; Matson and Fontana, 1977: 11–12; Gómez Canedo, 1983: 11–12).

2. For more about early Florida historiography, see "Spanish Florida, 1565–1763, and Spanish East Florida, 1784–1821" (Bushnell, 1989).

CHAPTER 2. ROYAL POLICIES FOR THE PERIPHERIES

In 1565 a naval squadron under don Pedro Menéndez de Avilés set out from Spain to destroy a colony that France had planted on the Georgia Bight.[1] The French, having failed to establish a colony at Guanabara Bay in Brazil under Nicolas Durand de Villegagnon, had been testing the waters of the Northern Hemisphere with expeditions under René de Laudonnière and Jean Ribault. Philip II had already agreed to contract the exploration and settlement of the coast out to Menéndez, latest in a series of private conquerors willing to advance the frontiers at their own expense, when reports of the French intrusion made the colonization of Florida an immediate priority. As the king threw his weight behind the project, the pace of preparations quickened and the number of men-at-arms and ships rose.

Royal support of the Menéndez expedition was an ad hoc response to an emergency situation. Ordinarily, royal behavior was more deliberate. The kings of Spain and their servants had had over 70 years in which to refine their views about how best to establish domain over New World frontiers, balancing the king's conscience against his coffers and the clamors of his Spanish subjects. What appear to be contradictions, reversals, and dissonances in the management of the Florida conquest and colony can be clarified by analyzing the separate royal policies that were in effect or being developed at the time the Florida enterprise commenced. To use a musical analogy, the imperial model was not harmony but counterpoint.

Among the policies that the councilors of Church, State, and Empire elaborated or revived during the long reign of Philip II (1556–1598), five were applicable to the conquest and evangelization of Florida: (1) the war on corsairs and their Indian and Maroon allies; (2) the use of private entrepreneurship as a means of advancing the frontier; (3) the secularizing of Indian parishes as a means of establishing authority over the Indian Church; (4) the pacifying of nonsedentary natives by means of gifts; and (5) the use of contracts with caciques to establish civil and religious control over native chiefdoms. Taken as a whole, the five policies were overlapping and contradictory, as befit a bureaucracy more organic than rationalized. The king did not take them as a whole, but applied them singly or in combination to fit the situation at hand, like a composer interweaving themes.

WAR ON CORSAIRS

The first royal policy bearing on the Florida conquest was the one toward contrabandists and corsairs. Spain reacted to the discovery of New World wealth with a mercantile monopoly. A convoy system implemented in 1542 restricted all shipping to a small number of approved ports. Inhabitants of unapproved ports had to choose between trade that was inadequate—one or two licensed vessels or "*navíos de permiso*" a year—and trade that was illegal. The minor ports either declined into insignificance or became havens of "*rescate*," exchanging low-value hides for contraband wines, oil, vinegar, linens and silks, slaves, spices, hardware, and other inviting goods (Wright, 1920; Ewen, 1990: 263–265).

To make matters worse, many contrabandists were foreign corsairs, who in the voids between declared wars were technically pirates. Emperor Charles V's wars against France were brought to a belated close with the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559, but in America there was "no peace beyond the line" (Hoffman, 1980: 103–107).

Philip II had come to the throne determined to give no quarter to the French corsairs who with the connivance of French authorities infested the seaways and interfered with Spain's monopoly of commerce. He took the same stance toward the English, whose queen was unwilling to wage open war on Spain yet ready enough to share the spoils of interlopers into Spanish waters. The rebellion of the Netherlands in 1567, which Elizabeth I abetted, and the advances of Protestantism in England and France added fuel to the fire. The medieval Iberian tradition of religious "*convivencia*"—mutual tolerance among

Christians, Jews, and Moslems—on which Ferdinand and Isabella had turned their backs in the 15th century would not be revived for the sake of heretics (Altman, 1989: 43). Philip II went to war with England in 1585 and with France in 1589 and remained at war with both countries as long as he lived.

The war on piracy, an extension of the war on heresy, was a war without quarter. The king pronounced sentence of death in advance, that all corsairs might be brought to justice "without dissimulation, dispensation, consultation with us, or delay" (Tanzi, 1973: 125). When once the king's mind was fixed on this terrible goal, all else, even conversion, became secondary. To the hard-pressed monarchs who succeeded him, 16th-century corsairs, 17th-century buccaneers, privateers and pirates, and 18th-contrabandists would all look very much alike. In Spain's counterpoint of policies for the Florida frontier, the *continuo* would be war.

PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Philip II's resurrection of two feudal institutions, the *adelantamiento* and the *encomienda*, reflected the financial straits of the Spanish Crown. An *adelantado* was a kind of royal surrogate or champion, a lord of the marches. An adelantamiento was the royal concession of economic and seigneurial privileges to a rich man who would undertake at his own expense to pacify a specified territory on the frontier within a stated period of time. Philip II made extensive use of the institution, often delegating the selection of adelantados to his viceroys (Costa, 1967: 96; Lyon, 1976: 1–5, 19–20; Kessell, 1987: 45).

The encomienda recalled the European manorial system. In the Spanish American society that the conquistadores hoped to establish, they would be knights and the Indians would be serfs. The king's champion rewarded his men by assigning them the Indian tribute of a certain locality, in exchange for which they were supposed to give the Indians protection and Christian indoctrination. This trusteeship arrangement, which gave rude soldiers virtual carte blanche to abuse the natives and defy the king, was no sooner in place than the emperor began to dismantle it. The New Laws of 1542–1543 prohibited the granting of further encomiendas, made existing grants nonhereditary, and forbade the "*servicio personal*" which *encomenderos* had been exacting from "their" Indians.

In a famous debate at Valladolid in 1550, Latin rhetorician Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda took the position that American Indians were patently inferior to Europeans, that they were, in fact, "natural slaves." As historian Robert E. Quirk has pointed out, "being a serf or vassal in Sepúlveda's Spain was not, in itself, an injustice, according to contemporary thought." The "injustice lay in mistreating him, overriding his privileges, denying him his rights" (Quirk, 1954: 363). The bishop of Chiapas, Dominican Bartolomé de las Casas, argued passionately for the opposite side. The poorest and most primitive American Indian society, he affirmed, possessed all of Aristotle's characteristics of civilization. Indians were "true men," whose rights to personal liberty and self-governance must be respected (Pagden, 1982: 109–145).

In the end, the emperor decided in favor of the Indians, or rather, he denied to the encomenderos the heritable privileges that they demanded as the rightful reward of conquerors and sons of conquerors. Despite widespread resistance, the New Laws were eventually implemented in the central core areas. Reverting to the Crown and administered by bureaucrats, encomiendas of Indian tribute became, in effect, assignable pensions.

In all three of the colonies founded during his reign—Florida, the Philippines, and New Mexico—Philip II sought to revive the encomienda in attenuated form. He was successful in two out of three. The *indios* of New Mexico and the *indios filipinos* of the Philippines possessed the sedentary habits and the exportable products on which such a system depended.

In the Philippines, the encomienda served primarily as a means of support for the Spanish population. All native adult males in Spanish-held territory except the chiefs and their sons paid their assigned encomenderos an annual tribute of one peso, with the chiefs often acting as the collectors. The old abuses of the encomienda in Mexico, Peru, and Guatemala recurred. Many encomenderos refused to accept specie and compelled the na-

tives to pay tribute in the form of labor or of scarce commodities which they could then resell. The Crown responded as it had in America, converting the personal tribute into a headtax. By 1655 the Philippine encomienda had completely reverted to the Crown and was being used as a cheap means of pensioning military personnel (Phelan, 1959: 95–97, 177).

The Pueblo Indians of New Mexico supported a total of 35 encomenderos, charged to protect them from Apaches and other enemies from the "nomadic north" (McCarty, 1983: 246–247). New Mexican encomenderos, like those in the Philippines, were shorn of any hint of lordship and had no part in indoctrination. Yet, again, this strengthening of the private sector weakened royal authority in the colony. Showdowns between the governors and the Franciscans were frequent and virulent, and Pueblo rebellions were unusually effective. The defensive encomienda proved useless during the Great Northern Revolt of the 1680s and 1690s, and the encomenderos fell from grace and were replaced by a formal presidio. At the same time, the Crown discontinued the government-subsidized supply service to the missions, and although the friars continued to receive their stipends, their share in the total payroll declined. The familiar 18th-century mission of northern New Spain, in which roving Indians settled down to learn the arts of agriculture and cattle raising and be protected from their enemies, was really a mission-presidio (Kessell, 1987: 187–188, 301, 522, note 40).

Judging from Philip II's 1565 contract with Pedro Menéndez, which tacitly allowed the commending of Indians by omitting any clause to the contrary, the king also meant to extend the defensive encomienda to Florida (Lyon, 1976: 43–55, 213–223). That the institution did not take hold on the East Coast of North America was due mainly to the intensity and duration of the conquest. Florida Indians were powerful archers, reported Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, and astute in self-defense (Cabeza de Vaca, 1542: 42). When Guale, Timucuan, and Apalache caciques consented to ally themselves with Spaniards and accept regular gifts from the Crown, they assumed the role of defenders of the frontier, with the tributaries, weapons, and mounts to go with their privileged status. They were encomenderos in all but name.

Florida's Spanish elite, the *floridanos*, found their substitute for the encomienda in the presidio payroll. With the collusion of the governor and the company captains, they served briefly as ensigns, then retired to be *reformados*, or reserve officers of the garrison. As such, they occupied the billets and drew the pay of footsoldiers but were exempt from guard duty. When Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera took office in the fall of 1680, the two companies had 81 reformados on their rolls. His slashing of that number down to 49 earned him the enmity of every floridano family who had marked a son for the military (Arana, 1960: 66–77).

The mission-presidio that took the place of the encomienda in New Mexico after the Pueblo Revolt was not intended for the Southwest alone. John Leddy Phelan noted the existence of a similar institution in the Philippines in the late 17th century, with "*misiones vivas*" of soldiers and semi-converted natives placed to form a buffer zone between the maritime provinces and the non-Christian peoples of the mountains (Phelan, 1959: 48). On its northern borders, Florida, too, was experimenting in the late 17th century with "live conversions" and lightly garrisoned doctrinas, which, given sufficient time, might have developed into a full-fledged mission-presidio. But whatever success that institution might have enjoyed in the Southeast was cut short by the wars for empire. When the mission-presidio was reaching its peak in Texas and New Mexico, during the 18th century, non-Christian Indians had long since retaken the Florida provinces and confined the Spanish and their native allies to the environs of St. Augustine and a few ill-supplied trading posts.

SECULARIZATION

The policy of secularization grew out of Philip II's problems with the mendicant orders of Augustinians, Dominicans, and Franciscans, who as regular (meaning "Rule-observing") clergy posed as great a challenge to the royal authority in his day as the encomenderos had in his father's. Under the *Patronato Real*, which under the Hapsburgs was

cultivated into the "Royal Vicariate of the Indies," the Spanish Crown held extensive authority over the Church in the Indies and was responsible for its welfare. The king was both head of State and head of the Church. Through the Consejo de Indias, the vicar-king exercised control in all but matters of doctrine, monitoring papal bulls, receiving ecclesiastical tithes, establishing and supporting churches, making appointments to benefices, setting diocesan boundaries, and dispatching missionaries (Padden, 1956; Farriss, 1968: 88–89; Ennis, 1971).

The regular clergy's reluctance to view the Indian parishes which they had carved out of sheer paganism as benefices or custodies to be awarded or revoked by the Crown inevitably brought them into conflict with the secular clergy. The seculars had the backing of bishops and kings, but the regulars had possession and a long memory for the Holy See's concessions to missionary orders, which included the faculties to grant indulgences, lift excommunications, and function in every way as priests. The papal bull *Alias felices*, 1521, confirmed the orders' right to administer the sacraments in places without a bishop; a follow-up bull, the *Omnimoda*, 1522, defined these places as anywhere over two "*dietas*" from an episcopal seat, a dieta being the unit in which land journeys were measured: 7 leagues per day by Roman law, 10 leagues by Spanish usage. In effect, every mendicant was his own bishop (Padden, 1956: 337).

The Council of Trent (1545–1563) revoked these privileges, giving bishops authority over members of mendicant orders who acted as parish priests, plus the right to collect Indian tithes. When the bishops of Mexico tried to enforce these decrees, however, the orders threatened to abandon their parishes. Philip II had to ask the pope to suspend the Tridentine reforms temporarily, permitting the regular clergy to function in the Indian parishes under their own superiors. The result was the bull *Exponi nobis*, 1567, a victory for the king's missionaries over the king's bishops.

The matter was not settled. Step by step, following a program outlined in a royally convoked council, the *Junta* of 1568, the Crown took control of the Indian Church within the viceroyalties. Philip II's *Ordenanza del Patronazgo*, 1574, placed all missions under viceregal and diocesan control. A follow-up *cédula*, or royal order, in 1583 gave the seculars preference over regulars in appointments to benefices. By 1600, members of the three mendicant orders had to choose between retiring to their monasteries to pray the Divine Office or taking their missions to the bishop-free frontiers. Augustinians and Dominicans by and large chose the contemplative life; Franciscans preferred activity (Padden, 1956: 352–353; Tibesar, 1967: 454–455).

Carried to the frontiers, the conflict between the Crown and the mendicants was merely deferred. Philip II's successors would continue to issue cédulas in an effort to implement the patronato and vicariate. The one in 1637 required all "religious" who exercised "the office of *cura* in a *doctrina*" then or thereafter, to "submit to an examination in doctrine and language" and "conform to episcopal provision, collation, canonical institution, visitation, correction, and removal at the will of the ordinary," or vested bishop (Shiels, 1971: 117).

The Franciscans had no intention of either submitting or conforming. When pressed too hard, their Commissary General for the Indies would disarmingly volunteer to order them all to surrender their posts and devote themselves to contemplation. This threat of a mass walk-out would lead to soothing words and backtracking cédulas. One such cédula sent in 1668 to the bishops in the northeast of New Spain reminded them that the regular clergy

> require neither appointment nor institution by the Bishop to administer the holy sacraments in the missions nor to do anything else which will contribute to the conversion of the unhappy Indians, nor for the instruction of converts (Bringas, [1796–1797]: 59–60).

Deep and unresolved internal divisions lay beneath the surface unity of the Church in Spanish society, fissures that in the colony of Florida would be exposed to view by acrimonious disputes over precedent or privilege. These disputes would pit the Franciscans against governors, against parish priests, against one another, and finally, against a roy-

ally appointed auxiliary bishop from their own order.

PACIFICATION

The fourth policy, pacification, grew out of the on-going debate about the rights of Indians, in particular the rights of the nomadic Chichimecas of New Spain's silver frontier. The Chichimecas appeared to have none of the characteristics of human reason and *civilitas*: cities, magistrates, rulers, laws, industry, commerce, or religion. Spaniards delegated them to the category of savages, which in the opinion of late 16th-century ethnographer José de Acosta included the Caribs, many tribes on the tributaries of the Amazon, and all the inhabitants of Florida (eastern North America) and Brazil (eastern South America) (Pagden, 1982: 67–79, 164).

Many, perhaps most, of the peoples on the "rim of Christendom" would have to be brought out of the jungles and deserts and reduced to "*pueblos en forma*," or towns possessing some kind of social order, before they could hope to live a Christian life. "Near men" roaming about "like wild beasts" should for their own good be confined and taught human ways (Rowe, 1964: 18; Bushnell, 1990b). But they could not be reduced without war, and the kind of war then being waged consigned them to civil slavery. It was "*guerra a fuego y a sangre*," "a war of fire and blood," without quarter, which meant that the lives of those captured were forfeit to their captors, to be dispatched, held for ransom, or sold as slaves.

In the opinion of the learned theologian Francisco de Vitoria, lecturing in 1540 on "the Affair of the Indies" at the University of Salamanca, the emperor could legitimately wage war on barbarous Indians if they were guilty of impeding the free commerce of nations, or if they prevented the preaching of the gospel, interfering with the free adoption of Christianity, or if their laws and leaders permitted "tyrannies" against the innocent, such as human sacrifice and cannibalism. Valid cause for war did not exist merely because the Indians were uncivilized *infieles* who lived in mortal sin, rejecting Christianity. As Pope Paul III had declared in 1537, Indians were "rational beings, capable of becoming Christians[,] and should neither be enslaved nor be deprived of their property." Neither faith nor fealty could be imposed by force (Van der Kroef, 1949: 133, 140; Tanzi, 1973: 95–97; Todorov, 1984: 149–150).

These principles of international law, enunciated at a time when conquistadors were still triumphing over empires, would inform Philip II's 1573 Ordinances of Pacification, which renounced wars of expansion, conquests by the sword, and the very word "conquest," transmuted in official discourse to "pacification." But what of the frontiers already in flames? On both the Chichimeca frontier of the far north and the Araucanian frontier of the far south, captains were purposely prolonging the wars in order to take and sell captives (Poole, 1965; Korth, 1968: 78–138).

Alonso de la Vera Cruz, a member of the "Salamanca School" that had formed around Vitoria, startled students at the new University of Mexico in the mid-1550s with a series of lectures in defense of Indian rights. A prophet crying in the wilderness, he created such an uproar that the king had to summon him back to Spain (Burrus, 1984: 535–539). A generation later, the Church in the Indies had come around to Vera Cruz's views. The Third Mexican Provincial Council of Bishops, meeting in 1585, roundly condemned both the war on the Chichimecas and the *españoles* who waged it (Poole, 1965).

To end the 40-year war, the Marqués de Villamanrique, viceroy of New Spain, and his successor, Luis de Velasco II, put into operation an enlightened policy of pacification that historian Philip Wayne Powell has dubbed "peace by purchase." Gifts attracted the nonsedentary people to "reductions" where they could be taught and tamed. By 1600 the northern frontier had done an aboutface. At government expense and under the eye of official Franciscan observers, captains of war, renamed "captains of peace," were handing out food, clothing, iron tools, oxen, reading primers, and even games to the Chichimecas (Powell, 1960).

There was little glory in the new humanitarianism, but it cost less than making war and it satisfied the king. The success of the policy of pacification by gifts discredited the military solution and virtually guaranteed that

missions would be the institution to advance the North American frontier. But where the Indians rejected missionaries and the sedentary life that Christianity called for, the frontier did not advance, and where the Gospel invitation was sweetened with gifts, gift-giving must continue. In the late 17th and the first half of the 18th century, the Spanish would learn hard lessons about the meaning of material goods to Eastern Woodland Indians.

CONQUEST BY CONTRACT

The fifth policy, that of conquest by contract, was yet another blend of international law, canon law, and trial and error. During the period of exploration, European powers often took possession of *terra nullius*, or lands unclaimed by any Christian monarch, with religious ceremonies and symbols alone. Planting crosses of stone or wood or carving a cross on a tree (Servín, 1957), they paid as little attention to native inhabitants as to forest creatures; in this discourse the intended recipients of the signs were not the watching Indians, but Europeans off the scene to whom the signifying acts would be reported.

Menéndez's "properly certified and recorded" act of possession-taking, according to historian Eugene Lyon, "validated the Spanish king's continental title, . . . granted through the donation of Pope Alexander VI." It "constituted the lands of North America as *tierras de realengo*" which the Spanish Crown or its representatives could either retain or alienate to third parties; "it was the semifeudal basis for the power of treaty making with the native peoples, in the name of a king who now suddenly owned, and could dispose of, the continent that they inhabited" (Lyon, 1990: 286).

Written treaties with the Indians served three purposes. They provided a European power with a back-up proof of claim to show to rivals; they gave ritual endorsement to amicable relations between two defined groups, one of Indians and the other of Europeans; and they satisfied the European need to put the native leadership under legal obligation.

Charles Gibson, in his 1977 presidential address to the American Historical Association, questioned whether the Spanish ever treated with Indians in the manner of the English, French, Dutch, or Portuguese. The network of formal agreements whereby Spaniards legitimated hegemony over foreign populations were not, he argued, formal agreements between equally sovereign entities, the only parties capable of treaty making; they were, instead, "*capitulaciones*," that is, contracts between unequals (Gibson, 1978: 1–8), the familiar arrangements of a patrimonial, hierarchical society that bound lord to vassal, patron to client, and God to man.

Yet in the 16th and 17th centuries, any effort on the part of Europeans to "*tratar y contratar*," or "treat and contract," with American natives seems to have had feudal overtones. The treaties that ensued were not understood, at least by Europeans, to be agreements between equals, nor were they meant to safeguard native sovereignty. In 1646, to give an example, the government of Virginia made a "treaty" with Necotowance, "King of the Indians," whereby his people ceded a large part of their territory to the English king, received a portion of it back with title derived from the Crown, and agreed to pay the English tribute (McCartney, 1989: 174–175).

The fundamental contract which a Spanish conquistador attempted to negotiate with caciques called for them to promise obedience to the king. In taking the oath of fealty a cacique proclaimed himself a vassal of the King of Spain and his own vassals Spanish subjects. To represent all such new subjects as under indoctrination was politically expedient, for Pope Alexander VI's bulls of donation had been a charter to evangelize, and, as Dominicans were fond of pointing out, Spain had no other title to the Indies. Therefore, the conquistador pressured the same cacique to acquiesce to Christianity and register a request for missionaries. The chief's promise of obedience to God committed him to become a Christian and committed his vassals to attend doctrina, learn the prayers and catechism, and be subject to the law of God.

Because a promise obtained by coercion was invalid, the Spanish showed a decent respect for free will, or at least for the formalities thereof. Every convert had to accept Christianity of his own volition and every vassal declare himself a vassal by choice—

legal precautions which Gibson termed "theoretical voluntarism" (1978: 11–13). Properly made, such promises were binding, enforceable obligations resembling a marriage vow or an army induction (McGarry, 1950: 355). The doctrina indio, vassal of a Christian cacique, was no longer free to do as he pleased. With the consent of his natural lord he had made solemn promises, and the Spanish stood ready to make him fulfill them.

The separate contracts which underlay and legitimated conquest were sealed by solemn ceremonies, each one marking a change of status. The act of homage—kissing the king's hand in the person of the governor's, a ceremony repeated yearly—followed the oath of fealty by which one became a vassal. Performing the act of submission, a rebel cacique threw himself at the governor's feet to beg for mercy and acknowledge his new status as someone whose vassals were now subject to forced labor. The act of baptism was a public acceptance of the yoke of the doctrine and the law of God, as well as, in many cases, a personal rite of passage. Treaties of trade or of peace were solemnized by the native calumet ceremony, which Europeans called "smoking the peace pipe," and reciprocal gifts. Homage, surrender, baptism, the calumet—all were acts in evidence of contract: the signatures of a preliterate society. Whatever record was being made by the attendant notary was not to validate the contract but to attest that it had been validated in his presence.

The notarized treaties of peace or trade that survive in the Florida *legajos*, the acts of homage or submission, records of mission foundings, declarations of just war, and lists of chiefs appearing before the governor to receive presents—all are the legal evidences of contracts which Spaniards called into existence and on occasion enforced. Those researchers who are obliged to rely on official archives learn to recognize the formulaic source for what it was: a paper trail designed to provide a particular official with an ironclad defense should higher authorities ever question his actions in office.

This kind of inquiry happened frequently, for each mission advance into new territory was followed sooner or later by a "secondary war," or uprising, which the Spanish then put down by force. The cacique who rose in rebellion committed a breach of contract for which he could be sent into exile, deposed from office, or stripped of his inherited privileges over lands and people. Those who followed his lead forfeited the status of Christians conquered by the gospel and entered the ranks of "nations" conquered by the sword, liable to forced labor. Whole towns could be relocated to serve this open-ended sentence. Whether or not a total war could be declared against Indians who had submitted and then rebelled was a matter of dispute (Tanzi, 1973: 118–120), but the fact that they were rebellious vassals was not.

One could be in a state of rebellion without committing acts of violence. Those who withdrew from the king's realms, singly or in a body, likewise repudiated the covenant, for the social contract as Spaniards understood it was irrevocable. Obedience once given could not be withdrawn. Although the missionaries sometimes sided with the rebels against the governor and appealed native grievances to the Crown, the Spanish system included no provision for secession. The Indian system did. Between 1680 and 1706, Indian commoners would secede from the provinces of Florida in overwhelming numbers, walking away and not coming back.

NOTES

1. The Georgia Bight is a large embayment on the Atlantic Coast between Cape Canaveral, Florida, and Cape Hatteras, North Carolina.

CHAPTER 3. ROYAL SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDIO

The word "*presidio*" comes from the Latin "*praesidium*," meaning "garrisoned place." The Romans extended it to apply to the imperial garrison assigned to preside over a particular military district. "Presidio" did not enter the Spanish language until early modern times. Used to refer to Spain's garrisons in Morocco, it took on connotations of a penal colony and a Christian enclave in heathen territory. The term crossed the Atlantic in the 1570s when small, Crown-supported military outposts appeared on the roads to the silver mines north of Mexico City. These New Spain presidios were an essentially defensive response to the Chichimeca War, which dragged on long after the conquest of the Aztec empire had run its course (Moorhead, 1975: 3–26).

Max L. Moorhead excluded the presidios of California and Florida from his study of *The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands*, not because they were less important than the presidios of the Southwest to their respective regions, but because, situated on seacoasts, they answered a different purpose and had a different pattern of development (Moorhead, 1975: xiv-xv). Unlike either the 16th-century presidios of northern New Spain or the 18th-century presidios of the "Provincias Internas," the Florida presidio was large, centralized, and unmistakably maritime. It originated as a detachment of "*gente de mar*" and "*gente de guerra*" from an armada of anti-corsairs, and it functioned as a coastguard station. St. Augustine faced the sea.

That the Crown would be investing heavily in the colony was foreseeable in 1565, when Philip II became an active partner in "the enterprise of Florida" (Lyon, 1976). This chapter is about that early involvement and about the gradual institutionalization of royal support that followed. The situado for the presidio is described and the nonmilitary situado funds are introduced. Chapters 4, 6, 7, and 9 expand on the nonmilitary situado funds, respectively discussing royal support for missionaries, for doctrinas, for religion in St. Augustine, and for caciques. The institutions which marshalled native labor in support of the convents and presidio are presented in Chapters 10 and 11.

THE ADELANTAMIENTO

When he accepted the adelantamiento of Florida, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés hoped to replicate in the New World his homeland of Asturias, to become as wealthy and have as much *señorío* as the marquis Hernán Cortés, and to reward his followers with the rights of conquerors and *primeros pobladores*, or first settlers: tax exemptions, native tribute, and native labor (Lyon, 1990: 283–284). What the king expected of his champion was written in the contract. In three years' time the Adelantado was charged: (1) to explore the coast of Florida from the Bay of St. Joseph on the Gulf around the Keys and up to Newfoundland; (2) to expel from that coast any "corsair settlers" or "other nations not subject to His Majesty;" (3) to settle the land, recruiting 500 "religiously clean" male settlers, 200 of them married, to build and populate two or three fortified towns; (4) to introduce four members of the Society of Jesus to begin the preaching of the Gospel, "in order that the Indians might be converted to our Holy Catholic faith and to the obedience of His Majesty"; (5) to introduce 100 horses, 200 calves, 400 hogs, 400 sheep, and other livestock; and (6) to introduce up to 500 African slaves to build the towns, cultivate the lands, and produce sugar (Lyon, 1976: 213–215).

The first and most pressing order of business was to rid Florida of the French colony under René de Laudonnière, for the settlers at Fort Caroline were due to be reinforced by a fleet under Jean Ribault. The French had planted themselves at the mouth of the St. Johns River, beside the fast-moving northward-flowing Gulf Stream. With his main fleet, which had gathered in the port of Cádiz, Menéndez raced across the Atlantic to a Puerto Rican rendezvous. From there, without waiting for the fleet from northern Spain, he made his way through the Bahamas to the

Florida coast. The French fleet under Ribault had preceded him and lay at anchor in the mouth of the St. Johns River. After falling back to secure his ships and fortify a port 40 miles to the south, Menéndez marched north through a storm to destroy Fort Caroline. The same storm drove Ribault's ships south and ran them aground near Cape Canaveral. Acting, in his own words, "as a good captain should," the Adelantado massacred two batches of French castaways as they came up the coast toward the Spanish camp. Later, near Cape Canaveral, he captured another group of castaways and sent them to the galleys. In two months's time, Florida had been virtually cleared of intruders.

Aware that he had made history, Menéndez declared four feastdays of commemoration: St. Augustine's Day, for when he had first sighted the coast; Our Lady's Day, September 8th, for the first Mass, celebrated at his landing place near St. Augustine—a spot also marked by the first Indian mission, Nombre de Dios; St. Matthew's Day, for when he captured Fort Caroline; and All Saints' Day, for his memorable victory at Cape Canaveral (Lyon, 1990: 287).

Reinforcements arrived: first the rest of his fleet, then a second fleet under Admiral Sancho de Archiniegas. The Adelantado clinched his victories by placing a fort and a garrison at every deep water harbor from Tocobaga (Tampa Bay) to Orista (Port Royal), each one an intrusion into Indian territory. Several French castaways had sought refuge with the Indians of Guale, who hoped to use them in their war with the Oristas. Menéndez sailed northward, partly to lay hands on these remaining corsairs, partly to establish northern outposts. Before he arrived, 15 of the Frenchmen had built a crude boat and set sail for the fisheries of Newfoundland. One young Frenchman who remained behind met the Adelantado at the landing place to reason with him that as "Guale" was a cognate of "Gallia," this made the region French. Gallic logic did not prevail. Seeing how the wind lay, the Guales surrendered the youth and his



Fig. 3.1. The forts of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés's short-lived Greater Florida, 1565–1568.

companions to the more powerful Spanish. At that time, according to ethnohistorian Grant D. Jones, the principal town of the chief of Guale was either on the inland waterway on Skidaway Island or on Ossabaw Island along the Bear River (Jones, 1978: 203).

It was essential to keep the French from reestablishing themselves next to the Gulf Stream, exit route for the convoyed Fleet of the Indies, which each year carried silver and other vital products of Mexico, Central America, Peru, and the Caribbean to Spain. Between 1565 and 1568 the Crown invested around 200,000 ducats—virtually the whole defense budget for the Indies—in the Florida enterprise, over and above the 75,000 ducats of private funds that Menéndez and his associates invested (Lyon, 1976: 183). By Paul E. Hoffman's calculations, before 1586, in years without special alarms, Florida absorbed over 70 percent of the Crown's land defense budget for the Caribbean—nine times as much as was spent on Havana, its nearest competitor (Hoffman, 1973: 416).

Too politically weak at home to resume the wars with Spain, the French Queen Mother Catherine de Medici, Philip II's mother-in-law, responded to the disaster with covert operations. Far from claiming to have rid Florida of the French, Menéndez reported that corsairs were constantly among the Indians, encouraging resistance and triggering assaults. The laws of Lutherans and the customs of Indians were much alike, he explained. The natives preferred heretics, for they let them live in liberty (Menéndez de Avilés, [1565]: 130; 1571: 432–443). Whatever cold courtesies Philip II was paying to his wife and her mother in Europe, in the Indies, France and Spain were at war.

Menéndez's contract also charged him to establish Spanish sovereignty over the Indians: reduce them to obedience (Lyon, 1990: 285). As he travelled from port to port positioning his garrisons, he drew the chiefs into "*amistades*," or "friendships," for the purposes of trade and mutual defense. In southern Florida he feigned to accept a native consort, sister of the paramount chief of the Calusas (Reilly, 1981). As James Merrell has pointed out, the exchange of people, like the exchange of goods, was an established means of confirming trust and friendship in the Southeast. Women were given in marriage and children in adoption; hostages in the guise of family, they enlarged the kinship web (Merrell, 1989: 198–203).

The garrison of 30 men that the Adelantado left in Guale was probably on St. Catherines, home of the chief of Guale. There Menéndez met with a large delegation of caciques to make peace between Guale and Orista. The chief of Guale allowed the Spaniards to erect a cross and showed a polite interest in Christian magic and spells, while Menéndez, as "*Mico Santamaría*," gained local influence as a rainmaker (Solís de Merás, [1567]: 164–176; Ross, 1930: 270; Lanning, 1935: 38–41; Lyon, 1984: 9).[1]

From Santa Elena, established in 1566 on Parris Island in Orista territory, not far from the site of an ill-fated early French fort, Menéndez sent parties of explorers into the interior. Twice, Captain Juan Pardo led expeditions through parts of present-day South Carolina and North Carolina, across Georgia, and into Alabama, laying a line of inland forts across Greater Florida with the object of opening a road to the silver mines of Zacatecas, a task that Viceroy Luis de Velasco I had once laid on the luckless adelantado Tristán de Luna y Arellano. Pardo's expeditions looked more promising. Sergeant Hernando Moyano (or Boyano) stayed behind at the fort of Joara, sallying forth from time to time to answer the challenges of caciques. One of them drew him out by threatening to kill and eat his dog. Chaplain Sebastián Montero remained in a place called Guatari to begin conversions (Ross, 1930; Gannon, 1965b; DePratter et al., 1983).

But Menéndez's forts in the interior did not survive, probably because the natives did not continue to provision them (Hudson, 1990: 46, 176). Europeans on expedition in America expected to obtain their food by means of barter and carried stores of trade goods for that purpose as a matter of course. Governor Gonzalo Méndez Canzo informed the Crown in 1602 that an expedition to the interior should take iron axes and hoes, knives, beads, and mirrors to exchange for food. He himself had sent two such expeditions to the interior region of Tama in the late 1590s (Méndez Canzo, 1602).



Fig. 3.2. Southeastern Indian groups around 1565. (After Thomas, 1990b: fig. 24.1; courtesy of the Smithsonian Institution Press.)

Most Southeastern Indians, however, were part-time agriculturalists, supplementing the domestic harvest with the harvest available in the wild. They cleared, planted, cultivated, and guarded fields that were moderate in size, from which they gathered, dried, and stored a modest surplus of maize and beans. They saw no reason to exhaust these stores in order to feed grown men who lay in the shade like deer at planting time. The "subjects" of "King Outina" had mocked Laudonnière's soldiers who were trying to trade their shirts for fish, telling them that if what they had was so valuable, they should eat it (Laudonnière, 1586: 124).

One after another, each of Menéndez's small garrisons faced the consequences of its raids on local food supplies. The natives in the interior closed down Pardo's forts, killing or driving off the defenders and with them, no doubt, Chaplain Montero (Gannon, 1965b: 351–353). On the east coast, the Ais assaulted the fort at Ponce de Leon inlet south of St. Augustine. The Potanos of central Florida wiped out a troop of 30 Spaniards. The Saturibas and the Tacatacurus, another eastern Timucuan tribe, enlisted the aid of French corsair Dominique de Gourgues to capture Fort San Mateo (the rebuilt Fort Caroline) and two outlying blockhouses. On the west coast, the Tocobagas slaughtered the garrison at Tampa Bay (Lyon, 1990: 290). In southern Florida, the Calusas drove their unwelcome guests from Charlotte Harbor; the Tequestas

did the same at Biscayne Bay. The Indians whom Menéndez had promised to bring to obedience and use as allies in the struggle against the French had instead become his enemies.

Under the circumstances, the king's charge to convert the Indians was unfulfillable, but Menéndez was determined to honor every clause in his contract. The Society of Jesus had agreed to send six fathers with the relief armada that sailed to Florida under Sancho de Archiniegas in 1566, and the king had given his approval, ordering the *Casa de Contratación* (House of Trade) in Seville to cover the Jesuits' travel costs, on the grounds that the "*religiosos*" were going to Florida "to preach the Gospel and promulgate the evangelical law and root out the tares sown by French corsairs" (Spanish Crown, 1566; Matter, 1990: 27). They would not be the first Jesuit mission to America—others of their order were at work in Brazil—but they would be the first ones in Spanish America.

The mission to Florida was plagued by mishaps from the start. Unready to leave by the sailing date of the Archiniegas fleet, Father Pedro Martínez, Father Juan Rogel, and Brother Francisco Villareal got to Havana on their own and arranged to be taken to St. Augustine. The captain of their vessel missed the port and fetched up at Cumberland Island. Blown out to sea in a storm, he returned to Havana, leaving Father Martínez ashore with a reconnaissance party. Martínez managed to reach Fort George Island, in the mouth of the St. Johns River, where the Tacatucurus dispatched him, producing the New World's first Jesuit martyr. In 1567 Menéndez escorted Rogel and Villareal from Havana to his garrisons among the Calusas and Tequestas, from whom Pedro Menéndez Márquez, the Adelantado's nephew, soon had to rescue them (Matter, 1990: 27–28).

It had become clear to the Jesuits that the presence of soldiers contravened conversions. Father Juan Bautista de Segura, superior of the next band of Jesuits, sidestepped the problem by establishing a college in Havana for the sons of caciques. At Father Rogel's recommendation, however, a lay brother named Báez and a boy catechist were sent north to establish a presence among the "better disposed" Indians of Orista and Guale (Segura, 1568; Matter, 1990: 28–29). Rogel assured Francis Borgia, General of the Society of Jesus, that the Guales were

> good workers, tillers of the soil. There are twenty-three friendly chieftains there and it would be easy to preach to them for almost all the Spaniards living there know the language. This language is the most widely spoken in Florida. A soldier who knows it, told me that when he was two hundred leagues inland he understood and was understood upon speaking it. These Indians have another good quality. They are inquisitive and want to know the reason for everything we tell them. They already know much about our holy religion and are very devoted to the cross. I am sure they would make excellent Christians, were it not for the bad example our countrymen give them (Rogel, 1568: 85).

In October and November 1567, Philip II appointed don Pedro Menéndez de Avilés to two new offices: the governorship of Cuba, to be exercised through a lieutenant like that of Florida, and the captaincy general of a new Armada of the Indies. The three positions were mutually reinforcing. Menéndez could now supply his ships and outposts with Cuban provisions and charge his soldiers' wages against the armada. The process of rationalizing royal support had taken a step forward. The king further rewarded his champion with the rents of Santa Cruz de la Zarza, a property of the military order of Santiago to which Menéndez belonged, and renewed his three-year contract (Lyon, 1976: 16, note 36, 187–194; Hoffman, 1980: 145; Schwaller, 1988: 298–301).

His services validated, the Adelantado renewed his requests to Jesuit General Borgia for an apostolic mission of 12 "religious" to begin large-scale conversions, promising:

> The soldiery will open the door by pacts of friendship with the chieftains, so that they may enter to preach the Gospel. Those Indians who embrace Christianity and those who do not shall remain in our friendship and all will be done according to Our Divine Lord's command (Menéndez de Avilés, 1568).

Notwithstanding the confident tone of this letter, the next year saw what Lyon calls "a general crisis in Menéndez's finances." The Adelantado forced the Crown to face the is-

sue of funding by evacuating from his remaining outposts all troops beyond the 150 on the royal payroll. Four councils—State, Indies, Finance, and War—were convoked to address the Florida problem (Lyon, 1984: 5; 1990: 291).

Pleading his case in Madrid, Menéndez found himself opposed at court by the highest officials of the Jesuit Order. To the best of their knowledge—and they were surprisingly well informed—the conversion of Florida was going poorly. Two of the three students in the first class at the college in Havana for the sons of Florida chiefs had died. Father Superior Segura, abandoning the long-view plan of educating the elites, had reunited the Jesuits in Cuba with those on the mainland. South of San Mateo all the Indians seemed to be up in arms, including those around St. Augustine, so he had distributed his forces farther north, assigning a lay brother named Carrera to Santa Elena, Father Rogel to Orista, and himself to Guale, with Brother Villareal (Sedeño, 1572a; Matter, 1990: 29).

Again, their combined efforts had met with small success. From Guale, Segura had written to General Borgia: "The health and strength of Ours is failing here, with little benefit to the souls of the natives." Their efforts, he suggested, might be better spent in a mission field that offered greater returns, such as the Philippines. The governor wanted to keep them on in Florida "to serve as chaplains"[2] in the "three or four forts which remain to him on these coasts," for, in Segura's worldly wise opinion, even though Menéndez was unable to "proceed with the conquest as he should," he was still "very anxious to retain his office" and not be "deprived of all governorship." Segura had learned in Puerto Rico from the superior of a Dominican monastery that, contrary to what the Adelantado had told the Jesuits in Seville, the Jesuit Order was not his first choice. The enterprise of Florida had been launched with six Dominicans, all of whom had subsequently returned to Spain. The Adelantado had taken measures to keep the Jesuits from doing the same thing in his absence. Several sloop captains had confided to Segura that they had been expressly forbidden to transport any of the "*teatinos*" from Santa Elena, under pain of being hanged from their own yardarms. Laymen frequently confused the Jesuits with the Theatines, another order founded to combat Lutheranism (Segura, 1569: 109–110; Auto, 1573: 38, 66, 68).

Outmaneuvered politically, Menéndez issued an order guaranteeing freedom of movement to the Jesuits in Florida, and once more the Crown came to the rescue of its strategic colony. In October 1570, royal orders created a permanent annual situado for the support and munitioning of 150 Florida soldiers. Menéndez, his financial problems eased, was already back in Santa Elena to prepare for the arrival of his wife and household. With him he had brought three additional Jesuits and a young Indian called don Luis de Velasco, scion of a ruling family, who wanted to return to his homeland of Axacán on the Chesapeake Bay. Father Superior Segura, now free to go where he saw fit, set off for Axacán in November 1570, at the head of a mission of five Jesuits and four catechists, with don Luis to translate. Returned to familiar surroundings, the convert apostatized. By the 8th of February the Powhatan Confederacy had wiped out the mission, sparing only the catechist Alonso de Olmos to be rescued by Menéndez and Rogel in 1572 (Vargas Ugarte and Owen, 1935: 64–68; Lyon, 1984: 5).

Santa Elena figured in the Adelantado's plans as a port for Greater Florida. The king had promised him lands in support of a marquisate, and the new *marqués* meant to lay out those lands near the rich town of Guatari. The new *marquesa*, doña María de Solís, with her ladies and attendants, travelled by easy stages from Asturias to Santa Elena, where she would reside until the estate was ready to occupy. This injection of "noble blood," reinforcing the upper end of the social hierarchy, revealed Menéndez's intention to reproduce in America the social gulf that existed in Spain between the upper order of hidalgos and the lower order of soldiers and farmer-settlers—or, some would say, the social gulf between the controlling classes and the laboring classes (Lyon, 1984; South, 1990). Reassured that with royal backing the colony would be permanent, and trusting in the tolerance of the Guales and their neighbors, Spanish settlers arrived in Santa Elena and commenced to farm the land around Fort San Felipe.

As Spanish attention shifted to northern Florida, the natives of Guale, between the mouth of the St. Johns and Santa Elena, found themselves on a well-travelled route and asked themselves what advantage could be gained from it. South of St. Augustine, the coastal peoples were consistently unfriendly and hostile incidents multiplied. These culminated in the winter of 1570–1571, when the Adelantado, Father Superior Antonio Sedeño, and 15 or 16 companions on their way to Havana were shipwrecked off Cape Canaveral and barely escaped death at the hands of the Ais Indians (Sedeño, 1572b). When Menéndez reached Madrid, he caused depositions to be taken

> on the great injuries and the deaths caused by certain Indians of the coast of Florida, in virtue whereof it was fitting that they be declared slaves, whereby he could continue the conquest and settlement of that province (Auto, 1573).

What he wanted was a license to take slaves in a "just war" and sell them to the islands to cover the expenses of conquest and settlement. His petition took a year and a half to come before the Consejo de Indias and then was denied (Lyon, 1990: 291). By that time, the king's champion was in Spain again, summoned to build an armada.

Father Superior Sedeño took advantage of the Adelantado's absence to close the Jesuit mission to Orista and Guale. At the time he was shipwrecked with Menéndez at Cape Canaveral, Sedeño had been on his way to Havana to recuperate from a long and debilitating fever that was his personal portion of the epidemic that swept like a firestorm through Santa Elena and the native communities in 1569 and 1570. Although the hardships of the journey on top of his illness left him with chronic asthma, Sedeño went on to become the first missionary of the Society of Jesus in Mexico and one of the first four Jesuits assigned to convert "the Indians of King Philip" in the Philippines (Sedeño, 1572b; Costa, 1967: 7–8; Thomas, 1990b: 373).

The first Franciscans to come to Menéndez's Florida,[3] a mission of two priests and a lay brother, arrived late in 1573, conducted by Fray Alonso de Reinoso. They took up residence in Santa Elena and St. Augustine and ministered mainly to the spiritual needs of Spaniards (Matter, 1990: 39). Evangelism took the form of itinerant preaching, the time-honored "flying mission." According to treasury official Bartolomé Martínez, who many years later offered a written testimony about the early missions, Fray Diego Moreno, a famous preacher, Fray Juan Codero, and Fray Juan went to visit Guale and Tolomato in 1575. At the time, explained Martínez, the *mico* of Tolomato, who was the supreme ruler and who had his seat on the mainland, was old and feeble, and his son-in-law the cacique of Guale, "the next in importance," was the actual ruler (Martínez, 1610: 137).

Indoctrination proceeded rapidly. The priests of Saint Francis found that by "just touching a little bell" they could draw "a great crowd of men, women and children." They converted the cacique of Guale and his wife and baptized them in Santa Elena, with Lieutenant Governor Diego de Velasco and his wife as benevolent sponsors. Martínez had no illusions about the Guales' motives.

> The chief was named Don Diego de Valdez [sic] after the General, and his wife was named Doña María Menéndez after the General's wife, Governor Pedro Menéndez's daughter. These were their godparents and paid for the greater part if not all of the presents which the illustrious gentlemen gave the Indians that they might become Christians (Martínez, 1610: 137).

Just days before the rejoicing that marked this occasion, Pedro Menéndez died of a sudden illness at the shipyards of Santander (Velasco, 1575: 142). The pious reader would not fail to connect the new conversions with the Adelantado's removal to heaven to plead in person for the souls in Florida.

Exactly when the town of the chief of Guale took the Christian name of Santa Catalina is unclear, but it did not have a resident missionary then or for some time to come. Soon after these elite baptisms, Velasco and Moreno had a falling out, reportedly over the lieutenant governor's highhanded treatment of the new Christians. When the three Franciscans learned that their patron was dead, they decided to leave. Velasco refused to give them travel clearance. Defying him, they embarked in a small vessel bound for Vera Cruz,

in the fall of 1575, and were lost at sea (Lyon, 1984: 9).

Putting a safer distance between themselves and Spaniards, the Guales moved the town of Guale southward. Its location in 1576, 20 leagues south of Santa Elena, places it on the island that would later be called St. Catherines (Jones, 1978: 203). The Guales had observed the divisions in Spanish ranks and were deeply divided over the attitude they should take toward them. One after another, all their European friends had manifested weakness and forsaken them, first the French, then the Theatines, then the Franciscans, leaving them without protection from Spanish cupidity. Dissatisfaction was growing in the towns along the inland waterway. It would no longer be wise to take Guale friendship for granted.

THE SITUADO SOLUTION

Before Menéndez ever set foot in Florida, Philip II already had a larger stake in the conquest and settlement of Greater Florida than either he or his champion had ever intended, and step by step, necessity continued to change the character of the original proprietorship. In just six years, Florida would make the transition from a privately financed and privately governed adelantamiento to a Crown colony, subsidized by royal revenues and governed by royal appointees. Adelantado Juan de Oñate's settlement in New Mexico would undergo much the same transformation between 1595 and 1609 (Scholes, 1930: 93; Kessell, 1987: 65–99).

Agreeing to subsidize the Florida presidio was one thing; finding a source of funds for the subsidy was another. For 30 years, from 1565 to 1595, the royal patron experimented with various financial arrangements. The original three-year contract with Menéndez, as the king ordered it rewritten following the news of a French settlement, had allowed the Adelantado, on top of the trade concessions already negotiated, a one-time expense grant of 15,000 ducats and a payroll for 300 soldiers. When the contract and the concessions were renewed in 1568, the king agreed to a garrison of 150 men to be paid out of the royal subvention for Menéndez's Armada of the Indies, funded by the treasuries of Tierra Firme and New Spain in equal parts. Two years later, the Florida situado was separated from that of the armada and a second situado was instituted for Havana. In 1573, when the Tierra Firme treasury split in two to form the treasuries of Nombre de Dios and Panama, the king reassigned the Florida subvention to the treasury of Vera Cruz, official port of the viceroyalty of New Spain (Spanish Crown, 1574a; 1574b; Hoffman, 1980: 127, 139–146).

Another important step toward the rationalizing of Florida finances was taken in 1571 when Philip II first issued permanent, proprietary titles to the officials charged with administering royal funds in the colony, in place of the transient titles good only for the duration of an entrada or an armada voyage. The appointing of a *factor y veedor* (factor-overseer), a *contador* (accountant), and a *tesorero* (treasurer) created an official branch of the royal treasury in Florida. The fact that they held office for life, while governors came and went, was only one of the checks and balances built into the royal bureaucracy (Bushnell, 1981: 3–7, 30–62, 101–117, 121, 143–148).

The outbreak of the Anglo-Spanish War in 1585 disturbed shipping and reduced port incomes to the point that Vera Cruz could no longer meet its subsidy commitments, and in 1592, Philip II instructed the central treasury of the viceroyalty in Mexico City to cover the deficits. In 1594, as ordered, the Mexico City treasury–the viceregal one–paid the arrears for 1592 and 1593, and the next year was made fully responsible for the Florida subvention. This, it continued to pay after the war ended in 1597, charging it either to "extraordinary" or to "military" expenditures as it did the subsidies for the rest of the Caribbean and the Philippines (Spanish Crown, 1592; Hoffman, 1973: 419; Sluiter, 1985: 3–8).

Between 1621 and 1648, while Spain was at war with most of northern Europe, the Dutch West India Company posed the greatest threat to Spanish shipping and to the regular delivery of subventions and supplies. By 1640, New Spain's royal treasuries were spending a third or more of their combined revenues on defense. Even before France and Spain made peace in 1659, England returned

TABLE 3.1
Florida Situado Payments from Spanish Treasuries, 1571–1616
In pesos of 8 reales (adapted from Sluiter, 1985)

Year	Situado
1571	16,544
1572	–
1573	11,415
1574	66,585
1575	38,862
1576	23,383
1577	28,176
1578	no data
1579	32,312
1580	46,276
1581	80,365
1582	65,914
1583	65,860
1584	no data
1585	no data
1586	no data
1587	no data
1588	127,927
1589	–
1590	22,000
1591	100,152
1592	60,326
1593	–
1594	142,874
1595	65,859
1596	73,798
1597	22,000
1598	114,420
1599	22,000
1600	30,000
1601	70,000
1602	65,859
1603	61,937
1604	40,550
1605	45,000
1606	60,264
1607	67,595
1608	64,264
1609	52,070
1610	59,442
1611	61,432
1612	64,199
1613	64,976
1614	62,170
1615	64,897
1616	64,621

to the offensive, seizing Jamaica and laying plans for an east coast colony below Virginia. The French followed suit with intrusions into the Gulf in the 1680s, and buccaneers of every nationality infested Spanish waters. By the late 17th century, the viceroy of New Spain spent more of the royal funds on defense annually than he remitted to Spain (Hoffman, 1973: 419; Sluiter, 1985: 4, 7; Burkholder and Johnson, 1994: 150).

The subvention for the presidio and provinces of Florida continued to be a drain on the Mexico City treasury until 1702. In that year, momentous for Colonel James Moore's siege of St. Augustine and destruction of the Guale missions on Amelia Island, the Florida situado was moved again. This time, it became a charge against the *alcabalas*, or sales taxes, of the city of Puebla de los Angeles, a revenue worth 140,000 pesos a year which the bishop of Puebla as a faithful civil servant collected for the Crown (Gillaspie, 1961: 75–76).

The situado was not a single fund, but the sum of several. Instructions to the officials of Tierra Firme in 1571 mentioned four: rations, wages, munitions, and bonuses. At the time, rationing 150 men cost 18,336 ducats (a ducat being 375 *maravedís* in units of account, and 11 *reales* in silver). Paying the same 150 men wages of 1 ducat per month cost another 1800 ducats. Between rations and wages, each *plaza*, or billet in the garrison, was worth 134¼ ducats a year, or, in the common currency of "*pesos de a ocho*" (pesos of 8 reales), 184½ pesos. The fund for powder and ammunition was another 1800 ducats, while the "troop commodities" bonus fund, which permitted some wage differentiation, was 1500 ducats. Together, the four funds totalled 8,788,735 maravedís, which equalled 23,436 ducats or 32,224 pesos (Spanish Crown, 1571).

In 1577, when the Crown called on Pedro Menéndez Márquez to go as governor to Florida and retake Santa Elena from the Indians, the king doubled the size of the garrison, bringing it back to the 300-man level, but increased the situado by only 4 million maravedís. This shortage was corrected in 1579, when the increase was changed to 9,125,000 maravedís, making the situado 47,770 ducats or 65,859 pesos (Consejo de

Indias, 1579; Cebadilla and Sánchez de Mercado, 1580).

Although Philip III sent orders in the early 1600s to discharge half of the garrison, this raised such an outcry of protest from Governor Pedro de Ybarra, the floridanos, and the friars that the budget cut was rescinded (Ybarra, 1606, 1608; Menéndez Márquez, 1608). For 90 years the regular situado for a full 300 plazas did not significantly vary. At midcentury, when Pedro Beltrán de Santa Cruz audited the Florida accounts, it stood at 65,123 pesos (Santa Cruz, 1655).

The amounts disbursed by the treasuries to satisfy this obligation were not as constant as the obligation itself. Intervals between disbursements were irregular. Sometimes the situado was calculated on the basis of authorized strength and sometimes on actual. Even had the sums been steady and the intervals even, the situado would still have faced the hazards of transportation. Storms caused losses of specie and supplies that could not always be replaced immediately. Pirates and privateers might pick off a supply ship en route, bringing further losses and delays. When, for example, Dutch admiral Piet Heyn captured Spain's entire treasure fleet in the Cuban harbor of Matanzas in 1628, the Florida situado was part of his prize. The Crown itself, under the financial stress of the wars that the Spanish Hapsburgs waged in Europe between 1621 and 1659, was apt to cancel all or part of the Caribbean situados or to sequester them en route to the presidios, as General Carlos de Ibarra was ordered to do in 1638 (Bushnell, 1981: 9–10, 63–74, 83, 128–130).

Within the regular situado for Florida, funds rose, fell, and replaced one another without affecting the total. Over and above the regular situado, various other funds appeared. Some of these were short-term subventions for a special purpose. Others were authorized supplements or reimbursements for situado funds that were overdrawn. Still others achieved permanence and even independence, becoming secondary situados.

In 1595, to take an example, Philip II ordered the Mexico City treasury to advance 10,000 ducats to Florida to construct a stone fort during a period of exceptional threat from English corsairs. The loan was duly made and paid back over the next 10 years by deductions of 1000 ducats a year from the situado (Sluiter, 1985: 5); yet no stone fort materialized. By the time the money arrived, the corsair threat had diminished and greater needs had arisen. Governor Méndez Canzo used the 10,000 ducats to rebuild the presidio, which had suffered a flood and a fire, and to reestablish Spanish presence in Mocamo and Guale after the 1597 Guale rebellion. Chapters 7 and 18 deal with a number of other royal allocations for religious buildings and defensive walls, and Chapters 13 through 16 with the extensive royal investment between 1670 and 1695 that underwrote the building of the Castillo de San Marcos.

Over time, an inflationary rise in the cost of provisions shrank the buying power of a soldier's sueldo, yet no cost-of-living adjustments were forthcoming. On the contrary, sometime before 1583 the amount of a plaza fell from 134¼ ducats to 115 ducats (158¼ pesos), where it remained fixed for 140 years (Spanish Crown, 1673; Escribanía de Cámara, 1689; Cardoso, [1701?]; Benavides, 1723; Geiger, 1937: 46, 51–52; Matter, 1990: 85, 93, note 75). In the view of most authorities, a soldier was a member of the lower orders who had responded to the recruiter's drum in order to pursue a life of indolence and petty crime. It was a charity to pay him anything. A presidial soldier on the 16th-century Chichimeca frontier, by comparison, was paid from 300 to 450 pesos—two or three times the Florida sueldo—but that soldier was expected to own and maintain a string of mounts (Moorhead, 1975: 14).

In 1577 the Crown gave governor-elect Pedro Menéndez Márquez permission to reserve a portion of the Florida situado for administrative costs: 2600 ducats to pay in cash one half of his and the three treasury officials' salaries, leaving them to collect the other halves from the "fruits of the land." Inasmuch as royal revenues were minimal, Menéndez Márquez soon got the Crown to authorize an increase of 1000 ducats in the salary fund so that he, at least, could draw his entire salary in cash. When the office of factor-overseer was suppressed in 1628, the salary fund fell by 533 ducats, or half of a treasury official's salary, to 3067 ducats (Bushnell, 1981: 65–66).

The "*gasto de indios*," or "Indian expense," made its appearance in 1593. The Crown recognized it as an unavoidable expense in 1615, with instructions—consistently ignored—to keep it under 1500 ducats a year (Bushnell, 1981: 66). The Indian fund became supplementary to the regular situado in 1616. Its development and uses are discussed in Chapter 9.

The king's alms to Franciscans provided each of them with the bare subsistence of a soldier's plaza. While this may have satisfied a mendicant's longings for simplicity, humility, and identification with the working poor, it did not cover the cost of his specialized clothing, the livery of a Christian soldier. By 1600 a small "habit and footwear" fund had appeared, which in 1616 also became supplementary to the situado. What this fund covered is discussed in Chapter 4.

Another small supplement was authorized in 1617: the "*mermas*" subsidy, which reimbursed the Florida treasury for loss and spoilage of provisions in transit and in storage to prevent such costs from being passed on to the soldiers and friars (Bushnell, 1981: 73–74; Sluiter, 1985: 6).

Don Pablo de Hita Salazar, former governor of both Florida and Vera Cruz, did not count the mermas in the list he made in the early 1680s of Florida's situado funds and supplements. They were, as he remembered them, the 1500-ducat bonus fund, the subsidy for the friars, the allotment for administrative salaries, the 1500-ducat Indian allowance, and the 350 plazas (Hita Salazar, [1683?]).

Changes in the method of calculating what was owed to the presidio for plazas made a substantial difference in the amount of money received. As the Mexico City treasury first figured its obligation, Florida was paid according to the person/months served, which due to attrition and absenteeism was always below the authorized strength, or *dotación*, of the garrison. Sometime before 1621, probably in 1616, the Crown ordered the full amount for authorized plazas paid every year whether the plazas were filled or not (Sluiter, 1985: 6–7), thereby providing the presidio with a cushion for unexpected expenses. The Crown allocated such funds, known as the "*sobras*" or "*vacancias*," as it thought best: to defenses in 1655, to pensions 20 years later, to defenses again in 1687, and once the viceroy of New Spain was instructed to send the surplus of the 1694 subsidy to Spain. It amounted to a third of the sum earmarked for plazas (Bushnell, 1981: 67–68). The problem of authorized versus effective strength in the Florida garrison, examined in detail by Luis R. Arana for the period of 1671 to 1702 (1960: 16–30), continued throughout the colony's history.

For close to a century the Florida manpower quota stood at 300, with more and more plazas held by "*inefectivos*": widows, minors, pensioners, and friars. The garrison's effective strength was further reduced by the excessive numbers of reformado officers receiving the pay of a soldier but exempted from standing guard. Pedro Benedit Horruytiner, elected governor by his fellow officers in the hectic atmosphere of a plague year, handed out 55 such officers' patents, including 23 for captain (Bushnell, 1981: 103–104).

After a pirate raid in 1668 exposed the weakness of the garrison, the Crown trimmed the numbers of inefectivos and reformados and increased the dotación. Between them, Queen Regent Mariana and her son Charles II added 50 plazas in 1669, took the 43 friars off the military payroll and enrolled them on the religious one in 1673 (Spanish Crown, 1677), and added 5 more soldiers' plazas in 1687, bringing the authorized strength of the presidio garrison up to 355.[4] The military situado reflected these changes: it rose by 6325 ducats, representing 55 plazas of 115 ducats each. According to Florida governor Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda (1701d), the regular situado in 1701 was roughly 70,000 pesos (50,900 ducats). The parish priest figured the total situado at closer to 80,000 pesos (Leturiondo, [1700]: 199).

In 1702, when the Spanish Hapsburg dynasty had come to an end and the Florida provinces were threatening to, Governor Zúñiga pleaded with Philip V to augment the presidio by another 100 soldiers. The king's royal forebears had maintained these conversions for well over a century, wrote the governor; surely he too would defend them (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702b). The dotación did shoot up sharply once again, but not until the late 1730s, and then not to protect mission

TABLE 3.2
Florida Situado Payments from Spanish Treasuries, 1617-1652
In pesos of 8 reales (adapted from Sluiter, 1985)

Year	Regular situado	Indian fund	Religioso fund	Mermas	Total
1617	63,026	5493	1126	—	69,825
1618	61,722	1790	885	966	65,363
1619	62,749	[4911]	[1965]	[917][a]	70,542
1620	64,278	[2530]	[1012]	855	68,675
1621	62,947	1967	1085	1048	67,047
1622	65,859	1840	783	1056	69,538
1623	62,222	3499	891	601	67,213
1624	65,783	3042	921	—	69,746
1625	51,859	4703	975	1144	58,681
1626	65,859	4371	718	1112	72,060
1627	65,859	4391	699	610	71,559
1628	65,859	4428	690	1040	72,017
1629	65,859	3113	953	2820	72,745[b]
1630	33,157	1943	1664	1308	38,072[c]
1631	98,561	2730	—	806	102,107
1632	64,389	2346	918	1917	69,570
1633	no data				
1634	no data				
1635	74,409	—	—	—	74,409
1636	64,389	1692	—	591	66,672[d]
1637	—	—	—	—	—
1638	65,124	—	—	—	65,124
1639	30,000	1458	—	2455[e]	33,933
1640	13,400	6850	2626	987	23,963
1641	35,325	1287	1180	—	37,792
1642	48,910	—	—	845	49,755
1643	45,627	—	—	—	45,627
1644	65,124	919	1503	—	67,546
1645	73,747	—	—	—	73,747
1646	55,515	2497	856	759	59,627
1647	—	—	—	—	—
1648	no data				
1649	no data				
1650	no data				
1651	69,829	—	—	—	69,829
1652	58,866	—	—	—	58,866

[a] In the sources, the lesser accounts are lumped two years in a row. In 1619 the combined Indian, religioso, and mermas funds totalled 7793 pesos, and in 1620 the combined Indian and religioso funds totalled 3542 pesos. To estimate the mermas percentage for 1619 I took percentages for the five nearest years with data (1618, 1620–1623), which averaged 1.3. Applying that percentage to the situado for 1619 supplied an estimated mermas of 917 pesos, given in brackets. I subtracted this figure from the 7793 pesos to get a total of 6876 for the Indian and religioso accounts combined. The average ratio of Indian to religioso accounts for the four nearest years with data (1617–1618, 1621–1622) was 2.5:1, or 5:2. Applying that ratio to the combined Indian and religioso accounts for 1619 and 1620 provided the other bracketed figures.

[b] This total does not include 18,749 pesos sent as reimbursement for a shipload of supplies lost in transit.

[c] This total does not include 8294 pesos in "*alcances*," which were collections made by an auditor.

[d] This total does not include 3676 pesos in alcances.

[e] Possibly by typographic error, Sluiter's table lists two figures (1179 and 1276) for the 1639 mermas, and none for the religiosos.

provinces, but to punish foreign interlopers. Of all the royal policies to be applied to Florida, the one that outlawed corsairs and contrabandists would prove the most enduring.

Thanks to the painstaking archival research of Engel Sluiter, we now have serial data on the Florida situado between 1571 and 1652: each year's authorized subsidy figure, the known amounts disbursed on behalf of that subsidy, and the dates of payment. After Mexico City assumed the responsibility in 1595, he finds, payments were reasonably prompt, regular, and complete until the war years of 1636–1648 (Sluiter, 1985). While Sluiter manages to exonerate the Mexico City treasury from charges that it neglected its obligations to Florida—in peacetime, at any rate—persons who were posted to the St. Augustine presidio or to the Florida provinces had reasons to be dissatisfied with the way the situado was managed. Funds disbursed in Panama, Vera Cruz, or Mexico City were not the same as funds received in St. Augustine. The "effective" situado, to borrow a phrase, was the amount left after deductions for delivery costs and losses en route (Leturiondo, [1700]: 179–190; Bushnell, 1981: 70–74). And, war or no war, delays in the payment or delivery of the situado created serious problems on the receiving end.

Using Sluiter's data, I have constructed tables for the two periods of 1571–1616 and 1617–1652 in which the payments released from Spanish treasuries toward the situado are grouped under the calendar year of disbursement. There are unavoidable deficiencies in the data. First, there is no way of knowing when or whether a payment was actually delivered, nor what deep discounts it suffered en route. Second, it is impossible to tell what part of the regular situado went to soldiers and what part to friars, nor to pinpoint when, exactly, the religious situado began. Third, the 1617 appearance of three supplementary funds (for Indians, religiosos, and mermas) may reflect nothing more meaningful than a change in accounting procedures. And fourth, Sluiter's data stop in 1652, before the important years of the building of the Castillo.

Rearranged by year of disbursement, however, the situado payments reveal the significant irregularity of the payments, year by year. Garrison mutinies, Indian rebellions, and missionary absenteeism before 1652 may now be correlated with situado shortages and delays. Obviously, individual soldiers, friars, and chiefs could survive without the situado, but could the colony? Spanish sovereignty, Catholic religion, and cacique authority, all three, were built on the *expectation* of royal support.

NOTES

1. In Spain, a rainmaker was called a "conjurer of clouds" (Christian, 1981: 29–30).

2. Chaplainships were subordinate posts unsuited to the regular clergy, who were under vows of obedience to their superiors. As an 18th-century Franciscan explained: "The office of chaplain is not proper to our institute" (Bringas, [1796–1797]: 65).

3. Five Franciscans accompanied Pánfilo de Narváez to Florida in 1528 and shared the fate of his expedition (Gannon, 1965a: 4).

4. For serial data on the number of friars versus the number of soldiers in the dotación, see Matter, 1990: 102–118. His table of "Estimated Numbers of Soldiers and Missionaries in Florida 1565–1763" is on pages 188–191.

CHAPTER 4. ROYAL SUPPORT OF THE MISSIONARIES

THE FRANCISCAN ORDER

After the departure of the Jesuits, the Franciscans held the mission monopoly for Florida. Established by Saint Francis of Assisi in the 13th century, the Order of Friars Minor suffered from deep divisions about how rigorously to practice poverty. In the early 16th century it split into two orders: the Observants, whose emphasis on strict poverty and asceticism made them the heirs of the Spiritual branch declared heretical in the 13th and 14th centuries, and the Conventuals, less at odds with the material world and more in harmony with the papal see. The Conventuals were effectively excluded from New World evangelism in 1517 when Cardinal Francisco Ximénez de Cisneros, himself an Observant, closed down their monasteries in Spain. In 1567 all Conventual provinces in Spain and Portugal were ceded to Observants.

During the 16th century, four new branches budded from the Observant stock: Capuchins, Discalced, Recollects, and Reformed. Two of these are familiar names in American mission history: the Recollects of New France, and the Discalced (or Alcantarines, for one of their leaders, Pedro de Alcántara), found in the Philippines, in Brazil, and, after 1596, in one province of New Spain, St. Didacus, where its members worked among the Indians at the Pachuca mines.[1] Other than these two subsets and a few unsung Capuchins in the South American jungles, all of the Franciscan provinces in colonial America were created and largely manned by Observants of the non-Reform kind (Geiger, 1937: 23–25; Habig, 1944: 89; Lynch, 1967; Phelan, 1970: 14–15, 45–46).

Franciscan spirituality was characterized by its emphasis on the man Christ and his bond with humanity in the person of the Virgin Mother. It emphasized fraternity and social mission above personal contemplation, mysticism as an intuitional union with God, asceticism as companionship with Christ, and reverence for all creation. Franciscans were reputed to be more practical and less dogmatic than members of other orders (McDevitt, 1967). In the 16th century they did not take university degrees, as registration and graduation fees discorded with their vow of poverty. In the 17th century most universities in Spanish America had a "Scotus Chair," an arrangement, gratis on both sides, which permitted them to exchange a number of doctoral degrees for a scholar qualified to lecture on the doctrines of the great Franciscan theologian John Duns Scotus (Gómez Canedo, 1983: 42–43). Profoundly critical of Church worldliness and wealth, Franciscans saw Church history as a declension from the Primitive and Apostolic Church of shared simplicity. In the Indian Church of the New World, they hoped that pre-Constantinian simplicity and holy poverty might be reborn (Phelan, 1970: 44–58).

The Twelve Apostles who arrived in New Spain in 1524 went there as mendicant preachers, not priests. Their plan was to live together in one city, where they could keep the Rule, reading the responses by day and night, practicing mental prayer, discipline, and the other exercises of conventual life, lest in their concern for the souls of others they neglect their own. They would go out by twos and fours on missions of preaching, no farther than a two-week journey from the mother house. Only with some difficulty, first in Spain, then in Peru, were the freedom-loving Franciscans persuaded to take on the duties of doctrineros and be managers of "fixed" as opposed to "flying" missions.

In 1571 the Order instituted a Commissary General of the Indies to coordinate missionary activities, recruit new members, and dispatch them on missions (Gómez Canedo, 1983: 12–13). In rural Spain the *Comisario General* had a large pool of potential missionaries on which to draw. According to a survey that Philip II's chronicler made of the New Castile countryside between 1575 and 1580, 60 percent of the male monasteries in towns of fewer than 1500 householders were Franciscan, either Discalced or non-Reform Observant (Christian, 1981: 14–16).

As was said in Chapter 3, the first mission of Franciscans to Florida arrived in 1573, their expenses underwritten by the Adelan-

tado. Other missions followed at three- to five-year intervals. In 1606 the Order raised the rapidly growing mission field to the rank of a *custodio*, a dependent administrative district. In accordance with the Franciscan constitution, the friars elected one of their number *padre custos*, to be their superior for a triennium. In 1609 the custodies of Florida and Cuba were combined into the Custody of Santa Elena with headquarters in Cuba and jurisdiction over friaries in Bayamo, Havana, and Santiago as well as St. Augustine. Three years later the custody advanced to the rank of *provincia*, becoming the Province of Santa Elena (Gómez Canedo, 1983: 11). In their triennial chapter meetings the friars now elected as their superior a *padre provincial*. He was advised by a council of *definidores* made up of his predecessors. The contemporary mission field of New Mexico, comparable to Florida in number of convents and converts, never attained provincial status. It remained a custody subject to the Franciscan Commissary General of New Spain, who resided at the *convento grande* of Holy Gospel Province in the heart of Mexico City.

Franciscans were not interchangeable. Their credentials and specialties varied, as did their positions and responsibilities. As was the custom in all the mendicant orders, a professed Franciscan who had been ordained to say Mass, preach, or confess was addressed as "*padre*" or "*padre fray*," by surname. A sacristan, chorister, or lay brother without the cure of souls was a simple *fraile*, addressed as "*fray*," by Christian name. In some cases the surname of a humble lay brother is not even known (Tibesar, 1953: 118).

The local superior of a Franciscan monastery or friary was the *padre guardián*. The only convent in Florida large enough to merit a guardián was the friary in St. Augustine, formally known as the Convent of the Immaculate Conception. Although a padre custos or padre provincial had the canonical right to accept *coristas*, or novices, and although several "sons of conquerors" in Florida and Cuba chose the religious life, the friary seldom functioned as a house of novices. Ordinarily, a floridano took his novitiate in one of the two larger Cuban convents, in Havana and Santiago (Franciscans, 1685).

Three reasons may be adduced for the lack of novitiates in Florida. First, a house of novices had to have enough friars to maintain "the routine of the cloisters," eight at least, which may be why, in 1611, Pope Paul V suppressed the convents in New Spain with fewer than that number. The convento in St. Augustine would have eight friars in residence only when several cells at the convent were occupied by infirm or elderly missionaries. In 1673 only three religious were on assignment to the friary: the guardián, a preacher, and a faithful lay brother, who assisted in the sacristy, worked in the garden, begged alms door to door, and trimmed the lamp of the Sacrament (Somoza, 1673; Luna, 1687; Geiger, 1937: 256–257; Haring, 1971: 175).

Second, a governor could place obstacles in a floridano's path to the priesthood by refusing to issue him rations during the yearlong novitiate. When civil and religious authorities were at odds, as they were during the governorship of Pedro de Ybarra, this happened (Pareja et al., 1608). A third reason may have been the reluctance of Florida's predominantly peninsular friars to Americanize the Province of Santa Elena.

Franciscans, like members of other orders, protected themselves against loss of status by excluding from their ranks anyone with African or Indian blood, reasoning that a non-Spanish priesthood would not be respected. Philip II extended this policy to the empire generally in 1578, forbidding the ordination of Indians, mestizos, or mulattoes (Tibesar, 1967: 460–461). This exclusion did not extend to creoles; the Order could not hope to fill the demand for doctrineros without admitting them. In the Viceroyalty of Peru, in 1675, 538 of the 643 Franciscans in Lima and Cuzco provinces were creoles. In the northern viceroyalty, the Order was even more naturalized. In 1619, 580 of the 630 Franciscans in Holy Gospel Province were creole, trained in one of the 166 religious houses that the Order possessed as of 1611 in New Spain alone (Haring, 1971: 175; Tibesar, 1971: 100–103). Inasmuch as the friars who went to the missions of New Mexico came from Holy Gospel convents, the vast majority of the Franciscans in New Mexico must have been American born.

Not so the missionaries posted to the Florida frontier. Those of known origins listed in

Maynard Geiger's *Biographical Dictionary of the Franciscans in Spanish Florida and Cuba (1528–1841)* (1940) as having served in Florida between 1573 and 1763 are overwhelmingly peninsular, straight from the friaries of Spain. That the 17th-century political rift in the Franciscan Order leading to the *alternativa*, or enforced alternation of creoles and peninsulars in office, did not make itself felt in Florida until the 1700s—and does not appear in this book until Chapter 19—was due to the Province's long history of keeping down the number of creole friars.

The king's resources for the support of missions and missionaries were dual: his royal patrimony, or inherited estate, and his royal revenues, in particular his share of all tithes collected in the Indies, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. A law that was promulgated in 1593, 1618, and 1643, published in the *Recopilación de leyes de los Reynos de la Indias* in 1681, and referred to by Father Bringas more than a century later, read:

> We have been informed that the *Ministros de Doctrina* have not taken proper care in the education of the Indians and in teaching them the Articles of our Holy Roman Catholic Faith. This is our primary duty. For its fulfillment we have founded and endowed all the churches that seemed needed and have assigned adequate incomes for the curas and doctrineros from our own income, and we have made up for any lack from our Royal Treasury (Bringas, [1796–1797]: 55, note 24, citing Recopilación, 1681: lib. 1, tít. 6, ley 46).

Few of the recipients of the royal largesse in Florida knew, and no one thought to record, exactly what portion of the king's patrimony was meant to be devoted to founding and endowing churches and supporting ministers, nor which of the funds in the king's coffer were to be drawn on when the royal patrimony ran short.

The king's alms to the Florida Franciscans were of three kinds: travel grants and allowances to take the religiosos to the Indies; stipends, rations, and allowances to feed, clothe, and doctor them while there; and allotments of sacramental supplies to the priests among them.

TRAVEL GRANTS

Travel costs were covered not merely port to port, but door to door. By royal order, the Casa de Contratación handled travel for the six Jesuits who went to Florida in 1566, "according to the usual procedure in providing for religious enroute to our Indies": passage and provisions for every leg of the journey and every delay in transit. Each religioso arranged his own transportation and that of his books and other belongings from his monastery to Seville; the Casa paid the muleteers. While the Jesuits were in Seville conducting their business at the Casa and while they waited to embark from San Lucar de Barrameda they received 1½ reales a day for their sustenance, either directly or through their agent. For shipboard use each religioso was issued "a cloak, a cassock, a biretta, a mattress, a blanket, and a pillow" (Spanish Crown, 1566).

The same procedure was followed for a Franciscan missionary. For his journey on foot from his own convent to Seville, each Franciscan, whether a priest of the mass or a lay brother, received 7 reales a day for travel, based on an 8-league *dieta*, or day's journey. As it had for Jesuits, the Crown paid for his personal belongings of books and clothing to be brought to the point of embarkation. While waiting in Seville for the party to gather and the ship to sail, the missionary received a daily ration worth first 1½, then 2 reales. Again, the Casa issued him a mattress, a blanket, and a pillow for the voyage (Moral, [1677?]; Ayeta, [1688]; Geiger, 1937: 46–58).

The personal belongings of a religious included breviaries, prayerbooks, missals, and manuals (Geiger, 1937: 97, 108), some of them with costly illuminations and cover ornaments. He probably stored them with his papers in a wooden "Bible box" that doubled as a portable writing desk (Langford, 1990: 147–149). When Jesuit Antonio Sedeño and Pedro Menéndez were shipwrecked at Cape Canaveral on their way to Havana, Sedeño managed to salvage his personal baggage and load it into a "*canoa*" that he and the Adelantado commandeered.[2] A squall came up, and the Adelantado suspected the Indian paddlers of trying to drown them. He began to lighten the boat, and the first things he heaved overboard were Sedeño's "poor possessions," with all of his "letters and papers" (Sedeño, 1572b).

Among the Franciscans, friars known as *comisarios* or *procuradores* made it their call-

ing to conduct missions to the Indies. In the 16th century, at least, a comisario had a fund of 300 or 400 ducats with which to equip the mission he conducted with missals, bells, sacred vessels and vestments, wafer irons, and other necessities. Their wide-ranging activities and handling of money placed comisarios on the edge of the Franciscan community. Alonso de Reinoso, who conducted four missions to Florida, was rude to authorities and reportedly whiled away his time playing cards, but Comisario Reinoso was also resourceful. During one prolonged layover in Havana he fed the friars of his company by selling a valuable breviary (Moral, [1677?]; Ayeta, [1688]; Geiger, 1937: 46–58).

By 1608 the Crown was spending 50,000 pesos annually on missionary passages (Castañeda and Marchena, 1978: 141), even though the friars traveled frugally, four and six to a cabin. These were essentially one-way tickets, for once a friar had been delivered to his destination he was expected to stay there at least ten years.

Sailings were scheduled to avoid the hurricane season, and escorted convoys reduced the danger from pirates, but any journey by sea could turn into an adventure. Three of the most interesting descriptions of early Florida are found in peril-and-deliverance accounts of voyages made by a bishop, don Juan de las Cabezas Altamirano; a Franciscan, Alonso de Escobedo; and a 16-year-old youth who later became a Carmelite friar, Andrés de Segura (Dávila, 1606; Escobedo, [1606–1609]; San Miguel, [1629]; García, 1902: xviii-xxi). A third danger, less thrilling but more lethal, was disease, fomented by foul shipboard conditions. Many missionaries arrived in the New World miserably ill. Those on their way to the Philippines often spent six months in Mexico recuperating from the Atlantic crossing before undertaking the even worse Pacific one (Phelan, 1959: 43).

Delays in transit increased the costs of travel. If instead of proceeding directly to Florida the party made a detour to Vera Cruz, its expenses rose by 10 ducats per traveler. If the mission was detained with the galleons for six months in Cartagena, the extra cost per missionary could amount to as much as a full year's stipend (Abengozar, 1681). In Havana, after the experience with the breviary, treasury officials maintained friars en route to Florida on an allowance of 6 reales per day during the layovers between ships, debiting whichever branch of the royal treasury was responsible for the situado.

The total cost to the Crown of introducing Jesuit and Franciscan missionaries to Florida has never been calculated. To do that would require the researcher to know the total number of religious who sailed from Spain to Florida; the changing costs of passage, daily allowances, and amounts for outfitting; and the lengths of fleet delays, year by year, in various ports. In 1688, the estimated cost of passages to bring 24 friars and 3 lay brothers from Spain to Florida was 1653 pesos—61 pesos each—not counting their travel to Seville and maintenance there (Ayeta, [1688]).

Compared to New Mexico, Florida was a bargain. It cost more to travel long distances by land than by sea, at least in America, unsuited to camel caravans. The cost of transporting a new missionary from Mexico City to the New Mexican frontier, spelled out in a 1631 contract, was 1387 pesos, 2 *tomines*: 875 pesos to outfit him, 325 pesos for his travel expenses, and the rest for freight, figured at a wagon and 16 mules for every two friars (Kessell, 1987: 144–147).

There was no canonical reason to restrict mission assignments to the regular orders. In 1680 a group of clerics in Cuba, moved by the reported pleas of souls in darkness, volunteered to turn missionary. The plan was to rent horses or mules to bring the party from Santiago de Cuba to Havana, where the bishop of Cuba and the governor would ration them while they awaited passage to Florida on the ship of the situado. The Consejo de Indias was doubtful that members of the secular clergy could exist among "barbarous Indians" on the salaries of regular clergy, "the clothing and manner of living of friars and clerics being dissimilar," and the idea did not bear fruit, but the king did not wholly give it up until 1690 (Consejo de Indias, [1680]; Spanish Crown, 1690).

STIPENDS

Charles V, who made the original choice to use the mendicant orders for the conversion of the Indies and in 1522 established his

right to license all missionaries destined for the Indies, also in the 1520s originated the practice of supporting them with *sínodos*, or stipends. The emperor respected the Franciscans' anti-pecuniary statutes by ordering that their stipends be paid in kind and be called "*limosnas*," or alms. Treasury officials in Peru created a crisis in the 1560s by trying to issue the Franciscans' stipends in money instead of food, clothing, and supplies. The friars refused to accede to this change, which compromised their strict and literal vow of poverty. When the matter came before Philip II, he assured the Franciscans that they were true beggars of the Lord and the stipend was a true limosna. He advised them to select lay custodians, or syndics, to handle their business affairs and distribute their alms to them daily, so that they themselves could "take no thought for the morrow." The king extended this solution to all the Indies, including Florida (Franciscans, 1681a; Benavides et al., 1733; Tibesar, 1953: 75–76).

As was pointed out in Chapter 4, the amount of the limosna to support one friar in Florida was linked to the military plaza. Drawn from the armadas, the soldiers and mariners who manned the original garrisons and vessels brought with them the armada system of wages and rations. They received 2½ reales a day in rations, plus 1000 maravedís a month, which worked out to 1 real a day. The friars, whose devotion to poverty kept them from handling money, drew 3 reales a day in rations and the remainder in supplies (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1701d; Geiger, 1937: 51–52). The sueldo of a Florida religioso was affirmed by royal cédula in 1641 to be 115 ducats of 11 reales per year, the same as a soldier's (Spanish Crown, 1673).

In 1705, the Florida Franciscans petitioned the Consejo de Indias for an increase in their stipends to enable them to keep the destitute Indians from fleeing to the English or to the woods. They suggested a stipend of 300 pesos, much as missionaries got in Michoacán. Two of the councilors, detailed to question the Franciscans' envoy, asked their colleagues how a friar was expected to live on only 158 pesos in a place "so poor and full of dangers" as Florida; Jesuits in some parts of the Indies received up to 500 pesos, they said. But the Consejo's response was to put a cap of 200 pesos a year on a religioso's stipend and allowances combined (TePaske, 1964: 179–180).

Within the dotación, soldiers of Christ and soldiers of the Crown were theoretically interchangeable, for by a budgetary arrangement that lasted into the 1670s, every added Franciscan meant one less soldier. St. Augustine officials kept books on both, recording to the day the individual lengths of service (Peñaranda, 1608; Franciscans, 1608; 1685; Consejo de Indias, [1680]; Luna, 1687; Vilches, 1757; Palacio y Valenzuela and Peña, 1759).

By 1616 there were 37 Franciscans in Florida, each one occupying the plaza of a soldier (Sluiter, 1985: 6). In this uneasy partnership, the friars' objective was to achieve financial independence from the garrison while continuing to receive support from the Crown. They began campaigning for this arrangement in 1617, requesting that their subvention be separated from that of the soldiers so that they could administer it themselves, purchasing their necessities at lower prices and not having to deal with two governors every time a friar was moved from Florida to one of the three Cuban convents. The presidio boats going to Havana, they said, should pick up for the friars whatever their prelate thought they needed, as well as the alms given by pious persons in Havana (Franciscans, 1617).

Some autonomy for purchasing seems to have been granted, for in 1637 the friars owed 2000 pesos to the St. Augustine treasury for an overdraft against their combined limosnas. The cause, according to Franciscan Juan Gómez de Palma, was an increase in prices over the previous five years. He petitioned the king to give them the same things every year whether prices rose or fell, to cancel the debt to the treasury "since we poor friars have nothing," and to include the cost of shipping in the royal limosnas (Gómez de Palma, [1637?]; Ponce de León, 1637).

During the first half of the 17th century, the number of friars occupying soldiers' plazas rose to the point that the garrison was seriously undermanned. Despite Governor Ybarra's plea in 1605 that no plazas be given to friars, widows, clerics, or mariners, by 1621 there were 35 friars and only 174 soldiers on the rolls (Ybarra, 1605b; Salinas, 1621). Fi-

nally, in 1646, the Crown set a ceiling of 60 missionaries, 43 to be covered by the dotación and the other 17 by a supplementary subsidy for missionaries: the friars' situado. Two years later the Crown raised the number of friars' plazas to 70, bringing the friars' situado to 27 plazas (Spanish Crown, 1646; 1648b).

In 1650 the Franciscans repeated their request that the total amount for their 70 plazas be delivered to their syndic in Mexico City so he could do the purchasing there instead of in Florida, where things were scarce, unsuitable, and expensive. They volunteered to cover the costs of shipment. This time the Consejo de Indias assented, ordering the viceroy to pay the friars' situado at the same time as the soldiers', prorating any partial payments to ensure that the recipients of the two situados were treated equally and making sure that the friars did not collect theirs twice (Ponce de León, [1650?]).

In 1673, as we have seen, the Franciscans managed to get their 43 longstanding plazas separated from the soldiers' dotación and added to their own, uniting all the friars under the same situado. They began sending their own collector and purchasing agent to Mexico City, paralleling the *situador* from the garrison. Charles II gave them yet another concession in 1688 (Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1697a; Torres y Ayala, 1699; Matter, 1990: 106–109), one which Franciscan spokesman Manuel de Cardoso made known to Philip V soon after his accession:

> The king your uncle further granted to them that the whole 70 plazas should be paid regardless of some being vacant, to cover the ill or those studying languages, or retired, and because the expenses of sending the money used up a third of the total, not counting the costs of the person going to collect it and the deterioration of supplies, which left each religioso with barely half of the 115 ducats (Cardoso, [1701?]).

Father Cardoso did not mention that Charles II had revoked his own ruling in 1698 with a cédula requiring the Florida treasury officials to certify the friars for their stipends individually. The Crown, however, was aware of it. The 1698 cédula was reissued in 1709 and again in 1737 (TePaske, 1964: 178–180, note 92; 189, note 116).

In the 18th century, after Florida's combined situados became a charge against the sales taxes of the city of Puebla, the problem of authorized versus effective strength rose again. Instead of collecting the stipends for their entire dotación, the Franciscans, like the garrison, were obliged to accept the lower amount for persons actually on the rolls, whether on active duty, on sick leave, or retired.

The Crown gave them a choice: either the goods could be brought to them at the treasury's expense, or else they could accept the 200 silver pesos per friar that was allotted them in 1706, do their own purchasing under the supervision of the bishop of Puebla, and accept the risks of shipping (Montiano, 1738a). Inasmuch as Spain and Great Britain were then engaged in the War of Jenkins' Ear, the friars probably opted for guaranteed delivery—with an occasional exception. One purchasing agent, while passing through Havana, bought a *pipa* of Spanish wine, two chocolate almond nougats, a large box of sugar, and a large box of cinnamon (Montiano, 1739).

The Franciscans probably never filled all 70 of their authorized plazas, nor would that have been in their best interests. Inflating the rolls of missionaries, as of soldiers, was the Florida way of writing extra money into the budget. The defect of the system was not that there were more friars on the books than in the doctrinas, but that, when guardians were indulgent and governors and bishops inattentive, the friars did not stay in their doctrinas. By law, no pueblo of Christian Indians was supposed to be without a minister for more than four months (Bringas, [1796–1797]: 55, citing Recopilación, 1681: lib. 1, tít. 6, ley 48). Among Florida Franciscans, four-month sick leaves were common.

In the opinion of Bishop Altamirano, the friars in Florida worked only when they felt like it. Emboldened by his attitude, Governor Ybarra criticized their father superior for not making the doctrineros stay in their doctrinas. To get them out of the friary in St. Augustine and back into the field the governor suspended their rations when they were away from their posts—or so he told the Crown in 1615. In 1622 the bishop of Santiago de Cuba asked the king to forbid the Florida friars to

congregate in Havana and live in idleness at the convent (Matter, 1990: 114, note 38, 121).

In 1697, of the 70 Franciscans authorized for Florida, 9 were on assignment to St. Augustine: the padre provincial, the guardián of the convent, a preacher, a lay brother, a teacher of Latin grammar, a situador, and three linguists to confess the Indians in the labor camps (Torres y Ayala and Menéndez Márquez, 1697).

ALLOWANCES

Over and above his 115-ducat plaza, a friar received a royal allowance called, simply, the "alms for habit and sandals" or "habit and footwear" (Fernández de Olivera, 1611; Treviño Guillamas, [1615?]; Geiger, 1937: 52). The initial amount of this limosna varied. According to Royal Auditor Pedro de Redondo Villegas in 1600, the Florida treasury expended 24 reales on each missionary over and above his 3 reales a day for rations (Geiger, 1937: 133). If this was a monthly expenditure, it would have raised the annual cost of supporting one friar to 126 ducats. Former governor Ybarra, no friend of Franciscans, advised the Crown in 1615 that each friar cost 1535 reales a year, or 139½ ducats (Matter, 1990: 85). Governor Gonzalo Méndez Canzo believed the amount to be even higher. According to his calculations, feeding and clothing a friar cost the treasury 4½ reales a day, or 149 ducats a year, equivalent to 205 pesos—virtually the same amount that the Consejo would set as a ceiling in 1706 (Méndez Canzo, 1602; TePaske 1964: 180, note 91).

In 1616 the Crown ordered the Mexico City treasury to reimburse the Florida treasury for the friars' "habit and footwear" and create a "religioso" fund supplementary to the situado. Thanks to the industry of Engel Sluiter (1985), the sums disbursed to cover the Florida religioso fund are known for 27 of the years between 1617 and 1647 (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2). They vary widely, from a low of 690 pesos in 1628 to a high of 2626 pesos in 1640. For 10 of the 27 years, no money whatever was allocated to the fund.

Irregular though the king's "habit and sandals" alms may have been, they provided a friar with the garments demanded by his profession and Order. Religious habit for a Franciscan began with a robe and a hood of *sayal*, a kind of woolen sackcloth—the common attire of a 13th-century Italian peasant. Sayal became identified with the mendicant friars when the peasant world moved on to other costumes. Each missionary was promised 26 varas of the fabric per year, though the amount actually delivered was apt to vary (Franciscans, 1681a; 1735; Montiano, 1738a). Governor Francisco del Moral Sánchez, clandestinely trading with the British, withheld a portion of the sayal allotment, prompting the Franciscans to inquire whether the governor was thinking to become one of them (León y Cordero, 1736).

Sayal was naturally gray (hence the English term "Grey Friars"), being woven from the blended wool of black and white sheep. In support of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary, which Spanish Franciscans were pressing the Pope to endorse, the friars of Holy Gospel Province in Mexico City began sometime around 1670 to dye their sayal and *sabanilla* homespun a deep blue in honor of a special apparition of the Virgin (Kessell, 1987: 150–152). The Franciscans of the province of Santiago de Jalisco followed suit, but not those of the Colegio de Santa Cruz de Querétaro, founded in 1683 by a mission of friars direct from Spain (McCloskey, 1955; Matson and Fontana, 1977: 62, note 35). Whether the friars of Santa Elena Province in Florida, also mostly Spaniards, made the switch to indigo-tinted habits is unclear. They had long since made their advocacy plain by naming all three of their central houses "The Convent of the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God" (Peñaranda and Pareja, 1607; Franciscans, 1685).

Around his waist a friar wore a triple-knotted rope, or cincture. Imaginative drawings of the Florida friars sometimes show them with a rosary suspended from the cincture, but this is unlikely. Manuel de Mendoza, martyred in Apalache, was identified by the beads of the rosary around his throat and the half-melted rosary crucifix at his neck (Auto, 1705a).[3]

The friars received an unspecified amount of linen for breeches and tunics (Méndez Canzo, 1602; Matson and Fontana, 1977:

110, note 92). These were underclothes; in the history of costume they traced their origins to detachable garment linings. Some of the missionaries mortified the flesh by donating their tunics to the poor and wearing the rough sayal next to their skin (Ojeda, 1687). Giving one's personal clothing to the poor, particularly one's linen, was considered one of the highest expressions of charity and virtue (Menéndez Márquez and Sánchez de Uriza, 1720; Azu et al., 1735). According to ecclesiastical visitor Luis Gerónimo de Oré, the patched, threadbare linen of a saintly Florida friar was believed to have protective properties and was sought by the people of St. Augustine for swaddling clothes (Oré, [1617–1620]: 72). Father Blás de Rodríguez, before being dispatched by the Guale rebels at Tupiqui in 1597, was allowed to say a Mass and to hand out articles of his clothing to be treasured as relics of a martyr (Geiger, 1937: 91, note 69).

The "*calzado*" that a friar was entitled to receive yearly was four pairs of footwear, the same in 1706 as 120 years earlier (Montiano, 1738a; Geiger, 1937: 52). When others wore buckled shoes and riding boots, Franciscans wore simple clogs and sandals. For protection, a mounted friar added leather leggings. Father Juan de Parga was so dressed in 1704 when enemy Creeks chased him into a canebrake. His corpse was later found with one leg, bearing a sandal and a leather legging (Auto, 1705a). In 1735, Florida friars were issued tanned goatskins, presumably to have their footwear and leggings made locally (Franciscans, 1735).

Sandals offered little protection from the weather, which may be why Father Francisco Alonso de Jesús protested that Florida was too cold a land for the friars to be going without shoes (Jesús, [1634]). Although the Province of Santa Elena was not one of the provinces of the Discalced branch of the Observants, the Franciscans who came to Florida were drawn from many convents in Spain. Fray Andrés de Vilches, who founded schools and repaired churches in the 1750s, was a "*descalzo*" (Geiger, 1940: 116).

The original cédula granting the Franciscans an ayuda de costa for books also provided them with headwear (Gómez de Palma, [1637?]; Auto, 1738). By the cédula of 1706 the Franciscans of Florida were allowed, all together, six new hats a year for outdoor wear and walking (Montiano, 1738a). Hats of good quality imported to Florida cost 100 reales apiece in 1602 (Geiger, 1937: 153, note 97). A hat this expensive would have been made of felt, manufactured in Europe from the fur of American beavers. The most valuable single item in most persons' wardrobes, it would last a lifetime or longer.

With simple clothing as expensive at it was, a soldier's cash wages of 1000 maravedís a month did not go far. According to the treasury officials in 1627, if the king as a great prince would only order clothing to be bought annually for the infantry as it was for the friars, royal slaves, and Indians it would save each soldier 300 reales (27 ducats) a year in the mark-ups of local merchants, not to mention the debt he ran up with the shoemaker (Menéndez Márquez et al., 1627). By 1701, between inflation and the cost of bringing goods to Florida, a soldier did well if he could buy his linen, hose, shoes, one suit of clothes per year, and one blanket (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1701d).

As long as the king's alms of clothing for religiosos were spelled out in kind, the missionary was better off than the soldier, whose money bought less and less. When, in 1706, the Consejo imposed a limit of 200 pesos on a Florida Franciscan's stipend and allowances, he too learned what it meant to have a fixed income (TePaske, 1964: 180, note 91).

RATIONS

A typical 2½-real-a-day ration for "*gente de mar*," and for "*gente de guerra*" on board ship, consisted of 2 cuartillos, or pints, of wine, 1½ pounds of biscuit with some olive oil and vinegar to soften it and make it palatable, a measure of legumes or *menestra*, which was a mixture of dried beans and garbanzos, and a half pound of salt meat—except on Fridays and other fast days, when the *gente* received salt fish. Once the garrisons were landbased and rations were issued monthly instead of daily, treasury officials set up an account for each soldier and charged his monthly ration against it (Menéndez Márquez et al., 1600), whether the staff of life that month was white flour or weevily biscuits, *cazabi* (cassava), or maize, the Indians' corn.

The food ration for a friar was much like that of a soldier. In the 1630s what a friar could expect to receive for his 2½ reales in rations was 2 pounds of flour and 1 pint of wine per day, plus 3 arrobas of olive oil, 3 arrobas of vinegar, and 6 arrobas of salt per year (Gómez de Palma, [1637?]). The energy value of the bread and wine is easy to calculate: two pounds of wheat flour represent 3300 calories, a pint of red wine, 340. Together, the king's alms of bread and wine exceeded by 40 percent the present recommended daily dietary allowance for a male of average height between the ages of 35 and 55: 2600 calories. Calorically speaking, the ration was more than adequate.

Almost no change took place over the years. In 1706, when a cédula again spelled out the friars' ration in detail, the only differences were the subtraction of 100 pounds a year in flour and the addition of 3 *botijas*, or jars, of lard (Montiano, 1738a). In 1735, again, the same dietary items were being issued as a hundred years earlier (Franciscans, 1735).

Once a soldier received his rations allotment, he was free to commute it to something else. He was sometimes forced to, as for example when the governor ordered him rationed for the month with 15 pounds of freshly butchered, rapidly spoiling beef (Ponce de León, 1683). A married soldier characteristically sold his flour ration to a local store owner and fed his family on the cheaper Indian corn (Argüelles, 1598). Friars, too, were known to commute their rations, live less expensively, and employ the difference to feed orphans or do other good works (Franciscans, 1657a).

A doctrinero received a number of nonfood items along with his rations, charged, like the food, to his stipend. Gómez de Palma listed the items as paper, writing quills, thread, needles, woven tape, 2 *mantas*, or mantles, 4 *congas*, or blankets, and an unspecified number of plates and rimless bowls. These things were authorized by cédula, either in 1641 or in 1663 (Gómez de Palma, [1637?]; TePaske, 1964: 179). Another cédula in 1706 specified that each missionary was entitled to 2 *frezadas*, or blankets with a center seam, 4 *mantas congas*, 6 earthenware plates, 4 rimless bowls, a paper of pins, 50 writing quills, and a pound and a half of hemp string (Montiano, 1738a). The 1735 list mentions pewter plates, congas, *media frezadas*, or half blankets, and boxed soap (Franciscans, 1735).

Health care was an ad hoc allotment. The doctrinero who fell ill did not enter a hospital, that place of last resort for the deserving indigent. He went to Havana on sick leave, or else he was given a cell, a bed, and medicines in the convent at St. Augustine (Franciscans, 1735; Castañeda and Marchena, 1978: 141, 153). There were women in the city who treated the sick with time-honored folk remedies drawn from the Spanish, Indian, and no doubt African traditions.[4] Although friars were not supposed to enter "houses of women," even for healing, in St. Augustine they sometimes did (Leturiondo, 1690; Consejo de Indias, 1695a).

Spaniards had a firm faith in the curative powers of special foods: wine, cane brandy, sugar, sweet biscuits and other sweets, fresh meat, and most especially, chicken (Leturiondo, [1707]). When, in 1601, Governor Méndez Canzo and the treasury officials took testimony from two physicians, Juan de LeConte and Gaspar Nieto, about Father Baltasar López's state of health, they declared that it would improve only if he ate chicken. With the price of a hen standing at 8 to 10 reales, this was an expensive prescription, but the royal officials filled it, increasing López's ration from 3 reales a day to 9 or 10 (Geiger, 1937: 156–159).[5] To avoid this sort of emergency, Father Gómez de Palma requested a standing authorization from the Crown to buy special foods for ailing missionaries, because, as everyone knew, "during illness an ordinary diet will not do" (Gómez de Palma, [1637?].

At times, the royal warehouse necessarily contained large quantities of food, drink, dry goods, and medicines—provisions and supplies that had survived the hazardous voyage from Vera Cruz and the St. Augustine sandbar, on which so many supply ships had run aground and broken apart, the flour in their 8-arroba barrels turning into a salty paste on the sea floor (Menéndez Márquez and Rocha, [1682?]; Pérez de Mancilla, 1682; Montiano, 1738b).

In 1591, Contador Bartolomé de Argüelles gave his *tenedor de bastimentos* (keeper of provisions) detailed instructions for storing perishables in the hot and floorless wooden



Fig. 4.1. A 1593 plan for a fort and warehouse in St. Augustine, depicting an inner sanctum with hogsheads of wine and oil lying on their sides, bungholes upward. (From Wissler et al., 1925: fig. 298.) This plan can probably be attributed to *Contador* Bartolomé de Argüelles, who in 1591 gave his *tenedor de bastimentos* written instructions on the proper storage of provisions (Argüelles, 1591a).

warehouse. The flour was to be stored in *pipas* (wooden kegs) or other containers, out of the way of the leaks in the roof. The wine was to stay in officially sealed pipas and be checked twice a day for leaks and unauthorized tapping. The botijas of oil, lard, and wine were to be guarded against breakage and stored without touching each other to avoid setting up osmosis. All storage containers were to be raised off the ground (Argüelles, 1591a).

For most of the friars, the warehouse was only a depot. Their share of its precious contents had yet to be gotten to them in their doctrinas. Although the burden of this delivery would fall heavily on conversión and doctrina commoners, it does not seem to have crossed the minds of the missionaries to question its necessity. Cultural distinctions must be maintained; a Spaniard could not "go native" and keep the respect of the Indians.

Nearly 50 years ago, Lansing S. Bloom ventured to quantify how much the kings of Spain invested in New Mexico up to the time of the second Pueblo revolt, in 1696. When the Crown took over the government of New Mexico in 1609, all that had to be done was to name a royal governor and make the treasury of Mexico City responsible for his salary. Already, the costs of defense, in the form of 35 encomenderos, had been laid on the Indians and the Crown was supporting the missionaries at an annual rate of 150 pesos per priest and 100 pesos per lay brother. By Bloom's calculations, more than half of the 120,000 pesos that the king paid out on New Mexico from 1596 to 1609 was spent on missionary travel, equipment, and maintenance.

Over the longer period of 1596 to 1697, direct mission costs were an estimated 1,340,000 pesos out of a total of 2,290,000 (Bloom, 1944: 9–13).

With backing like this, Franciscans labored with blessed assurance. The king was pouring out his patrimony to maintain them in mission fields that were rich only in souls. They themselves were His Majesty's alms to the Indians (Luna, [1688]a; Franciscans, 1716).

NOTES

1. The Discalced were also known as Alcantarines in honor of their leader Saint Peter of Alcántara, who forbade them to wear sandals, eat meat, or have libraries (Matson and Fontana, 1977: 60, note 30).

2. The native "*canoa*" was a large dugout. In Florida, cargo canoas ordinarily required four paddlers and sometimes carried sails (Guerra y Vega, 1668; Mateos, 1686).

3. In New Mexico, Governor Diego de Vargas hung a rosary around an Indian's neck as a sign of peace (Kessell, 1987: 246).

4. For Father Alonso de Leturiondo's list of Florida's herbal specifics, see Leturiondo, [1700]: 200.

5. As late as 1790, a hen still cost 6 reales (Gannon, 1965a: 106–107).

CHAPTER 5. EARLY CONQUESTS AND PACIFICATIONS

THE CONQUEST OF GUALE

"Although initially organized for strong resistance to the intruders," wrote Kathleen Deagan, Florida Indians appear to have been "subdued in large measure by the end of the sixteenth century" through "the combined effects of population loss, mission efforts, and the collaboration of the caciques with the Spaniards" (Deagan, 1990a: 231). Partly because Spain's resources limited Spain's grasp to the more strategic regions, and partly because Christian practice was incompatible with seasonal nomadism (Bushnell, 1990b), only a fraction of the tribal groups in the Southeast developed into full Spanish provinces. Those that completed the transition were undeniably suborned by novel gifts, weakened by exotic diseases, and beleaguered by the bearers of a strange religion; they were also, one by one, conquered.

The first province to undergo conquest was Guale, which we left in Chapter 3 with growing grievances against Spaniards. The Guale people spoke a Muskhogean language understood by the inland peoples, with whom they shared redistribution ceremonies. For six months of the year, they practiced central-based nomadism, living by hunting, fishing, and gathering (Wallace, 1975: 265–272).

Anthropologist Grant D. Jones, discarding as 18th-century usage John R. Swanton's division of the coastal Muskoghean speakers at the Savannah River into the Guales below the river and the Cusabos above, redefined Guale territory to extend from St. Marys River up to Edisto Island, South Carolina, and to include the riverine chiefdoms of Orista, Escamacu, and Cusabo. His map of "Approximate locations of Spanish period towns and settlements along the Guale Coast," reprinted herein, shows 24 documented settlements, three-fourths of which fall between St. Andrews Sound and the Savannah River. The northernmost chiefdom, Cusabo, took in Santa Elena (later Port Royal) and a place that the Spanish called "San Jorge" and the English would rename "Charles Town" (Swanton, 1922: 16–17, 61, 65; Jones, 1978: 178, 186–187, 241–243; Hann, 1987: 2–4).

South of Guale was the "*lengua*" of Mocamo, the area where Mocamo, principal eastern dialect of the Timucuan language, was spoken. Mocamo territory ran from St. Marys River down to below St. Augustine, divided between the Tacatacuru, who were islanders, and the Saturiwa, a mainland people (Deagan, 1978: 90–91, 100–108; Hann, 1987: 2–4).

The Guales fought their first war with Spaniards in 1576, 10 years after the first Spanish colonists arrived. A subsequent investigation (see Lyon, 1985c) exposed their longstanding grievances over quartering, unpaid labor, unjust tributes of deerskins and maize, and seizures of their valuables. People said that when Lieutenant Governor Diego de Velasco tried to take a *braza* of pearls from the cacique of Guale, the cacique swallowed them. Velasco and Captain Alonso de Solís did, it seems, take several brazas of native "money" worth two ducats apiece and some canoas from the Indians without compensation. The cacique of Guale confided to Alonso de Olmos that it looked like the Spanish had made him a Christian in order to make him serve and to take his property.

Later, defending himself against the charges lodged against him, Velasco denied that he had required the natives to pay tribute. What happened, he said, was that Spaniards and Indians made each other reciprocal gifts. The Spaniards gave the Indians "seed-corn . . . axes, hoes and other iron goods, shirts, blankets and woolen and linen outfits." In return, the Indians, "even the poorest," brought the Spanish leaders "free-will gifts" of "deerskins, mantles of *gato* [panther or wildcat], pearls, or maize." To have refused their gifts would have been an insult. In Velasco's version of the pearl story, don Diego, the cacique, had fallen ill on a visit to Santa Elena. Velasco had restored him to health with costly medicines and delicacies and given clothing and other gifts to him and his wife. In return, the grateful couple had given Velasco a braza of dark-colored pearls "of little value" (Lyon, 1985c).[1]

War broke out in 1576, six months after Hernando de Miranda, a second son-in-law



Fig. 5.1. Approximate locations of Guale towns and chiefdoms from 1565 to 1680. (After Jones, 1978: fig. 17.)

of the Adelantado's, armed with a royal appointment, came to Florida and threw his brother-in-law in prison. The triggering incident occurred in the town of Guale, where some vassals of the cacique rebelled and wounded him with an arrow, from which he died. Although don Diego had been "half in revolt" himself, Captain Alonso de Solís, temporarily in charge, meted out severe punishments for this assault on a Christian. He stabbed the cacique's brother Mateo "for his much talking," hanged the cacique's nephew and heir, beat an Indian of middling status, and cut off another man's ear. The person who had wounded the cacique was Perico of Sapelo Island, the son of a cacique himself.

Solís brought Perico to Santa Elena and garrotted him (Velasco, 1577: 5; Lyon, 1985c). Bartolomé Martínez said that Solís killed three caciques—"they being very important Indians, much thought of in that land"–one of whom, Humalo, had been to Madrid (Martínez, 1577: 239).

Outraged at this summary justice, the leaders of Guale, Escamacu, and Orista launched a well-coordinated series of attacks. At the time, the three royal officials of the treasury, with a notary and five soldiers, were traveling up the inland waterway with the payroll,

> and near a village they call Guale they stopped to talk with the Indians. One of them, who was the cacique, told them that they should land, and eat and rest themselves . . . and they did so: and the moment they landed, the Indians of the said village killed them all, for of the said nine persons not one was left alive (Auto, 1577: 197).

The Indians killed five other Spaniards who were on a maize requisitioning expedition to Guale, including the interpreter Francisco de Aguilar. In the main attack, 500 warriors overran Parris Island. Taking matters into their own hands, the settlers forced Governor Miranda to abandon Santa Elena and take them to St. Augustine (Auto, 1577: 193–203; Martínez, 1577: 239–241).

Not long after the Spanish evacuation, a French vessel, the *Prince*, ran aground in St. Helens Sound, which contained not only Parris Island's Santa Elena but the site of an earlier French fort. Her pilot, Felix, knew the coast well. For two years after the death of Jean Ribault he had been an oarsman on the Spanish launches that traveled the inland waterway between St. Augustine and Santa Elena. Felix and 18 other French prisoners had managed to steal a frigate and make their escape. The Spanish believed that he had come back to make "some assault" on the land (Quirós, 1584).

The castaways of the *Prince* included a real prince, Nicholas Strozzi, a cousin of the queen mother Catherine de Medici. They built a stockade and settled down to await rescue. They feared an attack by Spaniards, but the Indians of Escamacu were the ones who stormed their stockade, captured a hundred of them, and distributed them as prizes to the members of the active anti-Spanish coalition. Emboldened by this victory, a group of Guales yelled insults at a passing boatload of 13 Spaniards, taunting them "that they were hens and worth nothing, and that they [the Indians] had many friends who would fight with them" (Menéndez Márquez, 1577: 264–268; 1578b: 78–82).

The true conquest of Florida began in 1577, when Governor Pedro Menéndez Márquez set out for Florida, "a land to which all refused to go" (Quirós, 1584), armed with a royal mandate to wage "a war of punishment" on the Indians and clear the coasts once and for all of corsairs. His first step was to send Captain Thomás Bernaldo de Quirós north with orders "to treat amity with the caciques" and to ransom a Frenchman and a *negro* in Guale hands, negotiating with a chief named Cazacolo. "One must take Cazacolo seriously," instructed the governor, "for this barbarian is clever. . . . Give the hatchets, hoe and wine to Cazacolo and on my behalf give him many presents, saying that I greatly rejoice that he is well." Quirós was to persuade four of the principal Indians of Guale to visit St. Augustine, if necessary offering himself or the soldier Clemente Vernal as a hostage, and there, "having them prisoner and well-provided with gifts," he should demand that they surrender the Frenchmen in their possession. The king was most anxious to keep Indians and heretics apart (Menéndez Márquez, 1578a; 1578c).

As an afterthought, Governor Menéndez Márquez instructed Quirós to find and forward to St. Augustine half a dozen Indian women skilled at gathering oysters. Whether the women were to be servants, slaves, units of tribute, wage laborers, or wives, the governor did not say. What was on his mind was pearls. Pedro Menéndez had obtained the right to develop a pearl fishery as part of his original contract, and so far the colony had offered little else of concentrated value (Menéndez Márquez, 1578a; 1578c; Lyon, 1976: 217).

Captain Quirós reestablished Santa Elena. Within two years it had a new church and "more than forty houses of clay and flat roofs" (Niel, [1580]; Quirós, 1584). The governor himself brought lumber and carpenters from St. Augustine in 1579 and rebuilt the fort,

naming it San Marcos. It became his stronghold for the war he had come to wage. In one year his troops burned 20 towns and destroyed standing crops, reserves of maize, and canoas for 45 leagues up and down the coast, and inland as far as Potano (Argüelles, 1600; Ybarra, 1605a; Marqués, 1606; Thomas, 1990b: 373–374).

The one condition that Menéndez Márquez set for peace was for the natives to turn over their French advisors, for, as he told the king, there would be no security for Spaniards while foreigners were among the Indians organizing resistance and disseminating their "evil sect." To stop his scorched-earth tactics, the Guales surrendered to him Prince Nicholas and the rest of their French captives, other than three who were on a journey to the interior. Captain Quirós personally took custody of 16 Frenchmen, including the pilot Felix (Martínez Carvajal, 1579: 247–249; Quirós, 1584).

Between December 1579 and July 1580 Quirós negotiated peace with 15 caciques, producing for the record treaties that were worded, written, notarized, and pledged to satisfy the legalities that had come to surround a conquest. Each chief in turn, "of his own and free will," committed himself to vassallage and tribute. The cacique of Coçapul, "for greater firmness and friendship," left in Spanish hands his son and the daughter of a vassal "as hostages and in deposit" (Quirós, 1579). "The cacique of the lengua of Guale" promised that he would "neither make nor deal in any treason to the Spaniards who serve His Majesty in these provinces" (Quirós, 1580a). "The cacique of Tupiqui which is of the lengua of Guale" promised "to tolerate the tributes and contracts which might be made with the *Mico Mayor* of the lengua of Tolomato and Guale, to whom he was subject" (Quirós, 1580b). "The Mico Mayor of the lengua of Oristan" promised to be "a vassal and loyal friend of the King of Spain—he and all his Indians" (Quirós, 1580c). "The Mico Mayor of all the lengua of Tolomato" brought a French captain as a peace offering and "said that he held valid the friendships made by the other caciques, his vassals," and would "favor and accept the tributes which the King or his governors might impose on them and would make them pay and would obey it as a loyal friend and vassal of the King of Spain" (Niel, 1580; Quirós, 1580d). Other treaties were made with caciques subject to Tolomato (Lyon, 1985a). Whether for the Indians these "peaces" marked an end to the war or only a truce, time would tell. The natives appeared to be friendly, said the Governor, but he did not trust them (Menéndez Márquez, 1580: 253–255).

The fact was that the Guales were disunited. When five French vessels appeared at the bar of Guale and five others at the bar of Sápala in July, the anti-French faction notified the Spanish at Santa Elena and once more allowed a Spaniard to be stationed in their territory. That observer and others sighted 20 French ships that summer in Guale's harbors, searching for the lost *Prince*. The corsair visitors of 1580 found friends among the Guales of Tolomato and Gualequini, but there was no welcome for them from the Guales on Sapelo or St. Catherines islands, nor from the Timucuans at San Juan del Puerto near the mouth of the St. Johns. With the aid of their Indian allies, the Spanish bested the corsairs in the naval Battle of San Mateo, fought near the old site of French Fort Caroline (Relation, 1580; Ross, 1923).

Meanwhile, missionary activity was on hold. Although Comisario Alonso de Reinoso returned in 1584 with a second mission of Franciscans, the few friars who stayed in Florida spent their time in St. Augustine or Santa Elena (Thomas, 1990b: 373). Open war broke out between Spain and England in 1585. The next year, Sir Francis Drake was returning home with a great fleet laden with spoils and a ransom of 132,000 ducats from the citizens of Santo Domingo and Cartagena. The long voyage had taken the usual toll of lives; Cape Verde Island fever had killed one in four of Drake's men. Possibly looking for Santa Elena and possibly only seeking a defensible spot where his men could convalesce before making the ocean crossing, he paused to investigate a watchtower on the Florida coast and found an unfinished wooden fort overlooking St. Augustine. The fort's defenders, after a seemly exchange of fire, withdrew to the woods, where the noncombatants had already taken refuge. Drake's men came ashore, burned the houses, cut down the fruit trees, and destroyed the maize fields. Their

only spoils were 14 bronze cannon, as much as 5000 ducats from the paychest, and what goods they could buy from the Indians of a nearby village, who had looted St. Augustine before it could be properly sacked (Covington, 1965: 83–92; Dobyns, 1983: 276–278).

After Drake's departure, the residents of Santa Elena moved to St. Augustine, assured that this would not void their rights and privileges as conquerors and primeros pobladores. Why the floridanos would choose St. Augustine, in its forlorn state, over Santa Elena has always begged for explanation. The official reason, offered 140 years after the fact, was that the southern settlement was closer to the Bahama Channel (Auto, 1726). In any case, from 1587 on, St. Augustine *was* the presidio.

Comisario Reinoso was back in 1587 with 12 recruits, whom war shortages and makeshift shelters soon seasoned into missionaries. He and the governor assigned them to Nombre de Dios, San Sebastián, the Río Dulce district (then ruled by the cacique Pedro Marqués), and the lengua of Mocamo. A "great mortality"–perhaps the same epidemic of which the "wilde people . . . died verie faste," blaming the "Englisshe God," according to the log of one of Drake's ships–continued to reduce the Indian population. Some of the Franciscans may have died with their charges; others, the Comisario General of New Spain reassigned. If any friars from the cohort of 1587 were sent to Guale, they did not stay; in 1588 the northernmost doctrina was San Pedro de Mocamo on Cumberland Island. Despite the arrival of another cohort of friars, the number of Franciscans in the colony in 1592 was down to five: two lay brothers and three priests, dividing their time between Indians and Spaniards (Argüelles, 1591b; Arnade, 1959a: 51–52; Dobyns, 1983: 276; Hann, 1987: 8–9; Matter, 1990: 40–41)

France, which in 1589 joined England in making war on Spain, applied its corsairs to the sealanes like leeches to a vein. While waiting beside the Gulf Stream to pick off one of St. Augustine's supply ships, the corsairs traded with the natives for shipwreck salvage and "fruits of the land." The Indians of Florida's Atlantic coast, making their seasonal rounds, gathered two nonfood products that were highly valued in Europe. Ambergris, a waxy substance from whale intestines used as a perfume fixative, washed up on the beaches, especially near Cape Canaveral in Ais territory. Medicinal herbs such as sassafras, a popular specific for syphilis, grew in the forests of Mocamo and Guale. Competition for salvage and salables made it inevitable that in Ais and Guale the interests of French and Spanish traders would collide.

The Spanish took action in 1595, turning both places into provinces. In a classic case of conquest by contract, the caciques of Ais (including the chief of Surruque, 20 leagues below St. Augustine) and of Guale, respectively, promised to accept missionaries, send laborers to St. Augustine, and report foreigners. The "talks" were ratified in Spanish eyes when the caciques accepted gifts, the currency of diplomacy (Sánchez Sáez de Mercado, 1596; Geiger, 1937: 137).

Sixteen-year-old Andrés de Segura, one of a party of castaways who passed through the Guale chiefdom of Asao-Talaxe early in 1595, saw no churches or convents and few signs of Spaniards. The Guales dressed in skins and lived on the mainland, leaving the barrier islands to feral pigs. The Mocamo practice was different. On Cumberland Island Segura visited San Pedro, a town of "many Christian Indian men and women" and a detachment of Spaniards. They lived "without Mass or sacraments," he said, because "in all Florida there was only one cleric, very old." This deficiency would soon be corrected. The very frigate that took Segura and his companions from St. Augustine to Havana made the return trip with a dozen missionaries (San Miguel, [1629]: 184–207; García, 1902: xviii–xix; Jones, 1978: 206–207).

At last, conditions were right for the Franciscans to erect churches, learn the native languages, and begin the task of conversion. They located their convents and churches in principal towns (*cabeceras*) with political rights over other towns, making their vicariate (*vicario*) coincide with the cabecera's territory. Using the cabecera convent as a hub, they visited tributary or satellite towns (*pueblos sujetos*) and hamlets (*lugares*) on an itinerant basis, calling these outstations, and the chapels in them, "*visitas*." During Holy Week and certain other seasons this procedure was re-

versed, and all the native Christians within the district gathered for services at "the vicario."

Young Andrés de Segura changed his name to San Miguel and became a Carmelite. Fifty years old when he wrote his account, he reflected on the mysterious ways of providence and concluded that he and his companions had been heralds of the gospel.

> God so disposed our path that in all the places where we were, populated or depopulated, the first five convents should be founded, because an español went over to the island where we first were, and with him as many Indians as required for its administration, and there founded a convent (San Miguel, [1629]: 198).

If San Miguel had his facts straight, the convent foundings of 1595 marked the beginnings of Guale population shift to the islands.[2] From the Spanish point of view there were good reasons for insular reductions. The islands, protected by marshes and moatlike waterways, offered vantage points from which to watch the coast for foreign intruders. They could be linked by ferries, forming a camino real all the way to the northern border. They put space between converts and their unconverted kinsmen. And, not least, the limited areas of islands made it easier to keep an eye on the inhabitants and tap them for tribute and labor.

Domingo Martínez de Avendaño was the governor who made the treaties with Ais and Guale. He accompanied the friars who came on San Miguel's frigate up to their posts, affixing the king's coat-of-arms to council houses and assigning tribute from Cumberland Island to St. Catherines. He promised that any soldiers who entered Guale territory would "carry trade goods with which to buy their food and not take from the Indians the little that they had" (Las Alas and Menéndez Márquez, 1595; Sánchez Sáez de Mercado, 1596; Franciscans, 1617).

The new missionaries had their eyes on the interior. From Tolomato, Pedro Fernández de Chozas and Francisco de Beráscola made an entrada on foot and horseback into the region of Tama, where the Ocmulgee and Oconee converge to form the Altamaha River (Ross, 1924: 178–179; Lawson, 1991: 28). But Tolomato, gateway to the interior, did not elect to become the springboard for a new Spanish sphere of influence.

In 1597, rebellions broke out in both new provinces almost simultaneously. First, the Indians of Ais refused to let Spaniards land within their territory. Swearing to punish the rebels, Governor Méndez Canzo turned on their closest settlement, Surruque, captured 50 inhabitants, and distributed them to his Spanish followers to perform their sentences of slavery (Menéndez Márquez, 1603).

The leader of the more serious Guale rebellion was "Juanillo," the heir to the chiefdom of Tolomato. The reason for the revolt put forward at the time was that the friars had tried to make Juanillo give up all his wives but the first one, and when he had balked, had gotten the governor to strike his name from the list of local authorities. This assault on cacique privilege may have been what triggered the rebellion, but it found support among those Guales who wanted to trade with French corsairs instead of Spaniards. As Menéndez had said, the French "let them live as they please." If change was unavoidable, they preferred it to be undirected. Perhaps the appearance of a French corsair off the coast in 1596, dropping off 36 Spanish prisoners from a captured galleon, had encouraged the Guales to renew their French alliance, on hold since the 1580 Battle of San Mateo (Méndez Canzo, 1602).

The rebellion began with coordinated attacks on four missions—Tolomato, Tupiqui, Asao, and Guale—and the killing of five Franciscans: Pedro de Corpa, Blás de Rodríguez, Francisco de Beráscola, and, at Santa Catalina de Guale, Miguel de Auñón and the lay brother Antonio de Badajóz. A fifth friar, Francisco de Avila, spent 10 months in captivity at Tulufina, spared in case of a prisoner exchange. On one occasion, his captors brought him two books of devotion and a breviary and ordered him to find out from his books how to make gunpowder and bullets for the 10 arquebuses in their possession (Geiger, 1937: 88–99, 105–108; Harkins, 1990: 461).

The chief of Guale participated in the revolt under protest, twice trying to warn the friars at Santa Catalina and escort them to the vicario at San Pedro de Mocamo before Juanillo's warriors could arrive. According to

Father Baltasar López, who came to Florida in 1585, San Pedro was the town "where Christianity first took root." It was "the head of the other maritime pueblos, even larger than the presidio at St. Augustine" (López, 1602). The cacique of San Pedro, don Juan, whom Father López had fostered from childhood, led a counterattack against 23 canoas full of Guale rebels and drove them off before reinforcements arrived (Oré, [1617–1620]: 71; Geiger, 1937: 87, 92–94).

Méndez Canzo's first trip into rebel territory achieved little more than the decent reburial of martyrs and the recovery of sacred treasure. Foreseeing a long war, he urged the Christians on Cumberland Island to move south to San Juan del Puerto, where he would reduce their tribute temporarily from one *arroba* of maize (approximately 25 pounds) per *casado*, or married man, to a token six ears. He also captured and enslaved a handful of youthful rebels (Matter, 1990: 44).

For six years, French sassafras traders came and went unhindered in the harbors of Guale, occasionally dropping off a crew member as a factor to make up the next cargo (Menéndez Márquez, 1603). Bartolomé de Argüelles, an official of the treasury, urged the governor to send the loyal Timucuans, reinforced by Spanish troops, on a campaign against the Guales, "to follow the coast and rivers and seize their canoas in which they go about to the islands for food, and burn their villages and cut down their maize and other crops, and capture some of them" (Argüelles, 1600). These, in the end, were the tactics Méndez Canzo used, reviving Menéndez Márquez's "war of fire and blood." Father Luis Gerónimo de Oré, a Peruvian Franciscan visiting the scene some ten years later, saw nothing wrong with them:

> Since all the Indians were hidden in the woods, the governor could neither punish them nor get in touch with them. They burned the maize fields and foodstuffs of the Indians. . . . On this account and due to what followed, during the subsequent years they had no maize harvest. Moreover since they were removed from the sea, they could neither fish nor gather shellfish, with the result that they suffered great hunger. Though the Indians sowed, it was little, while the Spaniards destroyed it every year, by which they understood that it was a punishment of God for having killed the fathers (Oré, [1617–1620]: 95–96).

As in 1579, the induced regional famine brought the majority of the rebels to terms. For the towns that surrendered, the price of pardon was steep: to turn on the one remaining rebel stronghold of Tolomato and punish it. The cacique of Talaxe led the campaign that burnt Tolomato to the ground and brought the rebellion to an end. As proof, he sent Juanillo's scalp to the governor (Ross, 1926: 174–178). Guale had been divided and conquered.

The rewards of conquest, slaves, were taken away from Méndez Canzo's men by a royal order in 1600 freeing all Indians held in bondage (Ross, 1926: 173–174; Matter, 1990: 44). The cédula was a general one, soon to be made a dead letter by the war in progress at the southern extreme of Spain's American empire. In 1598, Chile's Araucanian frontier had erupted in rebellion, with scores of español deaths and the loss of several settlements. The ensuing debate over whether Spanish captains could legitimately enslave Araucanian rebels went to the highest level. Reluctantly, Philip III resolved it in 1608 with a cédula permitting terms of slavery (Korth, 1968: 82–95).

In Florida, the governor resettled the liberated Surruques near St. Augustine (Argüelles, 1599; Méndez Canzo, 1600). The Guales, for a while, he left to themselves. St. Augustine had suffered a general fire in 1599 and needed to be rebuilt, as did San Pedro, center of the sassafras trade. Méndez Canzo also had his own business to attend to. "I trust that the peace the governor has made with the rebels of Guale is founded upon Your Majesty's service and the good of souls," wrote a treasury official to the Crown, "and he was not influenced by the temptation of sassafras, which they say fetches a high price in Seville" (Menéndez Márquez, [1601]).

THE NORTHERN BORDER

After what the colony had suffered from fire, famine, "El Draque," and Indian uprisings, it came as no surprise when Philip III, who came to the throne in 1598, inquired whether it would not be better to close the base in St. Augustine and put an end to the

drain on the royal exchequer. Don Pedro de Valdés, governor of Cuba, had his son conduct a formal hearing, at which 18 expert witnesses testified (Arnade, 1959a). Father Pedro Ruiz advised the Crown to abandon, not Florida, but St. Augustine—the site had no wood, no islands for the cattle, little fish, a ruinous sandbar, and nothing for building houses but palm thatch—and move the presidio north to Guale, which had "good ports," roads "leading to the mines of the interior, islands for raising cattle, fertile fields, plenty of wood for building houses, good clay for bricks and tile," and trade-conscious Indians "who would come in their canoas to our pueblo with produce, chickens and other meats to sell to us" (Ruiz, 1602). Personally, Father Ruiz thought that Méndez Canzo was much too lenient with Indians.

> In this country things go backwards, for when we see Indians doing some excess worthy of punishment and ask the governor to do something [about it], he passes over it; thus they hold him for a father and us for accusers, when it should be the other way around. The governor should be the one to punish and we with our entreaties to deliver them from the gallows and whippings, that they would hold us to be true fathers and hold him to be an upright judge (Ruiz, 1602).

At the time the rebellion broke out in Guale, Father Baltasar López was absent on an entrada to the five pueblos and 1500 people in the district known as Timucua, 50 leagues overland from San Pedro. He had made other entradas into the interior, or "*tierra adentro*," he said, to the districts of Potano, Ibi, and Icafui/Cascange, the latter subject to San Pedro. These four districts plus a fifth, Oconi, were awaiting conversion. One of those who wanted to move the presidio northward, López reminded the king that Guale was on the way to the sierras of Tama, where there were mines of gold and silver. On one of his journeys, he recalled, he had seen "Indians with gorgets and beads of gold passed hand to hand from pueblos close to that sierra."

Governor Méndez Canzo too had his mind on Tama and submitted a budget for a mounted entrada from Guale to the interior in the footsteps of Fernández de Chozas and Beráscola. He had, he said, already travelled inland as far as Oconi, on the borders of Tama (Méndez Canzo, 1602; 1603; see also [Cáceres, 1575?]; Lawson, 1991).

Counting up the number of native Christians, the Franciscans reported 200 in the vicario of Nombre de Dios, 500 in the vicario of San Juan del Puerto, and nearly 800 in the vicario of San Pedro. Once the missionaries' depleted ranks were replenished, it would be possible to return 1200 Christians to the fold in Guale, they said, and also resume the interrupted conversion of Mayaca and Agua Dulce (Informe, 1602; López, 1602), two districts which apparently lay on opposite sides of the north-flowing St. Johns above the tidewater line, putting them both well below St. Augustine on the map. An exact identification of the "Agua Dulce" district is complicated by the Spanish practice of lumping all missions on fresh water under the designation of "agua dulce" and all missions on salt water under "agua salada." Up to that time, every cabecera, and perhaps every pueblo sujeto and lugar as well, was either riverine or estuarine.

After looking over the depositions his son had collected, Governor Valdés recommended from Havana that the Florida garrison be cut by half and the provinces taken under his own governorship. Méndez Canzo, in one of his last letters to the Crown as governor of Florida, agreed with the reduction in forces and added that the artillery should be sent to safety. In Florida, he reasoned, costly cannons attracted pirates instead of repelling them (Matter, 1990: 46).

Putting aside his questions about the colony's future, the governor had thrown himself into the task of reconstruction, using the 10,000 ducats that had arrived in 1598 for a stone fort. As part of the rebuilding program, he had soldiers from St. Augustine go to the "city of San Pedro" to build a new church for the faithful Timucuans. In a long message to his successor, Governor Pedro de Ybarra, he reported the finished church to be "as large and capacious as the one in St. Augustine without its costing the Indians more than three hundred ducats, although it is worth two thousand" (Méndez Canzo, 1603).

A fresh consignment of nine Franciscans from Spain arrived safely, late in 1605, despite their ship's having run aground at the bar of Mosquito Inlet. Governor Ybarra in-

vited them to spend Christmas in St. Augustine, having their vestments made and recovering from their journey at the friary. After the soldier Gaspar de Salas returned from inspecting the churches and convents built to receive them, he personally escorted them to their new posts in Guale and Agua Dulce (Ybarra, 1605d; Matter, 1990: 47).

At Asao, one of the stops on Ybarra's progress through Guale, he admonished the Indians to "erect crosses along their roads similar to the one they have at the landing place. The cross is the perfect symbol of a Christian" (Geiger, 1937: 174–175). The church that was ready for consecration on St. Catherines was half a league from the landing place on the southern end of the island. Santa Catalina de Guale—Guale, for short—set the governor's party a better table than they had seen in other towns, with venison and pork in addition to cakes of Indian corn. In return, Ybarra invited the assembled chiefs to dine with him and share his wine (Lanning, 1935: 143–144). He reminded Bartholomé, cacique of Guale, and the lesser caciques of their promise to maintain a coast watch, reporting any vessels of foreigners, especially those that entered the sound (Geiger, 1937: 172).

Experienced missionaries were given the tasks of reopening the doctrinas of Talaxe and Santa Catalina (Ross, 1926: 184–186) and restoring sinners to the fold. At Santa Catalina, Father Pedro Ruiz found that during the period of apostasy the cacique of Guale had taken a second wife, a sister of his first one. He had three children by his second wife, and four by his first, who then died. He entreated Father Ruiz to let his sister-in-law continue to care for the children, promising that their "incestuous" relations would cease, and Ruiz consented. Once the friars felt strong enough to take action, however, they told the cacique that moral reformation had to begin at the top. He must send the woman back to her father's house and let them raise the seven children in the convent. Instead, the chief installed her and his children in a separate house, which he visited to take them food and firewood and to be fed. Ruiz recalled for the benefit of Visitor Oré years later that he then told the cacique:

> It would be better if you had never been a Christian, because in hell, being a pagan, you would not have to endure so many pains and torments, as you will have to, being a bad Christian. But I tell you in the name of God that if you do not amend, I will have to bury you or this woman within thirty days (Oré, [1617–1620]: 101).

The woman, he said, died 20 days later, and on the day of the funeral the cacique stood at the door of the church in tears, entreating the other men to leave the women they had stolen and to be satisfied with the ones God had given them through the Church. Similar manifestations caused many conversions, the friars reported (Oré, [1617–1620]: 101–103). To the modern historian they suggest the possibility that an epidemic followed the man-made famine of the war years.

Its short period of apostasy aside, Santa Catalina de Guale guarded the Florida border for nearly a century: from 1587, when Santa Elena was abandoned, to the time of its own abandonment in 1680. During most of this time, Santa Catalina's overlordship extended 10 leagues farther north to include the town of Satuache above the mouth of the Savannah River. When the rest of the province returned to the Spanish fold, the people of Satuache took up arms against the cacique of Guale over the issue of trade with the French, who continued to visit their harbors long after the ill-fated Ais and Guale rebellions. Without this trade, they claimed, they could not survive (Ybarra, 1605b).

Despite Satuache's opposition, the chief of Santa Catalina, as promised, passed on military intelligence to the Spaniards about the French early in 1605. "A large *navío* with much artillery and 27 persons," he said, was "bartering for sassafras and china[root]" in the Savannah River, 8 leagues to the north. The navío had put out a launch to sound the bars at St. Augustine and San Pedro. When the launch and her eight-man crew got as far as Santa Catalina, the cacique invited them ashore, killed the pilot and captain, and captured two others, whom he sent back to St. Augustine. Governor Ybarra, responding quickly, sent Captain Francisco Fernández de Ecija northward to trap the French ship at anchor. Caught at their moorings, the French tried to set the ship afire, but the Spanish put out the fire, and the ship, her 9 pieces of

artillery, and 21 Frenchmen became prizes of war. Ybarra reported to the Crown:

> I can only say that these foreigners have more knowledge of the coast and tierra adentro, mines of gold and other riches in it, than we do ourselves. Some of them confess that in the time of Gonzalo Méndez Canzo they were at that same port for two years. I keep a Spaniard up there now to tell me of the arrivals of ships, for the Indians are not to be wholly trusted (Ybarra, 1605b).

Uncomfortable with the idea of executing his prisoners as pirates, Ybarra appealed to the Crown to let him exchange them for ransom or send them to Spain. He was curtly reminded of the royal policy to give no quarter to corsairs, but to bring them to justice on the spot. Still reluctant, he postponed their punishment in order to give Bishop Altamirano an opportunity to heal their souls of Huguenot heresy (Ybarra, 1606; 1607; Menéndez Márquez and Las Alas 1609; Ross, 1924: 183–190).

The bishop, reminded by the king of his obligation to visit all parts of his diocese, travelled from Santiago de Cuba to Florida in 1606. It was a journey marked by storms, shipwreck, and pirates (Dávila, 1606). On his trip north from St. Augustine, the bishop stopped at San Pedro, San Juan, Talaje, Espogache, and Santa Catalina de Guale. In the province of Guale he confirmed a total of 756 Christians, 286 of them at Santa Catalina.

Four years after Florida was put on trial, Philip III, still hoping to cut the defense budget, instructed Governor Ybarra to return the garrison to its pre-1580s strength of 150 plazas, remove the artillery, raze the fort, and make plans to evacuate the Christian Indians to Española. Governor, treasury officials, and friars reacted as one to warn His Majesty of the disaster that would fall on loyal settlers, soldiers, and natives should the St. Augustine base be closed, and to remind him of the region's rich potential, lying, as always, just beyond the border (Ybarra, 1606; Menéndez Márquez, 1608; Peñaranda, 1608). In the end, it was not the pleas of primeros pobladores, the sad state of discharged soldiers, or the lure of gold mines that saved the colony; it was the king's obligation to 6000 native Christians—too many to relocate and unthinkable to abandon, body and soul (Matter, 1990: 52–54). Some of these may have been rushed into baptism. Governor Ybarra had heard of 4000 Christian souls, he wrote to the Crown, "and now the religiosos say there are 2000 more" (Ybarra, 1606).

Florida was not the only mission field on trial in the early 1600s nor the only place where Franciscans came forward with thousands of sudden converts. New Mexico survived its existential crisis by producing 7000 of them, virtually out of nowhere (Kessell, 1987: 92–93). "Rather than permit the spiritual loss of the native people," wrote Lansing S. Bloom about the resolution of this crisis, "the king chose to maintain a useless frontier province which produced no revenue but which rather occasioned continual heavy expenditure to himself" (Bloom, 1944: 5).

Despite the optimism displayed in Florida for the king's benefit at the turn of the century, the restored doctrinas of Guale did not lead the Spanish toward fabled Tama (Lawson, 1991). The factions of Guale's civil war were still alive and would remain troublesome until the French ceased to visit the province for sassafras around 1610. Exercising the prerogative of the patronato, Governor Ybarra forbade Franciscans to extend the frontier beyond what the garrison could police and supply. The friars of Guale and Agua Dulce had to content themselves with making entradas and founding strings of visitas westward from their vicarios (Ybarra, 1605a; Márquez, 1606; Pareja et al., 1608).

Satuache, not Santa Catalina, marked the northern border. In 1606 its name was missing from Bishop Altamirano's notarial list of seven towns subject to don Diego, head mico of Guale (Ross, 1926: 190–195; Lanning, 1935: 157). A year later, five other towns rebelled against their duty to the chief of Guale, who, presumably, turned to the Spanish for help to control them (Ybarra, 1608). In 1613 Satuache's name reappeared on a list of towns with convents (Jones, 1978: 185).[3]

The Spanish Crown responded to the Virginia Company's 1607 founding of Jamestown in the Chesapeake Bay with two missions of naval reconnaissance from St. Augustine. Florida had little to fear from the English colony to the north. As any mariner knew, the English would not be sailing south-

ward against the Gulf Stream, and, as Governor Juan Fernández de Olivera explained to the Crown in 1612, "the Indians of this coast have no communications with those of Virginia and are usually at war, and there are many swamps and rivers between there and here" (1612). According to contemporary geographic lore, the two things that Virginians threatened and sought were the northwest passage to the Orient and the silver mines of Zacatecas (Cumming, 1988; Hoffman, 1990).

Governor Juan de Salinas, in 1623, thought that Virginia and Bermuda were near enough neighbors that the Florida dotación ought to stay at 300 plazas (Salinas, 1623). Roused by reports that "blond men on horseback" were exploring inland, he dispatched two entradas in search of them under the command of a Timucuan chief. His successor, Governor Luis de Rojas y Borja, sent a third entrada of 10 soldiers and 60 Guale Indians. Although they covered 200 leagues of backcountry, the three parties succeeded only in relocating Hernando de Soto's "lagoon of pearls" (Rojas y Borja, 1625; 1628; Bolton and Ross, 1925: 24–25). Spain, at war with the Dutch since 1621, was in no position to undertake the conquest that would have been required to exploit an inland pearl fishery.

The northern border came to notice briefly in 1627 when the governor recommended Satuache as a good place to grow hemp and produce rope for naval stores (Rojas y Borja, 1627), but Spanish visitors to the border must have been few, for Satuache was able to hide three Protestant castaways from Spanish authorities for three years. In 1633 its chief, bypassing his overlord at Santa Catalina, brought three Englishmen down to St. Augustine to deliver to newly arrived Governor Luis de Horruytiner in person. They were survivors of a "*navío de alto bordo*," or "tall ship," that had gone down in a storm on her way to Virginia. Forwarding two of the prisoners to Havana, the governor reserved the third one, a smith by trade, for the service of the presidio. He had a precedent for doing so; an earlier shipwreck had fortuitously delivered into the hands of a former governor a cooper, who had been kept and put to work. The Junta de Guerra endorsed Horruytiner's decision to hold the smith and keep the cooper, but cautioned him to "watch that they do not infect others with their religion" (Horruytiner, 1633; Junta de Guerra, 1634). If the commandeered craftsmen followed the usual pattern of foreigners trapped in St. Augustine, they learned Spanish, converted to Catholicism, married, and were absorbed into the community.

Guale province as a whole, declining in population and burdened by demands for laborers and foodstuffs, was a backwater best known to the Franciscans, the masters of presidio sloops loading Indian corn, and the soldiers sent to escort the labor levy. The cutting edge of Florida conversions had already shifted from the vertical axis of the Atlantic coast to the horizontal axis, moving westward through Potano into western Timucua and the Gulf, where the future beckoned from populous, fertile Apalache.

THE PACIFICATION OF CENTRAL FLORIDA

The westward advance of missions in the early 17th century was not due to military conquests like the bloody conquest of Guale, nor yet to mass conversions such as those reported in eastern Timucua. Partly, perhaps principally, the "pacifications" of central Florida were due to the gifts which Governor Ybarra and his successor, Governor Fernández de Olivera, offered in the king's name to the chiefs who came to kiss their hands in St. Augustine (Ybarra, 1605a; Ruiz et al., 1612). Veteran Indian fighters were not altogether pleased with the new arrangement. Treasurer Juan Menéndez Márquez I grumbled that "no governor [had] made any other conquest, discovery, or entrada in person" since the days of his cousin Pedro Menéndez Márquez, "nor done anything other than go about attracting Indians with presents" at His Majesty's expense (Menéndez Márquez, 1608). But Governor Ybarra took it as a favorable sign when the young cacique of Potano with his advisors and vassals appeared to pay his respects and ask permission to reoccupy his lands after an exile of 25 years (Ybarra, 1605a).

As military entradas fell out of favor, mission entradas assumed a paramilitary cast: Indians armed with harquebuses and the Holy Cross emblazoned on a banner, as though the friars were reenacting a Crusade. They re-

turned a good report, like Caleb and Joshua spying out the Land of Promise. The land had rivers for watermills, they said, and forests so clear of underbrush that a horse could run under the trees. All it lacked was to be "peopled," meaning populated and made productive. The Indians were the only problem. Content to live on maize, acorns, roots, fish, and game, they pulled up foreign trees and seedlings and exterminated foreign livestock like vermin, "wishing to leave no trace or smell of us" (Ruiz et al., 1612).

The Franciscans' accounts of the Church Triumphant are the sole written evidence for most of the epidemics, wars, and explorations between Governor Ybarra's term, ending in 1610, and the mid-1640s—one of those periods when the documentary fountain goes dry and history literally goes underground. At times the friars' zeal approached the foolhardy (Pareja, 1617). It was a bold challenge to burn heathen images and erect Christian symbols in a pagan place, for the other side of veneration is the willful defiling of the sacred, and the missionaries were giving lessons in sacrilege.

For the time being, however, the friar on a "flying mission" who walked into a strange plaza might well find a cross already raised (López, 1602). The significance the Spanish attached to crosses was well known; the Indians who paddled out a league and a half to trade with a Cuban vessel anchored off the Gulf Coast in 1605 showed their friendly intentions by hoisting a large one made of pine (Ybarra, 1605e). "We friars who go out are well received," Ruiz reported in 1612, "and asked to stay or at least to put up a cross and show them where we want a church built for the friar who is to come" (Ruiz et al., 1612). Visitor Oré met natives who wanted him to tell them in advance the saint's name that their town would carry when it was Christian (Oré, [1617–1620]: 129).

Father Francisco Pareja wrote:

> In all the towns, they have their churches, and they emulate one another in building better ones. . . . Infieles come every day from their towns to those of the Christians, to receive the blessing of the religious. The friars ask them, "What are you looking for here?" They answer, "We came to see the church and your house and that of our relatives." After a while they return and say: "Father, we have a house for you and a church; come teach us" (Pareja, 1614: 104, 106–107).

Pareja and his fellow priests, he said, had made "many and important entradas into those provinces, and crosses have been raised, and there are simple and peaceable Indians, and house[s] and churches waiting for ministers" (Pareja, 1617).

If some of the structures were mere *ramadas*—what Kieran McCarty called "a seven-hour job" of "four upright poles" under "a pile of branches" (McCarty, 1983: 250)—the faith had nonetheless been planted. In a canonic sense, a convent was "erected" when construction began on permanent convent quarters (Bretos, 1983: 393). To erect a church all that was needed was a pastor, a few baptized believers, and a place in which to store the *sacra*.

In 1607 the mission program took a leap westward when Father Martín Prieto opened mission work in Potano. The next year the "great cacique of Timucua," with "more than twenty places under his command," invited Prieto and another friar to use their good offices to bring an end to the three-year war between his district and Apalache (Matter, 1990: 54). Their mediation was successful, but the price they exacted was

> to go and visit all his [the cacique's] towns and to throw down to the ground all the idols the places contained. Starting with the place where he was and which is now called San Martín, we burned twelve images in the center of the plaza; then we went to four other places and in each one of them we burned six images (Prieto, 1614: 114–115).

Ybarra consented to the advance of the frontier, characteristically taking credit for it (Matter, 1990: 122), despite signs of a new foreign threat on the horizon. A humiliating 12-year truce in 1609 between Spain and the Netherlands provided that Dutch and English merchants might trade in the West Indies anywhere that the Spanish could not demonstrate "effective occupation." The presidio of St. Augustine became, in effect, a coastguard station, its *capitanes de mar* scouring the coasts for evidence of intruders and vying with Cuba to secure the Gulf.

The new mission province was Utina, more

often called Timucua, the name of the dialect of the district, which was the principal western dialect of the Timucua language (Granberry, 1987: 16–19). The maritime chiefdoms of infieles to the west and south harassed the new towns of Christians until Captain Juan Rodríguez de Cartaya made Utina safe for Christianity with a gunboat in 1612. The captain's service record reads that he pacified "Carlos," chiefdom of the Calusas, and the chiefs of the coast all the way from Carlos to Apalache, with a gunboat built on "the river [going] to those provinces," and "he reduced those chiefs to the obedience of Governor Juan Fernández de Olivera in the name of Your Majesty, in everything respecting the religious on the frontier" (Rodríguez de Cartaya, 1613).

Understanding as he did "the nature of Indians," the captain was able "to subject that coast to peace for the first time, when it had formerly attracted many ships of enemies." Even the chief of Carlos, "most powerful of all that coast," sent word that "he wanted no more war with Christians." The conquest concluded with treaties of peace ratified by the exchange of presents, and hearing about it, other chiefs arrived for other gifts (Rodríguez de Cartaya, 1613). According to a 1612 report to Pope Paul V by the Franciscan Comisario General de Indies, Antonio de Trejo y Paniagua, one of these visitors was an 80-year-old chief who journeyed over 100 leagues from Apalache in search of salvation, bringing with him a son and a nephew whom he wanted to have catechized and baptized to ensure that the succession would be Christian ([Trejo y Paniagua], 1612: 491).

The Crown was trying a new combination of policies in its strategic colony: conquest by contract, pacification by gifts, and a firm hand with missionaries (Fernández de Olivera, 1612). No longer would founding a mission be a spontaneous act of faith; it would require three prior permissions: an invitation from the chief, a directive from the local superior of the Order, and a promise of support and protection from the governor.

Although the Franciscans would in time chafe at the curbs placed on evangelism by a system intended to reduce the incidence of mission failure and wars of reprisal, for the time being they were satisfied.

> The hour of God has come. . . . We who have been here twenty years taming and mastering Indians are overwhelmed. [Chiefs] come from more than 100 leagues to render obedience to Your Majesty and ask to be baptized. The governor receives them kindly, regaling, feeding, and clothing them, and giving them the kind of things they value, sending them to their lands again content (Ruiz et al., 1612).

In the friars' opinion, the effects of this policy on the Indians made it well worth the cost.

> Whatever they receive in peace to please them and reduce them to the service of God and Your Majesty is as nothing compared to the cost of making war on them, for the matchlock fuses alone would cost more. Besides, a war has no effect on them, for they have no properties. . . . But with the word of the Gospel and by clothing the naked, they come to us offering their lands, their wills, and their bit of food (Ruiz et al., 1612).

What the missionaries would do with this opportunity and these offerings remained to be seen.

NOTES

1. They were discolored because the women opened the oysters with fire. More than 100 years later, the St. Augustine parish priest reported that, in Guale, native women wore earrings of large, yellowed pearls (Leturiondo, [1700]: 201).

2. Grant Jones dates the beginnings of the move to the islands 14 years later, in 1609 (1978: 185).

3. Jones locates the 1613 convent on the Edisto River, north of Santa Elena (Jones, 1978: 185).

CHAPTER 6. ROYAL SUPPORT OF THE DOCTRINAS

THE DEMANDS OF DECENT WORSHIP

For a proselytizing religion trying to take root on a far frontier, Roman Catholicism made remarkably few concessions to local circumstances. The "*culto divino*" was ancient. Over the centuries its performance had become properly complicated, calling for irreducible paraphernalia and irreplaceable supplies. Elsewhere I have argued that the ritual demands of Roman Catholicism restricted it to a sedentary population and thereby limited its range in the New World to those native groups who were or would become "people of polity," fixed in place (Bushnell, 1990b). Streamlining the ritual or adapting it to an impoverished environment was tactically impossible. The Council of Trent had responded to the Protestant challenge by hardening on all fronts, defining disputed points of doctrine and demanding conformity to canon law, exact observance of ritual, and a universal, unvarying liturgy (Jedin, 1967; Polzer, 1976: 40).

It is ironic that the Franciscans, whose insistence on poverty and simplicity had made them a living reproach to the late medieval Church, should in the 16th century have been transformed into parish ministers, observing and causing others to observe the burdensome, material side of religion. Yet year after year in the Florida doctrinas, the friars and their disciples struggled with dedication and ingenuity to fulfill the demands of decent worship.

According to the Abbé Durand's handbook of Catholic ceremonies (1896: facing 88, 137), a priest's travelling kit for giving the last rites or performing emergency baptisms included these items:

pyx for the consecrated wafer
burse for the pyx
miniature vials for the Holy Oils
container for the salt
prayerbook
manual
container for the Holy Water
aspergillum for the Holy Water
crucifix
stole

Again according to the Abbé (Durand, 1896: facing 40), the priest going to say Mass in a "chapel of ease" created a portable altar with

an altar bell
altar cards
a missal
a crucifix
2 candlesticks with wax candles
oilstock and oil
a breadbox and bread
a wine flask and wine
a pyx for the consecrated wafer
2 cruets for the water and wine
a chalice
a paten
a cere-cloth
an altar cloth
the "fair linen": corporal, veil, purificator, pall, and burse
white vestments: amice, alb, cincture
liturgical vestments: maniple, stole, and chasuble in red, green, purple, or black

The "*hermita*" of San Marcos, which was the chapel in the Castillo, contained the following furnishings when it was inventoried in 1683:

an altar
a picture of Saint Mark
a crucifix
a frontal
some altarcloths
a chalice
a paten of silver
a chasuble
a stole
a maniple
a burse
some kind of "*paño*," or cloth
a missal
a basin
a small bell

A nearer equivalent to the "chapel of ease" was the doctrina de visita, tended by a travelling fraile de misa. While the Host itself was never kept in a visita chapel (Phelan, 1959: 68–69), images or crucifixes would be installed in places where the desecration of religious symbols was unlikely, sacralizing the spot and turning the chapel into a shrine.

In the contemporary Franciscan architecture of the Yucatan, according to architectural historian Miguel A. Bretos, a visita chapel was simply a sanctuary without a nave; it consisted of a stone-vaulted chancel and two adjoining rooms, one of them a sacristy and the other perhaps a baptistery or confessional. In place of the nave, the visita had a thatched, open-sided *ramada*, or open chapel, with a slightly raised stuccoed floor and a low stone wall. In the Yucatan, if the visita matured into a main doctrina with a resident friar, the open chapel was enclosed and became the church nave (Bretos, 1983).

The doctrina of a cabecera town, where the friar himself resided, had an iglesia with a permanent altar, installed fittings, a lavabo and a baptismal font, a full set of liturgical vestments, and stocks of consecrated oil. Most importantly, an iglesia possessed the vessels needed to display and guard the Blessed Sacrament with due reverence: a monstrance, a tabernacle to hold the consecrated elements of the Eucharist, and inside it a ciborium for the consecrated bread. The tabernacle was kept locked, and however faithful the catechist or the sacristan, no native was entrusted with the key (Bullones, 1728; Phelan, 1959: 68–69; Matter, 1990: 56).

On view within the iglesia were the *santos*, realistic paintings or painted images intended to aid the believer to reach a desired level of religious emotion (Christian, 1982: 110). According to John H. Hann's analysis of two inventories of Florida mission furnishings, dated 1681 and 1704 respectively, the average main doctrina (of which there were 34 in 1681) possessed 5 or 6 statues and 13 pictures or paintings (Hann, 1986a).

Out of sight in the sacristy were the iglesia's processional monstrances and crosses, torches and lanterns, whips for discipline, books for registering marriages, burials, and baptisms, handbells to call adults to prayer and children to catechism, and riveting pedagogical pictures of heaven and hell, saintly virtue and sinnerly vice. Hann estimates that if religious items were evenly distributed over the main doctrinas, the average iglesia, in addition to statues, paintings, sacred vestments and altar linens, was furnished with

1 monstrance
2 silver chalices
2 missals, one for Requiem Mass
7 handbells
2 or 3 large bells
8 brass candlesticks
1 silver lunet for the viaticum
1 set of cruets
1 or 2 silver chrism vials
1 altar lamp, either silver or brass
1 silver procession cross
1 thurible and incense boat and spoon
2 religious banners
2 engravings
1 wooden missal stand
1 cedar chest
1 silver crown or halo

Beyond the items inventoried, each main doctrina would have possessed a tabernacle, some chalices of base metals, and an altarstone containing a sacred relic. A well-furnished iglesia might also own processional lanterns, canopies, silver deposit vases, presses for making large hosts, and veils of silk. As Hann pointed out, the single cedar chest in the average inventory could not have held all these valuables; sacristies probably had built-in cabinets or shelves (Hann, 1986a).

After the initial gift of sacred furnishings, a doctrina had to manage on its own. The friars learned to make do. Resourceful Francisco Pareja and Pedro Ruiz made their own chalices out of lead and got by with one set of vestments between them (Pareja, 1614: 107). The neophytes for their part learned that being a Christian called for beeswax and little bells.

> With regard to the question of furnishings, despite their poverty, they are accustomed to bring some deer skins, in order to buy wax, for the burial of the dead; in other parts, by means of some arrobas of maize, and *machos*, for so they call the pigs, they have gathered enough to purchase some small bells (Pareja, 1614: 107).[1]

The burden of acquiring and guarding sacra was matched by the burden of keeping the doctrina in religous supplies, for the god of Spaniards made no concessions to practicality and could not be adored in a cake of Indian corn. The rituals of Catholicism, a religion that evolved in the Mediterranean, associated "decent worship" with grape wine, wheat flour, olive oil, beeswax, incense, and linen.

The wine for the Eucharist was made from the pure, untrodden, naturally fermented juice of grapes, or failing that, of reconstituted raisins. The host was an unleavened wafer made from white wheat flour and pure water. In the Latin rite anyone could bake the wafer who had access to the wafer irons, round presses (large for the priest, small for the communicants) that marked the wafer with the letters "I.H.S." or a crucifix. Pure olive oil was the basis of the holy oils (oil for the sick, oil for the catechumens, and oil of the chrism) blessed by the bishop at a special Mass on Maundy Thursday. Olive oil was also used in the lamp of the sanctuary. Candles of pure beeswax were used in Church ceremonies from baptism to burial. The simplest Mass required two lighted white wax candles on the altar, and the amount of wax expended increased with the solemnity or joyousness of the occasion, excepting the Easter vigil, when a single large paschal candle stood watch on the gospel side of the altar. Incense, a vegetable gum or resin, was burned in portable censers during a High Mass and other special ceremonies. By tradition five large grains of incense were fastened to the paschal candle. White linen was required for the officiating priest's amice and alb, the three cloths blessed by a bishop that covered the altar during Mass, and the unblessed waxed cloth that protected the altarstone.

The problem of maintaining, in the frontier colony of Florida, a regular and sufficient supply of these six necessities—wine, flour, oil, wax, incense, and linen—was to preoccupy missionaries, secular clergy, governors, royal officials, and caciques and influence the course of trade and agriculture.

GRANTS TO NATIVE CHURCHES

Pedro Menéndez's flagship, the *San Pelayo*, arrived in St. Augustine in 1565 with a full set of altar furnishings and eight bells, gifts of the Adelantado to his new colony. The great galleon, unable to enter the harbor, had to be sent south to escape a hurricane before the bells could be unloaded. In the Caribbean, mutineers seized control, changed course for Europe, and made it to the coast of Denmark, where the *San Pelayo* went down in a storm (Lyon, 1976: 91, 128).

When Menéndez lost his fortune, the church lost its chief patron. In 1604, shortly after the restoration of the missions in Guale, Father Pedro Bermejo reminded the Crown that Florida was dependent on the royal treasury for the support of religion. The españoles were too poor to give alms to the church, and the Indians were so poor that instead of giving alms, he said, they ought to receive them (Bermejo, 1604).

Hundreds of letters like Bermejo's can be found in the archives of the Indies. They were the grant application forms of the Spanish Empire, for, recognizing the expense of establishing decent worship on the frontier, the Crown made two kinds of grants to doctrinas. The first were the extraordinary grants for building and furnishing, funded by the royal share of Indies tithes. The second were the ordinary grants for supplies, funded in most places by the income of encomiendas that had reverted to the Crown. In Florida, which had skipped the phase of private encomiendas, the Crown left it up to local officials to find an alternate source of funds for supply grants.

Construction grants to native churches in Florida took the form of iron tools and nails fashioned at the royal forge in St. Augustine. In the mid-1630s, a period of Florida mission expansion, Comisario Alonso de Jesús petitioned:

> We need nails, as many as the chief carpenter specifies, enough for the size of the temples being built, and iron tools to lend during the construction. And when the church in a pueblo is finished the chiefs or the friar will return them to Your Majesty, for they cannot afford to buy tools. At present the friars are buying the nails and tools out of their rations (Jesús, [1635?]).

The governor endorsed this request with the stipulation that the treasury officials keep track of the tools and nails, dispensing them as needed (Jesús, [1635?]).

Archaeologist Rebecca Saunders, reviewing the state of knowledge on Florida mission architecture, came to several general conclusions. Church size in Florida bore little relation to the size of the congregation; perhaps Mass was celebrated in open chapels. Only the postrebellion church of Santa Catalina de Guale showed evidence of the formal *atrio*,

or atrium, common to 16th-century Mexico. Mission buildings were arranged in a quadrangle. Church, convent, and kitchen were most often constructed of wattle-and-daub, a Spanish peasant building technique which the friars introduced. Occasionally the walls were whitewashed. Some native churches were entirely built of wood; others were a mixture, with a nave of wattle-and-daub and a sanctuary of the more expensive vertical wall boarding. Sanctuaries were commonly elevated, with wide, stairstepped "*gradas*" (Saunders, 1990).

Archaeologist Rochelle A. Marrinan, reviewing the same architectural data, warned against what she saw as "a readiness to accept the missions of *La Florida* as small, rustic settlements."

> Evidence from other areas indicates that wherever the Franciscans went, they demonstrated an organizational concept of mission plan. The ruins of the Southwestern missions stand as testimony to their obvious ability to translate, through the labor of the native population, the architectural plan of places of worship in a grand scale (Marrinan, 1991: 251).

Franciscans in Florida were just as able, Marrinan argued. If the identifying features of a church structure were subfloor burials and the absence of internal partitions, then at four mission sites, she said, convent structures have been mistakenly identified as churches, and the churches have yet to be found (Marrinan, 1991: 250).

In the contemporary Yucatan, Franciscan churches were adorned with mural paintings, floor to ceiling, in which architectural elements were combined with standing figures or themes associated with the Order: Saint Claire, Saint Francis, and the Immaculate Conception (Bretos, 1983). No such murals have been detected archaeologically in Florida, although there is documentary evidence for murals, at least of a secular kind. In a 1700 memorial to the Crown, parish priest Alonso de Leturiondo wrote that on a certain hacienda near St. Augustine-there was

> a piece of land where the Indians extract very fine and light powders of all colors, which they use to make pigments, and, with them they paint their council houses and churches, their battles and histories with great naturalness" (Leturiondo, [1700]: 201).

The king's baptismal gift to a new "foundation" was the same for the converts of every order: a 1000-peso ayuda de costa for a start-up set of religious furnishings: vestments, bells, ornaments, and other necessities of the "divine cult." Unquestionably, 1000 pesos multiplied by the total number of mission foundations represented a heavy outlay for the royal treasury, but the same grant-in-aid that aided the natives to become Christians also eased their transition into full-time farming by supplying them with tools for construction and tillage, seeds, domestic animals, and even food and clothing, at least for the duration of the catechumenal state (Bringas, [1796–1797]: 73, 127; Bolton, 1917: 7–11; Tibesar, 1967; Block, 1980: 165; Kessell, 1987: 122).

As early as 1595 the royal officials of Florida were forwarding what appeared to be a routine order for bells, vestments, and chalices for the new conversions (Las Alas and Menéndez Márquez, 1595). It would avoid delays, Comisario Juan Gómez de Palma suggested ([1637?]), if the Crown would simply order that every newly formed doctrina be given a complete set of what was necessary instead of approving the cases one by one. Without the furnishings for new churches, incoming friars were unable to administer the sacraments and had to double up in the doctrinas and devote themselves to language study and the frustrating task of teaching through an interpreter (Ybarra, 1605d; Fernández de Olivera, 1612). With proper coordination, new friars and the necessities for new churches could arrive more or less at once.

The Indians who were the objects of conversion often showed more interest in the trappings of religion than in the content. Governor Fernández de Olivera, sending an order for "ornaments and vestments and all the supplies for altars," asked the Crown to be sure that some of the bells were "around two arrobas or a little more, to which these people have taken a fancy" (1611). A generation later, the bold mendicant Gómez de Palma ([1637?]) wrote to ask for more:

> It is now twenty-five years since Your Maj-

> esty made us a grant of some ornaments and bells, which in the course of time have become so worn out that [Mass] cannot be celebrated with decency. I beg of Your Majesty that we be given ornaments and some small bells of two or three *quintales*, and that when a doctrina is founded it may receive the necessary things of this kind ([1637?]).

Gómez de Palma's "small bells" weighed two and three hundred pounds.[2]

Indian infieles who entered the provinces and consented to settle in "regular pueblos" also received "ornaments and bells and the other things that are given to a new doctrina" (Auto, 1682a). Non-Indian infieles also qualified. In 1609 the African leader Yanga presented the viceroy of New Spain with the terms under which he and his maroons would cease their guerrilla war in the mountains between the capital and Vera Cruz. They wanted the status of a free town with Yanga as their governor, a cabildo, no Spaniards except on market days, no missionaries other than Franciscan friars, and ornaments for their church from the Crown. The viceroy accepted these conditions and the town of San Lorenzo de los Negros was duly founded (Davidson, 1966).

The second kind of grant to a doctrina was for religious supplies. The Franciscans of the original apostolic mission to Florida were guaranteed a supply of wine and olive oil for divine worship even before they left Spain. By a cédula of 1573 the Crown promised each fraile de misa one and a half arrobas of sacramental wine a year for six years and enough oil collectively to keep the lamp of the Blessed Sacrament burning (Geiger, 1937: 37, 256–257). This too represented a sizeable expenditure. In 1608 the Crown spent 100,000 pesos (72,545 ducats) on limosnas of oil and other religious necessities to missionary friars and medicines for their convents (Castañeda and Marchena, 1978: 14, 17, 29).

As wine and oil cédulas were renewed, they achieved greater precision: for each friar celebrating Mass, over and above the wine for his table, 48 cuartillos of sacramental wine per year—an amount which, once set, did not vary (Gómez de Palma, [1637?]; Montiano, 1738a); for the friary, 6 arrobas of olive oil (Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1693). Not knowing what else to do with the expense of the lamp oil, the treasury officials in St. Augustine charged it to the friars' building fund (Menéndez Márquez et al., 1608).

By a general cédula of 1633 the limosnas of wine and oil to all the convents of the New World were charged against local tributes and labor revenues. In places without Crown encomiendas of tribute-paying Indians, governors and viceroys were told to look for some way to cover the limosnas apart from the royal treasury (Jesús, [1635?]). The wine and oil cédulas were designed for periodic review and reevaluation every four to six years (Pérez, [1646?]b). Yet according to the Escribanía de Cámara (1689), the four convents of the Franciscan Province of Santa Elena (Florida, Havana, Santiago, and Bayamo) remained wholly dependent on the royal treasury for their oil and wine, neither Florida nor Cuba having any tributary Indians.

Little was said about a limosna of wheat flour for baking the hosts. As parish priest Alonso de Leturiondo observed in 1689, there must have been an original cédula for that, along with the ones for oil and wine, as it was customary to allow every celebrant 6 pounds of flour per month above his rations (Leturiondo, 1689a).

Of all the supplies essential to religion, it was wax, mysteriously formed in the bodies of virgin bees like Christ in the womb of Mary, that gave the religious in Florida the most trouble. Unlike the royal provisions for wine, oil, and flour, there seemed to be no cédula for a limosna of beeswax.

In 1617 the friars of Florida put in a request for 1 arroba of wax apiece for saying Mass, suggesting that the cheapest place to buy it was Campeche, in the Yucatan (Franciscans, 1617). Several years later they changed the amount to 2 arrobas, a request which the governor and treasury officials refused to endorse, saying that 1 arroba was plenty (Jesús, [1630]). In the late 1630s Gómez de Palma ([1637?]) stated that the king's alms of wax for all 43 missionaries in Florida was only 6 arrobas, allowing barely 4 pounds per friar. He asked for 25 additional arrobas to divide among them.

An investigation of the record at the Escribanía de Cámara (1689) showed that the king had been providing 10 arrobas of wax to the missionaries of Florida—the Indians

paying no tributes against which supplies could be charged—and that the cédula authorizing the wax had just been renewed for six years. In 1706, after the ravages of Queen Anne's War had reduced the numbers of both Christian Indians and friars, the alms of wax dropped back to the earlier level of 6 arrobas (Montiano, 1738a).

When Comisario Gómez de Palma ([1637?]) petitioned the Crown for a ration of wax, he also asked that the frailes de misa be given 8 varas a year of *ruán*, or cotton cloth from Rouen, for "the service of the altar" (the towels and napery) so they could enjoy the "spiritual sustenance" they hungered for as much as "earthly food." In the manner of budget planners Gómez may have padded the figure to allow room for cuts. A cédula of 1706 entitled each friar to 4 varas of ruán yearly plus 4 ounces of ornamental braid (Montiano, 1738a).

The grants of sacramental supplies to frailes de misa functioned as expense accounts in kind instead of money. Doctrineros regularly bartered their measures of flour, wine, and olive oil for religious ornaments, construction tools and materials, for candles to baptize, marry, and bury their parishioners, and even for shrouds (Franciscans, 1657a; 1681a; Bullones, 1728; Benavides, et al. 1733).

PRODUCING RELIGIOUS SUPPLIES

The grainfields, vines, and groves of the dry plateaus about the Mediterranean produced the Spanish staples of life: wheat, grapes, and olives. Wherever Spaniards settled they planted them, even in hot, humid climates where the wafer for Mass bent "like wet paper," but experiments showed that Mediterranean-style agriculture could be reproduced only in the valleys of coastal Peru. Of the "table triumvirate" of wheat, grapes, and olives, only wheat grew well in New Spain (Crosby, 1972: 65–74; Lynch, 1984: 235, 229). As a result, Florida's garrison and missionaries were rationed on Mexican flour, Andalusian olive oil, and Canaries wine—all of it passing through the approved port of Vera Cruz.

Situado shipments to Florida being at the mercy of war, weather, and bureaucrats, the staples for rations arrived irregularly. When they were delayed, an español of the "better sort" fell back grudgingly on the Indian corn, hog lard, and cassina tea with which an español of the "lower sort" was already well acquainted. In times of actual famine, españoles, like Indians, survived on a root called "*ache*" and other wild foods of the swamps and forests.[3]

The Lord's Table permitted no such substitutes. If without wax candles the Mass lacked "decency," without wheat and wine a priest was reduced to performing the "*misa seca*," or "dry Mass," which stopped short at the point of consecration. Yet sacramental supplies were delivered to Florida as erratically as rations. Once in the late 17th century none arrived for three years (Pérez, [1646?]b; Ojeda, 1687). To bridge the gap between the fluctuating supplies of religious necessities from royal alms and the steady demand for them in the Florida doctrinas, the friars appealed in emergencies to the generosity of private persons, hoping to rely in the long run on the productivity of Indians. It was in the interest of all Catholics to make the colony self-sufficient in religious essentials.

The first agricultural experiments were made by the *labradores* who arrived in Florida in the early 1570s with seedstock and cuttings. These farmers quickly found the climate and soil of Santa Elena and St. Augustine unsuitable for replicating Iberian crops. Plant assemblages from 16th-century sites in those two places reveal that despite their best efforts, wheat, olives, and other Iberian staples were rarely available (Scarry and Reitz, 1990).

The friars, also making experiments, claimed in 1612 that their wheat was as good and its yield as abundant as that from "the Plain of Morata" (Franciscans, 1612). Not everyone was so optimistic. One missionary in the mid-1640s lamented that Florida was "so destitute of the things necessary for human life that it did not produce wheat or any other kind of bread, nothing but maize" (Pérez, [1646?]a).

By that time, Governor Benito Ruiz de Salazar y Vallecilla had started his own wheat farm in western Timucua, near the doctrina of Asile. For several years his foreman, a mulatto slave, replanted the yield to augment the seed until at last they were ready to send

off to the Canaries for millstones and a miller. Unfortunately, by the time the miller arrived, the governor had died in one of the mid-century epidemics. His son Luis sold the farm to the Crown, but Pedro Benedit Horruytiner, a creole interim governor, dismantled it at the request of the Franciscans and auctioned off the slaves and equipment below cost (Informe, 1645; Salazar y Vallecilla, [1650?]; Ponce de León, 1651b; Ponce de León et al., 1651; Horruytiner, 1657; Las Heras and Leturiondo, 1657; Rebolledo, 1657).

Wheat was soon established as a secondary crop in Apalache and western Timucua. Governor Diego de Rebolledo, on a visita of Timucua and Apalache, saw for himself that the friars and chiefs cultivated enough of it that flour no longer had to be imported to the western doctrinas (Rebolledo, 1657). In 1658 the governor of Havana listed wheat along with maize, cattle and pigs, ambergris, and deerskins, as titheable products with the potential to support a bishop in Florida (Salamanca, 1658). Bishop don Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, visiting Apalache in 1674, reported that the wheat the province produced was of excellent quality and high yield, each *fanega* of seed yielding 70 fanegas of grain (Díaz Vara Calderón, [1675]: 13–14). Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera, disregarding military rules against planting anything on the campagna that might give cover to an enemy, sowed 3 arrobas of wheat on the landward side of the Castillo and harvested 200 arrobas, or so he claimed (Márquez Cabrera, 1683).

At last, if one of the doctrinas in the Florida mission network ran out of imported "*harina de trigo*," locally grown wheat was available. It could have been distributed in several forms: in the whole grain, husked or unhusked; as unrefined, or unbolted, whole wheat flour; or as refined, or bolted, white flour, without bran or germ. White flour was preferred because it kept better and because the wafer for Mass was supposed to be white, but whether the miller who came in from the Canaries refined the flour on top of milling it is unknown. Unrefined flour keeps poorly; insects like it better than white flour and the oil in the wheat germ becomes rancid in warm weather. Any flour could be ruined by a driving rain or a capsized boat, whereas wheat in the whole grain could conceivably be rescued and dried before it had time to swell and sprout or mildew. In the right container—moisture-free, insect- and rodent-proof—whole grains would keep almost indefinitely. Grains of wheat have been found archaeologically at San Luis de Apalache and in two locations of the mission of Santa Catalina de Guale, on St. Catherines and Amelia islands (Ruhl, 1990).

Wine was the next necessity. Florida has several native species of grapes, including the fox grape and the muscadine (Larson, 1980: 198). In the 1730s, promoter Antonio de Arredondo (1738) reported wild grapes the size of large filberts, but the botanist William Bartram was impressed only by the size and ubiquity of native grapevines and reported that the fruit was small and disagreeable (Bartram, 1791: 91–92).

Español settlers introduced cuttings of European species. When the British took over St. Augustine in 1763, they found that most of the houses had before their entrances "arbours of vines, producing plenty and very good grapes" (De Brahm, 1773: 298). These were probably eating varieties, as experiments with wine grapes in New World climates similar to Florida's had proven disappointing. Yet there may have been exceptions. A reliable Indian sent up to St. Simons Island during the War of Jenkins' Ear to spy on Governor Oglethorpe's forces reported on his return that the officer in charge had heard of a certain bountiful grapevine at the governor's house in St. Augustine and had boasted that the British would soon be making wine and brandy from those very grapes (Los Reyes, 1738).

Whether or not a supply of emergency sacramental wine was handpressed at the doctrinas year after year when grapes were in season, and whether this local wine, decanted into earthenware jars or pitch-impregnated casks or corked glass bottles, was stored in a place cool enough to prevent the bacteria from turning it into mother of vinegar are all questions that have yet to be answered. As far as the Mass was concerned, the problem was less critical than that of wheat, because wine could always be made from dried grapes, raisins, which stored relatively well.

Olives were never successfully grown in

Florida. The Holy Oils and Holy Chrism (a mixture of balsam and olive oil) were necessarily imported—which they would have been anyway because they had to be consecrated by the bishop in person on Maundy Thursday of Holy Week, and until St. Augustine became the seat of an auxiliary bishop in 1736, this happened only twice, in 1606 and 1675 (Ross, 1926: 190; Gannon, 1965a: 46–48, 61–66, 79–80, 87–88).

Substitutes for the olive oil burned in lamps were familiar native products. Despite the suspicions of Spanish officials, the lamp of the Blessed Sacrament in Florida doctrinas was not lit with "unclean" tallow, lard, whale oil, or bear grease, nor with "evil-smelling" hygerilla oil, nor did the friars rely on pine-knot torches or glass lanterns containing a candle. The Indians extracted two kinds of sweet vegetable oil, one from liveoak acorns and the other from hickory nuts, crushed and boiled in water (Bartram, 1791: 9; Larson, 1980: 187). Natural stands of live oaks and hickories were highly valued; their harvesting was "a kind of quasi-agriculture" (Hatley, 1989: 239–240). The Indian wife of a soldier, Teresa Martín, when asked about her girlhood home 150 leagues inland from the Georgia coast, recalled that it had a salt spring and plenty of nuts to make oil (Relation, 1600).

Wax candles were obligatory at Mass, during processions, and at private religious services. Español parishioners customarily supplied the candles when they asked the priest to perform a marriage, burial, or baptism. Afterward, the sacristan or another assistant carefully collected the drippings and stubs and recycled them, for beeswax was costly, whether bought in bulk or made up into pound and half-pound vigil tapers (Laudonnière, 1586: 145; Davis, [1737]; Montiano et al., 1745).

Indians were lax about candles. The friars complained that in order to perform burials, marriages, and baptisms "with decency" they themselves had to provide the wax. Bishop Altamirano, too, when he confirmed the Christians of San Pedro and San Juan del Puerto in 1606, bought the wax and wrote it off as a charity (Dávila, 1606).

One might think that wax could have been produced locally, but unlike the Indians of the Yucatan, Florida natives did not take to beekeeping (Franciscans, 1617; A. Leturiondo, 1689a). In 1748 a party of Yuchis visiting St. Augustine brought beeswax to barter with the españoles, but this was long after the mission period was over (Montiano, 1748). Bartram, travelling in the provinces of East Florida and West Florida in the 1770s, reported honeybees south of the former mission provinces of Guale and Apalache only (Bartram, 1791: 164, 193–194, 251–252, 330).

There was no specific cédula covering incense. If, as Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada declared, the Crown provided the Franciscans with everything they needed (Matter, 1990: 85), incense may have come under the category of miscellaneous expenses in the doctrinas as it did in the parish church (Leturiondo, 1689a). There were thuribles, incense boats, and incense spoons aplenty in the main doctrinas (Hann, 1986a: 159), although occasions for using them may have been rare.

Perfumed gums and aromatic resins came from the "balsam coast" of Guatemala and the Yucatan (Franciscans, 1617; Leturiondo, 1689a). Copal, the incense of the Mayas, had long been important to the Mesoamerican trade network of precious goods. Little is known about incense as an extractive product in Florida. Arredondo declared in the 1730s that the colony was rich in the woods for resins, pitch, and turpentine and that the Yuchis traded balsams as well as deerskins to the English (Arredondo, 1738).

The final necessity was linen. All the white linen for priestly vestments and altar "clothing" appears to have been imported, as were other textiles used in Florida: Oriental silks, English woolens, Mexican wool blankets, Campeche cottons, and linens from Holland and Brittany. An indigenous variety of cotton existed and for a quarter of a century plans were discussed to bring in either 24 families of native weavers and spinners from Campeche or 12 families from Tlaxcala to teach the Florida Indians how to weave cotton cloth, but the Mexican artisans never came (Hita Salazar, 1675; Márquez Cabrera, 1680b; 1683; Zúñiga y Cerda, 1701e).

Parish priest Leturiondo reported hopefully in 1700, "the flax is a wonder the way it flourishes and grows" (Leturiondo, [1700]:

201). Retting and spinning flax were common household skills, but weaving was a specialized one and few households boasted a loom. Even had homespun linen been available, altar linens would still have been imported, for they, like the Holy Oils, had to be consecrated by a bishop.

Three of the six demands of decent worship—wheat, wine, and an acceptable substitute for olive oil—the Indians had managed to produce. The other three—wax, incense, and linen—native production did not satisfy. But there was another option. If they could not produce the genuine articles, they could produce something for export that could be exchanged for them, and enough more to beautify their churches. The door was opened to trade in Indian products through the ports of Florida, a trade which governors, caciques, friars, and floridanos would find more and more absorbing.

NOTES

1. The 34 doctrinas in Florida in 1681 among them owned 238 "little bells, some with stands and others without, to ring the *sanctus*," and 92 "bells to ring the mass" (Inventory, 1681). The military also used small signal bells (Betancourt, [1763]).

2. Brass bell fragments have been found archaeologically at San Damián de Escambé in Apalache (Jones and Shapiro, 1990: 498) and bronze ones at Santa Catalina de Guale (Thomas, 1988b: 104).

3. For fuller discussions of imported and native foods see Larson, 1980; Reitz and Scarry, 1985. On *ache* use and processing see Leturiondo, 1697a; [1700].

CHAPTER 7. ROYAL SUPPORT OF THE SPANISH PARISH

THE PARISH AND BENEFICE OF ST. AUGUSTINE

St. Augustine was a city, entitled on formal occasions to call itself "the noble and loyal city," although informally its *vecinos* called it "the presidio" or "the plaza." The corps of its vecinos consisted of all of the free, non-Indian heads of households in the captaincy general of Florida, for St. Augustine was the colony's one Spanish municipality from 1587, when Santa Elena was depopulated, until 1698, when an expedition from New Spain reoccupied the site of Pensacola. The city's *término*, meaning its hinterland or jurisdiction, was the ecumene of Florida. The Indian towns within that ecumene, with their houses and council houses, fields and hunting grounds, caciques and principales, were self-governing within parameters that were set in St. Augustine by Spanish authorities who considered themselves the natives' patrons and protectors. The parish of St. Augustine coincided geographically with the city, yet the corps of parishioners was larger than that of vecinos. Regardless of caste or social status, whether native, peninsular, or naturalized, every non-Indian Roman Catholic who was a resident of Florida was a member of the parish of St. Augustine.

If the Counter-Reformation Church placed high demands on doctrina Indians, it asked as much of other Catholics. Reasons of pride and reasons of politics combined to call for heavy investments in the ecclesiastical infrastructure. It was expedient to awe those gentiles who visited the city with Spain's spiritual authority as well as its military might. The presidio's fortifications, artillery, and ships testified expressively to the power of the Sword; its ornately furnished religious edifices and solemn services, to the power of the Gospel. These, along with the street theater of religious processions and the military drills on the plaza, were designed to impress proud caciques and humble indios with the superiority of all things Spanish.

"*La iglesia parroquial*," as the main church of the parish was called, provided numerous social services to the local community. Españoles looked to their parish churches and priests to relieve the poor, educate the young, place and watch over foundlings, pressure debtors, combat heretics, bury the dead, take the yearly census, and keep the registry of baptisms. By the early 18th century most churches also kept books of marriages and burials.

The church's *campanario*, or belltower, was the community timepiece, calling the faithful to their evening and morning devotions with the regularity of a muezzin in a minaret. At the ringing of "*las ánimas*" the soldier making his evening rounds bowed his head without self-consciousness to say an Our Father and a Hail Mary for the souls in purgatory.[1]

The church was a public source of information, with announcements made from its pulpit and notices posted on its front doors. The priest was expected to screen the news; if defamatory or seditious writings appeared on the church, he would be held responsible, for Spanish authorities were expected to present a common front to the Indian laborers from the provinces, the royal slaves of African origin, and the racially diverse "*involuntarios*" or "*forzados*" serving sentences of exile and forced labor at the presidio, all of whom were believed to watch their masters closely for signs of disunity (Las Heras and Prado, 1653; Torres y Ayala, 1697c).

In a society prepared to interpret fire, flood, war, and famine as divine judgments and to view happier events as occasions to praise and thank God, public prayers were a civic duty. Governors, reminded of their duty by general royal orders, responded to the onset of war between Spain and other countries by sponsoring general reformations of morals (in effect, crackdowns on other people's sinful habits) and, for the success of His Majesty's arms, ordering general processions through the town and "rogations, sacrifices, and prayers" at the parish church, the Franciscan convent church, and all the doctrinas of Indians (Horruytiner, 1636; Palacio y Valenzuela, 1758a). Accessions, births, and espousals in the royal family were celebrated, by royal command, with sermons of thanksgiving and Te Deum Masses in all of the

churches of the Indies, and royal deaths were publicly mourned (Solana, 1702a; 1702b; Navarrete, 1751).

Finally, for someone who had accidentally committed a serious offense and feared a violent reprisal, the Church offered sanctuary. Any church in the city was entitled to take such an individual under its protection. While the avenger cooled off, ecclesiastical authorities took counsel with one another and decided whether to grant the culprit asylum, deliver him up to secular justice, or offer their services in arbitration. Among those who had recourse to sanctuary in St. Augustine were a royal accountant fleeing from an enraged colleague (Ponce de León, 1632), an unidentified soldier running down the street with his governor in hot pursuit (Anon., 1655), a presidio pilot who ran a supply ship aground on the St. Augustine sandbar (Pérez de Mancilla, 1682), the passengers of some Cuban tobacco smugglers captured by the coastguard (Auto, [1756]; Consejo de Indias, 1756), and a whole squad of soldiers on strike for better conditions (Palacio y Valenzuela, 1758b).

The privilege of sanctuary was limited to Spanish males. No one in Florida, it seems, had the wealth to endow a nunnery in which female victims of violence could be protected or female miscreants confined. And there are no known cases of Indians seeking asylum in the precincts of a church. Theoretically, every mission compound was a sanctuary and every native convert had "fled to the Sacred." It was regrettable that some neophytes seemed as ready to flee from the Sacred as toward it.

A settlement desiring to split off from an existing parish and establish parochial status for itself was ordinarily expected to prove that it could support a parish church—that the community could cover the priest's living stipend, pay for the sacramental services, and subscribe at least three *cofradías*, or confraternities, to sponsor Masses and festivals, cover the cost of altar supplies, and furnish the church with a respectable assortment of crucifixes, candelabra, statues, and pictures (Graff, 1976: 340–342). On a strategic frontier, the Crown asked less of settlers, underwriting their isolated, struggling parishes, as it did the doctrinas, with a variety of financial supplements.

The support structure for a parish of Spaniards was a complex mixture consisting of (1) alms from the king and other patrons; (2) ecclesiastical taxes, including the "*primicias*," or firstfruits, and a percentage of local tithes; (3) investment income from property rentals and interest-bearing instruments; and (4) altar fees, or the charges for sacraments and special services.

A fortunate congregation enjoyed the alms of a wealthy local patron or patroness. Pedro Menéndez de Avilés set out for Florida with a full set of altar furnishings and eight large bells. His wife, doña María de Solís, Florida's first *gobernadora*, adorned the church at Santa Elena with a painted retable, a gilded cross, and an image of Santa Clara, patron saint of Avilés. Governor Méndez Canzo gave the parish church in St. Augustine a silver lamp, a silver chalice, and a large carved retable; Governor Quiroga donated the pillars, bases, and ornaments for two campanarios; and Governor Joseph de Zúñiga bestowed a scarlet altarcloth and a chasuble on the shrine of Santa Barbara, patroness of artillerymen (Méndez Canzo, 1603; Quiroga y Losada, [1697]b; Leturiondo, [1707]; Lyon, 1990: 289). Most of the members of the parish congregation, however, were underpaid soldiers and mariners or their even poorer relatives, and a good number were slaves or convicts. Taken together, they could no more support a proper church in St. Augustine than could a "*pordiosero*," begging alms in the name of God.

As we have seen, the Crown routinely provided Indian doctrinas with the means to conduct divine worship: a start-up kit of vestments, ornaments, and bells; remittances of supplies for the sacraments; and not least, a doctrinero. Needy churches of españoles on the peripheries of empire could apply for grants that were similar in character to the royal alms given to doctrinas, knowing that the royal patronato gave the king a decisive say in ecclesiastical taxation and that, furthermore, His Majesty had a discretionary fund allowing him to shift resources from a richer region to a poorer one.

The *Recopilación* instructed the royal officials of all the regional treasuries (sweepingly referred to as "*nuestras cajas*," or "our coffers") to keep a book of accounts of the Crown's local revenues: the customs duties,

the judicial fines, the confiscations, and the "*novenos*," or "ninths" (Recopilación, 1681: lib. 3, tít. 44).[2] These "ninths" were the king's discretionary fund derived from the tithes, known as the "*diezmos*," or "tenths." The diezmos were an ecclesiastical tax that the king as head of the Church was entitled to collect from his Spanish subjects wherever they resided, in "these kingdoms" of Spain or in "those kingdoms" of America.

Despite its name, the tax could be as low as 2½ percent of yearly increase, which is what it was in Florida. According to the *Recopilación*, the products titheable were fruits, grains, animals, dairy products, apiary products, wool, and cacao. By law, only the Republic of Spaniards was liable to the tithes, just as only the Republic of Indians paid tribute. An español whose tithe payments were in arrears could be denied a passport to travel outside his parish (Robertson, 1931: 162). But the Crown was lenient. In the case of a new colony or of sponsored settlement on a remote frontier, the king routinely forgave the tax for a grace period of ten years or even longer.

The Indies tithes were divided according to an elaborate formula. Normally, the Crown assigned one quarter to the bishop and one quarter to the cathedral chapter. The remaining half was divided into ninths: four ninths to the support of local clerics, three ninths to churches and hospitals, which in those days were shelters for the aged, the homeless, and those whose illnesses were incurable, and two ninths to the king's contingency fund for religious expenses in places with an inadequate tithing base (Robertson, 1931: 162–165; Haring, 1947: 266).

The actual fraction of tithes that ended up in the local novenos fund was apt to vary broadly from place to place. A powerful archbishopric could easily absorb more than half of the total tithes. In the archdiocese of Lima, the three ninths for churches and hospitals was split in two, one half going to hospitals and to the "*fábricas*," or operating expenses, of parish churches, and the other half to the cathedral to cover the sacristy costs of wax, wine, and oil and to replace the ornaments and bells (Castañeda and Marchena, 1978: 12–13).

On the other end of the extreme, a frontier that seldom saw a bishop was seldom ready to surrender to a bishop half of its meager tithes. The see of Santiago de Cuba was particularly unsuccessful at collecting any tithes from Florida, even during the rare episcopal visits of inspection. Bishop Altamirano, when he saw the condition of the St. Augustine parish church in 1606, asked that his share of Florida tithes be applied to its upkeep and service (Robertson, 1931: 157); Bishop Díaz Vara Calderón, who arrived in the same city four days after the flood of 1674, donated his tithes in kind to feed the homeless.

Although during the 17th century the Crown passed on inquiries from bishops of Cuba about their missing Florida tithes or itself asked for an accounting of them on at least five occasions—in the 1620s, 1635, the mid-1650s, the mid-1670s, and again in 1697—each time the royal officials had a new answer for why the local tithes could not seem to leave the harbor. Their replies yield welcome data about tithe totals and thus about Spanish agricultural production in the colony. In 1600 the tithes amounted to 840 pesos, of which 651 pesos came from maize and 189 from "*menudos*," probably legumes. The tithes of maize for the three-year period of 1631–1633 amounted to 1707½ pesos, not counting the menudos, which came to another 468, making a total of 2175½ pesos, an average of over 711 pesos a year. For the 10-year period between 1648 and 1657, the royal officials offered some rare serial data, with annual tithe totals of 1137, 1254, 1853, 2023, 1659, 1277, 1342, 1126, 1086, and 1355½ pesos respectively, in which the tithes from livestock, a new category, were 220, 227, 265, 250, 152, 135, 176, 224, 193, and 171 pesos (Bushnell, 1981: 76–79).

It is safe to assume that virtually all of the Florida tithes ended up as part of the king's local ninths and were spent by the local treasury officials, partly on priests' salaries and partly to support the city's churches and hospital, and that, moreover, the king drew heavily on his discretionary ninths from other colonies to cover the shortages in those accounts, as well as to support religious construction in St. Augustine.

Investment incomes, or "*rentas*," were earned from leases on church properties and invested funds known as "*censos*," which

could be liens, mortgages, reassignable annuities, or "*obras pías*." These last were bequests for a special intent, such as supporting a certain feast or having Masses said for a particular soul (Lavrín, 1971). In Florida, the "pious works" fund mainly paid for Masses for the souls of the departed, whether Spanish or Indian. If the deceased left heirs, a fifth of his or her estate went to this purpose; if not, the fund could swallow the entire estate. Another source for "obras pías" were the funds generated by the fines in the form of deerskins that the governor or his appointed visitor laid on caciques or ranchers who violated a gubernatorial ordinance.

The final source of parish church income was the income from altar fees: the charges to individuals, cofradías, and the Crown for the sacraments and services of the church available *à la carte*. Altar fees—at the time called obventions, emoluments, oblations, and now more often prebendary revenues—followed a price schedule that the bishop set for the churches of his diocese and the *audiencia*, a court of judges with executive authority over that particular region, approved.

Priests possessing the benefice of the parish of St. Augustine pieced together a livelihood from the same sources that supported the parish church: altar fees, the commissions of private benefactors, ordinary and extraordinary royal grants, seasonal "*pié de altar*" offerings, incidentals converted over time into perquisites, and the local Spanish tithes on maize, menudos, and livestock.

On a population-seeking frontier where wars and rebellions interfered with normal agricultural development, like Florida, ecclesiastical taxes did not cover even the salaries of the secular clergy. Until the colony got on its feet, the Crown therefore "situated" the difference between ecclesiastical income and outgo on some other royal treasury (Leturiondo, [1700]: 190; Arredondo, 1738). These measures meant to be temporary could be prolonged almost indefinitely, one kind reinforcing another, like all the funds in the congeries known as the "situado." The Crown, which already supplied the stipends of friars, the wages of soldiers, the salaries of governors and other proprietary officeholders, and the gifts to caciques, also underwrote the salaries of St. Augustine's parish priest and other ecclesiastics and guaranteed to each of them an amount of food equivalent to a soldier's ration (Robertson, 1931; Bushnell, 1981: 39).

The clerical staff of the parish church slowly grew, as the Crown conceded one salaried position after another. The first two to be approved were the parish priest, at a salary of 200 ducats plus the 83-ducat ration, and the military chaplain, his deputized subordinate, at 150 ducats plus ration. In the early days, a soldier on assignment from the garrison and paid by the dotación filled the office of sacristan and sang in the choir. His pay of 125 ducats was a bare 10 ducats above base pay and included his 83-ducat ration. In 1665 the church was authorized to employ a third cleric as chief sacristan at an annual salary of 200 pesos, or 145 ducats, which again included the 83-ducat ration. The chief sacristan, a priest, earned only 30 ducats a year more than a footsoldier. It was no wonder that when the bishop of Cuba posted the position announcement on a church door in Havana only two students responded, or that he chose the applicant who was a native of St. Augustine on the grounds that he was already "used to poverty." The chief sacristan, being a priest, was excused from janitorial work. The garrison continued to provide a soldier to be assistant sacristan, and the treasury paid a boy two rations of bread (worth 50 pesos, or 36 ducats, a year) to sweep the church and ring the bells (Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1693; Robertson, 1931: 160–161; Bushnell, 1981: 38–40).

By 1697, between the church and the parsonage, parish priest Alonso de Leturiondo, whose title of "*bachiller*" indicated that he had a university degree, already had a sizeable staff consisting of a chaplain, a chief sacristan, an assistant sacristan, a sweeping boy, a housekeeper, and four slaves (Auto, 1697; Leturiondo, 1697a; Bushnell, 1981: 39–40, 66), when he asked the Crown to add two acolytes so that he would not have to rely on volunteers or friars to assist with the Mass. The answer must have been favorable, for two "*niños*" in clerical habit, 12 to 18 years of age, were reported on the payroll in 1730. One of the niños served at the altar, the other sang in the choir, and both of them assisted the chief sacristan to prepare for Mass and the divine offices (Menéndez Márquez, 1730).

In 1698 the Crown approved a fourth cleric for the staff, an organist, at 200 ducats a year plus rations. A few days before the new organist, floridano Father Antonio Ponce de León, arrived, Moore's besieging force burned the church. Rather than lose the position, the treasury officials added it to the payroll anyway, reasoning that it was not the organist's fault that there was no organ (Robertson, 1931: 159; Bushnell, 1981: 39).

There were no further additions. When Spanish authorities were preparing to evacuate Florida in 1763 they listed seven positions on the parish payroll: the priest, an assistant priest, a senior sacristan, an organist, a first acolyte, a second acolyte, and a bell-ringer who doubled as the baker of the hosts (Gold, 1966: 386).

The parish priest's 200-ducat salary was equivalent to that of a company captain or a chief carpenter, lower than the salaries of the master of the forge (260 ducats), the master of construction (500 ducats), or the sergeant major (515 ducats), and far lower than those of his presumed social equals, the treasury officials (1067 ducats) and the governor (2000 ducats) (Bushnell, 1981: 39). In his case, as in theirs, a salary was simply the base on which the king's servant could build his real income.

In 1689 Father Alonso de Leturiondo (1689a) informed the Crown that his stipend was disproportionately low for the priest of a growing parish, especially given the difficulty of collecting altar fees in St. Augustine.

> The priest gives all the funerals, weddings, nuptial Masses, and feasts on credit against the situado, and when it arrives he is paid in ordinary trade goods, because it does not bring silver. When I attempt to collect against the [back wages of] deceased soldiers the governor says that the infantry comes first, putting the work of a soldier ahead of the work of a priest.

The businesslike Leturiondo had a sliding scale of charges with which to figure the cost of interring anyone from a pauper on up:

> The [burial] fábrica of this church consists in the fee for graves, and the cross in interments, and the bier. Of the graves, the most expensive one is 16 ducats, other than the ones in the main chapel and the side ones, set off and distinguished by some low railings that were removed in the time of [my predecessor, Father] Sebastián Pérez de la Cerda[,] so the *gobernadora* could have a seat within.
>
> In my three years as priest no one has yet paid all the fees they are supposed to, even though burial was within the bars or [in] the area where Treasurer Juan de Avila lies, set apart from the other graves. Joseph de Valladares of the governor's household was buried in the 10-ducat section and he [the governor] has not paid the fee, and he wants to pay that burial the same as the other ones, of soldiers, for 12 pesos. In the other graves, of 3 and 4 ducats, not one person has been buried. The fee for the cross is 6 reales (those that pertain to the fábrica), and 4 for the coffin. And the fábrica loses this fee on all the children, as it [the cross] is not used.
>
> In 1688 31 persons died. Three were buried out of charity because they were paupers. Six were buried in their own graves, the two above in the manner described. Eight [were] soldiers, on whom the fábrica loses all the fee, for the flat 12 pesos per burial that they give for the Mass, vigil, interment and cope is not enough to pay for a grave. Four were slaves, who pay only 1 ducat for a grave. The *angelitos* pay the same as the rest, which is less than 3 ducats.

When the priest's letter was referred to them for comment, treasury officials Thomás Menéndez Márquez and Joachín de Florencia volunteered a different view of parish revenues. Significantly, they did not distinguish between the incomes proper to the church and those of the priest personally.

> If the number of soldiers has increased, so too has that of vecinos and families, which means higher rents and emoluments, such as the primicias, the five cofradías that it has today, burials, obsequies of vecinos and their families and those of the soldiers (who at first did not have them), nuptial Masses, memorials, feastdays of private individuals, and other revenues which have increased along with the number of those on wages, with [a corresponding] increase to the fábrica. And Your Majesty pays for everything that is necessary, down to the ropes for lamps and for bells. . . . The church has for its fábrica the prebendary fees for burials, obsequies, nuptial Masses, feastdays and the rest.

In their opinion, funeral costs in St. Augustine were excessive.

> On the obsequies that by His Majesty's order and on his account are done for the deceased soldiers, his clerics are paid 21 pesos in fees, in addition to the wax, or a part of it, which the church ordinarily keeps when they are done there. . . . We enclose a *copia* to show the fees

that are charged for each item, fees that were altered recently, in the midst of the general poverty of this presidio, to correspond to the *arancel* [schedule of fees] at Havana—a matter to greatly disconsole a *pobre*, who pays as much for cope, burial, and bells as a *rico*, with distinction of graves.

It is worse for a soldier, for with the church supported by His Majesty, and dying in his service, they charge him twenty or thirty pesos without the shroud and the wax, not to mention the exorbitance of the *posas*. We did not pay the burial of one of the governor's servants, don Joseph Valladares, because the governor said that he would, and it came to 36 pesos 6 reales. From that, His Majesty can see what the burial of a private person costs nowadays.

When we ask the priest to bury a soldier, he is a bachelor and an outsider, without family or relatives. On these we pay 100 reales for their burial—having common graves there is no reason to bury them in the upper ones, nor His Majesty's slaves and convicts [either]—and that seems like enough. Since 1688 the only deaths in this category have been two mariners on the payroll, three *negros*, one of His Majesty's convicts, and six soldiers, whose burials are satisfied. All these have [had] the wax and shroud charged to the account of their wages, and the slave and convict to His Majesty's (Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1693).

The "copia" they enclosed was a certified copy of the itemized bill for the funeral of Treasurer Juan Fernández de Avila:

Burial:	
for [tolling] *doblas* on the days of his death and burial	3 pesos
for the burial	2 pesos 4 reales
reponse and accompaniment	3 pesos
2 posas, at 100 reales	5 pesos[3]
Mass and vigil	3 pesos
tall cross	1 peso
cope	3 pesos
censer	0 pesos 4 reales
grave (of 18 ducats)	24 pesos 6 reales
Obsequies:	
Mass and vigil	3 pesos
tolling	3 pesos
response	1 peso 4 reales
Total	73 pesos 2 reales[4]

The *fiscal*, or legal counsel, of the Consejo de Indias, reviewing the accumulated correspondence in 1695, bowed to both sides:

> Tell the governor to observe that which is disposed in the arancel approved by the Audiencia, . . . and express surprise at the excessive charge of 12½ pesos per posa, that this fee may be moderated and regulated to something proportionate and just (Consejo de Indias, 1695b).

Father Antonio Ponce de León, the former sacristan, contributed a copy of the schedule of fees in use at the parish church "from time immemorial" up to 1687, when the arancel from Havana was applied.[5] Expressed in "*reales de a ocho*," 8 to the peso, they were:

solemn feast: vespers and Mass with incense	26
procession around the church	8
burial of an adult	20
vigil and Mass with body present [bier]	24
tolling of three bells	12
each posa	8
burial of an infant or a slave	15
incensing	2
use of the cope of the choir	8
use of tall cross of the parish	8
use of short cross	4
sung *miserere* [Requiem Mass]	12
presence of priest and sacristan at a burial	20
sung response	5
christening	4
"yoke and veil" for a married couple	4
performing a marriage	54
"veiling" Mass [nuptial Mass]	26
recited Mass	4

The only variation the sacristan could recall was that when Father Pérez de la Cerda was priest of the parish he had charged three times as much for the cope.

Whether or not his fees were reasonable, Bachiller Leturiondo's complaints about how slowly the royal treasury met its obligations were probably justified. In 1766, two years after the St. Augustine parish church ceased services, the treasury still owed it over 4200 pesos for salaries in arrears, royally ordered oblations and feasts, and royal allotments of wine, oil, and candle wax (Gold, 1966: 387).

BUILDING GRANTS AND ENDOWMENTS

Agreeing with local authorities that the spiritual surroundings of Spaniards should be more imposing than those of Indians, the Crown approved numerous extraordinary

grants to build, rebuild, and furnish churches, hospitals, friaries, and chapels in St. Augustine. Again, the royal alms were seconded by the donations of private persons in public life.

In the spring of 1599 a fire swept through the city, destroying the parish church, the Franciscan church, and the friary. Philip III responded with an assortment of alms from various sources. To rebuild the main church and endow its fund for operating expenses, the king assigned four years of the city's tithes—a gift worth 2400 ducats. To rebuild the Franciscan complex he granted 1100 ducats from the royal treasury in Mexico City and 250 ducats from the smaller royal treasury in Florida. He stopped short of endowing a fábricas fund for the Franciscans, whose constitution permitted gifts but not endowments. Finally, the king underwrote the hospital operated by the cofradía of Nuestra Señora de la Soledad with 500 ducats and a female slave (Méndez Canzo, 1601; Christian, 1981: 17)

Three years later a new wooden church stood in St. Augustine, one of the "neatest and best finished of its kind in the Indies," the governor reported proudly (Méndez Canzo, 1602). Replacing the Franciscan church took three years longer, further grants from the Crown, and the sacrificial gifts of friars and vecinos (Ybarra, 1605a; Menéndez Márquez et al., 1608). Of the 745 ducats spent on the Franciscan church through 24 April 1601, 219 ducats went to furnishings: 159 ducats for a damask frontal for the main altar, a cloth case for the cross, and a set of velvet and damask vestments for a High Mass; 23 ducats for 2 lengths of damask to make other vestments; 26 ducats for a missal; and 9 ducats for an *hechura*, or image, of Saint Francis of Assisi (Méndez Canzo, 1601). In keeping with the conventional iconography, it would have depicted San Francisco receiving the stigmata, preaching to the birds, or using his knotted girdle to rescue a soul from hell.

Only after the Franciscans had a proper home for the Blessed Sacrament and could stop "carrying it around in cattleyards," as they put it, did they ask for royal carpenters and sawyers and for the materials to rebuild their own residence. Meanwhile, the hospital of La Soledad served as a temporary convent (Bermejo, 1604; 1605; Menéndez Márquez et al., 1608). For the old soldiers and royal slaves evicted from the hospital, Governor Méndez Canzo built an infirmary dedicated to Santa Barbara, furnishing it at his own expense with six double beds and a small chapel arranged so that the sick could see the altar and hear Mass from where they lay (Méndez Canzo, 1601).

One of the functions of the rebuilt Convent of the Immaculate Conception of the Mother of God of la Florida was to be a hospice for sick and aged missionaries. To this end, the Franciscans asked permission in 1630 to add an infirmary of four cells, furnished with beds, linens, and blankets. Governor Rojas denied the request, saying that there was no need for the convent to have a separate infirmary "because all year long they have empty cells, except when they hold a provincial chapter or a meeting. They do need more beds" (Jesús, [1635]).

Official correspondence with the Crown on the subject of church structures, written with fundraising in mind, continually emphasized the sad and dilapidated state into which the house of God had fallen (Robertson, 1931: 157–159). In 1653, for example, the treasury officials reported the main church to be leaking, termite ridden, and falling down—no way, they said, for a church of Spaniards to look to Indians from the provinces (Las Heras and Prado, 1653).

Occasional information about the locations and floor plans of religious structures in St. Augustine can be gleaned from reports on other subjects. In 1632 the Franciscan church became a literal sanctuary when, as has been mentioned, *Contador* Nicolás Ponce de León I fled there to escape Sergeant Major Eugenio de Espinosa, who had threatened to cut off his head. The royal accountant took up residence inside the church and spent uncomfortable nights in the choir, where he could hear bloodcurdling taunts and threats coming through an outside door (Ponce de León, 1632). In 1697, charges and countercharges generated by a high-level dispute between Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala and parish priest Leturiondo revealed that the parish church was located on a plaza, because it was possible to take 40 paces straight out from the main doors of the church;

that the church had a portico; and that a person walking in the portico was near enough to the guardhouse to converse with the watch (Auto, 1697).

Governors continued to erect pious monuments to their terms in office. In honor of Nuestra Señora de la Leche, an image "of great devotion" at the pueblo of Nombre de Dios (and because on New Year's Day the cofradía had elected him mayordomo), Governor Hita Salazar built a church "out of mortar and masonry, the only one like it in the provinces" (Hita Salazar, [1678]b). Governor Quiroga built a belltower for the "iglesia mayor parroquial"; he ordered "a great quantity of *piedra de sillería*," the stone for ashlar masonry, brought to the hermitage of San Patricio on the outskirts of town; and he enlarged the shrine at the hospital of La Soledad into a little church complete with a campanario, leaving a stack of wooden shakes[6] to his successor to reroof it, "because it rained in everywhere" (Quiroga y Losada, [1697]b).

The 1702 siege of St. Augustine by Colonel James Moore of South Carolina lasted 50 days. When it was over the city lay in ashes, just as it had after the fire of 1599. Again the hospital of La Soledad was spared from the flames. Its chapel became the temporary parish church, with Governor Zúñiga's scarlet altarcloth and chasuble from the shrine of Santa Barbara to lend dignity to the services (Leturiondo, [1707]). Once again officials solicited royal alms to rebuild the parish church and the Franciscan headquarters. They could have saved time by resubmitting their predecessors' letters of a hundred years earlier, changing nothing but the Roman numeral behind the royal name from III to V (Sotolongo, 1703).

The Consejo de Indias recommended a royal grant of 20,000 pesos from the Mexico City treasury to rebuild the church (Gannon, 1965: 76). The king raised the amount to 40,000 pesos for both church and convent and temporarily assigned to the same project the proceeds of the St. Augustine *comisos*, or goods confiscated from smugglers. When the money came, however, the city was expecting another invasion from South Carolina at any moment, and the vecinos persuaded Governor Alonso de Benavides to use the entire amount, plus contributions, to build a stone defense wall (Chatelain, 1941: 85–87).

Part of the money must have been replaced, for between 1724 and 1737 the Franciscans built themselves a handsome new friary of stone, but the hospital chapel of La Soledad continued to function as parish church (Gannon, 1965: 76, 82). A mid-18th century observer dismissed it as a "poorly adorned," unprepossessing structure of wood and tabby (Sánchez Griñán, 1756: 5). Tabby, or *tapia*, was the local concrete, made with a seashell aggregate and a burned-seashell lime.

None of the sanctuaries should have had to be refurnished after the Moore invasion, for the sacred furnishings had spent the siege in the safety of the Castillo. Many of these items were gifts from the king—in a sense, royal alms to the soldiers, who could never have furnished the presidio's parish church "with decency" without royal aid. Although treasury officials Thomás Menéndez Márquez and Joachín de Florencia were unable to lay hands on any written authorization, they said in 1693 that it had been their predecessors' practice "from primitive times" to send to New Spain for whatever vestments, vessels, monstrances, and missals the parish priest said he needed, turn them over to the church sacristan, and charge them to His Majesty's account, as they did for the chapel in the fort (Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1693).

When Spain ceded the colony of Florida to Great Britain in 1763, the Spanish Catholics of Florida and their dependents emigrated to Cuba en masse. The movable property of the parish church, the friary, and the confraternities went with them on a schooner, transported at royal expense. In Havana, agents of the bishop, don Pedro Agustín Morel y Santa Cruz, inventoried over 250 items from the parish church alone, from tabernacles, altars, images, biers, and candlesticks to wooden clappers, chintz curtains, and white wax (Gold, 1966: 379).

A parish church on the frontier had been disassembled. Who should take charge of its contents? Bishop Morel claimed the lot as Church property; the governor of Cuba claimed them as the Crown's and subpoenaed floridanos to testify that royal funds had paid

for them. In retrospect, the king's gifts turned suddenly insubstantial. Parish priest Juan Joseph Solana swore that the Crown had sent no gold and silver vessels to the parish church during his time, which went back to 1737. Even the 1000 pesos it had cost to renovate the hermitage of Nuestra Señora de la Soledad into a church after Moore's invasion, he said, had been borne by the parishioners. Sacristan Juan Bernardo de Paredes, searching his memory for royal gifts, recalled 100 pesos worth of pontifical vestments made in St. Augustine, two black chasubles and a crimson frontal, and two small shipments, one in 1728 and the other in the 1740s, of sacred vessels; he specifically remembered a small gold-plated silver ciborium from New Spain. Later testimony established that the cost of these items, too, plus the freight, had been charged to the parish church's account. The bishop won the suit against the governor, and the Church kept the sacred treasure (Gold, 1966: 380–382).

During Florida's 21 years as a British colony, Catholicism resurfaced among the laborers of Mediterranean origin at Dr. Andrew Turnbull's indigo plantation of New Smyrna. The two priests who accompanied them, Pedro Camps and Bartholome Casasnoves, made contact with the bishop of Cuba to ask for credentials and Holy Oils. "We have a church already somewhat adorned," Father Camps wrote in his letter of thanks.

> At the main altar there is a figure of the Santo Cristo, one of St. Anthony, and one of the patron of the church who is the Apostle St. Peter, and other ornaments follow. We preach every Sunday and during the feasts of Lent and some others during the year, in addition to the obligatory doctrina. We administer the sacraments openly and our processions are undisturbed. The *señora* of the *señor* of our settlement is Catholic and very devout; she frequents the church and the sacraments, to the example of all.
>
> Our salary consists in the 300 pesos which the señor Andrés Tornbull, commander of our settlement, contracted to give me yearly, . . . and 260 to the *padre* Casasnoves. I keep two parts of the emoluments, and the padre, one (Camps and Casasnoves, 1772).

After two centuries of Crown Catholicism, the church in Florida had experienced a return to private patronage.

HOLY DAY AND ALTAR ALLOWANCES

The law of God made demands on an individual's time. Under pain of mortal sin, a Christian presented himself at church to hear Mass every Sunday of the year, plus numerous days of obligation, or "feastdays of precept." Persons desiring extra spiritual sustenance or social contact attended Mass every morning (A. Leturiondo, 1697a; Torres y Ayala, 1697c; I. Leturiondo, [1707]).

Feastdays and festal seasons were occasions for the community to express collective fervor, make collective supplications, and stage exciting local events. In 16th-century Spain, feasts were generally observed by a solemn "procession with crosses"—attended by musicians, dancers, and actors presenting *entremeses*, or skits—from the parish church to a shrine. At the shrine a Mass was said, followed by a sermon. The procession returned as it had come, and the day ended satisfyingly with the running of "good bulls" (Christian, 1981: 113).

A Catholic community's religious calendar was a unique record of the communal history and vows. As we have seen, Pedro Menéndez de Avilés initiated the city calendar of St. Augustine by decreeing four feastdays in honor of his exploits as a royal champion and colony founder. St. Augustine's Day commemorated his arrival in Florida; Our Lady's Day, when his chaplain celebrated the first Mass; St. Matthew's Day, when he captured Fort Caroline; and All Saint's Day, when he defeated the French at Cape Canaveral (Lyon, 1990: 287).

The doctrinas had their own commemorative holidays. Each town celebrated two in particular: the day of the saint whose name it carried, and the saint's day of its chief. Thus the town of San Lorenzo de Ivitachuco, whose chief was don Patricio de Hinachuba, would celebrate the day of San Lorenzo and the day of San Patricio.

In addition to its own commemorative holidays, the community observed the "feastdays of obligation" that the Council of Trent had established, plus whatever days of feasting or fasting the bishop of the diocese declared. By order of the Bishop of Santiago de Cuba, published during the Diocesan Synod of 1684, held in Havana, to which the See

was about to be transferred (Shea, 1886: 173–174), the Indians of Florida were supposed to be released from their labors to observe as fastdays the Fridays of Lent, Holy Saturday, and Christmas Eve (the Vigil of the Paschal feast of the Nativity). The "feastdays of obligation" when the Indians were supposed to hear Mass were

> Every Sunday
> The Paschal feasts of the Nativity, the Resurrection, and Pentecost
> The Day of Epiphany
> The Day of the Lord's Circumcision
> The Day of the Lord's Ascension
> The Day of Corpus Christi
> The Day of the Purification of Our Lady
> The Day of the Annunciation of Our Lady
> The Day of the Assumption of Our Lady
> The Day of the Nativity of Our Lady
> The Day of the Apostles Saint Peter and Saint Paul
> All Saints Day
> (García de Palacios, 1684: tít. v, const. v)

Both feastdays and fastdays offered a welcome change of routine.

In times of crisis, when work could not be safely interrupted, the Church could issue a dispensation permitting a specific holy day to be postponed, cancelled, shortened to a halfday, or used for emergency activities. Those who needed such a dispensation could purchase an indulgence from the local official of the "bulls of the crusade," the priest to whom the bishop had delegated his authority to commute vows.

When the Castillo de San Marcos was under construction and Governor Márquez Cabrera was anxious to get it to the point of being defensible, he asked the priest of the parish for holy day indulgences for the workmen. When he was refused, the governor appealed to higher church authorities and got permission for the men to work on Sundays and holy days—only during the emergency, and only on the fort (Arana and Manucy, 1977: 30). As far as the local secular clergy were concerned, the governor was out of order. Years later, when it would do the most damage, parish priest Alonso de Leturiondo charged that Governor Márquez Cabrera neglected to obtain the proper dispensations and "broke holy days without license" (Leturiondo, 1687).

The cofradia, or confraternity, was the chief lay organization in a parish or doctrina. The members, or *hermanos*, engaged in a specific work of charity, were associated with a certain church or shrine, underwrote a particular feast, and marched in general processions, bearing pennants, insignias, processional crosses believed to hold great power, and "sufficient candles for adornment and decorum" (Spanish Crown, 1688). Unusually full documentation is available about late 17th-century cofradías in St. Augustine thanks to the king himself.

Charles II, whose congenital defects of mind and body earned him the sobriquet of "The Bewitched," took a minute interest in the state of religious observances throughout his empire. In 1680, soon after his minority ended and he assumed the throne (Lynch, 1984: 263), the 19-year-old monarch sent out a general cédula to the Indies to inquire about the number of holy days celebrated in each city, the antiquity of the feasts, and the cofradías that supported them.

Governor Márquez Cabrera's initial response to the questionnaire (1682b) was evidently unsatisfactory; a second cédula instructed him to provide more detail. He did so in three reports which the king turned to consider in 1688, eight years after his original cédula. It seemed that there were seven active cofradías in St. Augustine: two at the friary, one at the hospital, one at Nombre de Dios, and three at the parish church. The king's secretaries summarized them:

1. The cofradía of La Santa Vera Cruz at the friary of Saint Francis was as old as the town itself. The brothers were soldiers, assessed 4 reales a year.
2. The cofradía of Nuestra Señora de la Concepción, also at the convento, had been founded when the convento was, again by the devotion of the soldiers, assessed another 4 reales a year.
3. The cofradía of Nuestra Señora de la Soledad, at the hospital, had been founded with the hospital 80 years earlier by the "*naturales*" in the presidio, who were the "sons of soldiers." Again the members paid 4 reales.
4. The cofradía of Nuestra Señora de la Leche, at the pueblo of Nombre de Dios, had been founded by Indian naturales but its membership was now mixed. The soldiers who belonged to it paid 2 reales a year.
5. The cofradía of the Santísimo Sacramento, situated in the parish church, had been founded

in 1655. It was supported by an entrance fee of 8 reales, the alms begged about the town weekly, and the bequests of the brothers. Its purposes were to celebrate festivals and to send the Viaticum to the sick.

6. The cofradía of Las Animas, founded in the same church by the soldiers 80 years earlier, was maintained by voluntary alms.
7. The cofradía of Nuestra Señora del Rosario, founded in the same church by the soldiers over 60 years earlier, also had no endowment and was supported by alms begged about town.

(Spanish Crown, 1688)

The cofradías that depended on payroll deductions from the soldiers' wages operated on credit, running up accounts in the local churches that would be settled at the same time as the soldiers' other debts, when the situado arrived (Leturiondo, 1697a). When the Consejo de Indias suggested that it might be better to stop the practice of payroll deductions and let all the soldiers' contributions to the cofradías be voluntary, Charles II answered sharply that the soldiers gave little enough and that there was no excuse for "lessening the worship of God and His saints in a place with so many friars" (Spanish Crown, 1688).

The cofradías continued into the 18th century. Don Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, the auxiliary bishop who arrived in 1736, found the confraternity accounts in arrears, both in collections and in payments. He listed eight cofradías in town (Martínez Tejada, 1736b):

Santísimo Sacramento
Santísimo Cristo de la Soledad
Santa Vera Cruz
Nuestra Señora de la Leche
Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe
Nuestra Señora de la Concepción
Nuestra Señora de Consolación
Las Animas

Seven were still in existence in 1763. Their names, as translated by Robert L. Gold (1966: 379), were:

Most Holy Sacrament
Most Holy Christ of the Solitude
Most Holy Christ of the Holy True Cross
Our Lady of the Milk
Our Lady of Guadalupe
Our Lady of the Conception
Our Lady of the Rosary

There was a reason behind the royal interest in local feastdays, at least in Charles II's time: the Crown was systematizing its grants of religious supplies to frontier parishes. It had been providing 30 pesos a year toward the wax to celebrate the local feast and octave of Corpus Christi in St. Augustine. Charles II raised this to 55 pesos so that his subjects could also observe the Days of Ascension, Saint Augustine, and Saint Mark, taking the money from the royal quitrent on Florida land grants, a tax instituted in the 1670s (Bushnell, 1981: 80–81) that had formerly gone to the operating expenses of the chapel in the Castillo.

The king's interest encouraged Bachiller Leturiondo to send him an informative letter about his other alms. The parish church of San Agustín de la Florida, the priest wrote, being a poor church without any endowment or other income, by immemorial custom received certain subsidies: 2 arrobas of wax for the service of the altar, and 48 cuartillos of sacramental wine for each of the priests associated with the church—himself, the chief sacristan, and the chaplain of the fort. This amount of wine was the same as that issued to the friars who said Mass in the doctrinas. He was sure that at some time the king had approved this arrangement, for the treasury officials always wrote on the paperwork for the wax and the wine, "as ordered by cédulas of His Majesty" (Leturiondo, 1689a).

Although Governor Quiroga was insisting that the cédulas to supply the secular clergy with white wax and wine be produced for inspection, they could not be found, being so old that they had probably been destroyed in one of the enemy invasions, or perhaps never been recorded. Yet surely someone, argued the bachiller, had set the original rate for the wine, the wax, and the flour for the host: 6 pounds a month.

The wax that parishioners brought for their marriages and burials, he went on to explain, was not of the white kind but Campeche yellow, unfit for use on the altar because the drippings soiled the corporals and palls. The only time that yellow wax could be used was during Holy Week. In the year since the governor had refused the church its provision of white wax, he would have run out of it completely, despite his economies, had the bishop

and a former pastor not sent him waxen alms. Church revenues would never be sufficient to cover the cost of candles, he explained, going on to describe in detail the church's burial fees and the problems he faced trying to collect them. They scarcely sufficed to repair the church doors, launder the "church clothing," and pay for the necessary storage cabinets, keys, incense, and vessels.

Father Leturiondo raised another problem. His Majesty had ordered that the lamps of the Blessed Sacrament throughout the Indies be lighted with olive oil and no other grease or oil. The parish fábricas fund was expected to cover this cost (see Menéndez Márquez et al., 1608), yet even when oil was available in the royal storehouse, the lamp in the parish church of St. Augustine was more commonly lit with bear grease or lard, so gross that in cold weather it hardened and the flame in the lamp was out, sometimes for most of the day, with disrespect to the Sacrament (Leturiondo, 1689a).

A search began for the cédulas that had supposedly authorized royal limosnas of supplies to the church in St. Augustine. First, the fiscal of the Consejo de Indias referred Father Leturiondo's inquiry to the Escribanía de Cámara. Cámara officials, unable to find anything about St. Augustine's limosnas in their own records, looked them up in Juan Díaz de la Calle's 1646 compilation of His Majesty's grants and alms to religious houses in the Indies (Díaz de la Calle, 1646) and again found nothing. Not knowing what else to do, the fiscal forwarded Leturiondo's letter to the royal officials of the treasury in St. Augustine, Thomás Menéndez Márquez and Joachín de Florencia.

They reported back that in a cédula dated 1604 the Crown had granted 6 arrobas of oil a year to the church and the church had received it ever since, whenever oil was available. When not, the treasury substituted the fat of hogs or bears—"common things in these provinces"—the same as they did for the friary. The officials did not mention whale oil. Schools of whales travelled along the Atlantic coast of South Florida (Las Alas, 1600; Larson, 1980: 145–162), but the enmity of coastal Indians effectively ruled out Spanish whaling in the waters below St. Augustine.

For the other limosnas, Menéndez Márquez and Florencia had been unable to locate specific cédulas. It was the custom, they said, to issue each of the three clerics at the parish church 6 pounds of flour a month with which to bake the hosts. The treasury also gave them 48 cuartillos of sacramental wine a year, when wine was available. If the priests ran out, they requisitioned more, and if any was left over they returned it. There was no cédula authorizing the 2 arrobas of wax that the treasury provided to the parish church, either, which were above and beyond the king's alms of altar and processional candles for feastdays. After a private feast or burial, the church returned the leftover wax to the family, they reported, but any wax left over from the king's alms of candles, the church kept. Finally, the two royal officials said, they assisted the parish church with the miscellaneous expenses of incense, ropes for the lamps and the bells, and nails, without which the church could not be festooned with garlands and greenery on royally sponsored feastdays and Palm Sunday (Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1693).

The overworked fiscal (Consejo de Indias, 1695a), reviewing the case seven years after Bachiller Leturiondo's original letter, decided that the limosnas established by custom should continue. But he was appalled at the way St. Augustine illuminated the Blessed Sacrament. It would be better to leave the lamp unlit than to light it with the fat of unclean animals. The fiscal could find no specific regulation about the matter in the *Recopilación de Indias*, but he recalled that the use of animal fat in the lamp of the Sacrament was forbidden in New Spain, as was the oil made from the seeds of the hygerilla tree, because of its fetid odor. He advised the Florida officials to use wax candles inside a lantern when they ran out of olive oil, ignoring the possibility that the colony might also be short on wax. Privately, the fiscal wondered whether the royal officials were substituting lard for the olive oil and pocketing the difference. The auditor in Havana would do well to inspect their accounts for the past ten years.

In 1697, Bachiller Leturiondo asked that the king's limosna for Holy Day observances be increased from 55 pesos to 100 to permit wax candles to be lit before the Blessed Sacrament all day on the Feast of Corpus. The

king approved this potlatch-like extravagance, which burnt up as much money in one day as the boy who swept the church earned in two years (Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1693; Leturiondo, 1697b).

At the conclusion of his career, Father Leturiondo stepped back to summarize the king's limosnas in a memorial addressed to the king himself.

> Although the provinces of Florida are very rich and fertile, inasmuch as those who cultivate them are few, and of these the majority occupied in the service of Your Majesty, the harvests can never be sufficient for sustaining the presidio. And neither for this, nor for its provinces can it provide the clothing needed nor what [is necessary for] divine worship because some types of fabric are not available there unless they enter from outside. . . .
>
> [So that] nothing at all should be wanting, Your Majesty, with your paternal disposition, decreed that a large sum should be assigned and given to the said presidio from the royal funds of the city of Mexico so that the necessary goods might be purchased with it for the clothing, the flour and the rest of the foodstuffs for the maintenance of the said presidio, the wine and oil for the religious services and for the maintenance of the doctrinas for the Christian Indians who are under the care of the religious of St. Francis. Inasmuch as this endowment which Your Majesty gives represents the totality of the maintenance and conservation of everything that exists in the said provinces, ecclesiastical as well as secular, without this, all those provinces would perish, religion would languish, and everything would deteriorate (Leturiondo, [1700]: 179–180).

Years later, in 1764, Father Juan Joseph Solana testified in Havana that during his time as parish priest the church in St. Augustine had received nothing whatever from the king in the way of religious supplies except oil for the lamp of the Holy Sacrament. His Majesty had, Solana understood, assigned a share of the 9½ percent local "tariff"—either import or export duties—toward the support of the church, but the treasury officials had refused to pay it (Gold, 1966: 380–382).

Whether or not Solana's testimony was correct is unclear. Perhaps, during the first half of the 18th century, the Crown simply discontinued its formal and informal grants in aid of the parish church, a step that, considering the impoverished state of Spanish Florida after it was shorn of its provinces, seems unlikely. Perhaps the contemporary dispute between the bishop and the governor of Cuba over the ownership of church treasure simply made it impolitic for Solana to acknowledge them. The liberality of seven kings of Spain, one after another, had enabled a parish of Spaniards to survive 200 years on an embattled frontier.[7] Six of those kings were at rest in glory. They would understand.

NOTES

1. In the Philippines, an altarboy walked through the streets at sunset ringing a handbell to remind the faithful to say their prayers (Phelan, 1959: 73).
2. For a more thorough discussion of Florida's royal revenues and how they were administered see chapter 6 of *The King's Coffer* (Bushnell, 1981: 75–100).
3. At 8 reales to the peso, each posa would be 12½ pesos, or two for 25. Apparently a digit is missing.
4. The sum of the stated figures is not 73 pesos 2 reales, but 60 pesos 2 reales. The discrepancy is not solved by correcting the amount for the two posas to 25 pesos, as the total then becomes 80 pesos 2 reales.
5. The arancel probably dated from the Diocesan Synod of 1684 (Shea, 1886; García de Palacios, 1684).
6. These were called "*tejamani*," in this case spelled "*ebtagamani*."
7. Philip II (1556–1598), Philip III (1598–1621), Philip IV (1621–1665), Charles II (1665–1700), Philip V (1700–1746), Ferdinand VI (1746–1759), and Charles III (1759–1788).

CHAPTER 8. LEARNING THE DOCTRINE

INDOCTRINATION

Up to this point we have reserved the term "doctrina" for the provincial Indian town under obedience to Spaniards spiritually and politically. Contemporaries were less discriminating, using the word "doctrina" in four different senses: for the accelerated program of adult indoctrination in the *conversión*, for the convent-operated day school at one of the older missions, for any native town under the care of a friar, and for the doctrine that was taught.

"Doctrina" in this last sense was the sum of things a Catholic was expected to know, with an emphasis on the law of God and the duties of a baptized believer. The short-form "*doctrina breve*" was the basic corpus of sacred literature, from prayers to set responses to the catechism, expounded by the missionaries of every Order, from Peru to the Philippines (Tibesar, 1953: 79; Ricard, 1966: 101–102; Costa, 1967: 141; Child and Colles, 1971: 236; Gómez Canedo, 1977: 148–149, 154). Informally, it was known as the "*rezo*," or recitation, because neophytes learned it by rote and recited it in unison in the age-old tradition of preliterate learning.

No part of the rezo was in Spanish. The Latin Prayers (*Pater Noster*, *Ave Maria*, and *Salve Regina*), Sign of the Cross, and *Credo* were impressive incantations, far removed from the Indian's world. The rest of the rezo was in a native language, his own or the local lingua franca. Franciscan linguists prepared confessionaries and catechisms in the more widely spoken tongues and spread the use of Quechua or Aymara in Peru, Tupí-Guaraní in Brazil and Paraguay, Cakchiquel in Guatemala, and, in Mexico, Nahuatl, which Rodrigo de la Cruz assured his emperor, Charles V, was "a most elegant language, the equal of any in the world" (Robertson, 1931: 170). Polyglot Florida had no lingua franca, but the friars did privilege the Mocamo dialect of the Timucuan language (Granberry, 1987: 19–24).

For easier memorization, the doctrina was subdivided and numbered. Laboriously, the neophytes learned a total of 14 articles of faith, 10 commandments of God, 5 commandments of the Church, 7 sacraments (baptism, penance, the Eucharist, matrimony, confirmation, extreme unction, and ordination), 7 virtues (the theological ones being faith, hope, and love and the cardinal ones, justice, prudence, temperance, and fortitude), 7 capital sins or vices (pride, covetousness, lust, envy, sloth, gluttony, and anger), 7 corporal works of mercy (giving food to the hungry, drink to the thirsty, and clothing to the naked, harboring the stranger, visiting the sick, ministering to prisoners, and burying the dead), and a like number of spiritual works of mercy. He or she knew by heart the enemies of the soul, the beatitudes, the act of contrition, and the correct answers to a catechism of 33 questions. The Franciscans made many portions easier to remember by setting them to music, using both Gregorian chant, or plainsong, and familiar native tunes (Gómez Canedo, 1977: 160–161, 155).

Convent-trained male catechists drilled the students in the various portions of the rezo, conducting separate classes for male and female neophytes. They, not the friars, were the ones who trained the female catechists. This practice kept the women of the doctrina at a proper distance from the Franciscans and reinforced the patriarchal hierarchy that Europeans accepted as natural.

The new Christian underwent indoctrination after baptism, not before it. Although Baltasar López claimed that it was his practice "at the beginning" in Florida to indoctrinate adults for up to four years before baptizing them, relentlessly grounding them in the faith, this was not usual (López, 1602). Missionaries ordinarily reduced prebaptismal instruction to essentials. In the Philippines, all that the Discalced Franciscans and the Jesuits required of adults prior to baptism was that they repudiate paganism, affirm belief in the sacrament they were about to receive, be monogamous if married, be able to recite the Pater Noster, Credo, Ave Maria, and Ten Commandments, know how to bless themselves, and have some idea of the meaning of the other sacraments and of the obligations of a Catholic, namely to attend Mass

on Sundays and holy days and make an annual confession. The very old were baptized if they could so much as recall what they had to believe in order to be saved. The very young, of course, were baptized at birth and received all their indoctrination postbaptismally.

Missionaries to the Philippines complained that the filipinos were all too easily baptized, drawn by the offer of material gifts and magical powers, including the supposed curative properties of Holy Water (Cushner, 1959: 371, 374, 378; Costa, 1967: 168; Phelan, 1959: 55–56). The actions of 16th- and 17th-century missionaries would not have disabused them. A Jesuit lay brother at Tequesta in south Florida believed that he healed children by reading the gospel over them and touching them with a crucifix (Villareal, 1568). Another Florida Jesuit calmed the sea with a relic and an Agnus Dei which he trailed through the water (Sedeño, 1572). Franciscans in New Mexico used religious medals on arrow wounds (Kessell, 1987: 139), and a secular priest in the Valley of Mexico cured a bewitched woman by having her take a spoonful of water containing a bit of saint's bone (Bushnell, 1971: 23–24; Coe and Whittaker, 1982: 53–54).

In Florida, the most intensive indoctrination occurred in the *conversiones*, where adults were taught the rudiments of Catholicism. In a society where houses were far apart and natives dispersed through the countryside to gather foods in season, the round of adult activities was seriously disrupted by the church bell summoning them to daily instruction. The entire community was expected to live "*bajo campana*," or "beneath the bell," no farther than half a league from the belltower (Phelan, 1959: 48–49). Even when classes were reduced to a Monday-Wednesday-Friday schedule, three days of doctrina per week, plus Sundays and holy days, left little opportunity for hunting, gathering, trading, visiting distant kinsmen, or attending out-of-town dances and ballgames. Experience showed that when adult indoctrination was instituted on this demanding a scale without enlisting the cooperation of caciques and distributing gifts of food and clothing, attendance was ragged and half-converted people came and went.

When necessary, the friars enforced religious discipline with the whip. Individuals who missed a day of doctrina or absented themselves from Mass on a day of obligation were punished publicly. Francis F. Guest pointed out, in the friars' defense, that "whipping was an integral part of the culture from which the Spaniards had come, and they seem to have taken it for granted that this form of punishment was beneficial" (Guest, 1979: 66). In theory, two classes of natives were not subject to whipping, in the Florida doctrinas: married women, who were subject to miscarriage, and caciques and principales, who as persons of rank were exempt from corporal punishment. In practice, an irate friar might order the whipping of any parishioner at will (Márquez Cabrera, 1680b).

If Spaniards took controlled violence directed at inferiors for granted, many indios did not, and "ran off to the woods to live and die as infieles." Spanish authorities made earnest efforts to track down these fugitives and reduce them once more "under the bell of their doctrinas and the hand of their padres doctrineros" (Informe, 1688). If the *fugitivos* remained at large after being invited to return, or if they committed acts of resistance and defiance, they were punishable as rebels.

After the early 17th century, when evangelism became more systematic and formal and three different authorities—cacique, governor, and padre provincial—had to give their consent before a program of conversion could be instituted, the transition became more orderly. Friars had time to learn the languages beforehand and to train corps of catechists. Caciques knew what to expect, which was that the conversión would be followed by the doctrina, and converts would metamorphose into repartimiento laborers. People were conducted through the doctrine with dispatch, and school became something for children.

The three Florida provinces of Timucua, Guale, and Apalache seem to have reached the saturation point in conversion by the mid-1640s. Indians born in the faith and educated by the friars called themselves "Old Christians." They mocked the religion of their ancestors and laughed at their elders who lapsed into "superstitions." The only adults still subject to indoctrination were the refugees of Indian wars who arrived as individuals, fam-

ilies, or tribal remnants to seek sanctuary among Christians and be resettled in subject pueblos to start a new and Catholic life.

No description of the religious routine of a Florida doctrina has surfaced. It was probably as close to that of a working monastery as the Franciscans could make it. Jonathan Dickinson, a Quaker castaway who passed through several mission towns along Florida's Atlantic coast in 1696, noted that "the Indians go as constantly to their devotion at all times and seasons as any of the Spaniards." Unfortunately, he did not describe these activities to his contemporary readers, who would have dismissed them as papist folderol (Dickinson, 1699: 66). A year or two before Dickinson's epic journey, two Spanish officers, Joachín de Florencia, visiting the provinces of Apalache and Timucua, and Juan de Pueyo, visiting Guale and Mocamo, issued perfunctory, almost identical orders to the caciques to "see that all the indios have crosses decently treated in their houses, a large cross at the door of the house and inside at the head of their beds other small ones," and that they "recite the Ave Maria and say their rosaries daily before these crosses" (Florencia, 1694–1695; Pueyo, 1695).[1]

The Franciscan Order had its favorite devotions emphasizing the human side of the Savior. The Christmas Crib, the Sacred Heart, the Holy Name, the Holy Eucharist, the Angelus, and the Immaculate Conception all found their way into lay religion, enriching the common tradition (McDevitt, 1967; Christian, 1981: 16). The dark side of Franciscan fervor was discernible in the Order's devotion to the Stations of the Cross, the Crucifix, and the Passion. In Spain, the Brotherhood of the True Cross that the Order fostered contributed thousands of members "of discipline" to processions on Holy Thursday and Good Friday. The height of the public flagellation mania was reached in Spain around 1575 and the practice was in decline by 1650 (Christian, 1982: 99; 1981: 185–186, 200, 204), but not before the friars had introduced the Indians of Florida, like those of New Mexico, to "processions of blood," a peculiarly Christian form of masochism (López, 1602).

Franciscans were purposeful, single-minded educators. Those who arrived in Brazil in 1585 opened schools and began to teach reading, writing, music, and the Catholic faith to young Indians, training lay helpers and interpreters for their mission program (Kiemen, 1983: 134). In some of their contemporary Florida missions, too, they taught the converts reading and writing. Visitor Oré observed in 1616 at Santa Cruz de Tarihica, principal town of the new province of Utina, or Timucua, that in the four years since his last visit some adults of 30 and 40 had learned to read and write. Father Francisco Pareja's devotional tracts were "always in the hands of the Indians," he noted with approval, and "with ease many Indian men and women have learned to read in less than two months, and they write letters to one another in their own language" (Oré, [1617–1620]: 103; Matter, 1990: 56).[2]

In the early 17th century, such practices were more of a novelty than a crusade on behalf of public education. The limited amount of reading material in the vernacular, plus the fact that reading and writing were specialist skills even in Spanish society, made literacy a luxury, and Father Pareja's experiment in teaching commoners to read and write does not seem to have been repeated. Literacy would remain the preserve of those with access to the languages of knowledge and power, Spanish and Latin.

THE SERVICES OF THE CHURCH

Of the seven sacraments through which the Church conveyed grace to the Christian, four—baptism, penance, the Eucharist, and matrimony—were available to the Indian commoner, and three—confirmation, extreme unction, and ordination—were not.

Through baptism a neophyte renounced the world of paganism in person or, in the case of infant, by proxy and was reborn into the Church. A one-time event essential to salvation, baptism could be administered by any Catholic in a case of urgent necessity, *in extremis*, such as mortal illness, nonviable newborn, shipwreck, siege, or general "insecurity of the country" (Ricard, 1966: 93). The high cost of the sacrament in St. Augustine in the late 17th century can be detected in the rising number of baptisms performed by midwives. In the early 17th century, when death stalked

the land, baptism was a virtual deathbed rite in Florida, the swathes cut by epidemics yielding harvests of souls by the thousand.

A well-staged funeral was useful to awe non-Christians. In 1748, when some Yuchis were in St. Augustine trading, a 16-year-old girl in their party fell gravely ill. Governor Manuel de Montiano stood godfather to her baptism, and she was buried "with as great solemnity as if she were the first officer of the garrison." Montiano himself walked with the chiefs to the church and stood beside them, and he was satisfied that they were impressed. A few days later one of the Yuchis returned with a newborn baby girl, saying that his children always died untimely and that if this one died without baptism he would be inconsolable (Montiano, 1748).

Confirmation, a kind of postscript to baptism, permitted the bishop of a diocese to verify the Christian education of converts and children. The Franciscans, who viewed the bishops as rivals and conceded them as little authority as possible, downplayed the episcopal sacrament. In Florida, which managed without a resident bishop until the mid-1730s, confirmation was so rare as to be virtually nonexistent, being available to floridanos and Indian Christians only twice in 170 years.

The sacrament of penance was properly preceded by confession. In Florida, an Indian Christian's first confession seems to have functioned as a rite of passage out of childhood and into the ranks of labor. Thereafter the Church required a Christian to confess to his parish priest and perform penance at least once a year. Inasmuch as church pastors deliberately scheduled the hearing of annual confessions to equip their wayward flocks with clean consciences for Easter, Florida officials were able to use the register of baptized Christians who had "complied with the Church" in their home towns during the Lenten season as a provincial census of laboring adults, town by town.

Reportedly, many Florida natives chose to confess oftener than the Church required and showed a remarkable aptitude for penance, relishing the chance to display their courage and physical endurance through fasts and other forms of self-denial, hours on their knees, and flagellation. Such practices were in harmony with the rituals of purification and fortitude that had long been part of the Southeastern way of life.

Not everyone who confessed and did penance was admitted to the sacrament of the Eucharist, even at Easter. In 16th-century New Spain, where embarrassing cases of "idols under altars" had first come to light, laymen communed rarely. Franciscans there were particularly wary of administering the sacrament to the unworthy. Only after their charges had undergone prolonged indoctrination, had been confessing for four or five years, and had satisfied their confessors that they possessed the kind of inner conviction and Christian practice that could only develop over time, did the clergy allow them to approach the Lord's Table. To prevent mistakes, the friars sometimes gave identifying badges to those who were judged ready to receive the sacrament (Ricard, 1966: 122–126).

The Franciscans in 16th-century Peru were somewhat more lenient. The Christians under their care ordinarily communed on either Holy Thursday or Easter Sunday and, with the permission of their confessors, also on Christmas, Pentecost, Assumption, and All Saints Day. Each time, they prepared to receive the Eucharist by bathing and putting on new or clean clothes (Tibesar, 1953: 88–90).

In 1614 the Peruvian-born Franciscan Father Oré, making an ecclesiastical visita of the Florida missions, asked Father Pareja, a 20-year veteran, to give his written opinion about whether or not the Christian natives of Florida could safely be admitted to the Lord's Table. Pareja was satisfied with the spiritual progress of the Indians in the vicarios of San Juan del Puerto and San Pedro. He responded:

> I have looked carefully into this matter, to see that they had that sufficiency to receive Holy Communion, and I have found no reason why they should be denied this Sacrament. Many persons are found, men and women, who confess and who receive with tears, and who show up advantageously with many Spaniards (Pareja, 1614: 105).

Males and females completed their transition into the world of responsible adulthood by marrying and establishing a home. Mat-

rimony was a relatively recent Catholic sacrament, the Council of Trent having declared it to be one in the mid-16th century, and some of the canonical intricacies had yet to be ironed out. In Florida first the Jesuits and then the Franciscans struggled manfully with the complicated cases of conscience created by a polygamous society, trying to differentiate "natural marriage," an inviolable contract, from concubinage and to determine which of a man's consorts was his "rightful" wife.

Before a marriage could take place, the parish priest had to investigate the betrothed couple's respective backgrounds for legal impediments such as bigamy, consanguinity, affinity, coercion, or male impotence. He then informed the congregation of the couple's intent by the reading of banns on three successive Sundays or days of doctrina, allowing time for possible obstacles to the union to surface (Tibesar, 1953: 88–90; Gutiérrez, 1991: 241–270).

The wedding ceremony itself was simple, requiring only that the couple join hands and voice their vows to one another before witnesses. Once the promise to marry was fulfilled by sexual consummation, the sacrament was complete; without consummation, it remained invalid. A wedding "in" the church meant only that a priest was present; few couples could afford the higher sacerdotal fees for a wedding "at" the church, or the consummation-affirming nuptial Mass and blessing on church premises (Phelan, 1959: 63–64).

Extreme unction was a further religious luxury. The Franciscans in New Spain administered it on demand, only to leading citizens (Ricard, 1966: 122–126). In Peru, too, the Viaticum went out rarely, carried in solemn procession along swept and cleaned streets, with the local Brotherhood of the Blessed Sacrament forming a guard of honor with lighted tapers, and all the church bells tolling (Tibesar, 1953: 88, 90). In the Philippines, where missionaries were few and the natives lived close to their rice fields instead of in villages, 7 out of 10 filipino Christians were said to die without the last rites (Phelan, 1959: 81–84). The insistence with which Florida friars urged their converts to stay within reach of the sacraments reflects the difficulty that they, too, faced, trying to administer extreme unction to parishioners scattered across the landscape (Bushnell, 1990b).

The clergy altogether withheld from Indians, as from *negros* and *mulatos*, the sacrament of ordination, threshhold to the ultimate religious privilege, the priesthood. Español males were the only candidates eligible to join the spiritual elite. An Indian man who wished to dedicate his life to the service of God did so in an auxiliary role befitting his ascribed incapacity and lack of judgment, like a woman.

Spaniards treated those ordained to the priesthood with elaborate deference, and trained Christian Indians from childhood to do the same. When they met their parish priest or another friar, they knelt in the street to ask his blessing and kiss his hand (Auto, 1738). Bishops, the nominal princes of the Church, were offended when a visitor belonging to one of the mendicant orders let himself be received with excessive marks of respect, particularly with the *adventus* reception, which called for sweeping roads and raising triumphal arches. That the Indians should kiss a friar's hands or robe was enough (Tibesar, 1953: 91; Ricard, 1966: 245; Gutiérrez, 1991: 119).

The priests of Spanish parishes were more concerned about friars who trespassed on their territory by providing religious services to their parishioners. In order to safeguard the authority and altar fees of the parish priest in St. Augustine, the one Spanish—or rather, non-Indian—parish in Florida, the Diocesan Synod of June 1684 forbade the priests of the Indian parishes to confer the sacraments of baptism or matrimony on Spaniards, *mulatos*, or *negros*. Franciscans could administer extreme unction to a person from another parish, and hear confessions and give communion to any who happened to be in their parishes during Lent, but that was all (García de Palacios, 1684; Shea, 1886).

As was seen in Chapter 7, the priest of the St. Augustine parish church derived revenue from a variety of local sources—limosnas, rents, ecclesiastical taxes, and altar fees—and discussed them frankly. The revenues of Franciscan doctrinas and doctrineros are more difficult to establish. Members of an

Order that had made a cult of "Lady Poverty" were naturally reluctant to disclose or discuss their worldly interests. In the discourse of the convents, terms for money and personal property are conspicuously missing.

Syndics handled the purchasing and other financial transactions for the Province of Santa Elena, preserving the friars corporately and individually from direct contact with Mammon. Chosen for their devotion to the Order as well as their business abilities, the syndics were participants in the discourse. Joachín de Florencia, personal business manager of three friars, testified in 1681 that to the best of his knowledge the Franciscans of Florida laid no ecclesiastical taxes on their parishioners and collected no obventions, or altar fees. As for alms, the Indians were too poor to give any; instead, the friars selflessly supported invalids and orphans (Franciscans, 1681c).

Lady Poverty aside, the doctrinero, like any other church pastor, expected and received altar fees, "free-will" offerings, and tithes. Although the king's alms underwrote the initial conversión and continued to subsidize the doctrineros and the service of the altar, the Indians themselves made a major contribution to mission support. The doctrinas were parishes, and all parishes made demands on their parishioners.

Like Spaniards, Christian Indians paid for the services of the church both directly and indirectly, as individuals and as members of confraternities. In the Sierra Zapoteca of Oaxaca, in New Spain, a community of 45 married couples without a resident priest made the following communal payments in 1707 to the circuit-riding Dominicans of their district:

offerings for 8 feastdays	77 pesos
gifts to the curate	16 pesos and 22 mantles
food for the curate	11 pesos 4 reales
Masses	23 pesos
payments to the vicar	19 pesos and 3 servants

Individuals in the same Sierra community paid 4 pesos 1 real for a wedding ceremony, 2 pesos 4 reales for death rites, and an unstated amount for a baptism (Chance, 1989: 156–157).

The English-born Dominican Thomas Gage, who in the 1630s was assigned to the two towns of Mixco and Pinola in Guatemala, later renounced Catholicism and penned for Oliver Cromwell's benefit a self-incriminating account of how a priest could accumulate a fortune at his parishioners' expense. All the Pokoman Indian towns of his valley, he said, were subordinate to the prior and cloister of Guatemala, and the friars who ministered to them were expected to surrender to that cloister whatever they collected above what it took to maintain them and their servants. He, however, had sent 450 pesos a year to the cloister (50 pesos more than his predecessor had) and had pocketed the difference.

His two stipends alone came to 420 pesos. Each month the alcaldes and regidores of Mixco paid him 20 crowns, or pesos, and those of Pinola, 15, paid for by a Guatemalan variant of the "sabana system" introduced in Chapter 10. Gage explained:

> To meet this payment the towns sowed a common piece of land with wheat or maize, and kept their book of accounts, wherein they set down what crops they yearly received, what moneys they took in for the sale of their corn, and in the same book I wrote down what every month I received from them.

In addition to his stipends, Gage took in 39 pesos a month, or 468 pesos a year, from the various sodalities. The 38 saints' statues in the two churches brought in another 266 pesos a year. The Church's five yearly feasts of obligation were worth 80 pesos, not counting offerings, and certain additional feasts, another 44 pesos. The offerings of the faithful on Christmas, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, All Souls' Day, and Candlemas came to 260 pesos, and the gifts from the two towns on their feastdays, another 130 pesos. Altogether, feasts and sodalities supplied a minimum of 1248 pesos per annum.

Altar fees and bequests from individuals were not inconsiderable.

> The communicants, every one giving a real, might make up in both towns at least a thousand reals; and the confessions in Lent at least a thousand more, besides other offerings of eggs, honey, cacao, fowls, and fruits. Every christening brought two reals, every marriage two crowns;

> every death two crowns more at least, and some in my time died who would leave ten or twelve crowns for five or six Masses to be sung for their souls.

His two towns, said Gage, were

> not to be compared in offerings and other church duties to many other towns about that country. Yet they yielded me with the offerings cast into the chests which stood in the churches for the souls of Purgatory, and with what the Indians offered when they came to speak unto me (for they never visit the priest with empty hands) and with what other Mass stipends did casually come in, the sum of at least two thousand crowns of Spanish money, which might yearly mount to five hundred English pounds.

In his five years in Mixco and Pinola and two years in Amatitlán, Gage, after expenses, amassed over 9000 pesos (Gage, 1648: 257–261).

In the Philippines, the costs of religious services may have been even higher. According to John Leddy Phelan, in that colony the Franciscans charged the natives 50 to 500 pesos to say a burial benediction, effectively limiting that comfort to the privileged (Phelan, 1959: 84, 103). The sums that the Indians of the provinces of Florida paid for altar fees are unknown, but that they did pay them, in the form of liens against their harvests, is certain. Juan de Uzeda, doctrinero of San Joseph de Sápala in Guale, reported in 1681 that his parishioners owed him 100 arrobas of maize for "burials, marriages, and other things" (Fuentes, 1681a).

Whether or not the Indians of Florida were subject to ecclesiastical taxation is problematic. In 1533 the Crown exempted Indians from the tithe (Sánchez-Bella, 1968: 221–222). The Council of Trent, sitting from 1545 to 1563, revoked this privilege, giving the bishops authority over the doctrinas, including the right to collect a general Indian tithe. The missionary orders raised such an outcry that parts of the decrees were withdrawn (Padden, 1956; Ennis, 1971; Shiels, 1971). In the Southwest, as long as a native town retained the status of doctrina—which was as long as it retained a Crown-supported doctrinero—the natives continued to be tax exempt (Polzer, 1976: 6).

The Indians of Florida did not tithe for the benefit of bishops, either. By pleading native poverty and the needs of native churches, the Franciscans succeeded in stalling their charges on the road to civic responsibility and acceptance as defined by Spaniards. But this did not exempt the natives from supporting *them*. The friars argued to Governor Márquez Cabrera that the "divine law" obligated an Indian, "like any other son of the church," to pay his firstfruits, obventions, and tithes (Franciscans, 1681a).

DAY SCHOOLS AND BOARDING SCHOOLS

Once the conversión phase with its adult education was past, the education of the young continued in the doctrina day school. Elementary catechism classes were short, suited to the attention spans of little ones. The older children, combining classwork with chores at the convent, were held in school most of the day, keeping them attached to the mission compound well after they had reached the age of being useful to their elders. Knowing the importance that Spaniards attached to religious instruction, Patricio de Hinachuba, cacique of Ivitachuco, couched a complaint he made to the appointed defender of the Indians about two officers who had started ranches in Apalache in terms of class attendance: "They keep the muchachos of the doctrina out at their cattle ranches, and although the *padre ministro* sends for them they are unwilling to send them back, and they grow up without knowing how to recite or hearing Mass" (Hinachuba, 1699).

In Peru, doctrina concluded at the age of twelve or fourteen with first confession, after which one became a marriageable adult (Tibesar, 1953: 88–90). In Florida, a male's first confession may have functioned as his rite of passage into the labor force of bachelors in the service of the king, the community, or the convent. Perhaps it was only by proving his valor and stoicism in some fashion—in the hunt, in battle, on the ballfield, in dangerous journeys, or in penances and punishments—that a man reached full maturity.

Whether girls stayed in school as long as boys is not easy to determine, for the Spanish word "*muchachos*" is ambiguous. Bishop Diaz Vara Calderón reported in 1674 that at the missions "the children, both male and female, go to the church on work days, to a

religious school where they are taught by a teacher . . . whom the priests have for this service" (Díaz Vara Calderón, [1675]: 14). In 1682, when the native officials at Nombre de Dios charged their friar with turning the doctrina schoolchildren into personal servants, they explicitly said "*muchachos y muchachas*" (Santiago et al., 1682). On the other hand, Jonathan Dickinson saw, at the town of Santa María in 1696, "Indian boys" only, "kept to school in the church, the friar being their schoolmaster" (Dickinson, 1699: 67).

In any case, Christian Indians in Florida were not unduly pressured to marry early, as they could be in places where marriage marked the advent of tributary status. Perhaps the period of single adulthood was artificially lengthened by a labor levy which took bachelors in preference to married men. Judging from the complaint of the Guale caciques in 1657, filtered through the friars, the demands of repartimiento labor not only delayed marriages, but prevented them (Meléndez et al. and Martínez et al., 1657).

The routine of a Florida doctrina was apparently too ordinary to record. For depictions of its monasterial function as a boarding school for native youths we must turn to the reports of two Franciscans written a continent and more than a century apart, the one by a brash mission publicist and the other by a worn-out, disillusioned missionary.

Alonso de Benavides, a strong advocate of the doctrinas of New Mexico, presented in his *Memorial* of 1630 an idealized picture of Franciscan education, with fatherly doctrineros and filial Indians (Kessell, 1987: 129–131). Each New Mexican pueblo, according to Benavides, had a day school for the teaching of prayers, polyphonic choral singing, and the playing of musical instruments. The friar's assistant took roll at Mass every morning and all the students knelt by the church door to sing the *Salve* in their own language, to which the friar responded with the "*Alabado*": "Praised be the Most Holy Sacrament." At noon the cooks of the convent fed the poor at the convent door and sent food to the sick in their houses. In the afternoon the friar went out to one of the neighboring pueblos in his care, where he heard confessions, settled disputes, and inspected the schools run by the local sacristans, each of whom could supply a dozen boys trained in the service of the sacristy to serve at Mass and lead prayers. More than 20 Indians lived in the convent with the friar, combining labor with prayer like so many monks. Some of these were servants; the others were caciques' sons sent to the convent to learn Latin, advanced music, and how to assist at religious services.

The second report was one that a lonely, anonymous Franciscan stationed at the mid-18th-century conversión of Puzuzu in the Peruvian montaña took the time to pen into his parish register for the benefit of the priest who would succeed him—a candid account of his weekly, yearly, and daily schedule (Tibesar, 1983: 150–153). It was the friar of Puzuzu's custom to say Mass four mornings a week, taking roll on Sundays. He had those members who were absent for Mass on Sundays whipped with 3, 6, or 12 lashes; if they persisted, they spent time in the stocks. The people used their Saturday afternoons to prepare for Sunday. The first concern was fuel and lighting. Each man brought a load of firewood to the convent. The sacristan of the week named those who were to bring candles for the following week. The leftover candles belonged to the priest. When oil for the lamp of the sacrament ran short, the women processed more. The next concern was cleanliness and decoration. When the sacristan of the week rang the bell, the married women came out and swept the plaza, the widows swept the church, and the girls swept the sacristy. After that, the women adorned the procession crosses with flowers. When everything was ready, the bell rang again for the Rosary and prayers to the Virgin, Saturday being her day.

The town of Puzuzu celebrated three feasts a year with sung vespers and processions: the Day of Corpus, the Day of St. Anthony of Padua, and the Assumption of the Virgin. The first Mass on Christmas Morning was at six o'clock. On Epiphany the whole pueblo came to adore the Child, each person bringing a gift. The community also celebrated Candlemas. During Lent, the priest heard confessions by appointment—six in the morning and six in the afternoon. To avoid confusion, he recorded the names of those who had fulfilled their yearly duty. During Holy Week the women filed out of the church building,

and the men joined him in scourging themselves. Easter Sunday was celebrated with a High Mass at sunrise, and the liturgical year ended on All Souls Day, when the men and women again brought gifts, whatever they could afford.

The friar's own daily schedule revolved around solitary prayers and innocent pleasures. He arose early for half an hour of mental prayer, prepared to say Mass, and ordered the bell rung to summon the "*cholos*" (a Peruvian term for mestizos or Hispanized Indians) boarding at the convent. He said Mass for the cholos, recited the appropriate Station of the Cross, and dismissed them to their day's activities. After a period of meditation, the friar of Puzuzu reentered the convent and gave orders about the food. He saw that his hens were let out of the henhouse and that his pigs and mule were fed. He had a cup of chocolate or some "*mate*" (a caffeine-rich Paraguayan tea), recited the Hours, and had a dip of snuff or a cigar. With walkingstick in hand, he took a turn about the pueblo, then went back to the convent to study, read, and write. At noon he ate, smoked a cigar, and lay down. After his nap he had a drink of "hot water," smoked another cigar, and recited his Vespers and Compline. If there was something to do in the garden he amused himself there for awhile, then again studied or read.

The bell rang for doctrina and the cholos arrived with their superintendant, the fiscal. The friar spent a while with them, then recited his Matins and some devotions. After a lemonade or a "*chicha*" (the native beer) and a last cigar, he went to the church to recite the "*corona*," or Rosary of seven decades. He concluded his half hour of evening prayer with "discipline," self flagellation. Returning home, he supped, recited evening devotions with the cholos of the convent, and sent them to bed. Having seen his flock safely into the fold, the priest himself retired (Tibesar, 1983: 154).

In Florida, too, the Franciscans appear to have boarded the sons of caciques in their convents for several years of advanced study. The special treatment and privileges that the Spanish in Florida afforded to native elites and what they expected to receive from them are the subjects of the next chapter.

NOTES

1. A like devotion was encouraged in the Philippines, where women and children gathered daily at the foot of the large wooden cross in the main plaza to chant the Rosary, and children walked chanting through the streets at sunset (Phelan, 1959: 73).

2. Francisco Pareja was the linguist who wrote and published the earliest surviving texts in any North American Indian language, the Mocamo dialect of Timucua (López, 1602; Pareja, 1614; Milanich et al., 1972: 9; Granberry, 1987).

CHAPTER 9. ROYAL SUPPORT OF THE CACIQUES

HISPANICIZING THE NATIVE ELITE

Throughout the Spanish empire it was standard procedure to favor and Hispanicize the native leaders, protecting their hereditary status and rank. This model of European-native relations evolved from Spain's practice of governing a conquered people through their own rulers as a separate polity, or *res publica*. Just as the conquest of Granada led to two *repúblicas*, one of Moslems and the other of Spaniards, so the New World was divided in theory into a dominant Republic of Spaniards and a subordinate Republic of Indians (Gibson, 1978: 3).

In the Philippines, as in the Americas, Franciscan missionaries boarded the sons of leaders in their convents, using them as catechists and interpreters. Once grown, these members of the ruling class served the Crown as production intermediaries and *gobernadores*, or elected local magistrates, the same as their New World counterparts. The caciques and principales of the "*indios filipinos* were similarly exempt from tribute and compulsory labor and entitled to honorifics and other signs of authority (Phelan, 1959: 55, 120–127).

By the end of the 16th century, Spaniards had encountered and recorded, in Greater Florida, over 50 autonomous political units, including 9 paramount chiefdoms. According to David H. Dye, the paramount chief in the Southeast and his or her supporting elites exercised hegemony over the chiefs of subordinate towns and tributary towns, periodically demanding loyalty oaths, or pledges, of subordinate chiefs or their emissaries. The lesser chiefs, in turn, controlled and delivered the labor and tribute of commoners. A paramount chiefdom's wars of conquest were hegemonic wars, intended to achieve political expansion and access to the tribute and social labor of new populations without the necessity of accessing new lands or policing new territories. Elites supported themselves through the institutions of staple finance and wealth finance, staple finance being the redistribution of commoner tribute to caciques, principales, and those working for the polity, and wealth finance being control over the distribution of status indicators such as copper and other exotic goods (Dye, 1990: 212–218). The paramount chiefs' methods of establishing hegemony were not unlike the Spaniards' own.

From 16th-century French sources, David Hurst Thomas determined that the chiefs of preconquest Guale functioned as "collectors and redistributors of food and other products," with the "most common mode of redistribution" being the periodic ritual feast. Their trade with inland people was largely in elite goods, and they "compensated their supporters in military activities with valued items such as deerskins, shell money, and metal tools received in exchange with Europeans" (Thomas, 1990b: 364). This pattern of exchange and redistribution made the caciques natural brokers between Spaniards and Indian commoners once the Spaniards had secured their friendship. It also provided an opening by which to secure it.

Depending on whether his purpose was trade or diplomacy, Pedro Menéndez's gifts to the coastal Indians of southern Florida and the Atlantic coast, including Guale, were of two kinds: "*rescates*" or "*regalos*." The term "rescate," originally meaning "ransom," had by the mid-1560s come to mean any kind of cross-cultural trade, including trade with corsairs or unpacified Indians. When Menéndez arrived in Florida, coastal chiefs and European visitors had long since opened channels and established procedures for the "rescate" of salvaged silver and Christian captives, and these procedures the Adelantado duly observed.

"Regalos," on the other hand, were the reciprocal tokens of "*amistades*," or "friendships," the common term for diplomatic and trading alliances. The term "regaling the chiefs," so prevalent in official Spanish correspondence, suggests not only gift-giving but the whole tiring round of speeches and hospitality associated with the calumet ceremony, the traditional means by which many North American Indian societies validated friendship and initiated or reestablished trade. The Spanish were not the only Europeans to

come around to the Indian system. When their turn came, the French and the British would do the same (Jacobs, 1950; Johns, 1975; Galloway, 1989).

The policy of pacification by gifts that was first implemented on the northern frontiers of New Spain, with Franciscans present to observe and translate, was tried in Florida soon after (López, 1602). There, however, the policy of "peace by purchase" appropriate to a nonsedentary native society with a low level of social stratification was overlaid by the policy of "conquest by contract" suitable to a more sedentary and stratified native society. Gifts from the king were the means by which civil and religious authorities attracted, attached, and empowered the "lords of the land" and through them exercised control over commoners. Outmaneuvered in war and suborned by gifts, the Florida caciques induced their followers to be baptized, to restrict their trade to españoles, and to function as a labor reserve. In the Spanish model of European-native relations, they were the enablers (Bushnell, 1989a).

The Jesuit plan for Florida was to establish a college in Havana for the sons of chiefs—"precious pledges," the Adelantado called them (Ménendez de Avilés, 1568)—and thereby influence the Indians through their elites. After the Jesuit departure, the sons and daughters of chiefs were raised in the governor's house, arriving as hostages and developing into pages, companions of rank, and interpreters. Governor Ybarra once claimed to be raising a native speaker for each of "the five lenguas" in his household (1606). As a natural result of this contact, marriage and concubinage were common between Spanish soldiers and officers and Indian women of the upper orders, some of whom were close relatives of caciques, and others, cacicas in their own right.

Following a policy of *cujus regio, ejus religio*, the Franciscans did not presume to call a town Christian until they had baptized the caciques and their families (Cushner, 1959: 375). When Francisco Gutiérrez de Vera erected a new doctrina at Sabacola on the Apalache frontier, he reported to the governor that in the first two months of the mission he had been able to baptize 30 of the "principal persons," including "the head chief with two of his sons and his father-in-law, and as soon as they learn the prayers, his mother and the governing chief with his wife and three children and a grandson, who are all the family he has" (Gutiérrez de Vera, 1681).

Descendants of the "*primeros bautizados*," or "first baptized," were the native equivalents of floridanos descended from "primeros pobladores." Within a few years of the formation of each new province the "*señores naturales*" were said to be "*españolados*," or "Spaniardlike." Andrés de Segura shipwrecked in 1595 off the coast of Guale, met an older chief who called himself "don Filipe, because he knew that was the king's name." While the castaways were in St. Augustine two more chiefs were baptized, each of them taking the name of "don Martín, because the governor's name was Martín de Avendaño" (San Miguel, [1629]: 197–198). Governors often stood *compadre* to native nobles at the time of baptism; they bestowed their surnames on them with such regularity that the sequence of conversions in the Florida provinces can be traced by matching the family names of chiefs and governors. The practice of *compadrazgo* harmonized with the Southeastern pattern of cementing a trade alliance with the calumet ceremony, in which the allied nation was given a fictive lineage and taken into the tribe (Galloway, 1989: 257).

Two petitions, one by a cacique and the other by the daughter of a cacica, illustrate the close relationships that developed in the 16th century across caste lines. In the first, Gaspar Marqués identified himself as the

> cacique principal of San Sebastián and Tocoy, son of Pedro Marqués and Catalina Marquesa his wife, caciques who were of the first to befriend the españoles in the time of the adelantado P[edr]o Meléndez de Avilés. In the wars that arose with the natives his father was always on the Spanish side, welcoming them in his tierra and giving them of his food in times of hunger, being always in their company as guide and translator and coming to their aid with all of his Indians. In order to be closer, he left his tierra and founded the pueblo of San Sebastián.
>
> His father was present when General P[edr]o Meléndez M. captured the Frenchman in the River of San Mateo twenty-five years ago, on the boat with the general. And in the war that the General waged on the pueblo and province of Potano he went personally in the company

> of the españoles to the pueblo, taking with him many of his Indians to serve as baggage carriers.
>
> His parents were among the first baptized, with their children and vassals, and when the priests came his father asked for them and built them churches. When his father died and he as eldest son inherited his tierras, he and his siblings and vassals remained friendly and [he has continued to] assist the fathers at San Sebastián, attending there with all his Indians to the things that come up in the service of His Majesty commanded of them by the governor, and he has made journeys by command of the governor into the interior.

In return for his services and those of his parents, Marqués asked for the *merced*, or royal grace, of the plaza of a soldier without the obligation of guard duty. Governor Ybarra and Bishop Altamirano endorsed his petition (Marqués, 1606).

The second petition, or set of petitions, was by the *mestiza* Catalina de Valdés, widow of a soldier (Valdés, 1606; 1612; [1616]). She identified herself as granddaughter of María Ruiz del Castillo, "an *india principal, cacica de Escamacu,*" who "brought other Indians to the obedience of the General [Pedro Menéndez Márquez] and was his interpreter." Catalina's mother and aunt, sisters, being raised in the General's house "as companions to the General's sister, were baptized in St. Augustine and took his name," her mother becoming Catalina Meléndez and her aunt, María Meléndez. She herself, Catalina *menor,* was the "*hija natural,*" or acknowledged daughter, of the unmarried soldier Juan de Valdés and the "India of Escamacu."

When the English enemy captured the fort, said Catalina, referring to Drake's invasion of 1586, she was very small and fell into enemy hands. Perhaps she was the small child whom the English discovered in the abandoned town of St. Augustine (Covington, 1965: 91). Catalina's mother, in order to see her, "for they would not let her have her, came and went unnoticed" across enemy lines, "dressed like an india," that is, in non-Spanish attire. Enabled by this disguise to observe enemy activities, "she gave information to the General, who had retired to the woods, and soldiers went with her in perfect safety to reconnoiter the entrances." As a result, "one night the soldier Juan Ramírez de Contreras entered [the city] and killed the enemy's sergeant major," who had stolen Contreras's horse.

After Catalina's mother died, the General married her mother's sister María to a soldier named Molina, and when Molina died, to Juan Jiménez, whom he named rations notary. When Catalina's father died, leaving her an orphan, the General married her to the military carpenter Graviel [sic] Hernández, who served in Santa Elena and St. Augustine for 20 years and advanced to the rank of captain. Her husband's death, she said, had left her poor and "burdened with many children." She wanted an ayuda de costa or *renta* of the kind given to "other *personas naturales*," or native-born persons.

Once the spiritual conquest of Florida got under way, sexual liaisons of the kind that produced Catalina became less common. In an effort to reduce the sum total of sin, the Franciscans did what they could to keep cacicas, like all Indian women, secluded from Spanish men.

The education of native males at the hands of friars was strongly religious. Incipient caciques and principales, following a different career track than commoners, were groomed from an early age to serve at the altar and trained in the offices of sacristan, chorister, and catechist. The future lords of the land learned to speak Spanish, as they had formerly in the governor's house, making them useful interpreters. Although learning how to write seems to have been optional, those who were trained as catechists could probably read Spanish and in some cases Timucua, while those who were choristers may have read Latin.

Convent-trained caciques and principales treated their priests with filial deference, calling them "My Father," indulging their demands, and putting up with their patriarchal tempers. The traveller Andrés de Segura met one such Hispanicized cacique and his wife on Cumberland Island and observed the strange ceremonial weeping with which their vassals welcomed them home.

> He and the cacica were Christians and he spoke the Castilian language very well; he had excellent presence and countenance [and] was of great strength. He called himself don Juan. . . . He dressed well in the Spanish manner. And the

> cacica when she went out covered herself with a mantle like a Spanish woman (San Miguel, [1629]: 197–198).

Don Juan, "fostered" from childhood by Father Baltasar López, distinguished himself in the defense of San Pedro during the so-called "Juanillo Revolt" (Oré, [1617–1620]: 71; Geiger, 1937: 100–101). Father López had trained him thoroughly. When Governor Méndez Canzo criticized the Franciscans to don Juan, he told the friars, who reported the governor's attitude to the Crown (Matter, 1990: 120).

By joining forces with the Spanish and becoming their vehicles for the exercise of civil and religious control, the caciques and principales gained far more than the empty "places of honor in processions and other services" that Robert Allen Matter allowed them (Matter, 1990: 75). They filled positions of true power and responsibility in a hierarchical system that put other Indians in the position of their vassals.

A clear demarcation between the dominant and the subordinate orders and well-established lines of authority were obvious prerequisites to the spread of Christianity in a native society. The Franciscans found it necessary to postpone the conversion of Apalache, they said, because "some of the Indians obey their chiefs poorly." The king, they thought, should send more soldiers, so that "the chiefs with the favor and aid of Your Majesty could subdue their Indians" (Franciscans, 1612; see also Bushnell, 1989a; 1990b).

The upper orders of native society lost as much as they gained by their alliance with Spaniards. Hispanicization could be deeply destructive of family support networks. Richard C. Trexler analyzed its impact in the Valley of Mexico as a problem in social psychology. There, as in Florida, the Franciscans' conversion strategy was to intern the sons of chiefs, often at a distance from their parents. This practice, differing sharply from former methods of socializing the young, served the military purpose of hostage taking and made it possible to create an elite cadre of native aides, but it also led to painful intergenerational conflicts. The retroactive monogamy imposed by Christian marriage turned many elite youths into bastards, ashamed of their mothers and angry with their fathers. Their new fathers, the padres, taught them to ridicule their pagan ancestors and heritage and to take comfort in the bosom of Mother Church. Returning to their villages, the "*niños*" informed on their elders and went about in terrorist squads attacking pagan holy sites and images. Servile toward the friars and alienated from their own families and heritage, they entered adult society drawing their importance from the new order and armed with the power to coerce (Trexler, 1982).

John K. Chance's analysis of the Sierra Zapoteca of Oaxaca, where the work of conversion was done by Dominicans, reveals how useful a native elite could be to its conquerors. Spanish settlement in the Sierra was numerically minimal, largely because the *alcalde mayor*, a political appointee of the viceroy's, monopolized both trade and tribute. Caciques and principales, who spoke Spanish and were licensed to carry a sword, go mounted, and wear Spanish clothes, were the go-betweens between the Republic of Indians and the Republic of Spaniards. Their brokering functions were multiple. As *fiscales*, or parish officials, they policed the towns for immorality, drunkenness, and apostasy on behalf of a priest who visited them two or three times a year on saints days to collect his fees. As town officials they collected tribute and administered the "*repartimientos de mercancías*," or forced sales of merchandise, on behalf of the alcalde, skimming a profit off the top for themselves. As members of the *cabildos*, or town councils, they paid the alcalde a fee of 5 pesos plus gifts to be invested with their *varas*, or staves of office.[1] And when the *visitador* named by the alcalde made his round of the towns, extorting 20 to 50 pesos in gifts from each cabildo over and above his party's entertainment, they were the ones who imposed the unpopular exactions on the communities.

As population in the Sierra Zapoteca declined, the social structure became topheavy; by the mid-18th century the privileged class comprised from a third to a half of Sierra population. The towns were saddled with an inflexible sociopolitical system designed for much larger places; some of them retained the status of pueblos sujetos simply to avoid

the costs of community government. Without war to bolster their position vis-à-vis the principales, the caciques became poor and politically weak, while the few españoles who lived in the Sierra, neither priests nor presidial soldiers, were little more than parasites attached to Indian society (Chance, 1989: 124–126, 131–136, 146, 154).

THE INDIAN SITUADO

The Crown first approved a "*gasto de indios*," or "Indian expense," for Florida in 1593, in a cédula advising the tenedor de bastimentos to keep an account of what was "given to the friendly caciques *comarcanos*" whose territories adjoined the mission provinces and "those who come as couriers: the rations for the days they are detained, and the clothing and tools" (Spanish Crown, 1593). From 16th-century documents it is difficult to determine whether the recorded "gifts to the Indians" were official presents or returns for goods or services (Lyon, 1990: 287). A second cédula, issued in 1615, authorized 1500 ducats annually "to clothe and regale the caciques who come to give obedience and show signs of eagerness to be converted." To judge from these two cédulas, the purpose of the gasto de indios was dual: to keep the peace with gentile chiefs and to reward Christian ones. The account covered the costs of diplomatic hospitality and messenger service, supplied caciques with articles of European clothing, and introduced commoners to Spanish farm implements. The treasury in Mexico City dubbed it an "extraordinary expenditure" because it was over and above the situado (Sluiter, 1985: 6).

Reports of cacique visits to St. Augustine in the 17th century are noncommittal on the subject of whether governors used the gasto de indios for trading, exchanging gifts, or remunerating services; they record only the formula that the governors have "regaled" the chiefs and sent them to their homes again "content" (Ruiz et al., 1612; Rojas y Borja, 1628).

The 1500-ducat ceiling on the gasto de indios set in 1615 was soon exceeded. The Florida treasury officials claimed in 1627 that the governors before the incumbent, Governor Luis de Rojas y Borja, had spent no more than 1000 to 1500 ducats a year "regaling" the lords of the land, Christian and allied, but that Governor Rojas had made 3400 ducats' worth of gifts in a single year to caciques, who stalked into town as though they were collecting tribute, "and that is what they call it" (Francisco Menéndez Márquez I et al., 1627). But Mexico City treasury records show that the fund was already overdrawn when

TABLE 9.1
Florida Indian Fund Disbursements
In ducats (adapted from Sluiter, 1985)

Year	Indian fund disbursements
1617	3994
1618	1302
1619	5668[a]
1620	1576[b]
1621	1431
1622	1338
1623	2545
1624	2212
1625	3420
1626	3179
1627	3193[c]
1628	3220
1629	2264
1630	1413
1631	1985
1632	1706
1633	no data
1634	no data
1635	no data
1636	1231
1637	—[d]
1638	no data[e]
1639	1060
1640	4982
1641	936
1642	no data
1643	no data
1644	668
1645	no data
1646	1816
1647	—[f]

[a] Indians, religiosos, mermas.
[b] Indians and religiosos.
[c] Piet Heyn captures situado.
[d] No disbursement.
[e] Situado sequestered by Crown.
[f] No disbursement.

Rojas's term began and that it tended to fluctuate wildly.

The resources of the Spanish Hapsburg empire were drained by European wars that lasted from 1621 until the 1659 Treaty of the Pyrenees with France. Under the circumstances, Spain could not continue to underwrite the increase in the Indian fund that had helped make it possible to expand into new provinces and guarantee the fidelity of older ones. After 1635 the gasto de indios, along with the situado for soldiers and Franciscans, began falling into arrears, with serious consequences. The governor employed the unpaid soldiers on his personal business, the friars spoke of abandoning their posts (Francisco Menéndez Márquez I and Horruytiner, 1646a), and Indians long since pacified began to show signs of restlessness.

In 1647 the royal officials wrote:

> For some years now they have been behaving suspiciously, which we blame on the poor collection of the situados and the shortages in what Your Majesty customarily gives them annually. Two years ago many of those in Guale abandoned their towns (that of Satuache totally) to retire among infieles, setting a poor example to other Christians. We have them just about reduced to their pueblos and doctrinas now and some of the ringleaders have been brought to this presidio. This, Sire, demands a remedy, for this presidio cannot conserve itself without the services of these natives (Francisco Menéndez Márquez I and Horruytiner, 1647a).

After the semi-converted Apalaches rebelled, the Mexico City treasury brought the situado and gasto de indios up to date. Several years afterward, the Crown asked Treasurer Joseph de Prado to report on the causes of the 1647 rebellion and also on who received the king's alms to Indians and the sum the governor yearly spent on gifts and clothing for chiefs.

Prado replied that annual expenditures on the Indians had risen from a low of 1875 pesos (1364 ducats) in 1615 to over 9000 pesos (6545 ducats) in 1650. The total expenditure for the gasto de indios over the four-year period from 1648 to 1651, the second half of Salazar's governorship, had been 15,587 ducats, he said, an average overdraft of some 2400 ducats a year above the original 1500-ducat ceiling. The peak year was 1650, when the gasto rose to 6744 ducats. There would be fewer "inconveniences," Prado said smoothly, if the treasury instead of the governor handled the gift account.

From the aforementioned cédulas of 1593 and 1615 in the Florida archives, the treasurer concluded that the fund, originally meant for "the messengers" and "the infieles who render obedience," was instead being "given out to fieles and infieles comarcanos"—Christians and gentile neighbors—"as a supplement and a distribution."

> I feel that this is not a proper expense to Your Majesty (unless it can be considered alms), except for the amount for food, which can no way be avoided if they are going to keep coming, particularly when they fall sick, and the same for those who come to dig the fields, who should on no account be deprived of the sustenance that they have always been given.
>
> The most equitable way to handle it, I think, is that whenever a new governor arrives (for that is when they come to render obedience) there should be a general distribution of what is customarily given to all the caciques and principales, and if this is done without delay they should be well satisfied. Also, it is the custom to repair some tools for them at the forge of Your Majesty throughout the year. This, too, could be continued, being an expense of small importance (Prado, 1654).

What was customarily given to caciques and principales was, primarily, European clothing. In their outward appearance, as in so much else, the rulers of the Republic of Indians were conditioned to think of Spanish ways as superior. Dressing like Spaniards set the elite apart from the "*gente baja*," or "people of the lower sort," who wore clothing made of deerskins (Franciscans, 1657a).[2]

As Prado's report on the rising gasto de indios indicates, by 1654 the Indian fund had been integrated into the regional economy. It rewarded the caciques for organizing and delivering their vassals to St. Augustine in relays for "the service of the king." It paid for the *jornales*, or daily wages, of the drafted laborers: the rescates of knives, beads, cloths, scissors, and hatchets which their chiefs doled out to them had been bought with gasto de indios money. It paid for the maize with which the caciques and their vassals in the king's service were rationed while they were in St.

Augustine. It even repaired their tools. By providing the presidio with native labor at the king's expense, the Indian fund was, in effect, another royal subsidy to Spanish colonists.

The gasto de indios was in constant danger of misapplication, as authorities tried to draw on it for other expenses. The bishop of Cuba suggested to the Crown in 1691 that two-thirds of the "gasto de indios," or 1000 ducats, should go to provide one-third of the support for a Florida bishopric, with the rest of the money to come from tithes (Robertson, 1931: 171; Matter, 1990: 163). In 1698 the St. Augustine treasury assigned 200 ducats and two rations of flour from "the chiefs' fund" to the organist and two altar boys of the St. Augustine parish church (Bushnell, 1981: 66). The governors simply tapped it. Whenever the king's money passed through private hands, a portion seemed to adhere. In this case the largesse came from two directions. With one hand, for his private trade, the governor skimmed off a portion of the king's gifts to caciques. With the other, he accepted the caciques' reciprocal gifts to the king: bezoar stones, fine furs, supple deerskins, ambergris, and pearls.

In the 18th century, the "gentiles" readily continued to accept gifts charged to the gasto de indios but showed little interest in Hispanicization. This was especially true of commoners. When Governor Melchor de Navarrete invited a party of Yuchis trading in St. Augustine "to leave in my hands two or three of their small children, engaging to support them decently and to have them educated in order afterward to baptize them, adopting them with my surname," they responded evasively that so great an honor should be reserved to chiefs (Navarrete, 1749). Two centuries of experience had convinced Southeastern Indians that the only natives who stood to gain anything by intimate contact with Spaniards were members of the elite.

NOTES

1. For a similar distribution of staves of authority on New Spain's northern frontier see Polzer, 1976: 49.

2. In the California missions, too, certain Indians wore special clothing to symbolize their authority over other Indians (McGarry, 1950: 350).

CHAPTER 10. NATIVE SUPPORT OF THE CONVENT

THE SABANA SYSTEM

A doctrinero's privileges included direct and indirect access to the labor of doctrina Indians. Each growing season they cleared and dug, sowed, cultivated, and harvested a field large enough to cover church expenses, including the support of the doctrinero and his entourage. They contributed another share of their time to "the service of the convent," which for the men meant fetching the king's alms for their doctrinero, paddling him about in canoas, and building the structures he wanted, and for the women, long hours of shelling and grinding maize. The Indians also brought him a share of everything they hunted, fished, and gathered. These practices were extensions of preexisting mechanisms for cacique and community support, but the doctrinero took them farther, exacting gifts on feastdays and in compensation for his services and keeping some natives in his service full time, exempted from the Spanish labor levy, which as a result fell more heavily on other members of the community.

The "sabana system" was the native institution for public finance. Once or twice a year the commoners of an Indian town prepared and planted two kinds of fields: individual fields for the cacique, the principales, the medicine man or woman, the interpreter, the ballplayers, and anyone else they saw fit to support, and one large communal field whose harvest would function as the town's reserve against famine, provide food for widows, orphans, and travellers, finance feasts, and ration those who were busy with construction projects, long-distance trade, or military campaigns for the defense or the honor of the town. All these fields the Spanish called "sabanas" or, using terms from other colonies, "*milpas*" and "*charcas*."

With the acquiescence of the caciques, Spanish authorities expanded the sabana system to include fields for themselves. Fields were measured, not by surface area or plowing time, as in Europe, but by the amount of seed required to plant them. Governor Rebolledo ordered his tenientes of the various provinces to have some of the doctrinas plant a "two-botija" wheat field for "the king's service" in addition to the "two-arroba" and "four-arroba" maize fields already required. If they could grow wheat for church needs and for export, he thought, they could also grow it for the presidio (Franciscans, 1657a).

The Franciscans, who had introduced the Indians to new agricultural tools and techniques, quickly went to the head of the line of sabana system beneficiaries. In a letter addressed to the governor but being copied to the Crown they explained why.

> In each doctrina they dig one sabana for maize—in half a day they dig it, all of them together. The harvest goes to sustain the ministers, helps cover the costs of maintenance and repair for the churches, and remedies the lack of ornaments and things necessary for divine worship or [buys] better ones (Franciscans, 1681a).

In case the king was wondering, they added: "The Indians do this willingly under our counsel and paternal direction."

The friars supported by the sabana system could not resist the opportunity it offered. In the 1670s Indian Christians found themselves planting ever larger fields for church beautification and loading ever more arrobas of Indian corn and beans onto vessels bound for the provisioners of the treasure fleet in Havana or for St. Augustine. Sometimes the Franciscans sold their stockpiled produce to the treasury on credit. "The friars aid us out of the provision they make for the adorning of their churches," wrote Governor Hita Salazar, "being reimbursed out of the situado, which brings them whatever they order" (Hita Salazar, 1677).

An avid promoter of provincial economic development, Hita Salazar welcomed agricultural and ranching entrepreneurship, whatever the source. "There is so much vacant land," he said, thinking of the "old fields" of a nearly depopulated central Timucua, "that in a few years the inhabitants could become rich." The fertility of the soil was "apparent from the bit of wheat that the religious plant for their sustenance, for in a year when the weather is favorable the yield is

copious." It was "the same with the maize, the common food of these provinces, which the natives and some of the soldiers of this presidio harvest." With an abundance of food in the provinces, the presidio would be famine-proofed with or without the situado (Hita Salazar, 1677).

THE SERVICE OF THE CONVENT

The built environment of a Franciscan monastery or mission compound called for a church, a convent, a kitchen, and a cool *huerta*, which was a walled kitchen garden or orchard, often irrigated (Ricard, 1966: 143; Altman, 1989: 104). In keeping with Spanish ideas of cleanliness, privacy, and status, the entire compound might be enclosed. Don Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, St. Augustine's first resident bishop, was dismayed in the 1730s to find one of the small doctrinas near the city "without regularity or proper form. Up to now it has been wide open," he said, meaning open for wandering animals to dirty. "Now they are putting up a fence" (Martínez Tejada, 1736a).

Many of the Florida missions were also farms, complete with the livestock corrals, the sabanas, or open fields with changing crops which differed markedly from the permanent plantings of a huerta, and the "*casas*," or outbuildings, the word being used for any kind of structure with walls and a roof. An estate inventory of Governor Salazar's wheat farm on the Apalache-Timucua border (Ponce de León et al., 1651) shows the kinds of casas necessary to a working farm in the mid-17th century:

a tall dwelling casa with good timbers
a kitchen of wood with its oven and two mills on pedestals, with a loft of planks
a large casa of palm thatch for storing the wheat
a new casa of clay walls thatched with palm

The "service of the convent" required the periodic labor of men and the part-time labor of women and children. Except during the season when they dug the sabanas for their families and the community, men's work often took them out of town. They were the friars' boatmen, burdeners, guides, bodyguards, and couriers. They hunted and fished, returning with food for the convent kitchen as well as their families. They were the ones who went to the woods for charcoal or the timbers for buildings and fences. Women, for reasons of security, child care, and propriety, did most of the work in or near the town. With the help of the larger children, they collected the firewood, shelled and ground the maize, and gathered and processed the cassina, nuts, and oysters. They cleaned the church and its grounds. They planted and hoed the sabanas and gardens, guarding them against birds and other garden raiders. No doubt they raised pigs and chickens as part of their gardening routine, keeping the hogs in pens during the growing season and feeding them on plants culled or weeded from their gardens, much like the Cherokee women Mark Catesby observed on a trip up the Savannah River in the 1720s (Hatley, 1989).

To supplement the seasonal and part-time labor of ordinary parishioners, the convent employed a number of servants.[1] Governor Márquez Cabrera thought that two servants per doctrina should be enough to fence and cultivate all the huertas that one friar needed and argued that the convent sabana should be no larger than what was necessary to feed the three of them (Márquez Cabrera, 1681c). But the number of native aides and specialists in the doctrinas had a way of growing. Not only was the convent a boarding school for young male members of the native elite, it was also an orphanage for foundling and displaced boys, all of whom were garbed in knee-length tunics of Franciscan sayal and girded with the knotted cord.

These "*mozos*" were also called "*hijos de la iglesia*" ("sons of the Church"), "*mancebos de doctrina*" ("catechists in training") (Vargas Ugarte and Owen, 1935: 65), and "*donados*" (Kessell, 1987: 25), or "donated ones," in memory of the Biblical Samuel, whose mother, Hannah, fulfilled a vow by giving him to the Temple when he reached the age of five. Of all the Florida natives, the mancebos or donados were the most detribalized. Once grown, they would be used to oversee sabana work gangs, police and discipline the congregations as *fiscales*, manage the visitas as sacristans, be Church "*atequíes*," or interpreters, catechize, serve as grooms and travelling companions, and otherwise aid the friars. They did not take religious vows, which meant that some of the

natives in the full-time service of the convent were married. Pansaca Luis, for instance, invited to be sacristan of Oconi, could not accept the position until his wife agreed to leave her home town of Ivitachuco (Florencia, 1694–1695).

TRANSPORTATION

Provisioning the doctrineros was a major exercise in logistics. Before the years of mission expansion, the few friars in Santa Elena or St. Augustine could be fed from a single kitchen and refectory. Then, the *tenedor de bastimentos*, or keeper of provisions at the presidio, under the direction of the contador at the treasury, doled out to their commissary monthly their individual shares of dietary items from the storehouse. When, however, the missionaries increased in number and dispersed to distant doctrinas, their food and clothing had to be taken to them.

On Gómez de Palma's authority ([1637?]), the weight of a friar's yearly ration of food plus his allotment of wax and sacramental wine (the two other items for which a weight is indicated) came to 1447 pounds:

2 lbs flour per day	730 lbs
1 cuartillo [16 oz.] table wine per day	365
4 cuartillos sacramental wine per month	48
3 arrobas oil per year	75
3 arrobas vinegar per year	75
6 arrobas salt per year	150
4 lbs wax per year	4
	1447 lbs

This was net weight, without the carrying containers. In Florida, those containers consisted of an assortment of wooden kegs, henequen sacks, boxes of waterproofed canvas with metal-reinforced corners, glass bottles, leather bags, earthenware jars, and large baskets that were carried on the back or slung from a shoulder (Shipping Invoice, 1607; Fuentes, 1681a; Auto, 1687a; Davis, [1737]; Betancourt, 1763). If these added 25 percent to the net weight, by a moderate estimate, the gross weight was at least 1800 pounds. That figure, multiplied by the number of friars—43 in Gómez de Palma's time—produces a minimum of 81,400 pounds per year to be carried from Florida's ports of entry to its doctrinas. This volume in itself is sufficient to explain why the early doctrinas were maritime (see Dobyns, 1983: 238–245, 338–341).

The first strings of doctrinas followed the waterways of Guale and eastern Timucua from Satuache on the northern border down to Agua Dulce, a 16th-century province on the east bank of the St. Johns between Lake Harney and present Palatka. Except for six easily crossed bars, it was possible to walk from Satuache down to St. Augustine. But as in the Philippines, most of the traffic went by boat. In Florida, the Indians' real roads, as Bishop Altamirano noted in 1606, were on the water (Dávila, 1606; Rojas y Borja, 1627; Phelan, 1959: 112). Native paddlers in native canoas took the Guale and Mocamo doctrineros from place to place. The friar of San Juan del Puerto, for example, responsible for the visita of Pilijiriba, was able to say a second Mass there on holy days because it was only "three leagues by canoa" (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1701c).

Below the mouth of the St. Johns River, southbound travellers and haulers had their choice of land or water routes. Those on foot or horseback took the ferry of San Juan del Puerto and followed the path through a cattle range to St. Augustine, perhaps changing horses at the halfway point later known as "Veinte Millas," or "Twenty Miles." Canoa traffic followed the inland waterway to a landing on the creek of San Pablo. There, the cargo was unloaded, hauled 10 or 12 leagues to the town of Tolomato, and loaded onto another canoa for the remaining 3 leagues to St. Augustine (Santiago and the Principales of Tolomato, 1658; Hann, 1987: 5–6). In the late 17th century, the rental for a canoa to carry Indian corn from Amelia Island down to the haulover was 8 reales, plus the paddlers' rations and the wages of 1 real a day (Caciques de Guale, 1701; Pueyo, 1695).

According to Franciscan Pedro Ruiz, testifying in St. Augustine in 1602 in favor of moving the presidio to Guale,

> All the Christians are twenty, thirty and forty leagues north of here and one has to go there by sea, for if one goes by land the way is through swamps and ten leagues of beach that are enough to discourage and kill all [the natives] there are. Now and then the Indians have to be sent for

> the food by land for lack of a boat or in times of seas, and they return exhausted and with what they were bringing considerably diminished, because necessity obliges them to eat part of it, and if by chance it rains on the road, it arrives a total loss (Ruiz, 1602).

As the number of doctrinas on the east coast increased, so did the task of delivery. Governor Ybarra asked the guardián of the St. Augustine friary to keep a record of distribution with the aid of a lay brother. When the rations were ready to go out to the friars on location, he offered to provide the launch and the people to take them (Ybarra, 1605d). Although the priests in Guale, San Juan, and San Pedro complained in 1608 that the presidio launch was not bringing them the wine or the wax with which to say Mass and that the two poor friars in Potano, 20 leagues inland, did not get even their rations (Franciscans, 1608), this situation was probably due to shortages in the situado rather than to the indifference of officials. Their responsibility ended in any case when a 1641 cédula made clear that the Crown wished the religiosos' superior, and not the governor and royal officials, to accept delivery of the king's alms and distribute them to the friars (Menéndez Márquez and Rocha, [1682?]).

No supply contracts for the Florida doctrinas have survived for the historian to put alongside the contracts for supplying the friars of New Mexico. Those called for 30-wagon caravans to leave Mexico City for the frontier once every three years carrying such things as barbers' lancets, tin-plated cruets, graters, basins, razors, snuffing scissors, grindstones, rosaries, wafer-boxes, copal incense, bassoons, books of chants, woolen stockings, butcher knives, saffron, stills, spurs, chisels, pewter plates, latches, pillows, thread, and a hundred other things to ease a lonely life on the edges of empire (Scholes, 1930).

The same items or similar ones would have been brought from New Spain to the Florida doctrinas. The sailing time to Florida may have been shorter than the wagon train time to New Mexico, but the trip was more frequently made and carried more risk. The cargo on its way to Florida had to survive a sea voyage, with its perils of storms and of pirates, who several times captured the laden Florida supply ship. After that, in a land as yet without cartroads, draft oxen, or pack animals, the goods had to be gotten out to the doctrinas.

Following a native precedent for which they saw no alternative, Spanish authorities, civil and religious, pressed Indians into service as burdeners. This use of native labor, drafted or obtained through the market mechanism, was common to both Spanish and British America (Crane, 1956: 127–128, 165–166; Tanner, 1989).[2] In Florida it began when allied caciques first supplied "their" Indians to carry the Spanish baggage on joint military campaigns (Marqués, 1606).

The second advance of the frontier, from east to west, had laid a line of doctrinas that reached western Timucua by 1608 and Apalache in 1633 (Horruytiner, 1633). Behind this moving frontier the supply lines lengthened until the camino real stretched westward for 100 leagues (Horruytiner, 1637). For the convenience of travellers, Indian towns along the camino real were urged to space themselves 7 leagues apart, the day's journey, or *dieta*, of Roman law. In the towns, the council houses offered lodging to chiefs, Indians, and soldiers. Thanks to the "king's sabana" that the town planted and to the widows that the town supported, the messenger or burdener in the king's service could count on a cooked meal and food for his next day's journey. The king's field also rationed the burdener that any travelling soldier could press into service to carry his gear and bedroll to the next town.

Theoretically, the load for one of the "*indios de carga*" over and above his personal gear was 3 arrobas, or 75 pounds (Gómez de Palma, 1657). Also theoretically, the doctrinas were supplied three times a year (Jesús, [1630]). If, for the sake of a rough estimate of the amount of labor involved, we assume the average distance to an inland doctrina to be 49 leagues, and if we further assume that a party of burdeners travelled at the rate of 7 leagues a day, then the average round trip to St. Augustine, without allowing time for turnaround or labor-free holy days, would have lasted two weeks. If, as we earlier calculated, the weight of rations, sacramental wine, and wax to be delivered to each doctrinero was 1800 pounds, delivered 600 pounds at a time, then to supply the average

doctrinero, eight indios de carga would have been required to make the trip to St. Augustine and back three times a year, for a total of 336 burdener-days. If as many as 25 doctrineros were stationed in western doctrinas that had to be so supplied, then the Indians of those provinces spent 8400 burdener-days on the road every year delivering the king's limosna to their missionaries. This burden alone was a powerful argument for the developing of Gulf ports.

As far as the Franciscans were concerned, the fact that it took a small army of men to deliver the king's alms of food to their tables was unfortunate but unavoidable. A Spaniard's stomach was affronted by Indian food, and most of the friars were true *peninsulares*, born in Spain. If one of them, in a misguided attempt to relieve the Indians, neglected to send for his rations, his brethren fully expected him to decline in health and discontinue his ministry, to the Indians' eternal loss (Jesús, [1630]).

And, although they knew better than to bring this to the Crown's attention, the road to the doctrinas ran both ways. If the wagons that were emptied in New Mexico could rumble back to Mexico City laden with hides, salt, and piñon nuts (Kessell, 1987: 149), why should Florida's indios de carga spend half of their time on the road with empty packs? Doctrineros and caciques used them on the outgoing trip to deliver native products—sides of bacon, rope, saddles, earthenware, and deerskins—to be sold in St. Augustine.

The obvious solution to the burdening problem was, of course, to substitute mules or horses. For these, as for nearly everything else, the friars turned to the Crown. In 1630 Francisco Alonso de Jesús boldly asked the king to donate seven *cabalgaduras*, or pack animals, to the missionaries of Timucua. The land was cold and swampy, he said, and some of the friars were old. The governor and treasury officials endorsed his request with the comment that the same beasts could carry the "biscuits, wine, and other things" to the doctrinas of Timucua. A cabalgadura load, called a "*petate*," weighed around 6 arrobas, twice as much as the load of an indio de carga. Furthermore, at the end of a day's journey, an animal could graze; the only rations to reduce its load would be those of the mule drivers (Florencia, 1694–1695; Quiroga y Losada, [1697?]b; Castañeda, 1705).

Comisario Jesús repeated his request four years later, adding that the 35 religiosos in Florida were tired and sick from "walking barefoot in a cold land," where there were 44 doctrinas and 30,000 Christians. The provinces were so spread out and the caciques were spaced so far apart, he said, that in order to confess all his parishioners a priest had to walk for 8 or 10 leagues (Jesús, [1634]). The missionaries needed riding horses.

The Spanish word for a horseman, "*caballero*," was a synonym for "*hidalgo*," or gentleman. Because of the close association between riding and knighthood, Franciscans were forbidden to ride horses except in a case of necessity. This was why, on his official visita of the Florida doctrinas, Visitor Oré had refused the horse that Governor Juan Treviño Guillamas offered him, saying that he preferred to travel on foot with the friars of his company (Oré, [1617–1620]: 15, 157). But with settlement as diffused as it was in much of Florida, time on the road had to be taken into account. During the early 17th-century epidemics that almost annihilated the eastern Timucuans, the person to be confessed often died before the friar could reach his bedside (Franciscans, 1617).

Charitable persons in Cuba, where horses and cattle ran wild, offered to donate 200 cabalgaduras to the missionaries "for the relief of the Indians." The Crown instructed the governor of Havana to transport them to Florida at royal expense, but the Cuban governor, having better things to do than arrange an eight-day sea voyage for 200 wild horses, shunted the royal order into a tangle of red tape (Spanish Crown, 1648a; Ponce de León, [1651?]b).

Despite such setbacks, by the late 17th century, the Franciscans of central and western Florida were mounted men. According to Father Pedro de Luna, the pattern of Indian settlements, dwellings, and fields was such that a doctrinero travelled by horseback wherever possible, and only where a horse could not go, made his way on foot "with discomfort aplenty" (Luna, 1687). Epidemics, rebellions, and fugitivism had turned many of the places along the camino real into ghost towns that offered a traveller nothing

but feral cattle, neglected fruit trees, and "old fields" covered with second growth. Bandits made it unsafe to travel alone. The missionaries who travelled from the western provinces in the late 1680s to attend a chapter meeting in St. Augustine set out together with bedrolls, food for the journey, and two or three Indians apiece "to look after the horses" (Ojeda, 1687; Auto, 1688).

Without a well-spaced string of hospices to depend on, an indio de carga had to provide himself with food. When he had to carry maize enough for a two-week journey, his rations reduced his payload by at least 2 pounds for every day on the road (Moral, [1676?]b). He started his journey in the western doctrinas carrying 28 pounds of Indian corn, effectively reducing his departing payload to 47 pounds out of 75. At the turnaround point in St. Augustine he had 14 pounds of food left for the return trip, raising his payload to 61 pounds. To carry the same 600 pounds to the same doctrina without the support of hospices thus required two additional men. This increased the number of burdener-days to supply one doctrinero to 420 per year, or 10,500 burdener-days to supply 25 doctrineros—a greater burden, falling on fewer people.

GIFTS AND ASSESSMENTS

In a near-barter economy, a doctrinero's parishioners had little to offer him beyond what the land itself yielded in "fruits of the land" or "fruits of Castile," but what little they had they were expected to share: the pigs and chickens of their corrals and the vegetables of their gardens; the plant products they collected and processed to eat, smoke, drink, or burn for fuel; the large and small game of their woods and marshes, the fish of their waters, and the shellfish of their mudflats. Visitor Oré noted that the natives took pumpkins, beans, maize, and toasted flour to the priests to pay for Masses for the dead (Oré, [1617–1620]: 105); Bishop Díaz Vara Calderón said that the indios brought a log of wood apiece to the priest before Mass and attended midnight Mass on Christmas Eve "with offerings of loaves, eggs, and other food" (Díaz Vara Calderón, [1675]: 13–14).

The Franciscans had never expected to subsist on the king's alms alone. Anyone knew better than to mistake bread and wine for a balanced diet, and they themselves dismissed the idea in the words of Christ to the tempter in the wilderness: "Man shall not live by bread alone" (Franciscans, 1681a, citing Matthew 4:4). For the "food of Castile" to be supplemented by voluntary gifts of the "food of the land," they believed, was right and proper (Franciscans, 1681a). Regularly, visitors from the governor reminded the chiefs to see that the friars were kept in venison, fish, and firewood (Florencia, 1694–1695).

The dietary needs of doctrineros were perceived to be different from those of Indians. A friar reduced to "a bit of pumpkin sprinkled with beans" or a diet of forage foods without meat or fat fully expected to fall ill (Pueyo and Horruytiner, 1708; Ojeda, 1751). With the respectable motive of prolonging his life and services, he permitted himself some variety. In the convent, as in the capital, a Spaniard had his cup of chocolate (Dickinson, 1699: 61; Kessell, 1987: 200, 203, 269, 330). The frigates from Havana that came to the port of San Marcos de Apalache to barter for hogs and chickens brought wax for the doctrinas and delicacies for the doctrineros: sugar, and botijas of wine and sugar syrup—things that, according to the friars, an indio did not buy and had no use for (Franciscans, 1657a).

By the 1680s the Franciscans had come to believe that the doctrinero who did not participate in the provisioning trade and who did not accept gifts of food from the Indians would be forced by necessity to exchange his clothing and warm blanket for his sustenance and go bare beneath the inclement Florida sky. On the king's limosna alone, they said, no one could survive (Franciscans, 1681b).

They themselves did not try to. On the basis of vertebrate food remains found in Spanish deposits, Elizabeth J. Reitz judges that Spaniards at Santa Catalina ate twice as much pork and over ten times as much venison as their counterparts in St. Augustine, while Spaniards at San Luis consumed more pork than the ones at Santa Catalina, and even more beef than pork (Reitz, 1990: 551; 1991: 302).

NOTES

1. Men and youths in the full-time "service of the convent" were exempt from the tribute in New Mexico (Kessell, 1987: 176) and from the labor draft in the Philippines (Phelan, 1967: 98).

2. According to Mark Catesby, women burdeners in the 1720s carried "at least sixty and sometimes eighty weight" of deerskins on their backs for distances of 15 to 20 miles, day after day, for sale to Charles Town (Hatley, 1989: 235–236).

CHAPTER 11. NATIVE SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDIO

The labor system of the colony of Florida reflected the hierarchical society of early modern Spanish America. A person's place was determined by gender, caste, and estate. One could do nothing to alter the first and most important toss of the coin, that of being male or female, but caste, based upon race or race mixture, was partly a matter of perception. Mobility within or even between the castes was difficult but not impossible, given a big enough change in one's circumstances. Estate was a matter of status. One started out with the status earned by one's ancestors and increased, diminished, or forfeited it oneself. The three hierarchies of gender, caste, and estate were divided horizontally into upper and lower orders. The distinction was clear: the lower orders, or "*gente baja*," did manual labor; the upper orders did not.

The Florida captaincy general, faced with a chronic deficit of manual labor, tried to remedy it with laborers of varied origins. Españoles, who were Spaniards or their accepted descendants, formed the basis of the presidio's *gente de mar* (sailors) and *gente de guerra* (soldiers), the latter called "*soldados*" because they received a *sueldo*, or regular wage. Nondischargeable servants, who were either *deudos* (poor relations) or *criados* (reared in the house), served and guarded the Spanish family of quality. *Forzados* (convicts) and *desterrados* (exiles) from other colonies worked out their sentences in the presidio, the forzados at hard labor and the desterrados as aides or clerks, as befit unfortunate gentlemen. *Forasteros* (outsiders), who had made their entrances as prisoners of war, castaways, or captured corsairs, exercised the arts of cooperage or medicine which had saved them from being executed or condemned to the galleys as *chusma* (captive rowers). Black slaves, both *bozales* (African-born) and *criollos* (American-born), served as cabin boys, military musicians, bodyguards, overseers, nurses, and blacksmiths. In 1606 Florida was said to have "100 *negros* who would fight with the enemy for their freedom" (Ybarra, 1606). All of these together could not fill the labor void in St. Augustine.

To do so, the españoles turned to native labor, obtaining it by any means and in any form, with several kinds of compulsory service to shade the area between slave and free. By the early 1600s they had tried slavery and service towns and discovered the usefulness of client communities. From then on they would channel native labor and products to the presidio through a system of coerced labor, especially galling in its burdening form, and a parallel system of forced sales.

With what internal debates, rationalizations, and apprehensions the natives reconciled themselves and each other to the Spanish demands will never be known from Spanish documents. More reliable indicators are the rebellions of provinces, the defections of towns, and the silent drift of individuals out of the provinces.

SERVICE TOWNS AND CLIENT COMMUNITIES

The first impulse of a conquistador needing labor was to take slaves. Pedro Menéndez proposed to make war on Florida Indians who broke faith with Spaniards and sell them to the islands—a proposal that Philip II rejected. A quarter of a century later, Governor Méndez Canzo tried a different approach, that of sentencing rebels to terms of involuntary servitude. Timely rebellions in the two new provinces of Surruque and Guale provided the opportunity. In 1597 he was able to distribute to his followers in St. Augustine 50 captives from Surruque alone (Menéndez Márquez, 1603).

But Philip III proved no more amenable to limited slavery for Indians than Philip II had been to total slavery. In 1600 a royal cédula ordered the governor "not to permit the enslaving or holding in involuntary servitude for any length of time" of any of the Indians taken on the Guale and Surruque campaigns (Ross, 1926: 173–174; Matter, 1990: 44). Méndez Canzo responded hastily that the moment the cédula arrived he had sent out the public crier and interpreters "with fife and drum" on the plaza and through the streets to proclaim

> to all the persons of this city and presidio, its officers and soldiers, that they might not hold any Indian man or woman of these provinces in their service by force nor under the title of slaves, nor cause the natives to serve otherwise than they care to and is of benefit to them, paying them whatever is just and moderate (Méndez Canzo, 1600).

By that time the Surruques had been slaves for three years. Instead of sending the survivors home, the governor resettled them on an island near St. Augustine where they could be "watched for further treachery" and make themselves useful to Spaniards (Argüelles, 1599; Méndez Canzo, 1600). This was the prototype of the Florida service town, a settlement of native outsiders enserfed to the presidio.

Service towns of various kinds could be found in other peripheries of empire. In the Sierra Zapoteca of Oaxaca the "*indios terrazgueros*" living near the Spanish town of Villa Alta were a motley mixture of displaced families from different pueblos; their land rent was rescinded in return for labor on communal projects (Chance, 1989: 42). The "*genízaros*" of New Mexico, neither Indian nor Spanish, were the detribalized descendants of nomad captives who had worked off their ransoms in the houses of españoles (Simmons, 1968: 151).

In the late 1620s, Governor Rojas created a new service town when he moved the Tolomatos from Guale to a landing at a break in the inland waterway three leagues north of St. Augustine.[1] Leaders in the war of 1576 and the Guale rebellion of 1597, they may also have doffed their allegiance during a little-known eastern Timucuan uprising in the late 1620s. The only written evidence of this uprising is a petition by Juan Orata and Agustín López, two natives of the ferry town of San Juan del Puerto, who had been sentenced to convict labor at El Morro in Havana for taking part in an insurrection. Specifically, they were guilty of having helped their cacica to free her brother and their kinsman, the cacique of Santa Maria, from some españoles who were conducting him to St. Augustine with his hands tied, as a prisoner of the Crown. Governor Rojas had reportedly tracked the rebel cacica to her hideout, hanged her, and sentenced them and three of her other subjects, now dead, to ear cropping and perpetual exile. According to the interceding friars, who had known Orata and López from childhood and may have been the ones who taught them how to sign their names, it could do no harm to pardon them, for in the seven years since the rebellion most of the people at San Juan had died off in the "*pestes*" (López and Orata, 1636).

Perhaps the Tolomatos had added to their fearsome reputation in a different revolt altogether, never mentioned in the thimbleful of documents that survive from the 1620s. Parish priest Alonso de Leturiondo, of an old Florida family, knew and repeated the story that the Tolomatos had once flayed the skin off a live Dominican priest and displayed it in their council house (Leturiondo, [1700]: 202).

In their new location near St. Augustine, the Tolomatos declined in number to the point that by 1658 the town had fewer than 30 men, counting caciques and principales, to accomplish its assigned tasks of carrying goods overland for the 10 or 12 leagues of the haulover and operating the ferry to San Juan del Puerto (Santiago and the Principales of Tolomato, 1658; Hann, 1987: 5–6).

A different, and in Florida more common, kind of subsidiary Indian town was the client community, linked to a Spanish patron community by ties of mutual interest, including compadrazgo. Chance describes an example in the Sierra Zapoteca. Nahuatl-speaking "*indios naborías*" from central Mexico lived beside Villa Alta in the *barrio* of Analco, which had its own patron saint, the Virgin of Rosario. As "descendants of the first Indians who aided the conquistadores in this province," the people of Analco had a special status: they paid no tribute, and they were allowed to have firearms. The disadvantages that went with these privileges were that the indios naborías had to perform many "voluntary" services for the vecinos, serving as messengers, carriers, workers, and watchmen, without pay, and that the local Indians disliked them (Chance, 1989: 34, 43).

In Florida, most client community inhabitants were eastern Timucuans, of local or at least regional origin. Kathleen A. Deagan finds that there were always two to ten villages within two miles of the Spanish city, their

inhabitants interacting with Spaniards as traders, domestics, sexual partners, and laborers of various kinds (Deagan, 1990b: 304). San Sebastián and Nombre de Dios were prominent examples.

Don Gaspar Marqués, cacique of San Sebastián and Tocoy, petitioned the Crown in 1606 for a soldier's plaza without guard duty as a reward for his and his parents' services. Pedro Marqués and his wife, Catalina Marquesa, were among the first to make the Spanish welcome, long before the Franciscans arrived, their son affirmed. Don Pedro had served the españoles as guide and translator, fed them, marshalled "all of his Indians" to fight and carry baggage for them "in the wars that arose with the natives," and established a new town, San Sebastián, to be near them. When the priests came, don Pedro had "asked for them and built them churches" and seen to it that all his family and vassals were baptized. Don Gaspar continued the alliance, "making entradas," assisting "the padres at San Sebastián," and, at the governor's command, "attending there with all his Indians to the things that come up in the service of His Majesty" (Marqués, 1606).

Doña María, cacica of Nombre de Dios and wife of the Spanish soldier Clemente Vernal, was another member of the second-generation Christian elite. Treasury officials informed the Crown that her mother was "the cacica nearest to this presidio of St. Augustine and the first to become Christian, serving and favoring the españoles without wavering," even during the Drake invasion, when many Timucuans seized the opportunity to loot the city. Doña María, by contrast, had come to the rescue of the presidio during a famine by requiring every casado at Nombre de Dios to contribute one arroba of maize to feed the soldiers. This head tax had amounted to 48 arrobas in 1595. The treasury officials were not certain that it was legal. The only tribute required in the time of Pedro Menéndez de Avilés and Pedro Menéndez Márquez, they pointed out, had been to entertain the españoles when they visited the provinces (Las Alas and Menéndez Márquez, 1595).

The royal response was all the more gracious because the gift was voluntary. The king himself sent a letter to doña María thanking her and encouraging her to "persevere in the things of the Holy Catholic faith." The cacica replied by signing her name to two letters that were half receipt, half testimonial to Governor Méndez Canzo. The first one read that the governor "succoured me with a quantity of tools, axes and hoes, and flour and clothing to the amount of 150 ducats," which had been an "example to the natives of the interior, who, learning with what a large hand Your Majesty makes *merced* to his vassals," would "come seeking to receive holy baptism" (María, 1600).

The second letter, summarized in third person for the Consejo, expressed gratitude for the governor's "love and charity" in giving her another 150 ducats worth of clothing and other things, for which she and her husband and children kissed His Majesty's hands. They "and all of her indios and caciques" had been given "many honors and good treatments, aids and succours in their necessities and for their lands, wives, and children, jointly and individually," which had led to the conversion of many souls and the reducing of many apostates. Thanks to the governor's generosity, her vassals came "with great pleasure, with sustenance for themselves and their children, to the labors of the fields and hacienda[s] as if they were their own or were to sustain them" (María, 1601).

According to Father Bermejo, "vicar of that province," Nombre de Dios had, with its subject pueblos, a combined native population of only 200 (Bermejo, 1602). But it was a mixed community, with a number of Spanish residents. When Bishop Altamirano visited Florida in 1606, he confirmed 216 persons at Nombre de Dios, including the cacica, two of her mestizo children, and 20 españoles (Ross, 1926: 190). The location was sacralized for Spanish and Indian Catholics alike as the site of Florida's first Mass, said in 1565 in the Timucuan town of Seloy, which the Spanish had occupied for a year before moving to the site of St. Augustine. Nombre de Dios was also Florida's first mission, established the same year (Deagan, 1990b: 301).

Over the years, the mission became the shrine of an image "of great devotion," Nuestra Señora de la Leche, whose feastday was a local holiday (Santiago et al., 1682). On New Year's Day in 1678, the members of her cofradía elected Governor Hita Salazar, no

less, to be their steward and put treasury officials into all the other offices. The governor, who knew what was expected of him, "built a church for Our Lady out of mortar and masonry, the only one like it in the provinces" (Hita Salazar, [1678]b). Nombre de Dios continued to have a fine church in the 18th century, thanks to the precious statue of Our Lady, which "drew alms from the devout" (Bullones, 1728).

THE LABOR REPARTIMIENTO

Before the royal cédula arrived that would outlaw Indian enslavement for any reason or for any period, Governor Méndez Canzo was already laying plans to implement an alternative form of unfree labor, one that had proven useful in other colonies. Contemporaries had no one word for the labor levy. It appeared under a variety of preconquest names, from the "*mita*" of Peru to the "*polo*" of the Philippines (Phelan, 1959: 99). Historians, who sift the past for identifiable patterns, are the ones who have given the labor levy the general name of "repartimiento," fixing on the term that contemporaries used for the division or distribution of any commodity.

The labor levy that Méndez Canzo implemented and got the accommodating Cacica María to endorse was an institution that had developed in the Indies as a response to the labor crises of the mid-16th century. The "new repartimiento," as Lyle N. McAlister calls it, was more conservative of the dwindling native population than the "old repartimiento" of encomiendas and personal service outlawed by the New Laws of 1542. Under the new and revised repartimiento administered by royal officials instead of private individuals, village authorities sent quotas of laborers in rotation to construct public works or perform other activities for the general welfare. They worked under regulated conditions and for a token *jornal*, usually applied against their tribute. By 1560, this system was the chief means by which Spaniards were supplied with Indian labor. While the "general welfare" was often broadly interpreted to include almost any productive activity, the new repartimiento did succeed in rationing what had become a scarce commodity and bringing it under governmental oversight (McAlister, 1984: 211).

Initially, Méndez Canzo seems to have conceived of the labor levy as a consequence of conquest, like slavery or the service town. Notary Juan Jiménez, husband of the cacica of Escamacu, made the first reference to it in connection with the cacique of Espogache's act of submission after the Guale rebellion. No sooner did Espogache surrender than the governor exacted laborers from his town. A party of 19 soldiers that the governor sent to Guale, Jiménez attested, came back with "*indios principales*" and "*otros de servicio*," to "cultivate the plantings and fields of this city and presidio, both those of His Majesty and those of private persons." The labor differed from slavery in two ways: it was episodic and it was paid. "Their merced from the lord governor sent them back grateful and content, those who wanted to go" (Jiménez, 1600).

In the notary's statement the germs of labor abuses are already discernible. Inevitably, public labor would flow to private individuals, laborers would be kept beyond their terms of service, and both practices would exacerbate the drift of labor out of the provinces. Yet, looking back over his governorship in 1603, Méndez Canzo reckoned the labor levy as one of his major achievements. He had had the soldiers plant the land in Indian corn and other crops, he had brought in hoes and other agricultural tools, and he had

> caused to come from the provinces of San Pedro and Guale a quantity of Indians for the cultivations, lending to those who had nothing the wherewithal to pay for the jornales and seeds. And in his time there was no want, and the presidio was better provisioned and sustained than ever before (Méndez Canzo, 1603).

As originally instituted, the labor service in Florida, like the military service, drew on the provincial reserves of single men. This was partly because the Spanish had compunctions about separating husbands and wives and partly because a casado was expected to be in his wife's town "at the time of cavas" to prepare a field for his family, lest they become a public charge.

Labor was requisitioned on a rotating basis, the number from every town being ne-

gotiated with its cacique and principales on the basis of a census that the friars provided to the governor from their count of those who had "complied with the Church" the previous Lent, when good Christians returned to their home parishes to confess. If necessary, the friars could construct from their books of baptism, marriage, and burial a more elaborate "*padrón*," or household census for every town subject to the labor service, summarized by age group, sex, and sometimes origin (López, 1602).

The selected laborers were escorted by soldiers, interpreters, and their own principales to St. Augustine or wherever else they were needed. The towns en route lodged and fed them "at the king's expense," from the granary of the king's sabana. For a set period of time the men labored in "the service of the king," defined as any activity in support of the presidio. Twice a year, "*indios de cava*" went through the complete agricultural cycle. They cleared, dug, and planted the fields, did the first, second, and third hoeings, guarded the ripening maize, and harvested it. Each procedure was probably done by a different set of hands, as in an assembly line.

The amount of time that any one individual spent in the king's service was a function of his town's labor supply divided by the presidio's labor demand. How often he would be called on depended on the length of the usual tour of duty, which was governed by the distance to the presidio. In many colonies the tour of duty was one week and the workers were known as "*semaneros*." In Florida, the Indians who built a fort of whitewashed logs in San Marcos de Apalache came in weekly shifts (Auto, 1683a), but the ordinary tour of duty was probably at least two weeks.

Repartimiento laborers were paid a jornal of one real a day, not in coin, but in set amounts of imported trade goods, or rescates, calculated and issued under the watchful eyes of their principales either at the conclusion of their tour of duty or later, when the situado arrived. Before the appointment of lieutenant governors and the stationing of secondary garrisons in the provinces, the "*paga*" was handled at the various vicarios, where the Franciscans, serving the Crown in yet another capacity, received and stored the rescates and verified their distribution (López, 1602).

According to Governor Hita Salazar, the Indians liked to be paid weekly in European manufactures of low unitary value and ready convertibility. For those who were going to build the fort at San Marcos he ordered hawksbells in two sizes, knives with black or white hafts, blue beads and multicolored beads, sheet brass, lengths of blue or red cloth, razors, and scissors—goods which Christian natives used in their own trade with neighboring tribes (Hita Salazar, 1678a). When the Spanish sent an Apalache to spy on the English in Apalachicola in 1675, they outfitted him to pass as a deerskin trader with a supply of beads, hatchets, and hawksbells (Auto, 1683a; Fernández de Florencia, 1675).

Méndez Canzo had originally instituted the repartimiento to bring in indios de cava for the soldiers' fields, but he soon expanded it to provide "*indios de servicio*" and "*indios de fábricas*." The "Indians of service" were necessary because españoles, like caciques, could not perform manual labor without loss of status, and someone had to unload ships, paddle canoes, cut firewood, carry messages, and serve. The "Indians of construction" or "public works," for their part, rebuilt St. Augustine. Governor Salinas called up more indios de fábricas to repair and maintain the wooden fort. Due to the advanced deforestation around St. Augustine, they had to haul wood on their backs for five and six leagues. Like Méndez Canzo, Salinas assured the Crown that the laborers received gifts and wages, that going to and from their homes they were escorted by soldiers and fed, and that they were not detained beyond their terms of service (Matter, 1990: 141).

When Spanish officials in Florida remembered how thoroughly other natives were exploited in other places, what they themselves were asking seemed little enough. Governor Andrés Rodríguez de Villegas refused to believe that the depopulation of the provinces, already well advanced in 1630, might be partially caused by fugitivism due to native dissatisfaction.

> There are no encomiendas, *obrajes* [workshops], or mines, so the only [Spanish] settlement here is that of the infantry garrison. The Indians are the best treated in America because they do not pay tribute. A few work in the soldiers' *sementeras* [plantings], but they are paid

> for their labor. The Crown spends much money in gifts to the caciques each year. Altogether, these Indians are the least worked and the best treated in the Indies (Rodríguez de Villegas, 1630).

Under a rule so mild, he found it difficult to understand why "they die here as elsewhere."

COMPULSORY SALES

If the repartimiento made the men into a labor enclave, the sabana system turned the women into peasants. Compared to their gentile counterparts, doctrina Indians practiced a more intensive agriculture, enjoyed a smaller variety of food resources, and had greater demands made on their labor, all at the expense of their health (Larsen et al., 1990). This situation went unnoticed at the time. A good harvest from an Indian town's communal sabana meant a salable surplus for which the presidio was a ready customer. An español might prefer the foodstuffs that came with the situado, but situado shipments were frequently interrupted by war and natural disasters, whereas St. Augustine's need for provisions was constant (Rebolledo, 1659). Its demand for maize was as insistent as its demand for labor.

Governor Hita Salazar, a farmer at heart, thought that the best places in Florida for settlers were Apalache and "another place next to it," both of them "as good for farming as Flanders" (Hita Salazar, 1675). But Apalache Province was a long haul and an even longer sail from St. Augustine. By sea, its closest market was Havana and the next closest Campeche; St. Augustine was a poor third. Once, when the presidio was in desperate need, Governor Pedro Benedit Horruytiner sent Captain Antonio de Argüelles to the port of St. Marks to intercept a boatload of maize being loaded for Campeche (Horruytiner, 1651).

The Atlantic provinces were less fertile but more accessible, and counting house records of the 1640s and 1650s show numerous brigantine trips from St. Augustine to Guale and Escamacu for loads of Indian corn and beans. The caciques of Escamacu accepted gifts from the gasto de indios, professed allegiance to the king, and sold maize to the presidio, all without offering to be Christians (Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner, 1647c; Santa Cruz, 1655).

Trading with the presidio had its disadvantages. In the name of the king, officials insisted on long-term credit, low prices, and priority, or the right of first refusal; they did not necessarily meet their payments, and they were apt to assign production schedules. The compulsory sale of products to the government was a common institution on the peripheries of empire; a forced credit sale was as good as a forced loan. In the Philippines, where the system was known as the "*vandala*," the Spanish treasury was a million pesos in debt to filipinos in 1619 (Phelan, 1959: 99–100).

How the system of compulsory sales worked in Florida can be seen from one more entry in Captain Argüelles's service record. In 1662 the presidio was in great extremity. No wheat flour had come from New Spain in over a year and unseasonable weather had given St. Augustine a poor maize crop. Governor Aranguíz reflected that even if he "was able to obtain a remedy . . . by sea from Apalache and the city of Havana" it would arrive too late for the current emergency. He therefore sent Captain Argüelles with a squad of soldiers to Guale "to represent to its religious, micos and caciques the state of this presidio" and "propose that they give, for His Majesty's account, up to the quantity of a thousand arrobas of maize," or 25,000 pounds. The Franciscans too, it seems, had reserves of Indian corn that the garrison expected to purchase. The governor left price and payment up to Argüelles. If he could not "politely and peacefully" persuade the caciques and micos to part with the maize, he was to conduct them under guard to the town of San Juan del Puerto, where the governor would see them in person. Such an extreme action did not turn out to be necessary, for the captain's mission was a success (Aranguíz y Cotes, 1662b; Ponce de León, 1662).

Argüelles made many trips to Guale (Argüelles, 1668). Extensive fields on St. Catherines Island testified to the high level of maize consumption in St. Augustine, and presidio supply boats tied up frequently at the Santa Catalina landing (Hita Salazar, 1680c; Márquez Cabrera, 1680c; Fuentes, 1681a). By the late 1670s, the fields of Santa Catalina de

Guale were as much a part of St. Augustine's defenses as its watchtowers and wooden fort. If anything should happen to interfere with that flow of foodstuffs, the whole system for provisioning the Spanish city would be thrown off balance.

NOTE

1. John Tate Lanning placed this move much later, as a response to the Westo raids of 1661 (1935: 210).

CHAPTER 12. EXPANSION, DEVELOPMENT, AND RESISTANCE

PROVINCES ON THE GULF

Flat as it is, the peninsula of Florida has its watersheds, which played a predictable role in the distribution of population. The Guales and eastern Timucuans were concentrated along the inland waterways behind the Atlantic barrier islands and on the north-flowing St. Johns River, which empties into the Atlantic. The Apalaches and western Timucuans lived on rivers and creeks that debouched into the Gulf (Jones and Shapiro, 1990: 503), although they tended to stay above the swamp line and did not venture far into Gulf waters, which were dominated by the seagoing peoples of southwest Florida: the Calusas, Tocobagas, and Pohoys.

Interaction between the Spanish and the maritime tribal groups, interrupted for half a century by the natives' decisive expulsion of Menéndez's south Florida garrisons, resumed in 1622, when the disaster to the fleet commanded by the Marqués de Cadereyta scattered shipwrecks and silver bullion along the west coast from Tampa Bay to the Keys. The hulk of the admiral's flagship, a rich prize, came to rest off Matecumbe Key, and that island was soon swarming with treasure salvors. They were followed by pirates of many nationalities, who made "*el buceo de la almiranta*" a favorite rendezvous. All of this activity drew the attention of the Florida coastguard to the southern Gulf coast. From there it was a short step to the preemptive occupation of fertile Apalache and the opening of trade between the western provinces and the burgeoning port city of Havana, which between 1580 and 1630 had the highest index of urban growth in Spanish America (Salinas, 1623; Bushnell, 1990a: 19; Hardoy and Aranovich, 1970: 74).

By 1633, Governor Luis de Horruytiner reported to the Crown, preparing his superiors for news of a new province, that the Apalaches were building churches and convents for the friars (Horruytiner, 1633). In 1637, the same governor sent two presidio pilots to chart and mark the channel of the St. Marks River, below present-day Tallahassee. He gave the Crown two reasons for opening this new port: it would offer Christian asylum to vessels fleeing from corsairs and storms, and it would spare mission Indians from the necessity of burdening, for once navigation was opened between San Marcos and Havana, the king's alms could go directly to the friars of the western doctrinas without having to pass through St. Augustine. Guided by his own chart, one of the pilots had already made his way from Havana to San Marcos in just eight days with a frigate laden with supplies for the western missions. The Indians reportedly were jubilant "when they saw a ship in their ports," and "many asked for baptism" (Horruytiner, 1637). The governor did not mention it, but he had already stationed a detachment of soldiers at the port of San Marcos under a *teniente de gobernador*, or deputy governor, to collect and ship Indian corn to St. Augustine (Junta de Guerra, 1660).

Comisario Gómez de Palma, spokesman for the Franciscan Province of Santa Elena, gave the new port his qualified approval. The situado for the 18 or 20 western friars might well be channeled through the Cuban treasury instead of the Florida one, he thought, but the port of San Marcos was still leagues from the doctrinas, and the natives would still be subject to burdening, to which they strongly objected. Gómez de Palma wanted the supplies brought up from the port and distributed on pack animals. This could be done, he said, if the governor would import horses from Havana and improve the roads (Gómez de Palma, [1637?]).

With the Dutch West India Company waging an all-out naval war on Spanish Hapsburg holdings, however, evangelization, like the Indian fund, had to take a back seat to imperial defense. In 1638, the king ordered the Caribbean situados sequestered to meet a more urgent need in Europe. Governor Damián de Vega Castro y Pardo disembarked at his post that year to find the Franciscans enduring hardships and shortages and only two missionaries at work in Apalache. Horruytiner's mission advances had gone into reverse (Matter, 1990: 155).

Vega Castro, recognizing the value of the

new province to a colony temporarily left to its own resources, opened a direct sea route between St. Augustine and San Marcos, a two-week sail, and began to provision the Spanish city with Apalache maize (Vega Castro y Pardo, 1639). He retained the detachment of soldiers at the port, having been told that "ships of enemies were entering there" to trade with the natives and friars, "without anyone to report it," in the time-honored practice of rescate (Junta de Guerra, 1660; Wright, 1920: 335).

Vega Castro's term saw one of the early waves of nomads from the north. "A great number of Indians called Chiscas, people who pride themselves on their fierceness, wander at will through these provinces," said the governor. He was hoping to reduce them to agricultural settlements "with the object of making them vassals of Your Majesty and converting them," and he expected them to "be useful to track down and return those fugitive Indians who absent themselves from their doctrinas" (Vega Castro y Pardo, 1639). But the Chiscas, later known as Yuchis, proved irreducible, choosing neither to be Christian farmers and subjects nor mercenaries. Eleven years later, the "Sisicas" returned to "infest" the province of Guale, visiting death and damage on the doctrinas and capturing "many women and children of Christian and friendly Indians" (Ponce de León, 1651a).

The next of the wartime governors, Benito Ruiz de Salazar y Vallecilla, arrived at his post in 1645 with a greater than average need of funds. Incapable of purchasing his office in the usual manner, he had taken on an obligation to the royal armada by contracting to build the Crown a 500-tun galleon[1] in the shipyards of Campeche, with his anticipated Florida revenues as collateral. Among Salazar's Florida business ventures were several farms. Near St. Augustine he bred cattle and mules. At San Miguel de Asile in the Timucuan district of Yustaga, just across the Aucilla River from Apalache, he started to raise wheat (Salazar y Vallecilla, [1650?]).

Ninety years later, Spanish promoters of Florida resettlement projects would spread stories about the large quantities of wheat and other European grains that the Indians and floridanos had once cultivated for export. Governor Francisco del Moral Sánchez would say that before the loss of the provinces, the land had produced wheat, barley, and rye in such abundance that the "island of Havana" was entirely supplied (Moral Sánchez, 1735c). His contemporary, the military engineer, historian, and promoter Antonio de Arredondo, would propose that a family of settlers could, on 25 acres, grow all the maize, beans, rice, and wheat needed to feed themselves and have plenty left to sell (Arredondo, 1738). And in 1756, when Florida, once continental in its dimensions, had shrunk to the vicinity of St. Augustine, Pedro Sánchez Griñán would declare that between "Florida" and Apalache there had once been many plantations raising the crops of Spain in such abundance that they had supplied the "island of Havana" with beans, wheat, and barley (Sánchez Griñán, 1756).

These 18th-century promoters failed to mention the 17th-century business venture that had the most far-reaching results. Governor Salazar made a trip into Apalachicola, a province of infieles on the Chattahoochee River above Apalache, to invite the Apalachicolas to have trade and communication with españoles (Leturiondo, 1672). He converted the soldiers in Apalache into personal trade representatives, sending them into Apalachicola with files of Indian burdeners who left with loads of rescates and returned with loads of deerskins. The port of San Marcos was the outlet for the Spanish deerskin trade. In time, together with the unauthorized port of San Martín on the Suwannee, it would add ranch products to its repertoire. But Apalache's most significant exports as a Spanish province would always be its prosaic maize and beans, hogs, chickens, and dried turkey meat, which went primarily to Cuba to provision the fleets of the Indies and sustain the growing population of Havana (Hann, 1988c: 126–159).

Everyone who counted in Florida—governors, officers, friars, floridanos, and caciques—had an interest in what passed through San Marcos. The governors commandeered a large part of the produce to provision the presidio, purchasing it with his own funds to resell at a profit. The friars, through their syndics, sold another portion to beautify their churches, retire the debts of their chap-

ter, and vary their diet. The floridanos, who had long since infiltrated the garrison and naturalized the treasury offices, were go-betweens to Cuban merchants and shipowners. The caciques controlled resources of land and labor and served as middlemen in the trade with Indian groups to the north (Bushnell, 1990a: 20).

For the necessary traffic between the western provinces and the presidio, Indians and españoles developed an amphibious route that ran from Apalache to St. Augustine. The products of Apalache were shipped by canoa out to the Gulf and down the coast to the Suwannee River, then upstream to a point on the Santa Fe River, a Suwannee tributary, where they were offloaded and reloaded onto pack animals or burdeners to make the rest of the trip overland (Boniface, 1971; Bushnell, 1978a; 1981; Hann, 1988c). Supplies for the western doctrinas made the trip in reverse.

In the trans-peninsular transportation network, boatmen were as important as burdeners. Filling this need, a group of Tocobagas appeared in Apalache sometime before or during the 1670s and settled near the town of Ivitachuco, concealing with branches a secret canoe entrance to the Bacissa, or Aucilla River. They hired out to transport loads of Indian corn and to lighter cargos of ranch products across the bar of the Suwannee, servicing the ships engaged in a tax-evading trade from an officially nonexistent port (Fernández de Florencia, 1675; Leturiondo, 1677; Bushnell, 1978a). Other towns of boatmen operated ferries across the Suwannee at San Juan de Guacara and across the St. Johns at Salamototo, charging one real per boatload for loading, unloading, and carrying the goods to the council house (Florencia, 1694–1695).

The route was demonstrated when the governor sought Indian settlers from western Timucua to open a new ferry at Ivitanayo in central Timucua. He promised the settlers Tocobaga boatmen to carry their maize and baggage out the Aucilla to the Gulf, then up the San Martín (the Spanish name for the Suwannee/Santa Fe River) to the landing place of Pulibica, where the cacique of Santa Fé, they were told, would transfer their belongings to pack animals and transport them to Ivitanayo (Florencia, 1694–1695).

Carrying the provisions to the friars of the western doctrinas across the peninsula avoided the dangerous maritime route around Florida, but the situado was still exposed to risk between Vera Cruz and St. Augustine. In 1673 Franciscan Juan Moreno proposed to Queen Regent Mariana that the situado be transported by land from Mexico to Apalache. He estimated the distance around the Gulf, through the present states of Tamaulipas, Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, to be 300 leagues (Matter, 1990: 84)—a long way, yet not nearly as long as the supply road to New Mexico. Moreno's imaginative proposal had to be shelved. Most of the Indians along the route were still unpacified hunters and gatherers, and, furthermore, any land transport of supplies from Mexico to Florida would have to be done by burdeners, because the Gulf coastlands—swampy, forested, and interrupted by deep bays and rivers—were not amenable to oxcarts or even to mule trains.

Some roadbuilding did occur in the Florida provinces. In the 1680s, military engineer Enrique Primo de Rivera obtained a contract from Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada to haul the royal provision for friars from St. Augustine to western Timucua and Apalache. To fulfill his contract he had to make the camino real passable by oxcart all the way from St. Augustine to San Luis de Apalache. Starting at the western end, the engineer managed to extend the cartroad as far as San Francisco de Potano near present-day Gainesville before the governor suspended his hauling contract (Hann, 1988c: 151).

The fact that in his bid Primo de Rivera offered to transport the supplies for the price of the maize that would otherwise be spent to ration the burdeners shows that despite repeated efforts to substitute pack animals, burdening was still prevalent. The logistical problem of getting all the supplies to all the doctrineros and, no less important, of getting deerskins and rescates to and from the ports, was apparently insoluble without using human beings as beasts of burden. The caciques cooperated, objecting only when the burdening affected them. The commoners, for the time being, did as they were told. When the opportunity came, they would simply walk away—from the convent, the Castillo, and

the council house—for theirs would be a rebellion against all the authorities: friars, governors, floridanos, and caciques.

MID-CENTURY REBELLIONS

Guale, a backwater by comparison with the Gulf provinces since 1612, was enduring the same situado delays, reductions, and cancellations as the other provinces. Caciques did not receive their allowances, repartimiento workers were unpaid, and the presidio was running up a sizeable debt for provisions; yet Spanish demands continued unabated. Finally, in 1645, "many of those of Guale abandoned their towns to retire among the heathen." The people of Satuache deserted their town altogether. Treasurer Francisco Menéndez Márquez I went north and "reduced" the Guales "to their pueblos and doctrinas," bringing the leaders of the uprising down to St. Augustine, because, as he and his colleague Pedro Benedit Horruytiner explained, the "presidio could not be conserved without the service of these *naturales*" (Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner, 1647a).

The next year, the two treasury officials staged a coup. Enforcing the penalty clause in the note held by the royal armada, they deposed Governor Salazar for not delivering his galleon within a year's time and named themselves co-governors "until His Majesty shall provide." Guale immediately commanded the co-governors' attention. The cacique and mico of Satuache had returned to their responsibilities, but not the commoners, who still came and went as they pleased. Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner therefore sent Ensign Antonio de Argüelles to the border to reduce the "Indians of the town of Chatoache," who "have been going to the provinces of Tama and Escamazu, which are of infieles," leaving "the town of Satoache of the province of Guale" progressively "diminished." They instructed the mico and the cacique of Satuache to assist Argüelles to recover "their indios," who were needed to "come to the service of God Our Lord and to His Majesty." For the repartimiento labor draft that Argüelles was collecting, the mico and cacique were to give him "the most indios they can," as many as 20 bachelors, young, strong, and fit for the work on the fort. If the native leaders could manage to fill their labor quota "from among those who are isolated and wild," said the co-governors, so much the better (Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner, 1646b).

The Apalaches, for their part, were uneasy at the way españoles were taking over their territory and turning it into a trade corridor. Apalache was not even a regular province, as the Spanish defined one. Of its 40 or more chiefs who had sworn allegiance to the Crown in exchange for Spanish gifts and military support, only 8 had been baptized. In 1647—"for no reason other than their sinful natures," according to the out-of-office governor—the non-Christian chiefs of Apalache rose up against the Christian ones and killed three of their eight friars, plus the teniente and his family. Christian Indians helped the other five friars and the five or six españoles at Salazar's wheat farm to escape. With what españoles and native allies he could muster, said Salazar, he fought a pitched battle with the Apalaches near the border, but after a day of fighting, they ran out of ammunition and were forced to withdraw to St. Augustine. Reducing the Apalaches to obedience, said Salazar, would take years (Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner, 1647a; Salazar y Vallecilla, 1647).

Francisco Menéndez Márquez I, unconvinced, crossed the Apalache border with a party of Timucuan warriors and caught the Apalaches by surprise in planting season, when, by native custom, no one in his right mind went to war. He restored order on Spanish terms, hanged the ringleaders, and subjected the Apalache commoners for the first time to the labor repartimiento, Christian and non-Christian alike. The Apalaches, he said, "raised and fixed in place everywhere many crosses, with demonstrations of great rejoicing and devotion, having formerly chopped down and burned all of them, together with seven churches and convents" (Menéndez Márquez and Horruytiner, 1647a; 1647b). The españoles had conquered their third province.

The Franciscans assigned the blame for the Apalache Rebellion of 1647 to Governor Salazar, for starting a wheat farm on the lands of the chief of Asile and for burdening the Indians with rescates (Prado, 1654). But the unabashed Salazar asked to be reinstated in office, offering to build the Crown a second

galleon. He wanted to remain in Florida, he said, because of the wheat and mule farms he had started for the service of His Majesty and the commonwealth. Conversions were progressing nicely, he assured the king; chiefs were coming from many leagues in the interior to ask for friars (Salazar y Vallecilla, [1650?]).

The Consejo de Indias, reinstating Salazar with some misgivings, instructed the newly appointed treasurer Joseph de Prado to conduct a quiet inquiry and inform them secretly whether or not the governor was in any way responsible for the Apalache rebellion. Prado's investigation revealed what he and Salazar had already privately concluded, that the cause of the revolt was burdening and that the one remedy was to buy 50 of the governor's mules for the service of the Crown. Trade or no trade, as the treasurer pointed out, there would always be loads to carry. The Consejo, bowing to necessity, ordered the 50 mules bought from the funds of the situado (Prado, 1654), but by the time the order arrived, the mule farm had shut down. Salazar was dead, an apparent victim of the mid-century yellow fever epidemics (Rebolledo, 1657).

Sergeant Major Nicolás Ponce de León I, who succeeded to the governorship ad interim in 1651, purchased the properties for the Crown from Salazar's son Luis, then succumbed to the same epidemic. Before the Crown had had time to approve or disapprove the purchase, to which the Franciscans were strongly opposed, Pedro Benedit de Horruytiner, elected governor by his fellow officers, had auctioned off all of Salazar's old properties, selling jackasses, mares, and horses for half of what they were worth. Also to please the friars, Horruytiner withdrew the soldiers from Apalache (Rebolledo, 1657).

Incoming Governor Diego de Rebolledo, hearing in 1654 that the naturales had again opened the port of San Marcos to the enemy, replaced the soldiers. They had no sooner arrived in San Luis, he reported, than yet another vessel of corsairs appeared at San Marcos, was refreshed, and departed without hindrance from what was clearly a routine visit. The friars, he hinted, were guilty of illicit trade. Leaving this charge to fester, the governor followed Salazar's lead and began sending soldiers into the interior as trade agents (Waselkov, 1989b: 118). In 1655 Rebolledo petitioned the Crown to raise St. Augustine to an episcopal see or at least to make Florida a "vicariate apostolic" with its own abbot (Matter, 1990: 60). Agricultural production in Florida had increased to the point that the tithes would soon be enough to support a bishop, but the governor had a more cogent reason: he was anxious for the Crown to secularize the doctrinas, that is, to bring them under episcopal control, because he was at odds with the Franciscans.

In an anonymous letter to the Crown that was packed with damning detail, someone who was either a Franciscan or a partisan of the friars' cause launched the first round of charges. The governor, not content to trade in the usual rescates, had purportedly ordered the royal blacksmith to fashion hoes and other tools out of the scrap iron and pig iron belonging to the king and was sending soldiers out among the Indians to exchange the said tools for ambergris and deerskins (Anon., 1655).

The governor had other things on his mind. A "great epidemic of *peste*" in Timucua and Apalache in 1655 halted the flow of repartimiento labor from those provinces, with the result that Rebolledo foresaw a severe shortage of Indian corn in St. Augustine. "If the flour which is brought from New Spain should be lacking, as usually occurs," he said, the presidio faced "total ruin." He responded to the emergency by launching a ruthless labor raid on a neighboring province. His orders to Captain Antonio de Argüelles were to take a troop of soldiers to "the province of Ybiniyutti" and there "enter into the places of its infidels and take out the people he can from each place, in accordance with the number he might see in them," both infidels and "*cimarrones* [fugitives] which are fled from the word of the Gospel," and bring them to work the soldiers' sabanas. These actions had to be undertaken, the governor explained for the record, so that the soldiers could sustain their large families, for "they cannot [exist] with only the ration given them from the royal storehouses" (Rebolledo, 1655). Neighboring provinces should also learn that it was unwise to harbor fugitives.

Rebolledo's problems were compounded when, after the English capture of Jamaica, he called up 500 Indians from the provincial

militias to protect St. Augustine. The caciques of western Timucua took exception to the governor's order to send their principales to St. Augustine for militia service loaded with Indian corn like "gente baja." By insisting, Rebolledo provoked the Timucuan Rebellion of 1656 and handed his enemies the ammunition with which to bring him down. Unhesitatingly, the Franciscans took the rebels' side. Veteran missionary Father Gómez de Palma wrote to a fellow friar:

> I have been here in Florida for 46 years seeing the labors and persecutions of the poor Indians, who have been such faithful vassals of His Majesty since Hernando de Soto discovered the land, but never have I seen them so unfortunate as under this governor, creole of Cartagena. He oppresses and mistreats them, forcing them to come here to St. Augustine from Apalache, 100 leagues away, burdened as if they were mules or horses—something that in the time of their infelicity was not done with those whom they call indios principales, who among us are hidalgos and caballeros and major councilors.
>
> They responded to a messenger from the governor that they could not obligate the indios principales to go burdened, that there were vassals to do that, . . . and they killed three or four españoles, supposing that this would soften the governor and those of the presidio (Gómez de Palma, 1657).

The rebellious western Timucuans did not assault their doctrineros the way the Guales and Apalaches had, they simply abandoned them. For eight months the runaways "attended only to their dances and the business of war" and left the friars sitting in their convents, "suffering, vilified by most of the Indians, destitute of necessary food" (Franciscans, 1657a; Matter, 1990: 145). Six friars embarked from the port of San Marcos without leave from the governor. On the way to Havana, their ship went down in a storm and they all drowned, at one stroke wiping out the corps of Apalache linguists. The Province of Santa Elena felt the loss all the more keenly because the deaths were meaningless, devoid of martyrdom (Matter, 1990: 59–60).

Not at all "softened," the governor responded to the killings of españoles in western Timucua by sending an expedition of punishment which captured and hanged 11 leaders. The uprising spilled into neighboring provinces. Refugees from Utina and Yustaga crossed into Apalache fleeing Rebolledo's soldiers. When the governor ordered those Timucuans who had been in Apalache less than two years back to their doctrinas under pain of 100 lashes and four years of forced labor on the fort, males and females alike, many of the western Timucuans left the provinces for good (Hann, 1986b: 389–390).

The leaders of the Guale militia, having sat around St. Augustine for a month waiting for a campaign to start and watching their men fall sick on a diet of spoiled biscuits, announced that their own towns were in danger of assault from the Timucuans and prepared to head home. As of 1655, six of these were mission towns: "Chatuache" (the "last on the coast to the North," 60 leagues above St. Augustine), San Felipe (54 leagues), "Sänta Catarina de Guale" (principal town in the Province of Guale, 50 leagues), "San Josef de Zápala" (45 leagues), "Santo Domingo de Talaje" (40 leagues), and "San Buenaventura de Boadalquivi" (32 leagues) (Díaz de la Calle, 1655).

Infuriated by what, to a military man, seemed to be rank insubordination, Rebolledo confiscated the Guale militia's bows and arrows and told the caciques that as long as he was governor they would not get one more thread of clothing from His Majesty. After a year without the customary gifts, five of them—Alonso Meléndez, Francisco de Ibarra, Juan de Sápala, Bernabé de Aluste, and Thomás de Yoa—addressed themselves to the king.

> It has been a long time now that going about bare we have been ashamed to see ourselves, Christians, assisting with the offices in the churches as naked as barbarians. . . . In the past, according to what we hear from our fathers and grandfathers and we ourselves experienced for some years, the governors of these provinces and other españoles loved, consoled, and favored us, and gave us the limosna that Your Majesty, God save you, ordered in a cédula that we be given, and treated us like fathers, speaking to us as to sons. Now, Sire, everything is to the contrary, and the only goal of the governor and other españoles, citizens of this presidio, [seems to be] to wipe us out, turning us and our vassals into their slaves and feudatories.
>
> It has been our custom since we became Christians to come together every year, each

pueblo as it was able, to work and dig a great sabana that they said was of Your Majesty, and when the task was finished, the governors returned all the indios, our sons and other vassals. . . . [Now] we have more vassals in the service of the governor and the soldiers than we have in our towns.

For this reason, and the pestilences, we are nearly out of people: the wives lack husbands, the sons lack fathers, and the fathers lack sons. There are pueblos of ours that do not have 16 indios, and more than 60 unmarried women who cannot marry because all the bachelors (not to mention the casados who serve the soldiers) are detained in the service of the governor and españoles. Many of those found serviceable to españoles have been given plazas of soldiers against Your Majesty's orders, . . . and when others want to return to their pueblos, their masters punish them and detain them by force. . . .

The soldiers, Sire, who come with an order of the governor will not show it to us, and therefore if the governor orders that they take 30 men for the cavas, they take 40 and put the extra ones in their [own] fields and services. If he orders that we succor them with a certain amount [of provisions], they ask for much more to keep it for themselves. In this manner they order and govern us like absolute lords, and if we ask them to exhibit the governor's order in order to comply with it, they say that they do not want to, that the governor has ordered that they be given [it], and often they lay hands on us and treat us like dogs. . . .

We the micos, tunaques, and caciques of this Province of Guale have determined among ourselves to relate this to Your Majesty, . . . asking that as our true father, king, and lord—who must, we judge, love us—you have mercy on us and free us from these many injustices (Meléndez et al. and Martínez et al., 1657).

Below the signatures of the Guale caciques were those of the three translators, all friars. Unlike Timucua and Apalache, Guale was not a language commonly written. The three friars had no doubt elicited and listened to the caciques' oral statements in Guale, talked them over, and jointly composed a letter in Spanish for them to sign. The grievances were no doubt real, but the letter reporting them was part of the Franciscans' campaign against Rebolledo. A direct appeal by aggrieved caciques was one of the few levers that could pry a governor out of office.

In Florida, the conflict reached a furor. Making an official visitation of Apalache in 1657 (see Pearson, 1968; Hann, 1986b; 1986d), Rebolledo found caciques who were willing to make complaints about some of the younger Franciscans, who, they said, whipped them and treated them with contempt in the presence of españoles (Hann, 1986d: 95). Juan de Paredes, for example, had "had many quarrels" with Francisco Luis, principal cacique of San Luis de Xinayca, and

> with his leading men over the fact that the said priest wished to carry off a storehouse full of Indian corn and beans and all that the church and convent had, which he aimed to export and carry with him to Santa Elena de Machaba, to which the said religious was going (Hann, 1986d: 93).

Father Francisco Pascual, the caciques related, once came from Patale to Santa María de Bacucua and with a stick broke all the pots of food cooking over the fire, which, they said, "obliged the caciques and other Indians to go to the woods" and caused Cacique Martín of Bacucua to "plunge headlong into a hut" in order to escape him (Hann, 1986d: 90).

From the caciques, Rebolledo learned that, much as he had suspected, the Franciscans had preached against the stationing of Spanish troops in the province and had forbidden them to support the soldiers. The friars, they said, tried to monopolize the export trade. They required the caciques to provide them with burdeners to transport their goods down to the port of San Marcos and then would not pay them. And they sent out the Indians of their doctrinas loaded down with rescates to buy deerskins from the Chacatos and Apalachicolas (Hann, 1986d; Matter, 1990: 145).

The friars retaliated with another, more sweeping round of accusations. Unrestrained greed, they declared, was the lodestone that drew all the governors to interfere in the provinces, putting soldiers where they were not wanted and provoking rebellions. Before ever setting foot on Florida soil, the governors learned in Havana of the money they could make if they misused the funds of the situado, bought up Indian corn and beans at two reales the arroba to resell for eight, and traded in deerskins. Rebolledo, they said, had furnished his teniente in Apalache with res-

cates and instructed him to buy up all the deerskins he could find. Yet on all of these exports, the friars charged, not the first real in taxes had been paid (Franciscans, 1657a).

To be reminded that the English had already invaded Jamaica and that rich, fertile Apalache was likely to be next, or that English boats on missions of reconnaissance had already tried their port, did not impress the friars. They readily confessed that Christian charity had moved them once to succor "one little frigate in distress," "provisionless" and "defeated" by the sea. If the provinces were in such peril, they asked, why then were there no soldiers in Timucua or Guale? It was because only from Apalache could one trade for deerskins or find 3000 or 4000 arrobas in Indian corn and beans. The governor had soldiers in Apalache to serve his private interests (Franciscans, 1657a; 1657b).

The friars also charged that the governor's claim "that the caciques take this price and are satisfied, or that they sow [the sabanas] willingly," was "a deliberate deception, 'parce que c'est a n'en pouvoir plus' [for they can do nothing else]." Admitting that the upper and lower orders of Indian society might have different views on the matter, they added: "Anyway, Sire, they [the caciques] are not the ones who do it. The ones who do the cultivating are the indios" (Franciscans, 1657a). They prayed their provincial either to remove them from Florida or to lay their grievances before the king (Matter, 1990: 124–125).

A final missive in the Franciscan barrage was a letter from the mico and principales of Tolomato, who asked the king to tell their governor that between the 12-league haulover and the ferry to San Juan del Puerto they had plenty to do without being called away from their fields to do unpaid chores for him and his cronies, unloading ships at the presidio, bringing logs from the woods, and making palm thatch. Most of the cargoes they carried to San Juan, they said, were rescates belonging to the governors and the soldiers, who offered them no pay but hard words and blows with a stick (Santiago and the Principales of Tolomato, 1658). The Tolomato letter was overkill, for the king had already acted, ordering don Diego de Rebolledo arrested for the "cruelty and inhumanity" with which he had repressed a revolt that he himself had provoked (Hann, 1986b: 392). Before the governor could mount a defense, he died.

In the midst of the charges flying back and forth, the underlying causes for Indian disaffection had been clarified. Supplying the doctrinas and sowing sabanas for the service of the king and the convent had become fronts for trade. Trade by anyone in authority, whether governor, friar, or cacique, required burdening, and burdening led to rebellion.

As the ponderous royal bureaucracy continued to process isolated pieces of information, the repercussions of the mid-century rebellions were felt for years. The fiscal of the Consejo suggested in 1660 that the new governor of Florida be told, with regard to

> the repartimiento of personal labors, that he do them as disposed in the cédulas on personal service, with the warning that should these be exceeded or should he draft them for other labors than those the said cédulas allow it will be a grave charge against him at his residencia (Consejo de Indias, 1660).

A royal cédula was accordingly dispatched to Governor Alonso de Aranguíz y Cotes, forbidding him to use the Tolomato Indians for personal service (Spanish Crown, 1660). He responded with some asperity that nobody was mistreating the Tolomatos. Either out of fear or to avoid displeasing the friars, he said, the chiefs of Florida had signed letters of complaint about his predecessor without the least idea about their contents. With regard to the inflammatory letter from the mico of Tolomato, someone had likely told the king that "the majority of the chiefs of these provinces wrote it to Your Majesty," but, said the governor, "there are very few who know how to write, which shows that the letter originated with the religiosos" (Aranguíz y Cotes, 1661).

Aranguíz reestablished the San Luis garrison with a teniente and 30 soldiers (Junta de Guerra, 1660; Menéndez Márquez and Prado, 1667). During their campaign against Governor Rebolledo, the Franciscans had vigorously protested the stationing of unmarried soldiers among the Indians, on the grounds that they would skip Mass, molest the women, and give the men lessons in profanity and irreverence. The friars did not re-

fuse to have soldiers in the province, they told the governor; on the contrary, "we esteem them, care for them, and welcome them into our convents, entertaining them on sight." What they did not want was to have the soldiers quartered "among the indios, utterly dependent on them if they are not to die of hunger" (Franciscans, 1657a). As a result, the officers and many of the soldiers of the new San Luis garrison were family men, looking to better themselves through ranching and trade.

The drastic epidemics continued—ten thousand Indians had died by 1662, the Consejo de Indias was informed (Matter, 1990: 75)—yet the repartimiento proceeded without interruption. Governor Aranguíz dispatched routine orders on the same day in 1663 to "the four provinces" of Guale, Timucua, Yustaga, and Apalache. Those that went to Captain Antonio de Argüelles, already in Guale "composing discords" among the micos and caciques, authorized him to ask the caciques and micos for the "indios de cava" from Guale, "in conformity with the repartimiento which by a signed instruction of mine I send to him." Aranguíz told Argüelles to assure them that their vassals would be fully paid for their work. If he could not raise the desired number in every place, he had permission to adjust the quotas as fairly as possible. The chiefs of Guale and Mocamo along the way were to "give all aid and good dispatch of canoas" to guarantee that the laborers and their escort of soldiers reached St. Augustine by the end of February (Aranguíz y Cotes, 1663b).

Finally, the governor instructed Argüelles not to let "any private person or anyone else" load the indios with trade goods for the trip to St. Augustine, for the king had relieved them of this form of service. The governor's admonition, made for the record as much as for Argüelles, is proof that despite protests and rebellions the old practice of burdening was going strong. The only way to avoid it would be to leave the provinces.

In most Eastern Woodland societies, the social contract was tenuous, open to review. A free man retained the option of abrogating it unilaterally, retracting his consent and connecting himself to an altogether different community or to none at all. Indian liberty did not reside in a bill of rights, but in free choice and independent action. The leaders of Apalache once tried to tell Governor Rebolledo why it was that people would "desert certain places and go to others." Indians might suffer unreasonable demands for awhile, they said, "because of being Christians," but eventually they would go to "where they encounter better treatment." Such an action was neither treason nor rebellion, but normal behavior. "Indians are not slaves," the caciques explained (Hann, 1986d: 95). But when American freedom clashed with European discipline and order, one side would have to back down.

NOTE

1. Ship cargoes were measured in tunnage, a "tun" being a wooden cask, or "*tonelada*," capable of holding 262 gallons of wine.

CHAPTER 13. THE COMING OF CAROLINA

SANTA CATALINA DE LA FRONTERA

The Indians of the provinces of Florida were town dwellers in a different sense than the present one. The historical and archaeological record of native settlement is complicated by the fact that a town was not a geographical site but a corporate entity which might possess a number of suitable sites, but carried the same name wherever it was. In a society of low population density and shifting agriculture, a given community progressed through its territory like a medieval court in slow motion, collecting firewood and cultivating fields in one place after another. Fields that lay fallow recovering fertility were known as "*chicasas*," meaning "old fields." Only if a community moved outside its traditional territory would its name take on a geographic qualifier, such as "Ivitachuco at Abosaya" (Bushnell, 1979).

Another factor complicating the record is the sequential occupation of desirable sites, with the function changing to fit the occupants. Two such cases are pertinent to this study. The site known as Santa Catalina on the southern end of St. Catherines Island, on the inland waterway side, first appeared in the documentary record in the late 16th century as a doctrina and a stopover for the coastal patrol. In the course of time it developed into Santa Catalina de la Frontera, a garrisoned border town shipping an agricultural surplus to the presidio. Abandoned during the border wars, the site ended the 17th century as a windswept camp for deer-hunters and fig gatherers. The site of Santa María, on Amelia Island, was occupied in sequence by eastern Timucuans, Yamasees, and Guales. In the early 18th century, it too reverted to the wild. Daubed walls and charred beams collapsed in the rains, palmettos encircled the orange trees, and the earth silently restored itself (Bushnell, 1986).

In 1726, with the threat of Georgia hanging over him, a Florida governor called on Florida veterans to testify to the boundaries of the long-lost mission province of Guale on the Atlantic coast. In their collective memory, the Province of Guale consisted of the barrier islands north of the presidio, all of which had had doctrineros and been populated by Christians. Using the Timucuan name for the Guale people, they said that on the mainland facing the said islands were three "lugares" of "Yguajas": Oatuache (Satuache), Tubique (Tupiqui), and Talaje. South to north, the veterans recalled, Guale territory ran from San Juan del Puerto at the mouth of the St. Johns River to a northern border 50 leagues above St. Augustine. The provincial garrison was located on the island of Santa Catalina, which was 40 leagues to the north and had eight lugares of Christians (Auto, 1726).

Judging from the sparse documentary record—which for the early 17th century, during Spain's wars with the Netherlands, is sparse indeed—Guale Province first came under external attack in 1650, from Chiscas/Yuchis (Ponce de León, 1651a). Eleven years later, shock waves from distant English colonization reached the northern border when a band of "Chichimecos" raided the Guale missions, sacking churches and convents and killing native Christians, then retreated across the pine barrens toward the trading center of Tama. These were the Westos, a warlike tribe sometimes identified as Ricahecrians from Virginia, sometimes as Erie Iroquois set in motion by the fur trade wars ([Los Santos, 1673?]; Covington, 1968a; Smith, 1989). The first native enemies to be furnished with firearms, they spread terror in the coastal doctrinas.

Governor Aranguíz moved quickly to reinforce the border. Captain Francisco de la Rocha took troops to garrison the "lugar de Sápala"; Captain Antonio de Argüelles set out in pursuit of a band of Chichimecos a half-day's journey from Guadalquini; Captain Juan Sánchez de Uriza went north to "pacify the province," coaxing the Guales out of the forests and back to their fields (Aranguíz y Cotes, 1661; 1662a; [Los Santos, 1673?]; Waselkov, 1989b: 118).

In the aftermath of the Chichimeco invasion, if not earlier, many of the Yguajas living on the mainland moved out to join the Guales on the barrier islands. Although both groups

spoke the same language, and the distinction between them may have existed primarily in the Spanish mind, the Yguajas evinced little enthusiasm for being absorbed. In 1663 the mico of Santa Catalina journeyed to St. Augustine to complain to the governor that the towns of his jurisdiction did not observe the preeminences to which he was entitled, being "superior to all the other micos and caciques of his lengua." The people of those towns did not make him the *salua* greeting, nor did they receive him in their council houses with the affectionate display that he was accustomed to being shown. By order of the governor, Captain Argüelles escorted the mico home "through all the province of Guale up to the place of Santa Catalina," making inquiries as he went to discover why the mico's subjects had altered toward him and reminding them of the honor they owed him as their lord (Aranguíz y Cotes, 1663a).

When news came by the grapevine that the Chichimecos were planning a fresh attack, the governor resolved to secure Guale with a permanent Spanish garrison, one that the grateful natives would subsequently maintain. Carefully he laid the political groundwork for his decision, appealing to the three sets of authorities who wielded provincial power. First, he called a council of the royal officials of the treasury and officers of the presidio, ostensibly to benefit by their combined knowledge of the provinces and the natives. He put the proposal for a garrison before them and gained their support. Second, he presented the same proposal to the friars, heading off their tendency to present a united, negative front by inviting each of the doctrineros in Guale to respond separately in writing. Third, he sent Captain Argüelles back to Guale to gauge morale and obtain a commitment from local leaders. Argüelles asked the micos and caciques whether they would not feel safer with a garrison at Santa Catalina and if so, whether they would share the burden of supporting the soldiers so that it did not fall on that town alone. The different towns agreed what their respective contributions should consist of, and the soldiers came. The mission town of Santa Catalina became the garrison town of Santa Catalina de la Frontera, guarding the frontier (Aranguíz y Cotes, 1661; 1663b; 1663c).

Florida was a captaincy general. Its governors held the military title of captain general and were drawn from the Spanish army or navy. A military appointee would naturally stress the colony's strategic interests above its economic, political, or spiritual ones. It is therefore safe to assume that the decision to evacuate the mainland and concentrate the population on the islands was a military one. Yet if the new locations offered better protection against enemy raiders from the interior, were more accessible to St. Augustine, and possessed vantage points from which to view traffic in and out of harbors and along the inland waterway, they were also vulnerable to seaborne enemies, who were beginning to present a growing problem.

English interest in the Atlantic coast immediately north of Guale originated not in England nor in one of the older mainland colonies but in Barbados, a small sugar island which in the early 1660s faced declining profits, excess numbers of poor whites, and, after 35 years of intensive land occupation, no more land. In 1663 the Barbadian Sir John Colleton and seven other well-placed men secured a charter from Charles II which made them proprietors of a thick slice of North America: everything between 31° and 36° degrees north latitude. In honor of their royal patron, they named it Carolina. Two years later, in an act which left the Spanish ambassador speechless, the king of England gave the proprietors a second charter which extended Carolina's lower boundary 2° into Florida, a colony of Spain's so long established that it was celebrating its centennial that very year (Sirmans, 1966: 5).

Unconcerned about this defect in their title, the proprietors sent William Hilton to explore the coasts of lower Carolina and select a site for a southern settlement. His first choice, like that of many earlier captains, was Port Royal, or Santa Elena, which the Indians had reclaimed in 1587. When Hilton landed on Parris Island, he found Captain Antonio de Argüelles there before him with a party of soldiers, probably to buy a boatload of Indian corn. The two officers exchanged compliments; Argüelles brought out venison and pork, Hilton a jug of brandy. Seeing the soldiers from St. Augustine prepared to stand their ground, the English returned to their

ship and sailed away (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 29).

In 1666 the Indians of Santa Elena had a second visitor, Captain Robert Sandford. Finding no evidence of Spaniards other than a wooden cross erected on the plaza, Sandford saw an opportunity to establish friendly relations and exchange hostages with the cacique Niquisalla. John Henry Woodward, an adventurous young surgeon in Sandford's party, offered to take the place of the cacique's nephew. With the captain as witness, the cacique sat Woodward in a place of honor at his side, gave him his niece as wife, and endowed him with "formall possession of the whole Country to hold as Tennant at Will of the right Honorable Lords Proprietors" (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 28–30, 69). Antonio de Arredondo, describing the scene by hearsay 70 years later, said that the English surrounded this spurious sale "with all the solemnities of documents, and with the ceremonies of pulling, and planting, and moving earth, which are usual in such contracts" (Bolton, 1925: 159–161).

Woodward applied himself for several months to learning the Indian languages and trade routes. He then appears to have surrendered to a Spanish patrol. Taken to St. Augustine, he expressed an interest in converting to Catholicism. Parish priest Francisco de Sotolongo befriended the young Englishman and invited him to stay in the manse, where they conversed companionably in Latin.

In the same year, 1668, the corsair Robert Searles out of Jamaica entered the St. Augustine harbor in the presidio's own supply ship, which he had captured. Emerging from their Trojan horse at midnight, the buccaneers shot up the town, killing the fleeing people in the streets. Part of the garrison rushed to defend the fort; the rest took refuge in the woods. The pirates sacked the town at their leisure, concentrating on ransomable women, saleable nonwhites, and treasure: royal, private, and sacred. Father Sotolongo was unable to save the church ornaments, he lamented to the Crown; he had "barely time to consume Our Redeemer Sacramented" (Sotolongo, 1668).

Acting as go-between, Sotolongo got the corsair captain to release the women of good family from shipboard custody by offering to take their place, "to protect their honor." By his own account he charged Searles to his face with enslaving free people: *negros*, *mulatos*, other persons of mixed race, "even those with Spanish fathers," and Indians, who were the king of Spain's "free subjects" and enjoyed his particular regard. Searles reportedly responded that his governor had granted him license to enslave anyone who was not a Spaniard (Sotolongo, 1668).

The parish priest was especially grieved when his convert left with the corsairs, no doubt guiding them to the rich pickings of the coastal missions on their way north (Chatelain, 1941: 62–63). Dr. Woodward could be relied on to tell all he knew about St. Augustine's defenses to the city's worst enemies. Floridanos told each other with foreboding that corsairs who charted a harbor and failed to burn a city must mean to return and occupy both.

BUILDING THE CASTILLO

At the time, the Mexico City treasury had not paid a full year's situado to Florida in eight years and was in debt to its treasury for more than 400,000 pesos. Costly as the Searles raid was in lives and property, it did bring the colony back to royal notice. In 1669 and 1673 Queen Regent Mariana gave the viceroy of New Spain new instructions that spelled out his responsibilities to the maritime periphery. He was to pay up the arrears of Florida's past situados and in future to remit the situado fully and promptly. He was to add 50 plazas to the 300-man dotación and thereafter to reserve all 350 plazas for soldiers, including the 43 plazas that had been going to friars. At the same time, he was to increase the Franciscan situado to cover all the religious. Finally, he was to allocate fortification funds to Florida for as many years as it took to build a stone fort in St. Augustine (Spanish Crown, 1677).

Manuel de Cendoya, royal appointee to the post of governor, went straight from Spain to Mexico City to collect the funds, send supplies to Florida, and meet with military engineers. While he was in New Spain, news came that in the southern part of Carolina the English had founded and were fortifying

a settlement called Charles Town, not at Santa Elena, but in a place the Spanish knew as "San Jorge," 10 or 12 leagues to the north of Santa Elena, in the old province of Escamacu. Left to itself, the English settlement would no doubt develop into a den of pirates like the infamous ports of Jamaica. In Mexico City, the viceroy and the governor-elect came to an agreement on funding the proposed fort: 12,000 pesos to begin with and 10,000 pesos a year thereafter until the work was finished. A complete defense system of the kind Cendoya wanted called for four smaller forts: two to guard the entrances to St. Augustine harbor, one at the port of San Marcos to guard the entrance to Apalache, and the other at Santa Catalina de la Frontera to protect the northern border. Spain's Junta de Guerra approved the secondary forts but did not ask the viceroy to fund them (Olds, 1962: 6–15; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 17).

As South Carolina moved from rumor to reality, the planters and indentured servants in Charles Town, which the floridanos persisted in calling San Jorge, had good reason to feel menaced, "settled," as they put it, "in the very chaps of the Spaniards."[1] A sloop, *The Three Brothers*, separated from the fleet bound for Charles Town from Bermuda in 1670, made the mistake of seeking shelter near St. Catherines Island, home of the Guale garrison. A party of 11 men and women were "invited on shore by the reverend father of Santa Catalina," wrote Sir James Colleton to the Florida governor in 1688, "and thence carried prisoners to San Agustín, being some of them persons of quality who were never sent home though desired." At the time, President of Council Joseph West dispatched a vessel to St. Catherines to obtain their release, but the two men who carried his message ashore were taken prisoner themselves. Maurice Mathew, who escaped the trap, reported seeing a small fort on the island (Colleton, 1688; Bolton and Ross, 1925: 32–33; Chatelain, 1940: 64, 153; Sirmans, 1966: 16; Wright, 1971: 54).

Marooned in St. Augustine, the English captives made the best of the situation, converted to Catholicism, and worked on the stone fort that was expected to hold St. Augustine against their former countrymen. William Carr, of the first group, became a gunner and a trusted interpreter, and as the husband of Juana de Contreras contributed eight children to the population. John Collins, one of the unlucky messengers, became master of the royal limekilns on Quarry Island (Anastasia), then quarrymaster, before succumbing to alcoholism. The gossip in the guardhouse was that Collins was a converted Jew (Auto, 1687a; Appeal, 1688; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 20).

Governor Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega, still smarting from the Searles fracas, prepared to drive off the intruders to the north with a Spanish seaborne raid. An appropriate provocation arose when infieles allied with the Carolinians "depopulated" the Yguaja town of Talaje, 33 leagues north of the presidio. Mainland Talaje might not have a doctrinero, and its inhabitants might be temporarily out of favor for refusing to move out to the islands, but they were still subjects of the King of Spain and under his protection. An opportune moment for retaliation presented itself with the arrival in port of a *navío* from New Spain bearing an installment of the situado in the form of supplies and provisions.

Losing no time, the governor "armed," or fitted out, 3 navíos (the one from New Spain and 2 presidio frigates) and 6 piraguas, and the small fleet set out from St. Augustine under the command of floridano Juan Menéndez Márquez II—not a Spanish friar, as the Carolinians thought, but a treasury official. At "the bar of Santa Catalina" they stopped to equip another 8 piraguas, in this case manned by Guale Indians and español soldiers drawn from the Santa Catalina garrison. Españoles and Indians then headed north, the 3 navíos by sea and the 14 piraguas by the inland waterway, picking up an occasional prisoner. The fleet rendezvoused at the mouth of Charles Town harbor and the combined forces were about to cross the bar and attack San Jorge when a north wind blew up. Unable to maintain their position or stay in contact, the 3 ships headed toward safety in the Bay of Santa Elena "and the *desalojo*," or "dislodging" of the Barbadians colonizing the Atlantic coast, "was frustrated" (Auto, 1726; Bolton and Ross, 1925: 33–34; Sirmans, 1966: 20).

Before a new offensive could be launched,

word came of a peace between the mother countries. In the 1670 Treaty of Madrid Spain reluctantly conceded the right of *uti possidetis*, or effective occupation, abandoning, at least for the foreseeable future, unenforceable claims based on discovery, possession taking, or past settlement. Colonies that the English had planted before the date of the treaty were to be left in peace. By a three-month margin, South Carolina qualified. Had the floridanos known that John Henry Woodward was in Cofitachequi renewing his contacts and laying the ground for Charles Town to move in on the Indian trade, they would have felt all the more betrayed (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 32; 46–48).

Governor Cendoya stationed 25 men at the northern border of St. Catherines in 1671, the same number as at San Luis, but a provincial garrison never stayed at capacity in peacetime unless the governor or floridanos had private reasons to keep it manned. Trade with the interior from St. Catherines Island, if any, was minimal compared to that between San Luis and Apalachicola. The number of soldiers stationed at Santa Catalina de la Frontera fell to 13 in 1672 and 9 in 1675 (Matter, 1972: 191–195).

As back situados were paid up, the first installments of funds to build a stone fort started to arrive, and the number of effective plazas in the presidio garrison increased by almost a third, St. Augustine reestablished itself as the colony's chief center of economic activity, a position which the more populous, productive, and commercial Gulf provinces had seriously challenged. As a major public works project, the Castillo injected new life into the economy. At the same time, however, it increased the pressure on the king's Indian subjects, putting severe strain on the two institutions developed to channel resources from the Indian towns to the presidio: the repartimiento of labor and the sabana system.

Alonso del Moral, arguing that Florida needed a "defender of the naturales," charged the governors, tenientes, and soldiers with using the repartimiento to keep the natives in servitude. Under the guise of the king's service, he said, they made them go burdened back and forth to Apalache, 80 leagues each way, paying for this hard work with an *azada* [shovel or hoe], an *hacha* [axe or hatchet], or a half blanket. They detained Indians in their service at the presidio as though they were not free men, Christians, and vassals of His Majesty, feeding them on short rations of maize and paying them at times in worthless rags.

> Worst of all, they take them by force from their homes and pueblos not only for the *faenas* [tasks] of the presidio but also for those of private individuals, and this in the rigor of winter, when as always they go naked, or in the midst of summer, when they are busiest with the work of their plantings, which their families depend on and which are a vital emergency [reserve of] provisions for the presidio (Moral, [1676?]b).

Those whom the Franciscans accused of abuses did not hesitate to respond in kind. The competition for ever scarcer resources coupled with the cost of defenseworks against ever bolder bandits and pirates would in the 1680s create deep fissures within Spanish society. More and more, the free Indian men and women who had seemed such loyal Christians and vassals would exercise their right to secede from the provinces and escape the demands that españoles made on them in the name of king and God.

In the heady atmosphere of the early 1670s, however, most members of the upper orders saw the influx of money to St. Augustine and its rising population as a double bonanza. More soldiers were at the presidio, bringing in more money and generating more dependents. The governors called up extra repartimiento workers, who, knowing they would be absent for longer periods than the normal, frequently brought their families. The city's demand for food increased correspondingly. Despite sporadic efforts to hold down prices and regulate distribution for the general welfare, increased demand raised the price of locally traded foodstuffs, particularly maize, cattle, and hogs.

Governors admonished caciques to have the indios plant ever larger sabanas for the king, and thousands of arrobas of Indian corn from the provinces travelled the king's roads and ferries toward the "mouths" of St. Augustine. Yet the royal granaries emptied as fast as they filled, partly because the presence of Charles Town had cut off St. Augustine's

sources of provisions north of the Guale missions. Years later, floridanos would remember with nostalgia the days when ships from the presidio could go north by sea and piraguas by the rivers to seek provisions at San Jorge in the old province of Escamacu and at Santa Elena, 10 or 12 leagues below (Auto, 1726).

Responding to the rising demand for ranch products, floridanos got *estancia* grants to portions of the grasslands of central Florida while caciques used or rented out their towns' old fields to start cattle ranches, better known as *haciendas*. Dried meat and tallow joined the list of Florida exports. Anyone with a fenced yard found it profitable to raise hogs, especially if, like a friar, he could use schoolchildren or orphans to "cast grass" to the stock, a task that on Caribbean plantations was reserved for the youngest gang of slaves. No stigma attached to hog farms (Altman, 1989: 69); in Spain, the pigs that wealthy nobles raised were proof positive of their indifference to Islamic and Jewish dietary laws. *Tocino*, or sides of bacon, quickly became another Florida export.

Luis Rafael Arana and Albert Manucy (1977) have described the building of the Castillo in detail, including the early stages. Once the preliminary drawings and financial arrangements were complete and Governor Cendoya had arrived in Florida with the viceroy's first allocation of 12,000 pesos, the preparation of materials could begin. Plans called for the walls to be built of coquina, a kind of shellstone available on Anastasia Island, then known as "*la isla de la cantera.*" or "Quarry Island." Lime for mortar was obtained by burning seashells from one of the hundreds of ancient shellmounds that dotted the Florida coast. Coquina and seashells cost nothing beyond the expenses of processing and transporting them. The Castillo's high labor costs included most of the cost of materials.

Almost all of the 138,375 pesos spent on the Castillo from 1671 until 1695, when the fort was pronounced finished, went to pay wages and buy rations. Master workmen earned 20 reales a day unless they were Indians or English prisoners, in which case they earned 8. Some Indians became artisans and worked as carpenters and masons; a native known only as "Andrés" worked as a stonecutter for 16 years. The 15 artisans on the payroll required 150 unskilled laborers to keep them from running out of materials: 50 to work in the quarries and drive the oxen that hauled the cut stone to the shore, from where it was rafted to the building site, 50 to gather oyster shells and burn charcoal for the limekilns, and 50 more to dig the foundation trenches, move dirt, carry baskets, and mix mortar. A Spanish *peón* without skills earned 4 reales a day; an Indian peón, 1 real plus a ration of maize. A convict doing the same job received only his food and clothes the same as the royal slaves who had worked on the wooden forts 85 and 90 years earlier.

At the new, inflated price, maize to feed the Indians cost the Crown 7½ to 8 reales per arroba. The maize ration for a repartimiento laborer was 3 pounds a day from 1671 to 1679, 2½ pounds from 1679 to 1684, a meager 2 pounds from 1684 to 1687, and 2½ pounds again until the Castillo was finished in 1695. A ration of 2½ pounds would consume 1 arroba of Indian corn every 10 days. If that arroba cost 7½ pesos, then the combined jornal and daily ration for an Indian peón came to 1¾ reales. Master workmen, English masons, and convicts were rationed in wheat flour at 10 reales the arroba. Being españoles, the convicts were also given rations of meat, for persons of European origin were thought to be unable to keep up their strength on the food of Indians.

Governors, royal officials, foremen, caciques and principales all faced new work force problems. More repartimiento laborers than ever had to be drafted from the three provinces and conducted to St. Augustine, with each group's arrival timed to fit a complicated work schedule. Labor camps had to be enlarged and new housing provided. Up to 7000 extra arrobas of Indian corn per year had to be requisitioned and purchased (Márquez Cabrera, 1681c), brought to St. Augustine, stored, and issued as rations. Trade goods had to be ordered, stored, and paid out at the proper time and in the proper amounts to repartimiento laborers and maize growers. Levels of discipline had to be established, strict enough to keep men steadily at work, mild enough to keep them from deserting. And not least, supervisors or interpreters had

to be found who could communicate clear directions to an impermanent labor force that spoke three native languages.

Real counts of repartimiento workers do not exist. Florida officials were either not statistically minded or they deliberately withheld and obscured quantifiable data. What little information the historian can relay about the numbers of Indians occupied by the repartimiento either during or before the building of the Castillo is necessarily drawn from a file of correspondence about the need of confessors for this 17th-century Tower of Babel. Soon after construction began, Father Juan Moreno sent a letter to Queen Regent Mariana to the effect that so many Indians from the three provinces of Apalache, Timucua, and Guale assisted at the presidio that there were enough of them to form three pueblos. He asked that the Franciscan dotación be increased by three stipends so that each pueblo of Indians could have its own religioso, understanding its language. The friars could reside at the friary and double as language instructors to newly arrived missionaries (Moreno, [1673?]).

The Consejo referred his letter to the Franciscan Commissary General for the Indies, Antonio de Somoza, who responded:

> In the city of St. Augustine the land is not cultivated for planting by plowing it, instead they work it with a hoe, to which exercise the governor compels the Indians reduced to Christianity. And because the land to be cultivated is great and the Indians of the vicinity are few, he obliges the Indians of the three aforesaid nations to descend [to the city], both to plant and to gather the fruit. Besides this, it is the custom to give indios de servicio to the private individuals of position. For these two ministries, more than 300 Indians are often found in St. Augustine, and some, knowing that their detention will be prolonged, bring their families.
>
> At present a much larger number of Indians are in the said city, compelled to assist with the fábrica of the Castillo, some occupied in quarrying stone, others in bringing it, and the rest in preparing the materials for the artisans. The number of Indians having so increased, it is only just that they should have priests to administer the Holy Sacraments to them, and that these be experts in the language of each one of those nations, so that in the midst of their miseries these poor ones should not be denied the comfort of their souls, all the more reason because, as the naturales are weakly, the work continuous, and the rations short, many of them die, and he who reaches the extremity of his life without a priest to understand his language places his salvation in jeopardy (Somoza, 1673).

Asked to give his expert opinion, ex-governor Guerra commented that during his term in Florida it was the custom to confess the repartimiento Indians before they left home—200 from Apalache, 50 to 55 from Timucua, and 45 to 50 from Guale (Matter, 1990: 149). Guerra's breakdown, of course, applied to the 300-man, short-term repartimiento that had been in effect during his governorship, before the Castillo project drew extra workmen to St. Augustine for longer periods.

The Queen Regent, considering the matter from all sides, increased the Franciscan dotación by three friars expressly to furnish the repartimiento Indians with confessors (Spanish Crown, 1673). Hopefully the priests gave some comfort to Christians stricken by the "contagion" that in 1672 began to ravage and reduce the native population and two years later was still going strong. So many of the Indian peones died in St. Augustine that the Crown had to order 30 royal slaves sent from Havana to keep the work going (Arana and Manucy, 1977: 25–26; Matter, 1990: 149). Although after 34,298 pesos had been spent with no end in sight the viceroy cut off funds and demanded a progress report, work actually stopped for only a 20-month period in 1678 and 1679. After that interruption, funds began to flow once more, and the laborers were back (Arana and Manucy, 1977: 27–28).

With the intensified repartimiento siphoning at least twice as many male laborers out of the provinces as before, the towns found themselves with fewer and fewer ablebodied persons left to clear and dig a sabana, whether the field concerned was for the doctrinero, the cacique, the council house, the king, or the family. Nicolás Ponce de León II told the Queen in 1674 that with the men away, all the labor of cultivating the crops fell on the women and children (Matter, 1990: 149). The situation was aggravated by pressure to grow and ship more maize and other foodstuffs to the presidio, to feed more and more persons travelling on the king's business, and to sustain a social structure that was increasingly topheavy. There literally were too many chiefs and not enough Indians.

An undetermined number of commoners simply drifted away from the doctrinas with their burdensome demands in search of an easier existence elsewhere. The sanctions against the total self-determination of a true fugitive, or "*cimarrón*," were severe. Whether a "*fugitivo*" left the company of Christians to join a town of infieles or to get along on his own, hunting, gathering, and growing a bit of maize, he could expect to be condemned as an apostate and pursued as a rebel. Fugitivism, or marronage, would continue to be a last resort until there was a stronger pull factor, namely, a better line of trade goods from a less interfering sort of European.

In the meantime, most of those who left the doctrinas chose the easier route of finding a *patron* who could get them exempted from the labor levy. The patron-client relation was a powerful bonding mechanism running through and reinforcing the hierarchical Spanish society. It linked governors to business partners and to native nobles, company captains to soldiers, shipowners to crews, and friars to their native assistants. It was given formal expression in the institution of *compadrazgo*, a kind of fictive kinship that created a tissue of mutual obligations. Governor Ybarra made reference to them in a letter to Padre Provincial Benito Blasco in 1605. He would, he said, pardon and release Alonso Jorge, teniente of the cacique of Nombre de Dios, for the offense of going to get stuffed mattresses from the Indians of the coast, a "new land" that he the governor was still conquering, but in future he meant to punish with rigor all disobedient caciques or tenientes, regardless of their godfathers ("*sin que les valgan padrinos*") (Ybarra, 1605c).

The increasing number and size of haciendas in the 1670s and 1680s offered new patrons. One could become a ranch peón simply by settling inside the boundaries of an hacienda and claiming the protection of the *hacendado*, who for his part was glad to add a reserve of seasonal laborers to his full-time ranchhands, who were a mixture of indios de servicio, workers on yearly contract, and black slaves.

John Hann observed that Hispanicized Apalaches migrating into Timucua to work on the ranches

> were following a classic pattern that prevailed elsewhere in Spanish America. The pattern consisted of an evolution from the repartimiento system's sporadic compulsory labor at prescribed low wages, to freely undertaken regular long-term contract labor at more attractive wages, as employers sought to compensate for the shrinking of the available labor pool.

Had the process not been cut short by Queen Anne's War, Hann proposed, Florida's "free contract-laborer would have been converted imperceptibly into a debt-peón" (Hann, 1986b: 379–380).

It is true that in New Spain the Indian's right to offer his labor as he chose began to erode in the 1680s when the Crown, concerned about the condition of agriculture and persuaded that the natives were better off in fixed communities, consented to a form of involuntary service similar to the *yanaconaje* of Peru, binding the agricultural workers, or *gañanes*, to the haciendas whereon they lived and regulating their treatment by the hacendados who employed them, guaranteed their tribute, and covered their altar fees (Riley, 1984).

But Florida deviated from the classic pattern. There, hacendados obtained labor by means of the repartimiento and also apart from it. A rancher commonly got his start with two grants from the governor, one of land and the other of indios de servicio. As early as 1664 Father Gabriel de Cubas claimed that floridano families kept four or five ill-fed Indian servants apiece, far from their doctrinas, who lived without hearing Mass or receiving the sacraments and died without confession (Matter, 1990: 148). The cacique of Tama in Apalache protested to Visitor Joachín de Florencia that the Spanish rancher Marcos Delgado had by violence taken a family of three women, two young and one old, to work on his hacienda and would not let them return home, "saying that he has a license for them from the señor visitador." Another woman from Tama, Chuquta Francisca, worked as a cook for the rancher Diego Jiménez and was dismissed without pay. Florencia responded to the two cases by having the law recorded in the provincial archive that no woman might be on the ranches without a husband, while in the province of Timucua, at the ranch of La Chua, he warned the foreman not to employ married men nor single women under pain of a 20-ducat fine (Florencia, 1694–1695).

Indios de servicio, not contract laborers, were the ones in danger of becoming gañanes in Florida, surrendering their provincial affiliations in order to be freed from the tiresome round of repartimiento labor. What kept them from serfdom and at the same time restricted the free movement of contract labor was the sabana system, which survived because everyone in authority in Florida, from the presidio to the caciques to the friars, needed for local agriculture to persist in just that form. Periodically, the caciques presented the Spanish authorities with lists of missing casados and the places where they were known to be and demanded that they be sent back to their wives' towns at planting time to do their share of digging the public sabanas, as well as the fields for their families (Florencia, 1694–1695).

Not all of the Indians who left the doctrinas for the service of Spaniards were destined to attach themselves to a patron in the countryside. Many made their way to St. Augustine, a place made familiar to repartimiento workers by a hundred years of labor assignments. Those indios de fábricas especially who made a career of working on the Castillo must have found themselves more at home in the presidial barrios than in the provincial doctrinas.

The metropolis represented a market. Daniel H. Usner, Jr., found that in the 18th century numerous Louisiana Indians chose to live in villages near New Orleans, where the men could work by the day on the docks or sell venison and waterfowls and the women could peddle baskets, mats, herbs, and firewood (Usner, 1989). The same opportunities were available in St. Augustine.

Finally, the capital offered excitement. The very year the Castillo was completed, two young Apalaches (Ajalap Cosme and Andrés de Escovedo) in St. Augustine on labor service found a tin plate in the street. Melting it down, they cast part of it into buttons. The rest they cast and marked to make counterfeit half-real pieces which could passed by night, in dimly lit stores, for fried sweet cakes and sugar syrup (Hann, 1988a). Opportunities for highspirited deviltry like this were not to be found in the provinces.

The ceramic record, in which the presence of the different groups of Indians can be detected by their distinctive wares, can reveal as much as the documentary about population drift and replacement. After the severe epidemics of the mid-17th century the proportion of Timucuan ceramics in a Spanish St. Augustine household silently declined, while that of ceramics in the Guale tradition correspondingly rose. Guale women were replacing Timucuans on the domestic scene as servants, wives, and concubines (Deagan, 1990b: 306). All of this breaking down of the barriers between the Republic of Indians and the Republic of Spaniards the Franciscans watched with foreboding.

TAKING STOCK

During the 1670s the Franciscans in the Philippines cooperated with the military to stabilize the frontier between the Christian maritime people and the pagan mountain people by founding a number of "live missions," with a few soldiers each. This semi-Christian buffer zone became a useful neutral ground for the exchange of maritime and mountain products (Phelan, 1959: 48, 140–141).

Religious and royal authorities in Florida, at the same time, were experimenting on their own frontiers with a similar kind of *conversión*, as strategic as it was evangelistic. South Carolina was threatening to take over the trade with the interior; brightly colored British jackets and firearms would cause the natives to despise Catholicism and all would be lost. Dr. Woodward had already negotiated a treaty with the Chichimecos/Westos settled along the middle reaches of the Savannah River not far from Guale (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 46–48). Acting quickly, the governor and the padre provincial sent soldiers and friars to found three new conversiones between April and June 1674: one for the Chines, Amacanos, and Pacaros living between Apalache and the coast, and two for the Chacatos (Chatots) between Apalache and Apalachicola (Moral, [1676?]a).

Queen Regent Mariana had already ordered don Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, Bishop of Santiago de Cuba, to visit the Florida missions, which had not seen a bishop in nearly 70 years. From the two priests he sent to make advance preparations, don Gabriel



Fig. 13.1. Names and approximate locations of the missions of Spanish Florida at the time of the visitation of Bishop Gabriel Díaz Vara Calderón, 1674–1675. (After Gannon, 1965: 64, facing, and Thomas 1990b: fig. 24.3; courtesy of the Smithsonian Institution Press. See also Díaz Vara Calderón, [1675].) In what he called "the Timuquan or Ustacanian province," the bishop reported (1) San Diego de Salamototo, (2) San Francisco, (3) Santa Fe, (4) Santa Catalina, (5) Ajohica, (6) Santa Cruz de Tarihica, (7) San Juan de Guacara, (8) Santa Helena de Machaba, (9) San Pedro de Potohiriba, (10) San Matheo, and (11) San Miguel de Asyle. In the province of Apalache were (12) San Lorenzo de Hibitachuco, (13) La Concepción de Ayubale, (14) San Francisco de Oconi, (15) San Juan de Aspalaga, (16) San Joseph de Ocuya, (17) San Pedro de Patali, (18) San Antonio de Bacuqua, (19) San Damian de Cupahica, also called Escambi, (20) San Luis de Talimali, (21) San Martín de Tomoli, (22) La Purificación de Tama, called Yamases, a heathen village, (23) Santa Cruz de Capoli, called Chuntafu, and (24) Assumpción del Puerto, a heathen village. In the potential province of "Apalachocoli" were the recently founded conversions of (25) La Encarnación a la Santa Cruz de Sabacola, of "Apalachocolans," (26) San Carlos, of Chacatos, and (27) San Nicolás, of Chacatos.

was happy to learn that after years of marching in place, the soldiers of the gospel were on the move again in Florida. During his 10-month visitation the bishop personally dedicated three churches: Santa Cruz de Sabacola on the Apalachicola River 12 leagues into Apalachicola and, in Apalache, La Purificación de Tama for the Yamasees and Assumpción del Puerto for the Chines and their companions. He also reestablished five former mission sites for Yamasees and other infieles in Guale and Mocamo (Díaz Vara Calderón, [1675]; Matter, 1990: 61–63). [Fig. 13.1]

The conversiones in Apalachicola lasted little longer than the arbors that were thrown up and called churches. Soon after the bishop's departure, the Chiscas/Yuchis and Chichimecos/Westos brought their war into the Spanish sphere of influence, attacking and dispersing the Chacatos under Spanish protection and forcing the abandonment of the exposed mission at Sabacola. A Chisca woman whom the Chichimecos had taken to Charles Town and traded for a musket and who had escaped from the English told the Spanish governor that there were Englishmen in the Chichimeco towns training people in the use of firearms so they could make war on the provinces of Christians (Valverde and Barrera, 1674; Escobedo, 1675; Fernández de Florencia, 1675).

Father Juan de Paiva, a veteran missionary at San Luis, interpreted these setbacks in the program of live missions as signs that God was displeased with Indian Christians. Bishop Díaz Vara Calderón had disapproved of the Apalaches' favorite ballgame, and Paiva now saw that *pelota* was replete with heathen magic and superstitions. After his damning report was read to them, the caciques in council promised to remove their towns' ballpoles and replace them with crosses (Paiva, 1676; Bushnell, 1978b: 14; Hann, 1988c: 70–95, 328–353). For help in battle, as on the ballfield, the Apalaches looked to Christian magic. Those who went out under their own leaders to fight the Chiscas in 1677 carried a pennant with a crucifix on one side and Our Lady of the Rosary[2] on the other. At the moment of launching their main attack, four caciques reported, a bluish light the height of a man arose behind them and disappeared into their midst. Over 30 persons bore witness to the miracle (Mendoza et al., 1678).

A census of Guale-Mocamo, now one province, that the soldier Pedro de Arcos made in 1675 underscored a fact that no one wanted to talk about: the native population was vanishing like an army of ghosts. In the five years since the coming of Carolina, the number of Guales north of St. Augustine had fallen so low that the Yamasees refugees in their midst were threatening to outnumber them. The two peoples, who spoke the same language and considered themselves related, had always been trading partners, and there is evidence that even prior to the building of the Castillo the Yamasees had been coming to Guale as seasonal workers, augmenting the labor pool and hiring out as repartimiento substitutes. According to former governor Guerra, of the 45 to 50 laborers that Guale regularly sent during his time to do their stint in St. Augustine, only 8 or 10 were Christians (Matter, 1990: 149).

At the time of the Arcos census, St. Catherines Island, with its 9 soldiers on detachment from the presidio, marked the northern border, Satuache having abandoned its exposed position on the frontier some time beforehand. Santa Catalina and its subject pueblos, all now on the same island, could muster only 140 adults and children.

Two leagues and a bar away from Santa Catalina was San Joseph de Sápala, which had, counting infieles, some 50 inhabitants. Six leagues on, passing the bars of Aspo and Asao, was Santo Domingo de Asao, with around 30 inhabitants. Their doctrinero was Juan de Uzeda, who would later play an important part in the provincial conflicts analyzed in Chapter 14. Two leagues from Asao was San Simón, a town of 40 infieles. Ocotonico, one league from that, had a population of perhaps 120, probably also infieles. Neither San Simón nor Ocotonico had a doctrinero. Guadalquini, one and a half leagues from Ocotonico, contained maybe 40 persons. Their doctrinero was Pedro de Luna, who would similarly figure in the conflicts that took place in St. Augustine, recounted in Chapter 17.

Six leagues and two bars (Guadalquini and Ballenas) from Guadalquini was San Felipe, with 36 people, some of whom were infieles.

In 1675 San Felipe was the only pueblo left on Cumberland Island. Three leagues from San Felipe, across the bar of San Pedro, census-taker Arcos reached the "island of Mocama" (Amelia Island), which had four small pueblos. The northernmost, unnamed, contained some 60 infiel Yamasees. One league away was the pueblo of the cacique of Ocotoque, with 40 infieles. La Tama, two leagues from Ocotoque, had 50 infieles. Santa María, half a league from La Tama, was the southernmost pueblo, with around 40 infieles. Three leagues away, across the bar of Santa María, stood the old ferry town of San Juan del Puerto, with 30 people (Geiger, 1940: 121; Boyd, 1948: 182–184). The total population of Guale-Mocamo Province was only 676, including an unknown number of Yamasees.

Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia made a census of Apalache and Timucua provinces in the same year as Arcos's census of Guale-Mocamo. Florencia's census—made to a lesser level of accuracy, to the nearest hundred instead of the nearest ten—showed 8720 inhabitants in the 11 pueblos of Apalache and 1370 in the 10 pueblos of Timucua, of whom 940 lived in the district of Yustaga just across the Apalache border (Boyd, 1948: 184–188), making an estimated provincial population of 10,766. Of this total, the Province of Apalache represented 81 percent of the total, Timucua 13 percent, and Guale-Mocamo a mere 6 percent. If the population of Yustaga is added to that of Apalache, it becomes strikingly apparent that the population of central Florida had not ceased to decline in the 20 years since the mid-century rebellions and epidemics. Without Yustaga, Timucua, still the largest province geographically, held only 4 percent of the Christian native population: a bare 430 people in a handful of isolated settlements to service the transportation network and to work on the cattle ranches that were starting to spread across the lonely lake country (Bushnell, 1978a).

When Antonio de Argüelles went on visita to Guale in the winter of 1677–1678 he stopped at "Santa María de los Yamases" and found the Indians there without a leader. Their chief had resigned, they admitted, because no one would obey him. The Christian caciques, of whom fully half were female, had several matters of general interest to take up with Argüelles. The cacica of Santa Catalina reminded her peers that when the Guale garrison was founded, all the towns had agreed to support it with food, cassina, and fuses for the soldiers' matchlock muskets. They had since failed to live up to their commitments, leaving the entire burden to fall on her town, and she and her followers were about to ask that the soldiers be withdrawn. The cacique of San Juan del Puerto explained that his people were fully occupied with the ferry across the St. Johns. Argüelles tried to smooth things over by admonishing all the caciques to fulfil their obligations (Argüelles, 1677–1678; Pearson, 1968: 219–220; 1975).

The caciques and cacicas agreed that too many españoles, *mulatos*, *negros*, and mestizos were coming and going on the roads and ferries, placing heavy demands on hospitality and services. What was more, many indios were moving about from one council house to another, expecting to be fed. Ignoring the possibility that some of the transients might be leaderless Yamasees drifting south to settle in the hollow peninsula, Argüelles forbade indios to travel from town to town without their caciques' permission (Argüelles, 1677–1678; Bushnell, 1986: 4–5; Hann, 1986b).

This solution was suited to a hierarchical society of the kind that would soon be a thing of the past. The advanced depopulation of central Timucua and Guale-Mocamo was proof that more and more of the natives without privilege or status were deciding that the kind of society that suited God, the king, the españoles, and the chiefs did not suit them. It offered a common Indian too little, and it asked too much.

THE LOSS OF ST. CATHERINES ISLAND

Comisario Alonso del Moral arrived in Florida in 1679 with 23 fresh missionaries, eager to advance the bounds of Christendom. Governor Hita Salazar did not quite know what to do with them, for the infieles were unreceptive on all sides. In the recent past, the cacique of Coweta had driven off the friars that the governor had sent into Apalachicola to make contact with Sabacolas who had once been Christian. Thomás Medina, cacique of Santa Fé in Timucua, had had to turn back

from a ransoming expedition when the Calusas' fearful tributaries convinced his men that they faced certain death if they went any farther. Hita Salazar's offhand mention of "a place to which a religious was sent a short time ago" probably refers to his attempt in 1679 to reestablish missions in Mayaca-Jororo, with Yamasees (Medina, 1680; Hann, 1988c: 48; 1991a: 26–30; 1991b: 169).

The governor and the padre provincial had to limit themselves to placing most of the newer friars with older ones to learn Indian languages, although they did shift some friars around to fill doctrina vacancies and revived the old missions of San Antonio de Enacape and San Salvador de Mayaca (Villarroel, 1681). According to the Franciscan Comisario General de Indias, the daily expenses of Comisario Moral's party, detained six months in Cartagena, had left the Province of Santa Elena 4000 pesos in debt, and their superiors looked to them to repay the "benefactor" who held the note (Abengozar, 1681).

Relations with the infieles went from bad to worse when two native groups, the Chiluques[3] and the Yuchis, made peace with the Chichimecos/Westos late in 1679 and entered the English orbit. The following May, warriors of the three nations united to raid Mocamo. Moving rapidly, they attacked two of the places mentioned in the Arcos census: San Buenaventura de Guadalquini, which four years earlier had been a doctrina with a friar and 40 people, and San Simón, the town of 40 infieles two and a half leagues away from it. The Chichimecos also accomplished "some killings" at Santiago de Ocone, site of a former doctrina, before Captain Francisco de Fuentes, teniente of Guale-Mocamo, and a party of Indians managed to drive them off (Hita Salazar, 1680c; Fuentes, 1681a; Boyd, 1948: 182–184).

As soon as he heard about the first engagement, Governor Hita Salazar sent 30 soldiers and 18 sailors to reinforce the small garrison on the Guale frontier. They had not yet arrived, three days later, when, according to the governor,

> A force of 300 of the same enemy invaded the island of Santa Catalina, capital and frontera. They killed the sentries at the first post, of 6 men, except for one who escaped to give the alarm. The vecinos of that pueblo, who were up to 40 natives and 5 españoles from this presidio, were able to mount a defense, occupying the convent of the friar of that doctrina, where Captain Francisco de Fuentes, my teniente of that province, had arrived two days previously. He organized the defense with such ability and valor that they defended it from daybreak until four o'clock in the afternoon with 16 Indians armed with firearms—for under these circumstances I think it important for Indians to have them. . . .
>
> It is reported that the enemy were instructed by some Englishmen with them and that all of them had long muskets, which have filled these natives with horror (Hita Salazar, 1680c).

By the time the relief party reached Santa Catalina de la Frontera, the enemy had withdrawn. So had the defenders, crossing the sound to San Joseph de Sápala, two leagues away on Sapelo Island (Hita Salazar, 1680c; Cigarroa, 1681). The people of Santa Catalina may have had mixed feelings about these near neighbors who surely had heard the sound of gunfire across the channel but who had not come to their aid (Fuentes, 1681a).

Governor Hita Salazar expected their stay on Sapelo to be a short one.

> The naturales have abandoned Santa Catalina out of horror, but I understand that they plan to return once we double the garrison. I had 8 men [stationed] in that area and I have decided to increase them to 20. We must protect Guale, both to protect ourselves from invasion and to assure our provisions from there (Hita Salazar, 1680c).

The governor may have wished he could put an extra 12 men at Sapelo, but in fact he increased the garrison by only 4 men, to make a total of 12 (Márquez Cabrera, 1680c).

Hita Salazar's predecessor Cendoya had argued that a provincial defense system called for secondary forts at Santa Catalina and San Marcos, but the Mexico City treasury would not release any money to build them. In fact, for the first four years of Hita Salazar's term, the viceroy blocked the flow of funds to the Castillo project itself. Pirates found the unfortified provincial ports easy prey. In 1677, a party of French and English buccaneers slipped up the St. Marks River to its confluence with the Wakulla, where at the San Marcos landing they seized a frigate loaded with

deerskins and ranch products, and from the nearby warehouse, more deerskins, a supply of the rescates used to buy them, and a sea chest containing a valuable chunk of ambergris, all of which was the property of the Florencias, a family of floridanos with ties to Havana. The pirates also took three prisoners—an officer and two friars—for whose combined return the Franciscans of Apalache paid a ransom of 30 hogs.

Hita Salazar had been authorized to fortify San Marcos, if he could do so on his own, but the Florida treasury was empty, the Indians were destitute due to a colony-wide poor harvest, and even a small fort would cost 10,000 pesos (Hita Salazar, 1678a). After the 1677 raid, however, he resolved to build "some slight fort" at San Marcos with what funds he could scrape together and trust that his successors would replace it with something more substantial. He therefore ordered to San Marcos his military engineer and two blacksmiths to make the nails, made arrangements with the caciques for "peones indios, who are the ones assigned to public works," redirected "the tithes of those provinces" to ration them, and sent to Spain for 1000 pesos worth of cheap "*géneros*" in which to pay them. He explained later:

> I knew that they hated to be many days away from home, and thinking to give them this relief I asked for knives, beads, and hawksbells, which is [sic] the coin current in these parts, [being] convertible, and with these trifles they are paid the 15 or 20 days with better satisfaction. The knives are worth four reales each, and they are given the beads and bells at three. . . . The caciques agreed to do the alternating, with the exact count and record that they know well how to keep (Hita Salazar, 1681).

The fort, completed in 1679, was a small, 67-foot-square stockade of palm logs whitewashed to look like plastered masonry, with a shallow moat flushed by river water. In the daytime it looked like a stage set, but by night its 18-foot walls loomed impressively. Hita Salazar was proud to turn it over to his successor (Bushnell, 1990a: 20–22).

Old Guale, whose population counting Yamasees was barely 1/19th the size of Apalache's, boasted no similar stockade at Santa Catalina de la Frontera or anywhere else. No lobby of floridano traders and shippers urged the governor to seek the Crown's permission and find some source of rations and jornales to enable the Guales to fortify their port. Guale-Mocamo had little to offer the commercially minded except its agricultural produce, which went to St. Augustine, not Havana. Too late, Spanish officials would realize that the fields of St. Catherines had been the breadbasket of the presidio and that now the basket suddenly stood empty.

Charles Town's own Indian troubles intervened to shield Guale Province for a few years. Its Chichimeco/Westo alliance, which stood in the way of trade with Apalachicola, Coweta, and Kasita and benefited mainly the proprietors of the colony and their agent Doctor Woodward, broke down in 1680. A migrating group of Shawnees who had settled on the fall line of the Savannah River fought on the side of South Carolina in the Westo War and helped to break the trade monopoly. By 1682 the Westos were nearly exterminated and by 1684 the Shawnee town was an established entrepôt where Indian slaves could be exchanged for English firearms. After that, wars for the purpose of slave-taking would spread through the Southeast like cuttlefish ink through sea water (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 46–48; Crane, 1956: 18–21).

NOTES

1. Joseph Dalton to Lord Ashley, 9-9-1670, cited in Sirmans, 1966: 19.
2. Confraternities of Our Lady of the Rosary were popular among slaves of African origin in Brazil (Queirós Mattoso, 1986: 127–128).
3. In his article, "St. Augustine's Fallout from the Yamasee War," Hann discussed the pros and cons of identifying the Chiluques with Cherokees and concluded that such an identification was problematic (Hann, 1989).

CHAPTER 14. THE GREAT CORN CONTROVERSY

REGALISM AND REFORMS

The governors of the Florida captaincy general were military men on active duty at a post in a "*tierra reputada por guerra viva*," meaning "a land reknowned for war." Trained to gauge the strength of a potential enemy, few of these old soldiers went out of their way to antagonize the friars, for Franciscans made formidable opponents, acting as one and taking advantage of their cloth and education to gain the ear of the Crown. By comparison to the state of near civil war that was the norm between the Franciscans and the governors of New Mexico (Kessell, 1987), relations in Florida between the religious (in and out of orders) and the royal appointees (governors, treasury officials, and officers) generally ran between correct and cordial. Perhaps this relative harmony existed because, unlike the majority of missionaries who went to New Mexico, Florida Franciscans were largely Spaniards, more at ease and less at odds with peninsular governors.

On the day that Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera disembarked at San Marcos de Apalache late in 1680, the climate changed. He did not, like the genial Hita Salazar, consult the Franciscans and do business with them. Instead, he spent his first month in Florida traveling the camino real from San Luis to St. Augustine accumulating evidence to use against them. Before his first dispatch went to the Crown, he and the friars had already clashed on three points.

First, the priests in Apalache, he wrote, punished the Indians

> without reserving the caciques or nobles or even the married women. I will tell more later if their provincial does not remedy it. Under pretext of the teaching of Christian doctrine, and that the fields of maize, wheat, and beans that they cause them to plant to shut up in the granaries of their convents are meant for the adorning of the churches and to give out to them in their necessities, they join hands with the law and keep them engaged in constant, needless labors and, taking occasion that they come and go with the clothing and wines that come from New Spain [as part] of their situado, they make them carry [things] on their backs over the road I mentioned, without paying them anything whatever other than the situado that goes to them (Márquez Cabrera, 1680b).

Second, Governor Márquez Cabrera had advised the padre provincial, Blás de Robles, that Florida did not need so many Franciscans: 52, according to the list he enclosed. Pueblos of 12 to 40 Indians no more than one to four leagues apart could just as well share a doctrinero,

> one being sufficient to administer four or five pueblos as they do all over New Spain and in the province of Honduras where I was governor. In these provinces especially, where the roads are so easy and flat, Your Majesty could save a lot of expense on the said religiosos, particularly since after all these expenditures, and with Indians as humble and domesticated as these, the conquests and conversions have not advanced one inch (Márquez Cabrera, 1680b).

He himself intended to promote the conversión of Apalachicola, from which 3 religiosos had recently returned without fruit. The cacique of Sabacola was even then at the presidio to welcome him. He would send him home with 2 friars and 10 soldiers.

Third, Márquez Cabrera had told Father Robles that doctrineros were not to be sent here and there without his knowledge and that in keeping with a cédula of December 21, 1678, not to mention the patronato real, he expected a yearly report on their numbers and whereabouts. The padre provincial, he said, "answered me that these were general cédulas, not used in this province, to which I returned that their being general was all the more reason to observe them" (Márquez Cabrera, 1680b).

The new governor's strict regalism stood in sharp contrast to the comfortable situationalism expounded to Pedro Menéndez de Avilés in 1567 by don Francisco de Toral, who as the Bishop of Mérida had just ended the Franciscan Diego de Landa's reign of terror on Maya apostates (Farriss, 1984): "For the General Laws of the Indies cannot cease having mild interpretations, the languages and lands being different, inasmuch as in one land

and people they usually ignore things in conformity to the times" (Bushnell, 1978b: 6).

Having dealt with missionary matters to his own satisfaction, Governor Márquez Cabrera turned his attention to the maize supply. He wrote to Juan Fernández de Florencia, teniente in Apalache:

> This next Saturday the royal boat will leave from this port to that to load the king's maize, which should be up to 700 measures, not counting what belongs to individuals. . . . This presidio is expected to suffer necessity, and the nearby pueblos of the Province of Guale. . . . Today the royal officials are sending the rescates for the king's maize. Urge all the caciques and mandadores of the pueblos to see to the planting and working and harvesting of the maize and beans, letting no one during that season, regardless of estate or quality, occupy himself with fishing or hunting or other activities (Márquez Cabrera, 1681a).

The subject of maize led him to think of St. Catherines Island. On the mission list that he sent to the Crown, the doctrinas of Guale-Mocamo, south to north, were Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de Tolomato, San Juan del Puerto, San Felipe de Atuluteca, San Buenaventura de Guadalquini, San Domingo de Asao, San Joseph de Sápala, and Santa Catalina de Guale (Márquez Cabrera, 1680b). Putting Santa Catalina in last place suggested that it was still the northernmost doctrina. By that time, however, the refugees and soldiers from St. Catherines had established themselves on Sapelo at a place six leagues away from the deserted town of Santa Catalina de la Frontera. Inasmuch as San Joseph was two leagues from the same town, the new site, which we may call Santa Catalina de Sápala, could not have been north of San Joseph and may have been up to four leagues south of it.

The governor hoped that Santa Catalina's stay on Sapelo would be temporary.

> I have sent them a reinforcement of eight soldiers with munitions and instructed them to build a *casa fuerte* [blockhouse], in case the enemy should return before I can get there to put [things] in defensive order, and if possible repopulate the island of Santa Catalina which they have abandoned, because it is fertile and abounding in provisions and the relief and succor of this presidio, as I am informed and as can be seen by experience, from the lack of it (Márquez Cabrera, 1680c).

The Crown, he suggested, should send him 100 families of Canary Islanders supplied at royal expense with oxen and horses to "populate and cultivate" the island of Santa Catalina, doubly important because it faced the English settlement of San Jorge. The Junta de Guerra approved the idea, which Márquez Cabrera had borrowed without acknowledgment from a predecessor (Ponce de León, 1675), and ordered the president of the Canaries to embark some families to Havana and the governor of Havana to see that they proceeded to Florida (Junta de Guerra, 1681). Assigned on paper to Apalache Province, then reassigned on paper to Santa Catalina de Guale, these particular Canary Islanders never materialized, any more than the 24 families of master weavers that the governor of Yucatan was supposed to send from Campeche (Márquez Cabrera, 1681f; 1683).

Salvador de Cigarroa, acting contador, checked the "*libro de acuerdos*," or book of accords, and found no St. Augustine junta de guerra resolutions concerning "the port of Santa Catalina, frontera of the Province of Guale," other than a brief May 24, 1680, accord authorizing Hita Salazar to draw as needed against the royal treasury to restore it (Cigarroa, 1681).

The king's Junta de Guerra tabled plans to populate and restore St. Catherines until they could see "a map with distances to scale, showing the situation of Florida and of that island." They also asked that someone explain to them why that particular island was so important. Did it produce the same fruits of the earth as the mainland, merely in greater abundance, or were they special ones that the presidio had to have to survive? Was Santa Catalina in an exposed location that was likely to be settled and fortified by foreigners? They asked the governor of Havana and the newly invested bishop of Santiago de Cuba—whose diocese included Cuba, Florida, and Jamaica, in English hands since 1656 (García de Palacios, 1684: 8)—to send them separate *informes*, or investigative reports, on the subject (Junta de Guerra, 1681).

The Junta had several things to take into account. Charles II's minority had ended, and

with it the influence of the Queen Mother. The new governor of Florida had informed them that much of the Castillo in St. Augustine which the queen had authorized would have to be torn down and redone; how his predecessors could have spent 55,926 pesos with so little to show for it, he could not fathom (Márquez Cabrera, 1680c). And for those who saw the Indies as a whole, news of the Great Northern Revolt which broke out in New Mexico in August 1680 must have eclipsed the plight of one small Indian outpost north of St. Augustine.

For Guale, however, time was running out. The Spanish Crown had opted to favor the core of the colony above the peripheries, and that core was demanding more and more native support while offering less and less protection against enemies equipped with deadly English guns. Under the circumstances, the Atlantic buffer zone could not fail to fall in on itself, island by island, like a collapsing spyglass.

SHOWDOWN ON SAPELO ISLAND

Meanwhile, Captain Francisco Fuentes, the teniente of Guale, was doing his best to fortify Sapelo. He got none of the assistance from St. Augustine that had gone to build the "slight fort" in San Marcos de Apalache three years earlier: no engineer or blacksmiths, no trade goods to pay the peones, no maize to ration them. Having seen the resources of the western provinces, Márquez Cabrera had apparently resolved to let the costs of provincial defenseworks fall locally, on the reserves of the respective communities, including what little they had saved for church beautification. If the sabana system ran short, private persons with their own stores of maize—in effect, priests and religiosos—could return a portion of their resources to the community in the form of a loan or, better yet, a contribution. Whether he knew it or not, the governor was about to lock horns with the Franciscans.

After Mass on Sunday, February 2, 1681, feastday of the Virgin of Candelaria, Fuentes was in San Joseph de Sápala, leaning against a wall near the door of "His Majesty's *bujío*" (apparently the council house) with some soldiers and two Indian notables—the cacique of "Fasuache" and the heir to the *micado*, or chiefdom, of Tupiqui, whom Fuentes called "the *tunaque*"—when he saw a number of indias go by with their grinding stones and yoked baskets on the way to the convent to shell maize. As an officer, Fuentes was familiar with labor dispensations for military emergencies, but no such emergency existed. He sent the women home and told the fiscal of the convent, passing by, to remind Father Juan de Uzeda that it was Sunday and that the work could wait until morning. Fuentes was the teniente of Guale, in residence and giving commands on Sapelo.

Father Uzeda thought it over for two hours. San Joseph de Sápala's meager maize harvest was in the convent granary, drying. If he could get the maize shelled immediately, he could collect the yield of the convent sabana, plus the larger amount of maize that the Indians owed him for altar fees, before other divisions and claims could be made. If not, he feared that Fuentes and the caciques would seize both stores of maize—his and the convent's—and use them to ration the indios de fábrica at work on the proposed fortifications, put aside a reserve for famine, or provision the presidio, leaving him, the doctrinero, with nothing but a handful of I.O.U.'s in which his maize would be valued at the low harvest-time price, notes that the treasury would be unable to redeem until the next situado arrived. Uzeda was determined to prevent this sequestration.

At noon the church bell began to ring intemperately, as though sounding an alarm. The soldiers rushed outside with their firearms and other weapons, expecting to find the place under assault. What they found, wrote Captain Fuentes in his report to the governor, was the fiscal,

> shouting as he does to call the indias. I asked him what for, and-he answered, "to shell maize." And seeing them come, desolately, out of the fear they all have of that padre, I again made them go to their houses. To do it I had to get angry. I then took myself to the convent and said with all due respect to our padre that I had told the indias to go home, that this was not a workday, that if it was to succor the presidio or to fit out some vessel he could correct me, but even so there were some who would excommunicate us [for it] (Fuentes, 1681a).

Father Uzeda, in no mood to debate the legal points of Sunday indulgences, attacked laterally. Who, he demanded, had told Fuentes that he could interfere with the bells? Then, the captain admitted candidly, the two of them started to shout at each other. "Am I a *negro*?" yelled Fuentes. "I, at least, have not depopulated any place with blows, much less spoken bad words to the Indians or raised scandals." He accused Uzeda of preventing the people of San Joseph from giving Santa Catalina "the aid that one place owes to another" at the time of the enemy invasion. He could prove it, he said, by two notes in Uzeda's handwriting that he had in his papers (Fuentes, 1681a; 1681b).

One of the notes, an intercepted message from Uzeda to another friar, read simply, "Fuentes is coming back again as teniente. He will land at Ospogue, so Your Paternity should depart from somewhere else" (Fuentes, 1681b), which proved only that the Franciscans in Guale did not wish to receive the governor's representative with the honors due. Reading it, Governor Márquez Cabrera remembered that Uzeda was guilty of absenteeism. He had spent the Lenten season in St. Augustine and had not returned to his doctrina until just before the enemy raids (Márquez Cabrera, 1681b).

A second Franciscan was present in San Joseph for the feast of the Virgin of Candelaria. Simón de Salas, whom the teniente characterized as "a religioso of all example and charity," was vainly trying to make peace between the parties. As he and Captain Fuentes walked together out of the convent, they overheard Uzeda shouting to a fiscal: "Go tell the caciques and indios to get their maize out of here!" The teniente, unwilling to surrender control of the only means available to ration laborers and thus to construct defenses, quickly interposed his own authority. "Padre, I will have what Your Paternity orders done in an instant, fulfilling the commands of my governor." Now ready to overlook the fact that it was a feastday and a Sunday, Fuentes returned to his post at the bujío and ordered the drummer to call the people. While they assembled, he explained the situation to the caciques, who agreed to move their maize out of the convent granary without delay. Keeping "a bland countenance" for the sake of the Indians, the teniente detailed

> four soldiers with their weapons, under Pedro de Torres, corporal, with orders to approach the group gathered outside the door of the holy convent and have them load up the maize, telling the padre for me that I kissed His Paternity's hands and informing him that the people were there to move the maize, with his permission, or it could wait until morning (Fuentes, 1681a).

Father Uzeda had 50 arrobas of his own maize in the granary, which the corporal and two caciques measured out and set aside. Beyond that, the friar claimed 100 arrobas for "burials, marriages, and other things" that the Indians owed him. These, he did not receive. Fuentes told Torres and the chiefs that any liens Uzeda had on the Indians' harvest would have to be settled between the reverend padre provincial and the governor. This was exactly what the friar had feared. Messages flew back and forth, carried by a soldier and Father Salas, who tried to distance himself from the fracas, telling the teniente, "I say nothing and I ask nothing."

With the help of two caciques and Ensign Bernardo de Medina, Fuentes checked in the maize as the Indians carried it into the bujío: 330 *puchacas* in all, not counting Uzeda's 50 arrobas. The women did not shell Indian corn on Sunday after all. "The next day," Fuentes wrote, "I had it shelled and it came to 315 arrobas, which they put in a granary that the chiefs pointed out to me, in sight of the soldier of the post, locked and nailed." Once the grain was safely inside the public granary, Fuentes made a speech to the assembled natives, telling them that this was their maize, "and that they should keep careful track of it and make it last, and that I wanted no one to fail to plant, for I would assist them with everything and be vexed" if they neglected to, that "God willing, no one was going to die on me of hunger" (Fuentes, 1681a).

While the teniente was still speaking, several Indian men and women walked up with loads of iron tools that Uzeda was throwing out of the convent. Fuentes sent the tools back to the friar under escort, with a note saying that the padre must be jesting, that he was not some carpenter to be in need of tools. Uzeda retorted that the teniente's message

did not make sense. The tools were not for Fuentes, but for the chiefs. Someone thought to make an inventory. Santa Catalina's communal tools consisted of

> 20 chisels of all kinds, some of them chipped
> augers of all kinds, some broken
> planes and punches, 16 of poor quality
> 5 saws, 3 of them broken
> axes, 28 with chipped edges and 5 under repair
> 10 adzes, 1 of them no good and 4 crooked
> 7 hammers of poor quality
> 152 old hoes
> 7 new hoes
> a bit of oakum
> a lock that is good for nothing

Rather than leave the tools lying about the bujío to be stolen, the chiefs put them into the public granary along with the maize, nailing the door shut because the key to the lock was missing. By casting the tools out of the convent, Uzeda gave symbolic notice that he resigned his role in the management of native agriculture. That, exactly, was what the governor wanted.

Captain Fuentes had more to think about than what Uzeda might do next. That Monday, Captain Francisco Pacheco landed at Sapelo to escort the repartimiento laborers to St. Augustine and to tell him to be on the lookout for four slaves who had escaped from the presidio. Fuentes took advantage of the opportunity to send a letter to the governor:

> From here he is taking 4 Christian indios and 3 Yamases, all we can spare. I have told him how many indios he can take out of the lugares, maybe 22 or 23, because there are no indios left in this province. . . . The time of cavas is near and there is a lot to do.
>
> In any case, I will get started tomorrow on the fortification, a matter of great importance for the security of these provinces. Father Uzeda opposes it, [but] there is no reason for His Majesty to pay the costs when the convent has the means to and it is their [defense] works. The Indians raise no difficulty, attending and obeying His Majesty's orders in all things. The casa for the watchtower at the bar I will try to build out of whatever is available; I will find the maize (Fuentes, 1681a).

From Fuentes's letter it is clear that Governor Márquez Cabrera had instructed him to seize the maize in the convent granaries, if necessary, to ration the indios de fábrica building defense works in the provinces.

The teniente was having the Indians build a shelter for the sentries at the watchtower. The blockhouse, he said, would have to be put off until summer. There had been another attack, during which his inexperienced soldiers had lost Sápala's best canoa loaded with "all of Saturnino's rescates," and this loss had left the garrison with not so much as a *petatillo*, or leather box, of salt. When the tunaque of Tupique returned to San Joseph, Fuentes meant to lead a band of Indians and four soldiers north to a place called "Haumalles Cazina," where they would try to pick up the enemy's trail (Fuentes, 1681a).

Three months later, San Joseph was the scene of a second showdown. On Saturday, May 3, 1681, feastday of the Most Holy Cross, Fuentes and the infantry under his command were kneeling in church to hear Mass when Uzeda, on his way to vest himself, turned his head and ordered them to take their weapons out of the church, saying curtly: "This post is not a guardhouse. *Usarcedes*[1] have a *centinela* [sentry post] and a casa where you can leave them, or there outdoors. This is my jurisdiction."

The next day, as everyone knelt in church again, Uzeda came out of the sacristy unvested, descended the steps of the sanctuary, and announced to his hearers generally that from the church door to where he stood all the space in the church was his, and as for saying Mass, he would do so whenever he pleased. With what dignity they could muster, the nine españoles got to their feet and filed out of church under the eyes of "the Indians of four places." At a loss to know what he should do, Fuentes entreated the governor to remove him from a post where he could not even go to church without "troubling the souls of the Indians" (Fuentes, 1681b).

Don Joseph de la Cruz, cacique of Guale, sent the governor a message having a ring of authenticity. It was blunt and practical, utterly unlike the elegantly phrased, courtier's type of letter that the Franciscans were apt to put forward under a cacique's signature.

> This is my fourth letter to you on this subject and I hope to have an answer. My padre fray

> Juan de Uzeda is not content to have my people attend punctually to all that he commands me, but merely to molest me he wants my daughter to assist in the chores of the convent and with the shellfish like other [female] individuals. I try to please the governors, and in my house the infantry finds ready entertainment. If Captain Francisco Fuentes were taken away from us we would all fall into slavery, and I would embark with all my family for that presidio, though I should lose my planted fields. Ensign Bernardo de Medina owes me 8 pesos: 4 pesos for 8 twists of tobacco for which he promised me 4 varas of linen, and 4 more pesos for a lined coat[2] (Cruz, 1681).

Don Joseph's plain language contained an implicit threat. If his chiefly privileges were not respected, he would not only cease to be a channel of native resources to the convent and presidio, he would present himself and his dependents to be fed in St. Augustine. At a time when the number of consumers in the colony was rising and the number of producers falling, he would transform producers into consumers.

Márquez Cabrera sent copies of the Sapelo letters to padre provincial Blás de Robles. In a cover letter he pointed out to the Franciscan superior that the teniente of Guale whom Father Juan de Uzeda had forbidden to bring arms inside the church, Francisco de Fuentes,

> was that same captain who last year defended the naturales from the English enemy and his allies from inside the church itself. . . . In places where there are wars, weapons enter the church and fight from within it, even if it be a monastery of nuns, as in the kingdoms of Italy, Cataluna, and Portugal, and if necessary they blow up the temples that can offend their arms. The padre says that the church is his. I say it is the king's, for it is in his lands and his vassals [are] there under orders, those who administer the sacraments the same as those who receive them.
>
> . . .
>
> Please apply a remedy, sending a religioso who will administer the holy sacraments and will not oppress the daughters of the principal chiefs to make them his servants the way this padre does (Márquez Cabrera, 1681b).

The message arrived at the Convent of the Immaculate Conception on the eve of the Franciscans' triennial chapter meeting. Delegates had come from every corner of Christian Florida, and the main items on their agenda were Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera's misdeeds and misgovernment. For nearly a month, the friars and the governor bombarded one another in writing before they gathered up their papers and forwarded them to a higher authority. Only the Crown could resolve the dispute in the ranks of Spaniards over Indian labor and Indian corn.

In Márquez Cabrera's opinion, the missionaries had taken on too much authority. He, not they, was responsible to the king for the good order and productivity of the provinces. He had therefore put into execution three reforms. First, he had given orders that the friars should no longer punish the Indians for concubinage, missing Mass, or any other offense, for all punishments and sentences should come under the royal justice. Second, he had asked his tenientes to work with the caciques to "lay out and work and make" the fields, "including a milpa for the doctrinero or priest who ministers to them," large enough "for two servants, who [were] plenty enough to fence and cultivate the huertas for his service," unless in his convent corral the friar was raising pigs and chickens for the Havana provisioning trade. Third, with regard to the gifts the friars were accustomed to receive from the Indians, he had declared that no duress of any kind could be used to extort a freewill offering. Alms were by definition voluntary (Márquez Cabrera, 1681c).

The Franciscans took the position that the governor was an ill-informed, impulsive newcomer who did not understand the local situation and had no respect for tradition. "Innovation in government causes disturbance and deterioration in long-established political practices, especially ones that have been tried and found to be good and convenient," they pointed out. They addressed Márquez Cabrera's supposed reforms one by one.

Yes, as spiritual fathers they were compelled to administer corporal punishment to their neophytes, who were "new plants" and "babes with the milk of doctrine on their lips." Regrettably, an Indian was "a child of the fear of four lashes."

Yes, they supervised native agriculture. That also was out of necessity, for such was the "uselessness, weakness and natural indolence" of the natives that they had to be

exhorted constantly to the growing of maize, "their only grain and staple," or else "they would not have been conserved to live rationally and socially in settlements" but would still be living in their old manner, "like wild animals of the forest." If the governor thought otherwise, he did not know "what an Indian was," much less "an Indian of Florida," nor appreciate the extent of their "idleness, weakness, and lack of concern for the common weal." Florida Indians would not on their own lay in an adequate store of grain, being "content with little," because "for something of this world that is likely to cost them some trouble they do not much kill themselves." As a result, they often ran short of maize and had to "go into the woods to maintain themselves with plants and roots," acorns and palm berries, and it was "their natural inclination to think that a good life" (Franciscans, 1681a). The Franciscans themselves had taken vows of poverty, but they were not peasants, obligated by their station in life to support the rest of society.

And yes, the friars accepted alms of food from the Indians, "who when they take a notion come to the aid of the religiosos their teachers and of the soldiers who live among them with a little venison from the deer they hunt in the woods and a bit of fish from the lagoons." They wondered what the governor's object could have been in notifying the caciques and principales that "in time of cavas they should not give to any person of whatever rank any meat or fish for his sustenance, nor let the Indians be so occupied." Being forced to do without the services of hunters and fishermen during planting season, they said, would leave them "without their natural food six months of the year."

Respecting their supposed misuse of convent corrals and their involvement in trade, they asked:

> Is it a sin, or is it honorable and a good example for the religious to have his house or convent enclosed with some stakes or poles? Is it a sin or sacrilege to have a few vegetables planted in a corral? If this is evil and abominable, as Your Grace thinks, then the same can be said for [their] having two dozen hens and two or three hogs, with which they barter for the . . . things they have need of in their convents, such as two or three bottles of wine, some [bottles] of sugar syrup, a little sugar, and wax for the churches—things that an indio neither buys nor has any use for (Franciscans, 1681a).

Captain Joachín de Florencia came forward to testify on their behalf. Speaking from seven years' experience as a syndic, he swore that personal gain could not be the friars' motive for engaging in trade. They did not charge parish fees nor receive emoluments; on the contrary, they spent their own stipends to care for the sick and fatherless. If they traded, it was in order to buy tools for the Indians and vestments for the churches, without having to appeal to the Crown. As they explained:

> It would be a great new expense to the royal treasury if it had to conserve the churches and doctrinas of these conversiones with the lustre and decency they now have, and the abundance of ornaments and other things for divine worship that there are in these churches and sacristies (Franciscans, 1681c).

Thanks to their trade and self-denial, the Indians' labor, and the alms of benefactors in Havana and elsewhere, the doctrinas had "many good things of all kinds, and all without expense to the king." To prove their point, the Franciscans appended a list of the sacred vessels, vestments, altar furnishings, images, paintings, and other items of value in their 34 doctrinas (Franciscans, 1681b; Hann, 1986a).

On the defensive, the governor acknowledged to the king that his course of action was disruptive—"It is clear, Sire, that a desire to amend and remedy an ancient and deeply rooted evil custom must cost some annoyance" (Márquez Cabrera, 1681c)—yet he still believed that a surgical solution was required. Instead of backing down, the governor found one thing more to regulate: the service of the convent. On the basis of a general cédula dated November 7, 1680, he forbade the Franciscans to use the labor of Indians without paying them. As the doctrineros well knew, requiring them to pay the modest jornal of one real a day to the natives in their service would incorporate those natives into the ranks of repartimiento workers and be the means by which the governor could establish control over the supply of labor to the convents. This innovation, he admitted, caused a general

sentiment against him among the religiosos. He asked for an episcopal visit to bring them into line (Márquez Cabrera, 1682a). With that, each side sat back to wait for the Crown to discipline the other.

By then the fiscal of the Consejo de Indias was reading the first act of a genuinely cereal drama. In one of the letters that the Franciscans had sent to the Crown, Pedro de Luna wrote that by forbidding the ministers to correct the Indians, the governor was interfering with a 100-year-old custom. It was clear to Luna that instead of letting the sabanas continue to be administered by the religiosos and their produce used to beautify Florida's churches, of which there were more than 80, Governor Márquez Cabrera planned to use the tenientes and soldiers of the secondary garrisons to bring the sabanas under the supervision of the presidio and use the produce partly to support the soldiers and partly to provide a safety net of provisions for St. Augustine. Obviously, said Father Luna, the governor did not realize that the friars employed the convent sabanas to accumulate a famine reserve, preserve the seedcorn, and keep the Indians from having to go to the woods to find roots, defaulting on their Christian obligation to be in church on certain days (Luna, [1682?]).

The fiscal made a note on Luna's letter: Let the Consejo thank the governor for visiting Apalache and ask him to treat the religiosos with respect. Privately, the members of the Consejo asked the governor of Havana to inform them in confidence about his colleague (Ponce de León, 1683). The Consejo Real, a higher council than the Consejo de Indias, invited Cristóbal del Viso, Franciscan Comisario General de Indias, to comment on the dispute. He was familiar with the defects of the friars in Florida, responded Viso. Clearly, the ailments of the doctrinas in the Indies were chronic and incurable. For that reason, he said, the Order of the Friars Minor had in its recent chapter general voted to surrender to His Majesty every one of their doctrinas in all the Indies and ask him to replace the friars with secular priests (Viso, 1682). At the time, the Franciscan Order had, in Hispanic America alone, 18 provinces and 2 custodies, 449 convents, and 4842 friars with whom to stage a walkout (Habig, 1944: 88). If Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera thought that the king would thank him for adding to the Crown's problems with this powerful body, he was mistaken.

The position of Defender of the Indians that Comisario Alonso del Moral had proposed, the Consejo de Indias duly approved, and the governor filled—not with an incorruptible religioso, as Father Moral had hoped, but with his own man, Sergeant Major Domingo de Leturiondo. The new appointee was present at the governor's parley with five infiel caciques.

As he had informed the Crown in his first packet of dispatches, Márquez Cabrera had celebrated his arrival on Florida soil by reopening the mission at Sabacola, stationing seven soldiers to protect the friars (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 46–48). The insecurity of the missionaries' situation became apparent in the fall of 1681, when some Indians from Apalachicola crossed the border into Apalache and killed two persons. Captain Juan Fernández de Florencia, teniente of Apalache, sent soldiers in pursuit of the "*agresores*," whereupon the Apalachicolas ejected all the Spanish from their province, including their supposed teniente, Captain Andrés Pérez, and two friars. Márquez Cabrera offered to forgive the murders if the caciques of Apalachicola would come to St. Augustine "to give obedience and receive the faith."

In due time, five caciques appeared and refused to do either. In the presence of the parish priest, the sergeant major, the contador, and the defender of the Indians, they unitedly declared that they had made the Spanish leave in order to save their lives, because the "aggressors" were of "those who wander in bands as fugitives in the woods without recognition or subjection to their caciques." Ejecting the españoles was not their idea, they said, but that of the "cacique of Caweta, who is not in Apalachicola but is the most principal, the one to whom they all render vassallage."

Realizing that the Spanish sphere of influence was in danger of evaporating, the governor reasoned with his visitors at length (and for the record),

> declaring to them how well it would be for them to reduce themselves to the body of Catholics

> because they were living deceived of the devil . . . and should see to their souls, and . . . if they just gave the word . . . he would give them ministers to teach them the Christian doctrine . . . [and would] help them in all he was able and defend them from their enemies.

The chiefs listened in silence, then responded that they were prepared to trade with Spaniards and live in peace, but

> as far as asking for friars, they had never done so or thought of doing so, and if God ever wanted them and their vassals to become Christians they would ask for friars then, but they did not presently find themselves with that intention (Márquez Cabrera, 1681f).

The self-assured caciques were not inclined to offer their obedience, either. The balance of power in the Southeast had shifted. Now that the Apalachicolas had the option of trading with South Carolina, the governor of Florida was in no position to dictate terms.

THE GOVERNOR'S FILE ON FRIARS

From Guale, Captain Francisco Fuentes continued to supply his superior with colorful stories for his file about Franciscan "abuses."

Father Domingo Santos of Asao was too free with the whip, wrote Fuentes in a typical letter.

> He publicly whipped the cacique Ventura in church for missing Mass one day, because he had gone to the mainland along with some of his vassals (there being so few of them) to get stakes or saplings to fence in the convent so the animals cannot get in and dirty it. It seems they were making a raft. . . . The indios who left to go to [work for] Joseph Sánchez have complained to me—the ones he whipped for missing Mass . . . .
>
> Some days ago he gave a Yuchi 40 lashes for missing Mass at daybreak because he overslept and for other grudges. The padre says it is because the Yuchi is running around with infiel women and does not want to learn the doctrine. The Yuchi has only been a Christian for one year. He says, and so do the other Indians, that nobody is teaching him, and that he [Santos] took him into the convent kitchen telling me that it was to teach him, when it was to dig and water.
>
> The [same] friar went with his fiscal at midnight in a canoa to a place a musket shot away where the Indians have most of their little fields and plantings and whipped the indias and muchachos he found there because they were guarding the plantings from animals by shouting and it made him angry. When I asked the said padre what reason he had for whipping the poor people like that, he answered that they were dancing forbidden dances. I asked: "And the indios, did you whip them?" He answered that there were none. "Well, then, padre," I said, "no dancing was going on, good or bad."
>
> I told him to be a father with love, not whipping, especially to this Yuchi so he would not run off to the mainland and we lose his soul. He has stopped fighting and does not want to return to the war, although his parents and siblings weep for him, and he does not leave because he loves me. And the padre sent him to me and will not take him back, and [Santos] says he will leave and go to St. Augustine, for well he knows the road (Fuentes, 1681c).

At the moment, doctrina discipline was probably not uppermost in the governor's mind. In the fall of 1681 a band of French buccaneers established themselves at Anclote Key, on the west coast of Florida, to prey on the traffic in the Gulf. Within six months they had taken seven prizes, including a loaded supply frigate bound for St. Augustine. In March they marked a flat-bottomed bilander enter the St. Marks River, followed her after dark in three piraguas, and came upon Hita Salazar's mock-masonry fort, which they assaulted and captured.

During the subsequent investigation several defenders testified that the three friars who were spending the night in the fort showed themselves on the wall at dawn to "sing quarter" and threw open the gate to the pirate captain, when they heard him call for grenades to set the fort on fire. When Governor Márquez Cabrera refused the buccaneers the ransom in the form of provisions that they asked for in exchange for their prisoners, they reoccupied the harbor and burned the small settlement at the port. In June, the same pirates sent a foraging party up the San Martín River to the ranch of la Chua. With that, the governor reassigned Captain Francisco Fuentes from Guale to Apalache (Bushnell, 1990a).

The new teniente was known to be the governor's right-hand man. For that alone, the friars were ready to give him trouble. First, Miguel Martorel, the doctrinero of Ayubale,

sent Captain Fuentes two short, sarcastic notes by a defiant young Indian whom he wanted the teniente to punish because he had refused for two years to marry the woman with whom he had a sexual relationship (Martorel, 1682a; 1682b). Then, on the 9th of August, Fuentes had a confrontation with Father Juan Arias de Servantes at San Joseph de Ocuya, one of the places to which the tenientes ordinarily went to buy maize for the presidio (Escobedo, 1675). Exercising his role as provincial magistrate, Captain Fuentes was in the town on the eve of San Lorenzo, name day of the cacique, to administer justice and to attend a dance in his and the cacique's honor.

It was the practice, wrote Servantes to an unnamed superior, probably Blás de Robles, for the dances in the bujío to stop at the bell for "las ánimas"—a fact corroborated by Bishop Díaz Vara Calderón, who visited the same doctrinas in 1675 (Díaz Vara Calderón, [1675]). When, that evening, the Indians did not stop dancing, Servantes sent to ask why not and was informed that Fuentes had told them they should continue. He asked a soldier to tell the teniente that he was at the door of the bujío to speak to him, and Fuentes, he said,

> answered with a lofty air that it made no difference where the padre was, that he himself was there (with his hat cocked, thinking he is somebody when he is nothing but a piece of worm shit), forgetting the veneration that is due to priests. And this was because I did not go out to greet him [when he came], whereas I am neither an indio nor a *mulato*, and besides, on account of the feastday there were some Indians to confess. . . .
>
> I want to know who is interfering with the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. . . . If it is the governor, I believe it, for it would not be the first time. Inasmuch as the teniente's behavior causes scandal and the Indians [take] liberties, I require him not to introduce himself in what is not his business, telling the Indians they can dance all night—which they did do, until cock's crow. Every feastday as many as 200 are missing for Mass, and when I send to find out why, they don't care, for they know that they only have to give the tenientes packages of cassina and maize cakes, hens, and even watermelons, as they have to that teniente, and they will let them live as they please ([Servantes], 1682).

No allowance was made for late sleepers at Ocuya. The bell rang for Mass on the Day of San Lorenzo at eight o'clock in the morning. Servantes, however, had decided that he should leave his doctrina to inform on the teniente in person, and cursed him resoundingly in consequence: "Let the holy sacraments and Masses that fail to be administered to these natives be charged to the account of his soul and his conscience." He concluded his letter to his superior with a grim little poem run into the text: "Vida breve muerte cierta hora incierta juez riguroso ay de ti perezoso que un alma tienes no mas si esa pierdes que haras has aquello que quisieras haber hecho cuando mueras" ([Servantes], 1682). Translated as verse, it reads:

> Life is brief, death is sure,
> Hour uncertain, judge severe.
> Idle one, alas for you,
> One soul have you, only one.
> If that you lose, what will you do?
> Have you that which you desire
> To have made ere you expire?

What every Christian aspired to make, of course, was a "good death," safely confessed and absolved.

In Captain Fuentes's version of the same events, addressed as usual to the governor, Father Servantes abused the soldiers roundly, saying "*Vayase nora mala, que eres un indio*!" ("Go in a bad hour, you indio!"), varying this with "you *mulato* indio!" Of Fuentes, he demanded rudely, "Who does the Gascon think he is? Does he think I don't know him and his sister and his whole family?" Fuentes replied, "What am I to do about it, padre? Nobody can pick his lineage. So I am a Gascon. . . . Go with God, Your Reverence." As Servantes walked away, he said over his shoulder, "See what we have now, married to a *vil india*!" Stung by this insult to his wife, Fuentes retorted, "That's false and you are lying, I swear to God!" If the friar would doff his holy habit, the captain said, he was ready to meet him with two carbines and four pistols.

Somehow, decorum was restored. Inside the bujío, the caciques were waiting to go on with their feast day. Said Fuentes,

> I smiled at them as affectionately as possible and said, "My sons, do not let this affright you; it is nothing. These are jurisdictional matters. .

> . . Be happy and enjoy your day licitly and as God commands, for the matter is over; I love the padre and regard him as I do the saints of the altar" (Fuentes, 1682b).

The captain continued his reporting of Franciscan misdeeds all the same. In late November he charged the friars in Apalache with collecting tribute from the indias: ever larger quantities of nuts for nut oil. Addressing the doctrinero at San Luis, he wrote:

> I gave orders that no india was to be compelled to bring her *fatta* filled with nuts to the padre or else be whipped, and I hear that three indias who did not bring the nuts have been whipped and that you are keeping track of the ones who are not bringing them. I have called together the principales of this place of San Luis and the king's interpreter and told them to send out express orders against this, not only for this place but the rest, promising 100 lashes to the india who carries nuts for fear of 50 lashes. And any cacique or principal who contravenes this I will remit to the governor. . . . If His Majesty could only see these miserable unfortunates [wandering] about those woods in *cueros de salados* [salt-cured hides] to obey mandates like this for fear of punishment, what would he say or do?

Did the padre not realize that out in the woods, far from the sacraments, the women were "committing a thousand mortal sins . . . and losing their Godgiven reason?" Fuentes continued:

> I have ordered that the grease of nuts shall be extracted in the bujío or casas [of government] under the supervision of the caciques and señores of the places, to give what they see fit to the lamp of the Most Holy Sacrament, because for one year they do not need 20 *peruleras*, only 4 or 6, or whatever the Indians want [to give], for they themselves well know how much is necessary (Fuentes, 1682a).

In a postscript on the governor's copy, Fuentes reported a fast-breaking story. The cacique of Ivitachuco, second largest town in Apalache, was waiting after Mass for the priest, Bartolomé de Ayala, to bless him, when the padre came out of the sacristy and asked him who was going to ration the carpenters working on the belltower. He answered, "I do not know, padre. I will ask the teniente." Whereupon the priest cried, "What teniente, shameless one? To feed the españoles who come and go you don't run short!" He struck the cacique in the face and chased him out of the church, hitting him with his fists and saying, "Go on, tell!" The cacique "fled in tears to his bujío, caught his horse, and left for Timucua"—after taking care that someone would tell the teniente where he was headed.

The belltower, doubling as a lookout, was part of Ivitachuco's defenseworks program, hence the question over whether the builders' rations should come from the sabana for the "service of His Majesty" or from the sabana for the "adornment of the church." The cacique, with keys to both granaries, was caught in the middle. The town had gathered 1500 arrobas of maize and he had intended to give the padre 200, but the padre told him 300 arrobas or nothing, so, said the cacique, he gave him 300, for he liked "to keep his padre content and with a good heart" (Fuentes, 1682b; 1682c).

Governor Márquez Cabrera sent a copy of Fuentes' letter to padre provincial Blás de Robles, who was visiting Guale at the time. The padre provincial replied with hauteur that he would look into the matter, but he saw no reason to take the word of a soldier above that of a friar. At Ivitachuco, Ayala grudgingly let the captain reconcile him to the cacique. As Fuentes recalled it, the doctrinero observed that donning "the habit did not change a man's nature or actions," to which he himself piously replied that "beneath the holy habit there was no room for imperfections" (Fuentes, 1682c).

Ironically, one of the first cases that Márquez Cabrera's newly appointed Defender of the Indians brought before the governor was against Alonso del Moral, the very friar who had lobbied for that position. Felipe de Santiago, gobernador of Nombre de Dios, backed up by the cacique Diego Jacinto and by Santiago, husband of the principal cacica, complained that the indios and indias of their pueblo were unhappy about the padre doctrinero's "continual punishing of the boys and girls, their children." The gobernador's nephew, who had served Moral for three years, had run away to a house in St. Augustine because he wanted to live with and help his sick mother, and once she was well, he wished to be apprenticed to a tailor. The friar, they

thought, ought to be able to spare him. He had four other servants, two from Nombre de Dios and two from Apalache, not to mention the boys and girls of the pueblo, who instead of learning the catechism spent the major part of the day watering his garden and feeding his hogs.

Another youngster had run off from Nombre de Dios, said the pueblo's officials, because Moral had accused him of stealing three deerskins. The padre had ordered them to go look for him, but they were busy preparing for the upcoming "feast of the Virgin" on the 8th of August, bringing torches for the illuminations and cleaning the streets for the procession that would depart from their fine new masonry church. When they objected, Moral threatened to cancel their dance. The three officials were informing Defender Leturiondo, they said, so that if some night all the people of the pueblo took off for the woods, the governor would not blame them (Santiago et al., 1682).

In another case brought before Defender Leturiondo, Francisco and Matheo, caciques of the Yamasees occupying the old site of San Salvador de Mayaca, sued their former doctrinero, Bartolomé de Quiñones, because, claiming that he had been ordered to dismantle the doctrina, he had gathered up the sacred furnishings and two church bells of their pueblo and floated them down river to Salamototo. The problem with Yamasees, as the friars saw it, was that they "were generally out in the woods, because they are unwilling to reduce themselves to labors or form themselves into a pueblo, and their principal sustenance is the roots they gather out in the countryside." Nevertheless, the two caciques argued to Leturiondo, "His Majesty made the grant and limosna of the said ornaments and bells to their pueblo and no other." If at the moment they were without a friar, they expected to get another one. Quiñones, they said, had not appreciated their letting "infieles mingle with Christians, but they could not dismiss them, being one and alike their vassals" (Auto, 1682a; Leturiondo, [1682?]).

The attitude that the Consejo de Indias took toward events in Florida in the 1680s may well have been influenced by the church-state conflict being played out on a larger stage. In 1684 the viceroy of Peru ordered his officials to take testimony about suspected priestly abuses: absenteeism, using native labor without compensation, taking more than one-fifth of a deceased Indian's property, demanding involuntary offerings, and appointing parishioners to confraternity or festival offices in order to exact fees from them. The archbishop of Peru vehemently protested this regalist attack on the Church's right to discipline itself. Viceroy and prelate referred the dispute to the Crown, which admonished its feuding bureaucracies to work in harmony and proceed together against those who were guilty of exploiting and mistreating Indians (Crahan, 1976).

Realizing the need to discipline his own diocese, don Juan García de Palacios, Bishop of Santiago de Cuba, convened a Diocesan Synod in Havana in 1684 and promulgated a series of statutes especially for the "newly converted Indians" of the provinces of Florida. Perhaps out of respect for former Bishop Díaz Vara Calderón, he included one statute forbidding the Indians to play ball. Several of the others reflected the changing situation and labor shortage in the colony. Noting with disapproval that "many Spaniards, *negros*, and *mulatos* residing in St. Augustine" detained the casados who came to the city "to work or dig" and used them for the service of their houses, not allowing them to live with their wives, the Bishop exhorted those in St. Augustine who had Indians working for them to allow them to hear Mass on the holy days of obligation and to send the Indian children and gentiles they employed to the Convent of St. Francis to be instructed in doctrine.

But the most important statute by far was the sixth one, which read:

> [W]e command and establish . . . that no religious preach the world of the Holy Gospel, nor administer the holy Sacrament of penance, even though he be in charge of a mission, without having our approbation and license, or that of our predecessors or successors, under pain of suspension from office and others, at our discretion. And that no priest in charge of a mission administer said holy Sacrament, nor the others, without our permission, under the penalty of nullity in their acts (García de Palacios, 1684: tít. v, const. vi).

Florida Franciscans would successfully evade obeying this statute for the next 64 years.

When the Crown asked the Bishop of Santiago to visit Florida, the bishop delegated the duty to a secular priest, Juan Ferro Machado, a native of Havana. Father Ferro Machado's findings were that there were too many friars in Florida, that some of them seemed readier to punish than to teach, and that they neither learned their charges' languages nor, as the king had ordered, taught Spanish to them (Márquez Cabrera, 1686b; 1686c; Auto, 1688; Robertson, 1931: 170; Matter, 1990: 64, 152, 158; Hann, 1991a: 136–138).

The Order itself was conducting an internal investigation. Franciscan Comisario Visitador Domingo de Ojeda came to Florida from New Spain in 1687 prepared to dispense discipline. For torturing an indio by crushing his thumb in the mechanism of a flintlock rifle, Visitor Ojeda dismissed Father Martorel from his doctrina; for manhandling caciques and extorting maize from them, he banished Father Ayala from Florida; for punishing their flocks too harshly, and in particular for whipping children who came to Mass emptyhanded, he reprimanded the friars in general. The Visitor pointed out, however, that the missions were dependent on two sources of support, the Crown and the natives, and could not do without either one. He admonished the governor to supply the doctrineros with what was their due, and the Indians to sustain them (Ojeda, 1687; Matter, 1990: 151, 158).

Both visitors, Ojeda and Ferro Machado, had vindicated Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera, but his victory was Pyrrhic. During the long jurisdictional dispute between the military and the religious over whether the primary function of the colony was to be a captaincy general or a Franciscan province, central authority had been divided and discredited before the Indians. The Crown's solution, which was to bring the friars under episcopal control, could only create further division and discord. The center did not hold. Meanwhile, provincial authorities had gained an opportunity to strengthen their positions at the expense of St. Augustine. The final winners of the Great Corn Controversy were not the protagonists, Spaniards on both sides; they were the caciques and the floridanos. But the rights over sabanas, granaries, and trade that the native elites had won could last no longer than the provinces.

NOTES

1. One of the several contractions for "*Vuestras Mercedes*" that preceded "*Ustedes*."

2. The cacique's *dastacon de picotte*, more often spelled *justacor de picote*, was a coat faced in a contrasting color.

CHAPTER 15. THE GUALE BUFFER ZONE

The collapse of Guale Province took 40 years, and the telling of it will figure in several chapters. In Chapter 13 we saw how enemy raids in the early 1660s drove many speakers of the Guale language from the mainland out to the barrier islands and impelled the Spanish to put a secondary garrison at St. Catherines Island. An assault by English pirates on St. Augustine in 1668, followed in two years by the founding of Charles Town, brought Florida to the Crown's attention. But the defenses of the core were strengthened at the expense of the peripheries. As we saw in Chapter 14, St. Augustine's heavier demands on the king's native subjects led to a drift of "rebel vassals" and "apostates" away from the doctrinas and toward the mercantile magnet to the north.

For some years the decline in provincial populations caused by desertion and the continuing inroads of disease was partially masked by an influx of refugees, mainly Yamasees, from the Indian wars to the north, wars that on occasion spilled across the Florida borders in the form of attacks on refugee pueblos. But by the early 1680s, Charles Town had settled most of its Indian problems and had started to encroach on the Spanish sphere of influence, offering guns to the Apalachicolas and other interior groups in exchange for deerskins and slaves. At the same time, both the English and the Spanish feared that the French, advancing down the Mississippi, would split the continent in two, seize the silver mines, and make themselves masters of the Gulf. This fear increased as French buccaneers and their associates, growing bolder, stepped up their attacks on Florida ports.

In the present chapter we will continue the story of how the Guales were caught in the crossfire of chiefdoms, colonies, and outlaws and forced out of their traditional territory. Those who remained loyal to Church and Crown or wished to maintain their connection to floridanos moved southward in four stages. As we have seen, they first abandoned the settlements at the mouth of the Savannah River, then those on St. Catherines Island. Population in the northeastern buffer zone thinned dramatically when the Yamasees moved back north, some in 1683 and others in 1685, taking many Guales with them and depopulating Jekyll and Cumberland islands. In the first case, an attack by buccaneers had demonstrated the vulnerability of outlying ports and settlements; in the second, the Spanish governor had shown that he would not protect the natives faithful to God and the king except in certain places, and he would install them there by force.

When Governor Márquez Cabrera exercised these strong-arm tactics on the people who were trying to rebuild their lives on Sapelo Island, two of the four pueblos defected and headed north. By 1686, Old Guale was a *despoblado*, a wasteland without a single pueblo, Christian or infidel. Those Guales who continued to cast their lot with Spain were reduced to three sites on Amelia Island. In that location, as we shall see in Chapter 16, they would support their friars and soldiers and continue their trade with St. Augustine until 1702.

The reason for the "sojourn on Santa María," a 16-year hiatus in the southward slide of the buffer zone, would not be that the northeastern border was any better defended, but that the Guales' enemies were temporarily neutralized, some by the international convention to end piracy and others by the wary alliance of Spain and England, which made it less acceptable to arm one's allies to raid by proxy. When, as will become apparent in Chapter 18, the War of the Spanish Succession, or "Queen Anne's War," left Carolina and Florida free to attack each other unreservedly, the remnants of the Guale loyalists would flee Amelia Island and appear at the gates of St. Augustine. There, in the refugee pueblos under the guns of the fort, they would lose their pride and, in time, their identity.

SEASONS OF PIRATES

The buccaneers who in the spring of 1682 had seized several vessels, captured the flimsy fort at San Marcos, and raided the ranch of La Chua, dropped off two of their prisoners on the coast of Cuba. Debriefing them, the

governor of Cuba learned that over the summer six buccaneer captains (five English and one French) had met in the Keys and shaken hands on a plan to join forces and attack St. Augustine under the command of the Frenchman Michel, Sieur de Grammont. Grammont, known to the Spanish as "Agramón," had participated in the sack of Campeche with the infamous "Hollander" Laurens de Graff, or "Lorencillo," from whom he had since parted company. Without waiting for the English ships, Grammont joined forces with a second Frenchman, Captain Nicolas Brigaut, who commanded a 40-man galley. On April 30, 1683, Brigaut, identified in Spanish documents as "Braha" or "Abraha," entered Matanzas Inlet at the southern end of Quarry Island and captured the watchtower (Weddle, 1973: 67; Bushnell, 1990a: 29).

When the alarm was given in St. Augustine, the governor, soldiers, and townspeople, women and men, hastily barricaded the gaps in the walls of the fort. The parish priest carried the viaticum and sacred ornaments from the parish church and the hospital chapel to safety in the military chapel of San Marcos, "preferring to risk his own fortune to capture than that of the Church." Everyone crowded inside the unfinished Castillo, to hear hair-raising tales of the ravishings of Maracaibo in 1667, Portobelo and their own city in 1668, Panama and Campeche in 1671, and Vera Cruz in 1682.

The 90 soldiers whom the governor sent out to meet the pirates were able to foil their advance. After several sharp skirmishes on Quarry Island, Brigaut and his uninjured men retreated southward to rendezvous with Grammont at Mosquito Inlet, leaving their galley aground. On the way they were attacked by a party of 50 or 60 Indians who vainly attempted to free the pirates' captives: three españoles, a *mulato*, a *negro*, and an *apalachino*, who was lucky enough to escape on his own. Captain Fuentes followed with another 50 fighting men, surprised the pirates, and killed them to a man, including their five hapless prisoners. He spared only a boy of nine and two men whom the governor would want to interrogate before hanging them: a *negro* pirate named Diego, and Brigaut himself, whose confession might yield some useful information even though, being a Protestant instead of a "Christian," he could not be sworn (Weddle, 1973: 69–72).

With no spoils except a presidio launch loaded with maize, Grammont abandoned his designs on St. Augustine and sailed north to the sea islands, where other ships were supposed to join him in taking on provisions. Not content to raid the granaries of the doctrinas of San Juan del Puerto and San Felipe, his men expressed themselves theologically by befouling the Indians' churches and hacking off the sacred images' heads, feet, and hands. By the time news of the enemies' whereabouts had reached the presidio and Captain Enrique Primo de Rivera had gotten to San Juan with 30 men, they were gone (Barbosa, 1683; Hita Salazar, 1683a; Reyes, 1683; Wright, 1960: 135, 142; Weddle, 1973: 67–75).

Ex-governor Hita Salazar, in retirement in St. Augustine, thought that his successor could have pursued the pirates with more energy.

> News has just come by courier from Guale that the enemy has been careening his boats on the island and bar of San Pedro and did not leave until the first day of the Paschal [season] of the Resurrection. They buried some bodies and released some prisoners, who say they have wounded men from the skirmish with them. . . .
>
> This sacking by the enemy will leave the Province of Guale incapable of recovery, which will do great harm to this presidio, both for the loss of sentinel and rearguard, and for the loss of the provisions which came from there. . . . Guale is totally ruined, which always remedied this city.
>
> If Captain Enrique de Rivera had been given reinforcements and a free hand he might have been able to defend it and make the enemy leave, so that having invaded one pueblo they could not have destroyed a whole province and supplied themselves from it, nor the Indians have left their pueblos and gone to the woods, from which not half of them will return (Hita Salazar, 1683a).

Depositions by the prisoners that Grammont released revealed that despite clauses in the Treaty of Madrid whereby both Spain and England agreed to revoke letters of marque and reprisal and to treat buccaneers as

international outlaws, Jamaica and New England were still harboring pirates (Reyes, 1683; Burkholder and Johnson, 1994: 148). Floridanos were convinced that South Carolina did so too.

What with the pirate scare, the 10-month war between Spain and France that broke out shortly afterward, and the confirmed reports that La Salle had sailed from France to discover the mouth of the Mississippi by sea, Governor Márquez Cabrera was strongly motivated to complete the Castillo and provide St. Augustine with a place of safety. Work was interrupted only when there was not enough maize to ration the workmen. As soon as the walls were finished, the governor built rooms into the vaults under the terreplein. He ended by preparing comfortable quarters inside the fort for himself, with partitions and a door that opened into the warm kitchen (Arana and Manucy, 1977: 32).

Perhaps the Grammont raid reminded Márquez Cabrera of the Junta de Guerra's inquiry about the advisability of recovering and repopulating St. Catherines Island, lost in a raid three years earlier. He appointed Alonso Solana to make a scale map of all three provinces—Apalache, Timucua, and Guale—with their ports and bars. The resulting "Mapa de la Ysla de la Florida" is preserved in Madrid at the Ministry of War.[1] Although the governor described Solana as "a person of practical experience and training in mathematics," his map was more of a diagram, with every sea island neatly drawn to the same size. Its value for military intelligence lay in showing the whereabouts of Spain's native allies, both the "pueblos de Xpnos" and the "pueblos de Ynfs" (Junta de Guerra, 1681; Márquez Cabrera, 1680b; 1683; Solana, [1683]).

Far down the east coast, between the bars of Jobe and Ays, Solana located two "pueblos de infieles," and between the Cabo de Canaveral and the bar of Mosquitos another one, not far from the two missions of Mayaca and San Antonio on the St. Johns River. The two "pueblos de cristianos" in the vicinity of St. Augustine, "Thamas" and Nombre de Dios, both seem to be on the road to Salamototo, a settlement on the east bank of the St. Johns. Seven pueblos are shown on the east coast above St. Augustine: an unnamed pueblo of Christians facing the inland waterway on an island between the bars of San Juan and Santa María (probably San Juan del Puerto, which was on Fort George Island in the mouth of the St. Johns), another pueblo of Christians on the "Ysla de San Phelipe" (Cumberland Island), two pueblos of Christians and one of infieles on the "Ysla de Gualesquini" (Jekyll Island), one pueblo of Christians on the northern end of the "Ysla de Sápala," and one last pueblo of infieles on an unidentified island between the "Bahía de los Bajos" and the "Bahía de Santa Elena." The "Ysla de Santa Cathalina de Guale" is shown as uninhabited (Solana, [1683]).

Governor Márquez Cabrera instructed Captain Francisco de Barbosa, Francisco Fuentes's successor to the post of teniente de Guale, to make a count of all the ablebodied men remaining in the five Christian towns of that province (see the 5-4-1683 addendum to Junta de Guerra, 1681). While he was at it, Barbosa counted the bells:

> At San Joseph de Zápala the friar is Simón de Salas. The town is composed of the pueblos of Tupiqui, Santa Catalina, and Satuache. It has 86 men and 7 bells. At Asahao the friar is Juan Baptista Campana. There are 21 men and 2 bells. At Guadalquini the friar is Juan Crisóstomo. There are 42 men and 2 bells. At San Phelipe the friar is Domingo Santos, serving in interim. There are 29 men. The enemy took 2 bells. At San Juan the friar is Francisco de la Cruz. There are 20 men. The pirates took 4 bells. The 2 bells now at San Juan belong to the presidio. . . . Many of the friars are away in San Agustín (Barbosa, 1683).

The bells were probably made of iron. Although bronze was easier than iron to cast and brass gave a more satisfactory product, iron artillery and bells were more common because iron was cheaper and more readily available than tin or copper (Cipolla, 1965: 23–36). Bells and artillery were technological twins. Either one could be melted down and recast to assume the form and function of the other. The artisans in Spain's foundries were a national resource, shifted as necessary from casting bells to casting guns, both of which they dedicated to saints. The stolen bells of Guale and Mocamo, however, were not re-



Fig. 15.1. Map of Florida by Alonso Solana, commissioned by Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera, showing settlements of Indians under Spanish protection in 1683. (After Chatelain, 1941: map 7.)

cast. They ended up in Charles Town, where they were seen by an unidentified Spanish spy or envoy and cited as conclusive proof that the city offered a haven to pirates (Quiroga y Losada, 1687; 1688).

Márquez Cabrera expected Captain Barbosa to do more than count the natives; he was under orders to move the "farther Guales" down to a new buffer zone below the Satilla River. The teniente reported back to the governor that the Guales were willing to relocate once they had harvested their crops. The towns of San Domingo de Asao and San Felipe would move to San Pedro and a second site on Cumberland Island; Santa Buenaventura de Guadalquini would go to San Juan del Puerto, "being of the same tongue" as its residents, who spoke Timucua.

The caciques of the four places on Sapelo Island—Santa Catalina, Satuache, Tupiqui, and Sápala—were resisting the governor's plan to consolidate them on the south bank of the St. Johns River at San Pablo, where the inland waterway met the road to St. Augustine. The landings at San Pablo were poor, they objected, and the cattle of nearby ranches would trample their crops. They may also have suspected that the governor meant to turn them into a service town like the Tolomatos, manning a node on the transportation network. Instead, the caciques on Sapelo proposed to Barbosa that they move to Santa María, which had a good landing place, plenty of fish, shellfish, and cassina, and enough tillable land to feed 80 families (Chatelain, 1941: 91; Bushnell, 1986).

By then, the name of Santa María had been associated with Amelia Island for a good 80 years. In 1602, Napoyca Island (the name it then carried) was part of the "lengua de Mocamo," a linguistic designation. The mission of "Santa María de Sena" was on the northern end of the island, only one league away from the Cumberland Island mission of San Pedro. Gaspar, cacique of Napoyca, was one of the subchiefs who in 1605 answered to doña María Meléndez at San Pedro (Geiger, 1937: 173; 1940: 121–122; Bushnell, 1986). In 1629, the cacique of Santa María and the cacica of San Juan del Puerto were brother and sister (López and Orata, 1636), another indication of the amalgamation that had taken place among the eastern Timucuans, or at least between the Mocamo-speaking Tacatacuru and Saturiba.

When Bishop Díaz Vara Calderón was touring Guale and Mocamo in 1675 he visited the "mission and village of Santa María," probably to revive a former mission site, something which he did five times in that province alone (Díaz Vara Calderón, [1675]). But Pedro de Arcos, taking a census of Guale and Mocamo later in the same year, found no Christians on Amelia Island, which he called "the island of Mocama," only two small settlements of infieles, with the name of Santa María attached to the southernmost one (Boyd, 1948: 183). That these infieles were Yamasees was made clear in the summer of 1681, when Father Juan Miguel de Villarroel complained to Governor Márquez Cabrera from the conversión of San Antonio de Enacape that the Yamasees with whom he was trying to form a pueblo—one that promised to be useful to the labor-hungry ranch of La Chua and other ranches of españoles nearby—were leaving San Antonio and returning to their former homes at Santa María and San Pedro. He wanted the governor to fetch them back, and other Yamasees with them. Although the infieles might not think to become Christians, he said, like monkeys they would see and do (Villarroel, 1681).

Márquez Cabrera replied that in his experience it was a mistake to try to force infieles to live anywhere they did not want to. Santa Catalina, he said, was where they wanted to be and where they could be converted. He had two other reasons for wanting them there: Santa Catalina was a "frontier with the enemy," and its provisions were "the succour of this presidio" (Márquez Cabrera, 1681d).

If any Yamasees visited or stayed on St. Catherines Island between 1680 and 1683, however, there is no sign that they did so because they wished to become Catholics, or take turns working in St. Augustine, or defend the Spanish frontier, or put food on Spanish tables. Yamasees were growing disenchanted with Spaniards. One of the reasons why the old mission sites on Amelia and Cumberland islands were vacant was that after the pirate invasion of 1683 the Yamasees in Mocamo had moved out en masse. Most of them went to Apalachicola, but one group settled on the Savannah River under the cacique Altamaha,

a bitter enemy of Spaniards ever since Governor Márquez Cabrera, extending the labor levy to infieles, had abused him for failing to deliver his assigned allotment of repartimiento workers (Covington, 1968a: 9).

A new set of actors appeared on the scene early in 1684. In blatant violation of the Treaty of Madrid, Henry Erskine, third Baron Cardross, settled a group of 30 Scottish dissenters at Port Royal, formerly Santa Elena. The Presbyterians got a cool reception from their neighbors in Charles Town. Not only had they settled between Charles Town and the Savannah River, South Carolina's gateway to the Indian trade, but their weakness virtually guaranteed that the local Indians would draw them into an alliance against the Spaniards, and Spaniards would not distinguish between Scots and Englishmen when they retaliated. Captain William Dunlop had already travelled up the Savannah to parley with Altamaha, and 40 of Altamaha's warriors had returned the visit and helped the Scots to erect beacons along the island (Crane, 1956: 25; Sirmans, 1966: 36–37; Covington, 1968a: 9; Wright, 1971: 57).

That summer the buccaneers returned to Florida waters for the third year in a row. Under Captain Thomas Jingle of New England, holding a dubious letter-of-marque from the governor of New Providence in the Bahamas, 11 French and English vessels joined forces to attack St. Augustine. After a storm scattered half of the fleet, the remaining ships abandoned their larger purpose and put boats ashore to seize maize from the Indians and meat from the ranches north of St. Augustine. Black ranchhands near San Pablo destroyed the camouflaged pirogue of one such landing party. When the pirates returned and were standing around, bewildered at the damage, 50 Spanish soldiers surrounded and captured them. The royal order to punish pirates where they were taken was still in effect. Governor Márquez Cabrera heard the evidence and condemned them all to perpetual hard labor on the Castillo except their leader, Andrew Ranson, whom he sentenced to the garrote (Wright, 1960: 137–138)—a sentence that, according to the governor's enemies, as we shall see in Chapter 17, the Virgin herself countermanded.

The "farther Guales" and their doctrineros had not yet moved to the places Captain Barbosa had indicated, and after two seasons of pirate raids some of them were no longer sure that they wanted to. But when two more pirate vessels visited the coast in the fall of 1684, they realized that they could no longer stay where they were (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 39). Santa Catalina and Satuache moved to Santa María as planned, apparently taking with them for reinterral the remains of some 50 persons (Milanich and Saunders, 1986: 12). Sápala and Tupiqui hesitated, and the governor, losing patience, relocated them by force. Too late, the Consejo warning arrived:

> Regarding moving the Guales to a nearer place, tell the governor that this His Majesty cannot order this nor shall he do it himself, for it must be solely from the choice and convenience of the same settlements. If those natives decide to move, [he may] assist them (Spanish Crown, 1684).

RAIDS AND REPRISALS

Antonio de Arredondo, looking back in 1742, traced the beginnings of Indian commerce with South Carolina to 1684, "when those Indian vassals of Spain began to revolt and to attach themselves to the British" (Bolton, 1925: 181). The natives' chosen allies were not the English of Charles Town but the Scots of Stuarts Town. First, Altamaha's band moved from the Savannah to St. Helena Island. Then, in January 1685, the Yamasees from Guale began to arrive, followed by streams of disaffected Guales from the doctrinas of San Simón, "Sapello," "Sapickay" or "Sapichbay" (Tupique), and "Soho" (Asao). Niquisalla—named the same as the cacique who had welcomed Sandford and Woodward to Santa Elena back in 1668—was the accepted leader of the new arrivals. During the next month over a thousand more Yamasees emerged on the coast from their retreat in Apalachicola (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 39–40; Bushnell, 1986: 6; Covington, 1968a: 10).

The flood of natives first alarmed the Scots, then, as the residents of Charles Town had feared, embroiled Lord Cardross's settlement in a recklessly anti-Spanish policy. The migration was still in progress when Niquisalla sent a message of warning to Captain Alonso

de Argüelles, teniente of Guale. The cacique's vassals in Santa Elena had learned that the "governor of Santa Elena" had armed "the Indians who used to live on the island of Santa María and who passed over to the obedience of the governor of San Jorge" to live "on the island of Santa Elena." The renegades were planning to raid old enemies in the Province of Timucua, and when that happened, Niquisalla did not want the Spanish to blame him. Argüelles sent word to the teniente of Timucua to alert the doctrinas, and the teniente quickly dispatched couriers with messages of warning. Unfortunately, the enemy reached Santa Catalina de Afuyca (or Ajoyca) several hours before the courier.

As Dr. John Henry Woodward would later prove to officials in Charles Town, the trader Caleb Westbrooke, with Lord Cardross's knowledge and consent, had armed 50 of Altamaha's warriors with 23 muskets and some cutlasses. These warriors had attacked Santa Catalina de Afuyca at dawn, killing an estimated 50 Timucuans, capturing 22, and sacking the church and the convent, from which they carried away religious ornaments and books in Spanish and Latin. Lord Cardross and others from Stuarts Town had met the raiders at the Savannah River and bought their slaves and other plunder (Auto, 1685; Rodríguez Tiznado, 1685; Luna, [1688]b; Bolton and Ross, 1925: 40–41; Covington, 1968a: 10).

St. Augustine's news from the provinces was uniformly disheartening: Guale was depopulated, Timucua was under assault, and Apalache's old trading partner Apalachicola was threatening to secede from the Spanish sphere of influence. Woodward himself was reported to be visiting towns in the vicinity of the Chattahoochee River to negotiate the terms of trade, in effect, the value in gamusas of a firearm, a barrel of powder, a blanket, or a lined coat. Twice the teniente of Apalache, Captain Antonio Matheos, had crossed the border to capture the elusive doctor; all that he accomplished was to burn four empty towns—Coweta, Kasita, Tuskegee, and Kolomoki—and all that he found was a cache of 50 gamusas with an insouciant note from Woodward in Latin (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 48–52; Boyd, 1937: 2).

Six years after the raid on Santa Catalina de Guale, three years after the raids on San Juan del Puerto and San Felipe, and one year after the raid on Santa Catalina de Afuyca, floridanos had an opportunity to strike back at pirates and arms suppliers together. The same "Agramont" who had raided the doctrinas of Guale-Mocamo in 1683 stopped by in 1686 to raid them once again. This time, however, a corsair tracker was following him. Alejandro Thomás de León, an "anticorsair" from Havana, stopped by St. Augustine for reinforcements, then set sail from the presidio in April with three ships and a force of 100 españoles and *mulatos* and 50 Indians. He engaged and defeated Grammont, sending some prisoners to Havana. Then in August, with floridano encouragement, he wiped out Stuarts Town, eliminating the nearest pirate sanctuary. Among those killed was the cagey cacique Niquisalla (Márquez Cabrera, 1686a; Colleton, 1688; Leturiondo, [1700]: 10; Sirmans, 1966: 44).

The "dislodging" of a settlement established after 1670 did not in itself violate the Treaty of Madrid, but León's forces pushed northward to Edisto Island, on the outskirts of Charles Town, where they sacked Mr. Paul Grimball's house and Governor Joseph Morton's plantation, the latter of goods and slaves to the value of 1500 pounds sterling and the former of goods "of great value, which were part of those burnt in a perryaug or galleot together with the late governor's brother-in-law, who was bound or ironed in the galleot which señor Alejandro's men fired" (Colleton, 1688). In the governor's house, the Spanish found candlesticks from the notorious sack of Campeche (Leturiondo, [1700]: 174), a discovery which confirmed them in their belief that Charles Town harbored pirates and purchased stolen goods. For once, the city between the Ashley and Cooper Rivers had reason to welcome an approaching hurricane. Two of León's ships were lost in the storm and the third returned to St. Augustine (Auto, 1726; Covington, 1968a: 10–11; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 32–33).

Five Guales from Santa María who had been with León were making their way home from the debacle in a canoe when in the mouth of a river, perhaps the Altamaha, they came upon five English traders and two Indians with a boatload of furs and skins from "the

provinces of Apalachicola, Caveta, and Casista." According to the Guales, the ingleses captured them, and planning to kill them later, tied their hands and covered them with some pelts. The Guales managed to free themselves in the night and to kill four of the ingleses with their own guns. They then came in the traders' boat to St. Augustine to inform the governor that "Captain Enrique" and other Englishmen, escorted by 60 Indians, would soon be descending the river from those same provinces.

Márquez Cabrera rewarded their exploit and contribution to military intelligence by granting them the entire prize: the boat filled with 180 deerskins, 200 otter and beaver pelts, and some buffalo and bear skins. He also, he informed the Consejo, gave them

> safe conduct not to occupy them in any labors—something which they esteemed more than the prize. . . . It might not seem like much to kill four Englishmen, but they knew those provinces, having had the run of them for over a year with the help of the natives, and it would have been better yet to have killed Captain Enrique (Márquez Cabrera, 1686a).

King and Consejo approved the governor's action and advised him further to "favor the five Indians in everything that arises suitable to their estate and to Indians, to encourage them and others who might imitate them" in "punishing the pirates who infest those coasts" (Spanish Crown, 1687).

The information that the five Indians had supplied inspired the governor to send a second expedition against his neighbors, this time to punish the renegade and apostate Indians living on the islands near Stuarts Town and capture Captain Enrique. Little is known about this expedition other than that Captain Francisco de Fuentes took a presidio galeota and three war piraguas north, apparently by the inland waterway, with 40 soldiers and 100 Apalache and Timucuan warriors, but no Guales, who may have been excused or excluded from this campaign against their friends and relatives.

Although Doctor Woodward once again escaped the net, the second "dislodging," this time of Yamasees and apostate Guales, was reportedly successful. When Governor James Colleton arrived in Charles Town in November 1686, he was "informed that some galeotas and launches came a second time from St. Augustine to the frontiers" of his government, "sacking, destroying, killing, and carrying off people, and this when we are at peace." A large force of 300 Carolinians, 200 French buccaneers, and 300 Indians was preparing to launch a retaliatory invasion on the Florida presidio. It took all the authority that the new governor could muster to put their plans into reverse (Colleton, 1687; Bolton and Ross, 1925: 41–44).

In a strongly worded diplomatic protest, Colleton demanded that the Florida governor notify him at once whether the two Spanish expeditions had come "with order, patent, or permission from Your Lordship, or out of that presidio." The inhabitants of Charles Town had assured him that "the soldiers of Your Lordship menace us with all kinds of hostility every three months" (Colleton, 1687; Sirmans, 1966: 44). To stop South Carolina from giving provocation, Colleton moved with vigor against the Goose Creek faction that promoted trade in Indian slaves and openly condoned the traffic with "Sea Robbers." The same Sieur de Grammont who had invaded Guale Province had also taken an English vessel, he told Governor Quiroga, and pirates had since landed on St. Johns Island to plunder cattle and hogs. "It is very hard we should answer for the vile deeds of pyrates and robbers," he said, "being sometymes plundered ourselves" (Colleton, 1688).

During the second border raid, Fuentes' men had seized a packet of important papers including a "cédula" from the King of England that showed Carolina to extend westward across Florida, New Mexico, and California to the "South Sea," or Pacific Ocean (Márquez Cabrera, 1687). Spain's colonies in North America were about to be caught in the crossfire of her rivals, for what England was doing to the map horizontally, France was doing vertically, extending its trading empire from New France down the Mississippi River and toward the Gulf. Reports of a fledgling French colony in the Gulf under Robert, Sieur de la Salle, triggered a near hysterical reaction. Between 1685 and 1689, 11 Spanish expeditions on what Robert S. Weddle called a "wilderness manhunt" would

reexplore the coast from the Keys to Tampico before they finally found in Texas the ruins of his settlement (Weddle, 1973). Marcos Delgado, a floridano rancher, was the leader of one of these expeditions, a modest one of 12 soldiers and 40 armed Apalaches (Boyd, 1937).

The War of the League of Augsburg (King William's War in America) found England and Spain for once on the same side, for after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 England had as much reason as Spain to oppose Louis XIV's expansionist policies. Diego de Quiroga y Losada and "Diego" Colleton acknowledged as much in mutual messages. They promised to work together against pirates, return fugitive slaves or pay for stolen ones, and aid each other with military stores and other necessities (Quiroga y Losada, 1687; Colleton, 1688; Sirmans, 1966: 45; Wright, 1971: 58–59). This raised the possibility of official trade between the colonies, although private trade would remain illegal.

In times of peace as well as of war, the Indians held the balance of power. The reason why Indians got on so well with the English, said Father Alonso de Leturiondo, was that they did not make them live "beneath the bell" in law and in righteousness, but let them do as they pleased, bringing them firearms, ammunition, glass beads, knives, hatchets, iron tools, and woolen blankets in exchange for deerskins, bearskins, buffalo hides, otter and beaver pelts, and Indian children to resell as slaves (Leturiondo, [1700]: 175).

But there was some hope that trade between Apalache and Apalachicola might be revived. When the caciques of Apalache came to welcome Quiroga, they brought him a letter in which they charged his predecessor with having interfered with their legitimate trade, not only in his mistreatment of the Apalachicolas but also in his refusal to let Christian Indians entertain gentiles in their towns (Matter, 1990: 159). Quiroga made a bid to regain the favor and trade of the Apalachicolas directly, outflanking the Christian cacique middlemen, by establishing a garrisoned trading post on the Chattahoochee River, this time with no religious strings attached.

The unsettled state of Indian affairs dictated that the post be fortified, so he sent Captain Enrique Primo de Rivera and a crew of Apalache repartimiento workers to build a stockade and earthworks. The Apalachicolas responded to this overture by moving eastward to join the Yuchis (Uchises) on the Ocmulgee River and Ocheese Creek, entering the pages of Anglo history as the Lower Creeks. Quiroga's fort, left high and dry by the ebbing of Spain's sphere of influence in the Southeast, was destroyed in 1691, almost before the bark was dry on the logs (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 52–56; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 35; Smith and Gottlob, 1978).

The politic Simón de Salas took advantage of improved relations between the colonies to travel north under a safe conduct from Governor Colleton. He hoped to meet with the Yamasees and Guales who had moved into the English sphere of influence and coax them back to their doctrinas, but the defectors would not see him except in the no-man's-land of St. Catherines Island, to which they said they would be going to gather figs in season (Quiroga y Losada, 1688). The English governor claimed to have no influence over them. "As for the Yamases Indians, they have nothing to do with our government nor do we trouble ourselves about them, . . . showing no profit but of a few deerskins for which we sell them powder, guns and shot as we do to all Indians indifferently" (Colleton, 1688). Nonetheless, the 10 Yamasee towns in the "Indian land" between the Savannah and Edisto rivers had taken the place of Stuart's Town as an English buffer zone on the southern Carolina frontier (Covington, 1968a: 11).

Florida's corresponding buffer zone, Guale and Mocamo, had shrunk to the area between two rivers, the St. Johns and the Satilla (Ponce de León, 1690). It had been years since the Junta de Guerra had asked the bishop of Cuba for an informe on whether or not the island of Santa Catalina in Guale should be resettled. The bishop forwarded the Crown's 1691 reminder to the parish priest of St. Augustine, Bachiller Alonso de Leturiondo, asking him to take care of it for him. In a later Memorial to the Crown, Leturiondo cited his now missing report on Santa Catalina, modestly referring to himself in third person.

> The pastor, therefore, . . . made a precise

> inquiry and sought to acquire reports from those who had been lieutenants in the province of Guale to which the said island belongs and from the Spaniards who had been on it and from the residents of the city of St. Augustine who had had dealings and trade with the Indians who came from the said island and province to sell the produce and goods that they gathered on it to the place [St. Augustine]. . . .
>
> And unanimously and in agreement everyone from Florida said that since the said island has been abandoned and since the Yamazes and Guales that lived there absented themselves, they have experienced a very great need because from the said island they brought to sell to the presidio the maize, beans, hogs, animal fat, rabbits, deer, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, and legumes that it produced in such abundance that it was the sole recourse of the presidio for its necessities (Leturiondo, [1700]: 196–197).

Leturiondo listed four reasons why he believed it to be in His Majesty's interest to resettle Santa Catalina. First, because of "the fecundity of the said island and that the provisions for the presidio come from it," because "it has good grazing for hogs. That the ones produced there were very corpulent and of very flavorful meat. And also for the sowing of grain and fruits that they gather at a good rate and in great abundance." Second, because "the Indians of St. George" would probably "return again to their lands" and the island and province of Guale would be settled by Yamasees, who, he had heard, were not very happy with the English. Third, because the province of Guale was an uninhabited wilderness, with "no forces that might serve as a first line of defense and as a look-out-post against those of Carolina in case they attempt some invasion by land or by the river." And fourth, to keep the English from settling there themselves (Leturiondo, [1700]: 198). But the Spanish sphere of influence no longer reached St. Catherines Island, and the Florida ecumene could not be stretched to include it.

NOTE

1. Verne E. Chatelain published the Solana map as anonymous and undated in *The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565 to 1763* (1941: map 7).

CHAPTER 16. SOJOURN AT SANTA MARÍA

THE UNBUILT TOWER

The last years of the 17th century were "the twilight of the Mocamo and Guale aborigines," in the phrase of John H. Hann. Two Mocamo settlements survived to service the camino real: Santa Cruz de Guadalquini on the mainland, two or three leagues from St. Augustine, and San Juan del Puerto on Fort George Island. The Guales had reduced themselves to three pueblos on Amelia Island: Santa Clara de Tupiqui at the northern end, San Phelipe de Athulateca three leagues below Tupiqui, and Santa María de Guale at the southern end, on Harrison Creek (Hann, 1987: 4–5).

The people of Santa Catalina, twice transplanted in four years, experienced 18 years of relative peace at the site of Santa María.[1] The population drain out of Guale-Mocamo nevertheless continued. Many of the loyalists simply settled at St. Augustine. By 1689 there were 225 Guale and Yamasee expatriates in the vicinity of the capital, one third as many as the reported population of Guale and Mocamo fourteen years before (Boyd, 1948: 182–184; Deagan, 1990b: 301).

For their part, the Spanish neglected to take advantage of the truce between Spain and England to improve the colony's provincial defenses. Sometime during the governorship of Márquez Cabrera, the Crown had promised to have the treasury in Mexico City remit an extra 6000 pesos for a stone watchtower at the bar of San Pedro on the northern end of Cumberland Island. In 1688, the Crown ordered Governor Quiroga to begin constructing the tower, specifying the type of raised "*guardainfante*" foundation on which it should stand (Consejo de Indias, 1688). He immediately drew up plans so that work could start as soon as the money came.

"In the interim until the tower could be built," reads Quiroga's subsequent memorial of his accomplishments, summarized in third person for the Consejo, he urged the Guales to build themselves a stockade of earth and palisades

> having four façades with raised places and sentry posts out of heart wood three varas high and another vara and a third underground, with its ditch and covered way, in the place of Santa María where the teniente is stationed along with a garrison of soldiers, for the consolation and defense of the Indians so they could have a place to retire to on occasions of enemies, with the convento and the guardhouse inside (Quiroga y Losada, [1697?]b).

This was a major project calling for weeks of digging and more weeks of logging on the mainland. The natives were limited in number and had neither the time nor the surplus maize to spend fortifying yet another location (Bushnell, 1986: 6–11). Quiroga could not understand their attitude.

> At present [the stockade] lies in ruins because it was never completed nor was the work advanced and fomented as must be done with fortifications made of earth and palisades—this [one being] without cost to the treasury. Of all this, he [Quiroga] has given an account to Your Majesty, sending plans (Quiroga y Losada, [1697?]b).

The 6000-peso supplement to the fortification fund failed to arrive until Quiroga was nearing the end of his term in 1693. His successor, Cuban-born Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala, during whose term the Castillo was finally completed at a total cost of 138,375 pesos, took the 6000 pesos and applied them toward his project of constructing a seawall for St. Augustine. How the Guales felt about this misdirection of funds, once again privileging the Spanish center above the Indian peripheries, or whether they ever found out about it, is unknown.

The documentary record of developments in the provinces during the Quiroga governorship is unusually fragmentary, partly because the papers of his residencia were lost at sea (Quiroga y Losada, [1697?]b; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 36). Only because the governors of Florida and South Carolina were more civil toward one another during the War of the League of Augsburg (1689–1697), communicating and cooperating in the apprehension of pirates and the return of fugitive slaves and subjects, and, perhaps, trading supplies, do we know that not all of the Guales who

Fig. 16.1. Plan of 1691 for Mission Santa Catalina de Guale in its location on Amelia Island. (After Thomas, 1987: fig. 7; courtesy of the P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida.)

left Amelia Island went to St. Augustine, but that there was a small but steady hemorrhage of Guale Christians, male and female, into English territory.

Meanwhile, on Florida's northwestern frontier, more populous than the northeastern one, the rupture in trade between Apalache and Apalachicola, which after the preemptive destruction of Primo de Rivera's fort could be denied no longer, deteriorated into a border war. For two years, wrote Governor Torres to Governor Thomas Smith in 1694, the Indians of Apalachicola had been harassing his Apalache and Chacato subjects, committing "many treacherous murders." He asked Smith to punish them, otherwise he himself would be forced to make an entrada (Torres y Ayala, 1694).

Instead, a 50-member raiding party of Sabacolas, Chiscas, Tiquipaches, and "Apalachicolas from Coweta," all armed with English muskets, attacked the doctrina of San Carlos de los Chacatos on the borders of Apalache Province. The raiders killed 5 persons and took 42 prisoners, telling them that they would be traded to the English for more firearms, and that then the towns of the interior would "join forces and make an end, once and for all, of españoles and apalachinos." Captain Jacinto Roque Pérez, teniente of Apalache, reported to the governor that prior to the actual raid the Tiquipaches went to "the old lugar of the Chacatos and, finding no people to kill, broke up the crosses, church, and convent, saying they did it because the españoles esteem that kind of thing highly" (Junta de Guerra, 1694).

The caciques who doubled as officers of the Apalache militia sought permission to collect an expeditionary force and wage a "just war" against the aggressors. The junta de guerra that Governor Torres called in St. Augustine approved the expedition, endorsed the choice of the cacique Matheo Chuba to lead it, and asked that the number of participants be limited to 400, including leaders. They instructed Captain Pérez to issue 4 peruleras of gunpowder and 2000 musketballs to the Apalaches, and 6 Spanish soldiers, if they wanted to take the chance of the "*mala unión*" that might result from putting Spanish soldiers under Indian command (Junta de Guerra, 1694).

The time was past when firearms could be kept out of the hands of natives. Many Apalaches had their own. According to the floridano priest Alonso de Leturiondo,

> The Indians of those provinces, and principally the Apalache, have been and are the most valiant of all those lands. Their arms are the bow and arrow, which they handle with great skill. And today they use firearms as do the Spaniards, and, in Apalache, they maintain their arms as well as do the best trained officers (Leturiondo, [1700]: 199).

The campaign was moderately successful. The Apalaches returned with some rescued Chacatos, 50 prisoners (who by custom belonged to their respective captors), and a few deerskins and buffalo hides to divide (Torres y Ayala, 1695b). Acting Governor Joseph Blake—Governor Thomas Smith had died in November 1694 (Sirmans, 1966: 54)—was outraged by the invasion of territory that for the last 10 years had come within South Carolina's sphere of influence.

> Sire, today I received news . . . of apalachinos indios robbing and burning the land of Cavetta, Cassisto, Ocomulque, Tasquique, Uchichi, and the places of Ocone, all of which are within my government and jurisdiction. I cannot believe that any Catholic vassal of His Majesty would dare do such a thing unless he were in league with the king of France, with whom all the world is at war (Blake, 1695).

The Apalaches, Blake said, had carried off 800 pesos worth of his own property and a large number of "Indian captains." He demanded the immediate return of both, otherwise he would through diplomatic channels request disciplinary action, "and I judge that Your Lordship's life will be in danger." Meanwhile, "all the Indians outside the walls of San Agustín and Apalache will not be enough to resist us. I am a powerful neighbor, so let them not approach too near" (Blake, 1695).

Torres's reply charged Blake with hotheaded ignorance:

> You are evidently new in that governorship to write in such a manner. . . . Ask the old vecinos whether those towns you call yours have not always been under this government's protection, until out of wickedness they rebelled and have remained so, fomented by your set-

> tlement, doing all the damages and atrocities of which they are capable (Torres y Ayala, 1695a).

None of the prisoners taken from Florida territory had ever been returned, not those from Santa Catalina de Ajoica, nor from San Juan de Guacara, where the enemy had killed most of the people and carried off all the women. As far as the English governor's 800-peso claim, Torres calculated that in three raids, including the one on the Chacatos, Indians armed by Carolina had carried off 8000 pesos worth of vestments, chalices, lamps, candlesticks, and bells (Torres y Ayala, 1695a; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 36).

VISITORS

After the return of the Apalache expedition, the governor sent out two visitors to inspect, belatedly, the defenses of the provinces. Captain Joachín de Florencia began his inspection of Apalache and Timucua in November 1694, and Captain Juan de Pueyo set out to visit Guale and Mocamo in January 1695.

Visitor Pueyo found the sabana system in Guale-Mocamo much weakened. The people of San Juan del Puerto and Santa Cruz explained that they had not been planting the king's sabanas because they were short on seedcorn. Although they readily promised to support the soldiers and assist their spiritual fathers in the future, he had inside information that they were selling their produce privately to St. Augustine, receiving advances in the form of trade goods and paying them off in maize and beans.

At least on the provincial level, the Great Corn Controversy of the 1680s seems to have been resolved. A division of resources had been worked out between local friars and local garrisons that left it up to the chiefs to keep both sides happy. Visitor Florencia's orders for Apalache and Timucua called on the chief of each place to require the Indians

> to revere and assist their friar, planting maize and wheat in his sabana and that of the youths who assist him in the convento, as they have heretofore, and to . . . plant the communal sabana and gather the fruits into a community granary with two keys, [the one] held by the chief and [the other by] a principal appointed by the teniente, and this grain is for aiding the poor orphans and widows without sabanas of their own, and to feed the soldiers coming and going in His Majesty's service, and to buy ornaments for the church, as well as tools to cultivate the said sabana (Florencia, 1694–1695).

Visitor Pueyo's parallel orders for Guale and Mocamo permitted a separate sabana for church beautification without giving the friars control of it. The caciques and cacicas were asked

> to plant in each place a community sabana, to assist with it the poor orphans and widows, the expenses of the service of His Majesty and public works in their pueblos, and once the harvest had been garnered in, that the teniente hold one key and the principal chief of the pueblo another, and that they plant another sabana for the ornaments of the churches, and that the friar hold one key to its garnered harvest and the chief another so it can be spent and commuted into what is necessary for the churches (Pueyo, 1695).

While some of the friars still sold for personal profit the harvests of the maize and wheat fields meant to sustain them, such actions were not seen as a problem. Governor Torres and the contador reported with satisfaction in 1697 that the caciques of Apalache had built a fort at San Luis at a cost of 304 pesos from the "1695 and 1696 tithes of those provinces" (Torres y Ayala and Menéndez Márquez, 1697). Only the Republic of Spaniards was obliged to tithe its agricultural production and livestock. The town of San Luis contained the second largest concentration of Spanish soldiers and ranchers in the colony, and the fort had been built primarily for their protection. What was significant about its financing was the fact that for the first time floridanos were covering part of the cost of provincial defenseworks, drawing on their tithes with the governor's approval, just as in the early 1680s tenientes and caciques had, for the same purpose and with the same approval, drawn on the maize in the convento granaries.

As Governor Torres had ordered, Visitor Pueyo urged the chiefs who assembled at Santa María in 1695 to raise livestock. The Guales were basically farmers. They wanted

no *ganado mayor* around to trample their crops, as happened all too often in the other provinces. Pueyo's own livestock were a case in point. His cattle ranch on the St. Johns River in Timucua was only one league away from the ferry town of Salamototo instead of the three leagues required by law, with the result that his animals overran the natives' gardens. In fact, Visitor Florencia, making a parallel visita of Apalache and Timucua, had just ordered Pueyo's foreman to enclose the entire town of Salamototo with all its plantings and to repair the enclosure yearly; otherwise, he predicted, the town would be deserted and the ferry left unattended (Florencia, 1694–1695).

Although none of the Guale caciques seem to have started cattle ranches, some of them did keep horses. Several years after the Pueyo visita, a wandering herd of horses destroyed four fields of beans and one of maize on Amelia Island. Juan Chicasle, gobernador of Santa María, appeared before Governor Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda in St. Augustine with a delegation of principales and interpreters to demand that the Pueyo recommendation be reversed. Speaking for everyone, Chicasle said that if María, cacica of Tulufina, and Diego Pérez, the sacristan, did not remove their seven horses from the island and pay damages, he and the other caciques would descend to St. Augustine with all their vassals to be fed (Horruytiner, 1700). The Spanish garrison at Santa María kept horses. If these animals were causing similar damage, Chicasle either did not complain about them directly or his complaint was edited out of the record.

The kind of support that the garrison at Santa María had come to expect from the natives can be seen from the charges that the Guales brought against their teniente, Diego de Jaén, during the Pueyo visita. Obviously, the officers and soldiers had set up their own fallback line of rations that resembled in nature and quantity the gifts of food that Indians had traditionally made to doctrineros.

Santiago, who claimed to be the only Yamás left at Santa María, testified that he often went fishing in order to feed his four small children and to give something to the "soldiers' house." One day, when he had invited a chief to eat with him and was outdoors cooking a large fish that was part of his catch, a soldier walked past and helped himself to a piece of it. Shortly afterward the teniente sent for the rest of the fish to feed the servants of the soldiers' house, and Santiago was left with nothing to give his guest. Other natives testified that Jaén had let the soldiers take their setting hens. Once, the teniente had personally gone into people's houses and taken away the unripe beans that they were eating for lack of other food, in order to provision a party of Englishmen, who were "enemies of God."

Juan Chicasle charged that Jaén had tried to send the women of Santa María

> alone to the woods to look for *ache* for the soldiers, . . . [although] to find it they had to go a long distance away, where being alone and without a man they might encounter some of the bandit infiel Indians who go about on the mainland where they have to go to find the roots and some disgrace might happen to them, and it would have been better and safer to send men on that errand (Pueyo, 1695).

For objecting, Chicasle said, the teniente had called him injurious names and had threatened to take away his chiefdom and government. Afterwards, he, Chicasle, "sent men to find the ache roots and on two occasions to hunt deer for the sustaining of the soldiers."

Españoles did not understand natural variations in the food supply, the chiefs protested.

> Even though it has been the custom ever since there were soldiers in this province to give them by weeks (one day to each pueblo) a little fish or [some] oysters, . . . [the soldiers] oblige them to give the one and the other without taking into account that on some days, due to bad weather or other accidents, they could not get any, and this in such abundance that the measure for oysters was a cassina pot (Pueyo, 1695).

Visitor Pueyo listened to the natives, but decided in favor of the military, ordering all the places of the lengua of Mocamo or Guale to "assist the soldiers at the garrison on Santa María with all those things that are established by custom, without omitting anything whatsoever."

As the case of the Yamás Juan Lorenzo shows, Franciscans and officers had finally

learned to reinforce each others' authority in the provinces. Pedro de la Lastra, doctrinero of Santa Clara de Tupiqui and San Felipe, sent Juan Lorenzo and another Indian to the house of Lastra's syndic in St. Augustine to pick up some things from "his situado." The things were not ready. After waiting around for several days and running out of food, Juan Lorenzo started home. On the road from Santa María to Tupiqui he met Captain Jaén and Father Lastra. Lastra berated him for failing in his mission, and Jaén threatened to put him in the stocks overnight, whip him in the morning, and send him back to the presidio "at his own cost." The next morning the town of Tupiqui awoke to find one of its canoas missing and with it Juan Lorenzo, his wife and son, and three other persons—six more individuals cutting their ties to the doctrinas and heading north (Pueyo, 1695).

Somehow, the governors of Florida and South Carolina were able to disassociate themselves from the Chacato War that had threatened to engulf the northern border and to repair the strained relations between their two colonies. Among the beneficiaries of this detente were 24 English and African castaways who in the winter of 1696 survived the wreck of the barkentine *Reformation* off Jupiter Island, rough treatment from Indian salvors, and a freezing journey up the coast, to find a charitable welcome in St. Augustine and be delivered at last into the hands of their co-religionists in Charles Town.

Quaker merchant Jonathan Dickinson published an account of this odyssey, called *God's Protecting Providence* (Dickinson, 1699), which reveals much about the state of the colony in the mid-1690s. In St. Augustine, Dickinson, his wife and baby, and shipmaster Joseph Kirle were houseguests of Governor Torres and his wife, who brought them warm clothes, Spanish wine and hot chocolate (a welcome change from the "cassena" tea that soldiers and Indians drank), and a doctor. The governor's "kindness to us all was extraordinary," Dickinson recalled, "and we eat no worse than he did daily," a diet of "hominy, herbs and pumpions."

> The governor stated the poverty of the country unto us. The place is a garrison maintained one half by the King of Spain, the other half by the Church of Rome. The male inhabitants are all soldiers. . . . And all their supply of bread, clothing and money comes from the Havana and Porto Vella. And it is going on of three years since they have had a vessel from any place whatsoever, which makes their wants very great: all things being expended except ammunition and salt, of which they said they had enough (Dickinson, 1699: 58, 61–62).

Torres accepted Dickinson's and Kirle's signed notes against the governor of South Carolina in order to permit the castaways to make purchases and outfit their party as best they could for the second half of their wintry journey. The city, it seemed, was suffering from compounded shortages. Clothing and cloth were unavailable at any price; all that the shoppers could find for warmth were a few skins and 7 blankets. To feed themselves along the way, they purchased 5 roves (arrobas) of ammunition for their Indian hunters, plus some water jars and earthen cooking pots. Other than some weevily wheat bread, 20 roves of strung beef, and 1 rove of salt, St. Augustine had no food to spare, but the governor arranged for the Englishmen to pick up 60 arrobas of Indian corn and 10 of "peas" in one of the border towns.

Dickinson's journal is a welcome source of information on the Christian towns above St. Augustine. Travelling north under escort, the English party stopped in turn at "Santa Cruce," "St. Wans," "St. Mary's," which Dickinson called "a frontier and a garrison town," and "St. Phillips." They saw "worshipping houses" with bells, where the Indians went "as constantly to their devotion at all times and seasons as any of the Spaniards" and the boys "were kept to school, . . . the friar being their schoolmaster."

Each town had a "war-house . . . for their times of mirth and dancing, and to lodge and entertain strangers." The structures were large, clean, and circular, measuring in diameter from 50 feet at Santa Cruz to 81 feet at Santa María. They had from 16 to 32 squares built around the walls, each one containing a "cabin" and a place for a fire. The cabins at Santa María were "about 8 foot long of a good height being painted and well matted." "Night being come and the time of their devotion over, the friar," who "some years past was at Charles Town in South Carolina, came in and many of the Indians both men and women" danced "according to their way

and custom" around a "great fire" built under a 20-foot quadrangle left open to the sky. Simón de Salas, it seems, did not forbid late-night dances.[2]

As might have been expected, the cloth shortage in St. Augustine extended to the provinces. At Santa María, Dickinson saw women wearing "gowns and petticoats" made from "the moss of trees"—the same fiber, fabric, and function that John Hawkins had observed near the same spot over 130 years earlier (Hawkins, 1564: 113). To Dickinson, the natives seemed "very industrious, having plenty of hogs and fowls and large crops of corn, as we could tell by their corn-houses." The maize and beans that he and Kirle had arranged for in St. Augustine they picked up at Santa María, where they also "got of the Indians plenty of garlic and long pepper to season our corn and peas, both which were griping and windy," and provided themselves with wooden trays and spoons and ropes made of platted rushes.

The English were relieved to learn that the "Carolina Indians called the Yammasees, which are related to these Indians[,] were here about a month since trading for deerskins." It showed that the coastal Indians to the north would not be hostile, like those to the south. It also showed that the Christian Guales were on friendly terms with the Yamasee defectors and through them participated in Charles Town's growing deerskin trade, and that the Spanish were aware of the connection and countenanced it.

Preparations complete, the English castaways set out in state in seven "large canoes," with an armed escort of 7 Spaniards and 2 caciques and some 30 Indians "from all the towns" to be their rowers, hunters, and pilots—evidence that the labor draft was yet functioning. On the way they saw plenty of hogs and deer but only a few hunters, among them "a canoe of Carolina Indians being a man his wife and children having his dogs and other hunting implements for to lie out this winter season." Dickinson was surprised to see signs of once thriving settlements that were now wastelands without shelter or firewood. One of these was "the place called St. Catalena, where hath been a great settlement of Indians, for the land hath been cleared for planting, for some miles distant" (Dickinson, 1699: 70–71).

RUMORS OF WARS

On the same day that Governor Torres learned of the English castaways down the coast, word came to him of a revolt in the province of Mayaca, also called "New Province," somewhat north of the shipwreck site. Martyred at the mission of Atoyquimi were Father Luis Sánchez and two young native assistants, one of them a cacique. The governor immediately sent out two squads of soldiers, one to Mayaca and the other one down the inland waterway. The second squad was the one that met and rescued the Dickinson party. Loose tongues told the English that three friars "under a vow" to convert the "Cape Indians" had gone amongst them and "gained on" the cacique of one town to embrace the Roman faith, whereupon his people, "much incensed against the friars," had killed him and one of the friars (Dickinson, 1699: 60).

By the time the soldiers of the first squad reached the mission of San Antonio de Enacape, the natives had stripped that church of its ornaments, images, and sacred vessels and fled. Backtracking to the mission of Jororo, the soldiers found that town deserted, a box of sacred ornaments rifled, and a companion with an injured foot whom they had left there, dead. They collected what images and ornaments they could find in Jororo and took them to the mission of San Salvador de Mayaca. Mayaca, too, they found abandoned, but nothing seemed to be missing from the convento or the church. Back in St. Augustine, the soldiers delivered what they had found to the guardián of the Convent of the Immaculate Conception. Their expedition had achieved little more than the rescue of sacred treasure (Torres y Ayala, 1697a; 1697b; Hann, 1991b: 170–171).

Later that same year, the Calusas of South Florida rejected a mission of five Franciscan friars who had made their approach from Cuba. When the Calusas discovered that conversion would not bring them the kind of gifts they had been led to expect, they stripped the missionaries of their clothing, food, and ornaments and abandoned them on Matecumbe Key (Hann, 1991a). In the provinces of "Old Christians" the mission-building process had gone into reverse, with churches and convents forsaken and falling into decay.

After the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) brought King William's War to an inconclusive end, the rivalry that La Salle had provoked in the 1680s resurfaced in the Gulf. Three nations attempted to plant new colonies at the same time. Dr. Daniel Coxe, identified by Gulf historian William S. Coker as the possessor of "the largest grant by the English crown in America to a private individual," laid plans for "Carolana," which was to be a colony of displaced Protestants. In short order, he was able "to fill two small brigantines which left England in October 1698 for the Gulf Coast." Unfortunately for Coxe, his settlers were forced to winter in Charles Town. By the time one of his brigantines reached the Gulf, a Spanish expedition had already fortified Pensacola Bay, and a French expedition, the Bay of Biloxi. Coxe's captain, exploring the Mississippi River, came upon a French vessel engaged in the same activity and was persuaded to withdraw (Coker, 1976: viii–x).

The death of Charles II in 1700 shattered the fragile peace between Spain and England. The Spanish king's will left his entire domain to the grandson of Louis XIV, throwing France and Spain together to face a Grand Alliance of England, Holland, and Austria. Like it or not, Florida and South Carolina were enemies once more (Wright, 1971: 58–60).

Governor Zúñiga's orders in November 1700 to Jacinto Roque Pérez, teniente of Apalache, reveal his two concerns for the provinces: that they produce food for the presidio, and that they prepare for war. Zúñiga sent Captain Juan de Ayala y Escobar to check on defenses in Apalache. The governor was suspicious of recent French-arranged treaties calling for the Apalaches to supply packhorses to the Creeks, who would undoubtedly trade them to the English for firearms. Through Ayala he clamped an embargo on all Apalache trade in European goods, in particular, weapons, clothing, silver, and horses. The Christians were not to travel into Apalachicola; gentiles who wanted to trade with them could come to the Apalache border (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1700; Ayala y Escobar, 1701; 4; Matter, 1990: 160).

Early in 1701, the governor himself visited Amelia Island to hold a junta general of the caciques of the three remaining Guale pueblos: Santa María, San Felipe, and Santa Clara de Tupique. There had been little turnover in leadership since Pueyo's visit to Santa María five years earlier. María, cacica of Santa Catalina, still had the place of honor; Juan de Santiago, cacique Chicasle, was still gobernador of Santa María. The presence of two "aggregated" caciques indicated that possibly new refugees were being absorbed (Pueyo, 1695; Caciques de Guale, 1701).

The caciques' requests were wholly practical. For the next cavas they wanted new tools in accordance with those they had received before: 4 azadas to Santa María, 4 to San Felipe, and 3 to Tupique. When private persons hired them to transport canoa-loads of maize from any one of the pueblos to the landing of San Pablo, they wanted to be paid a flat rate of 8 reales per canoa, regardless of distance or time. "*Dure lo que durare*," they said: "Last what it may."

They listened to the transmitted complaint of don Lorenzo, cacique of the Mocamo town of San Juan del Puerto, that the Guales went back and forth to St. Augustine too often. Juan Chicasle responded that they had always lived in harmony with their neighbors and had never paid for their passage, because providing ferry service was San Juan's traditional "imposition." Furthermore, he said, San Juan owed 60 "*veces de cazina*," or "brewings of cassina," delivered monthly to Santa María for the infantry of "the king's house," and when the people of San Juan did not bring it, those of Santa María had to go and get it. The Guales went to the presidio, he said, to have their tools and firearms repaired and to collect debts from españoles, which, he said with an eye on the governor, could take several trips. As they had made clear in 1695, until they themselves were paid for their canoas, tobacco, and pots, they could not pay the St. Augustine shopkeepers. To obtain goods on credit, they were having to mortgage their harvests (Pueyo, 1695; Caciques de Guale, 1701).

Parish priest Alonso de Leturiondo was even then in Spain accusing his fellow floridanos of employing violence

> to obtain what they wish from the Indians, because the latter, with the natural reticence that they have, in order not to suffer some hardships

> or in order not to displease the españoles, surrender their goods to them, not for the just price but rather for the one that [they] wish (Leturiondo, [1700]: 178).

The priest allowed that the Indians were as guilty as the floridanos for the sharp rise in prices, especially the price of hogs, "saying that there is no more a law that they should sell more cheaply than there is one that the españoles should sell them more dearly" (Leturiondo, [1700]: 178).

As though he could overhear what Leturiondo was saying, Governor Zúñiga admonished the chiefs at Santa María not to change the measures of the "fruits of the land" that they sold or make "innovations" in the price list that the teniente was going to post in each of the pueblos. Anything of value that washed up on the coasts and beaches should be shown to the teniente.

To guarantee that God stayed on the side of Spain in the war that loomed on the horizon, he asked the chiefs to make sure that their vassals fulfilled all the obligations of Christians and that they were not guilty of using "some heathen rite and ceremony." The natives, he said, should venerate their priests, assisting them as always, without changes, and see that the muchachos attended doctrina, either at the iglesia or in the visitas. Distinguishing between permissible and impermissible dances, the governor warned the chiefs not to make the women attend the dances against their will, and not to let the men carry firearms in their dances of war.

Zúñiga's acute concern, and the main reason for his visit, was defense. Despite being "unwell on account of the rigorous season of cold and rains," he had already been up to inspect the wooden watchtower at the bar of San Pedro. He asked the people of Tupique to keep the road to the tower clean and to continue to provide the soldiers on sentry duty with fish and shellfish. Then,

> His Lordship proposed to the chiefs that it would be advisable to build an offensive and defensive palisade to enclose the king's house where the soldiers live, with bastions and walls reinforced with heartwood supports, every tenth one taller and heavier, so that the crosswise ones may be strong and bind together the other ones, and to terreplein the interior with fascines and earth up to chest height, the earth being two thirds [of a vara] in thickness for the protection of the soldiers.
>
> They should add to the said house a large room into which the women of the three towns could gather themselves for protection in the event of some infestation, and that all the natives of them should enter with the soldiers to defend the said house and stockade, and all the canoas be brought within musket range of the said defense, and that they be always on the alert, maintaining sentinels and watches and having their nightly rounds in all the towns, and quivers of arrows sufficient for any occasion that might unexpectly come up, and the firearms cleaned and ready.
>
> And they should start on the said stockade as soon as the next fields to ripen were harvested, the natives of the three towns working on it as chosen by their chiefs, and His Lordship would assist them with some tools and with the nails (Caciques de Guale, 1701).

Once again, the Guales had promised to build a stockade. Whether or not they would do so remained to be seen.

In March, the people of San Salvador de Mayaca left their doctrina a second time. Governor Zúñiga appointed Captain Joachín de Florencia to retrieve them, accompanied by Father Francisco Camacho. Marching from St. Augustine with 20 soldiers, Florencia was supposed to pick up 11 "Yguatas" at San Diego de Salamototo, then, at San Francisco de Potano, 60 Chacatos and Apalaches, 3 soldiers, and some provisions, probably brought there from Apalache. At one or the other place, 20 Timucuans and 3 more soldiers joined the expedition, which proceeded toward the "Rinconada" (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1701a).

Zúñiga's hope that Florencia and Camacho could achieve their aim without bloodshed was disappointed.

> The natives who were in the troop of my españoles have done some killings. The accident of coming upon some stray, unreduced Indians moved them to employ the voracity and passion that these nations have to kill one another only to make themselves fewer. They claim that while they were trying to bring them into the presence of the captain they seized arms, and self defense being natural, they did the same, with better luck than the others (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1701b).

What truly shocked the governor was the fact that the Indians had scalped their victims

and brought the scalps back to camp. In order to

> abolish once and for all the diabolic custom of scalping, and the killings that they perpetrate in order to acquire them, without motive or cause other than to kill those they meet who are of different and remote nations, I order . . . that from here on out, the Ayudante Manual Solana, teniente of Apalache, and the tenientes of the other provinces shall not permit the custom of entering with scalps to dance them in the bujío. Those who in legitimate war and with cause do killings must make use of some other means and symbol to signalize themselves *norocos* and *tascayas* (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1701c).

Zúñiga's disillusionment with Florida Indians extended to the Guales. On the whole island of Santa María, he wrote to the Crown in the summer of 1701, there could not be more than 200 natives. They were

> a miserable, low-spirited people, very poor and humble, maintaining themselves by the maize, beans and other seeds that they raise and by fishing and hunting and the shellfish that the women gather, all with excessive labors (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1701d).

The Guales had consistently rejected Spanish values. Their leaders had refused to raise livestock or to prize horses; they had neglected to build a stockade for the garrison and themselves; and they had continued to fight and distinguish themselves by Indian, not Spanish, rules. Governor Zúñiga did not understand the Guales, but he did understand that their province had ceased to be a buffer zone. Three small pueblos of part-time peasants would not deter nor long delay an invasion from the north. Suspended in harm's way like a cage of canaries in a mine, the Guales could give early warning to the presidio only by being the first casualties of war.

NOTES

1. From the list of Florida doctrinas made in 1689 for Bishop Evelino y Compostela, it seems that their doctrina carried two names: "Santa Catalina or Santa María de Guale" (cited in Hann, 1987: 22).

2. A year later, Salas was stationed at Tupiqui and the doctrinero at Santa María was Fray Diego Bravo (Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1697a).

CHAPTER 17. CONFLICT AND CEREMONY AT THE PRESIDIO

CREATING AND HANDLING CRISES

In the last six chapters, combining narrative, analysis, and illustration, the focus has been on the Florida provinces and how they were affected by external threats and internal disputes. This chapter is about the on-going drama of conflict and ceremony in St. Augustine.

Disputes at the presidio were a form of public entertainment, vividly performed and avidly reported. The cast was composed of local authorities—officers, treasury officials, past and present governors, Franciscans, secular priests, merchants, ranchers, shipowners, and dowagers—in every conceivable combination. The plot was advanced and complications introduced by devices that could be considered standard: family connections, implacable codes of honor, and the increasing tension between Spaniards and creoles.

Documentary sources for the 20-year-period after 1680 are particularly rich in the depiction of conflict, as we saw in Chapter 14, about the controversy between Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera and the Franciscans over who was to control the proceeds of Indian agriculture. In this chapter we will limit ourselves to conflicts that took place in the city of St. Augustine and possessed a religious element: the friars versus the parish priest, the parish priest versus the governor, the governor versus the friars, the friars *and* the parish priest versus the governor. Some of these conflicts were triggered by circumstances beyond the participants' immediate control, such as piracy, famine, shipwreck, deferred situados, and interrupted deliveries of silver and supplies. Other crises, however, were contrived or manipulated by one of the parties in order to discredit and disempower the other. In such a case, the triggering incident was often a piece of tactical maneuvering to gain critical terrain ahead of the real battle.

Governor Márquez Cabrera, ignoring the military maxim of taking on one opponent at a time, had not only outraged the Franciscans, but with his highhanded, letter-of-the-law anti-creole measures had also thoroughly alienated the local "better sort." One of those who participated in the general sentiment was the licenciado don Joseph Pérez de la Mota, a secular priest who doubled as chaplain of the Castillo and interim pastor, or vicar, of the parish church. In 1684 the vicar precipitated a crisis by threatening the governor with excommunication *latae sententiae* and a fine of 200 silver ducats unless he removed the guard he had posted around all three churches in St. Augustine to keep them from granting asylum to a fugitive slave. In a colony where the governor was also the captain general, civil and military authority being vested in the same person, the Church had to guard its autonomy with special care.

Later in the same year a second opportunity arose for the vicar to underscore the Church's right to offer sanctuary and embarrass his governor. Exercising his judicial authority, Márquez Cabrera had tried the English pirate Andrew Ranson and condemned him to be publicly garroted at the foot of the gallows in the plaza. Sometime around the feastday of Our Lady of the Rosary, the first Sunday in October, Ranson, who was a Catholic, made his last confession to the Castillo chaplain, who was the licenciado Pérez de la Mota (Queirós Mattoso, 1986: 128; Gannon, 1990: 456). When the silk cord around the pirate's neck broke, Lic. Pérez hailed it as a miracle. He and a circle of Franciscans spirited Ranson into the friary and refused to deliver him up. Instead, exhibiting their proof that Heaven itself defied the governor, they paraded an image of Our Lady of the Rosary about town with the frayed cord dangling from her hands (Wright, 1960: 140–141).

This was no way for holy men to act, stormed Márquez Cabrera to Pedro de Luna, local comisario of the Holy Office of the Inquisition, when "the enemy was off the coasts of these provinces, sacking the towns and burning the churches and knifing their holy images" (Márquez Cabrera, 1685). Lic. Pérez had caused him "so many vexations," the governor said, once to the point of upbraiding him publicly in the middle of Mass, that he had not entered the parish church for 22 months (Gannon, 1981: 16). But the religious

establishment did not give ground. This controversy joined the others that Fuentes, Uzeda, Ayala, and others had generated in the provinces and that the Consejo was being asked to resolve.

Eventually, the Crown would back the royal governor in St. Augustine as it did in the provinces. Lic. Pérez would be summoned to Spain to answer for his interference with royal justice, and at least two other friars would go into exile. The fortunate Ranson would emerge from the friary to join his countrymen at work on the Castillo and, as an artillerist, carpenter, and maker of the "artificial fires" without which no feastday was complete, would metamorphose into a useful member of society (Wright, 1960: 142–143; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 21). All this would occur much later.

Meanwhile, Márquez Cabrera's anti-creole actions and intemperate behavior won him no friends among the clergy. In 1685, two definitors, venerable members of the Franciscan council, waited on him to ask that he assign stipends to two floridano novices. His response was vituperative:

> Spewing forth vows and oaths, he said: "Don't come at me with your philosophies!" He said to put what we wanted in writing. We said that we would do so, and stood to leave. When we had gone about halfway down the steps the Governor yelled after us with vows and curses and made rude gestures in our direction. He shouted, "I don't give a damn about your Father Provincial or the rest of your friars!" (Gannon, 1981: 11–12).

The governor's gravest sin seems to have been his unpopularity, brought on by his open contempt for floridanos and disrespect for priests, about whom he said "injurious things . . . of great affront to the husbands in town." Starting in the Easter season of 1685, four separate priests refused their governor sacramental absolution for reasons they kept to themselves. In April 1687, the bachiller don Alonso de Leturiondo, a floridano newly appointed parish priest, followed suit. This left Márquez Cabrera in the category of those who had failed to "comply with the Church," and the religious establishment prepared to censure him. Leturiondo as pastor of the parish began by offering the governor in writing a 12-day grace period and a hearing before the assembled religious community. Twice, Márquez Cabrera sent Leturiondo's letter back unread (Leturiondo, 1687).

At anchor outside the bar of the harbor was a presidio vessel which the governor, over the protests of the treasury officials, had fitted out and supplied for Captain Martín Echegaray, so Florida could participate in the search for La Salle. Either in the face of ecclesiastical censure the governor suffered a nervous collapse, or the Echegaray expedition was a cover for his own departure plans. Márquez Cabrera had himself rowed out to the ship, threw his baton of government into the sea before the thunderstruck treasury officials, yelling, "There's where you can go for your government in this filthy place," and fled "to seek his salvation" in Havana, leaving his family behind (Márquez Cabrera, 1687).[1]

After this resounding victory over a royal governor, the university-trained bachiller Leturiondo let no authority pass unchallenged. His spirited defense of the rights of the parochial church against all comers—governors, friars, even representatives of the Inquisition—generated whole legajos rich in information about religious life and leaders in St. Augustine. Governor Diego de Quiroga y Losada inadvertently reopened hostilities in April 1689, when for lack of an authorizing cédula he suspended the three secular priests' altar allowances of wine, wheat flour, and white wax. Father Leturiondo countered the move with a letter of protest to the Crown, filled with damaging information about situado delays and mismanagement (Leturiondo, 1689a).

Unwisely, Quiroga decided that it was also time to put an end to the nighttime ringing of the church bells. In a letter to the Crown, he wrote that he had found it to be the custom in St. Augustine to ring the church bells the whole time the viaticum was outside the church doors, being carried to and from a deathbed, by night the same as by day. This was a dangerous practice which interfered with military signals. When the sentinel at the watchtower on the island across from the harbor saw ships approaching he was supposed to come to the beach across the bay from the fort and fire his weapon once for every ship he saw. But with the main church

right beside the guardhouse, the clamor of the bells kept the shots from being counted and the presidio from being warned. The governor had therefore asked the parish priest not to ring the bells past eight o'clock at night.

In response, on the night of May 22, 1689, when the presidio was in a state of alert, Father Leturiondo rang the bells from ten o'clock at night until two in the morning, long after the viaticum was safely back inside the church. The governor sent two messages to ask him to desist. At the first request, the young bellringer stopped ringing the bells, whereupon the priest rushed back to the church and ordered the assistant sacristan under pain of excommunication to take over. The governor's second request was never delivered, for the priest refused to accept it from the messenger (Auto, 1689).

Father Leturiondo presented his side of the conflict to the Crown in a letter full of telling arguments. From time immemorial, he said, it had been the custom in St. Augustine to ring the bells when the viaticum issued from the parish church so that the faithful could come out to accompany the Lord. The governor claimed that the signals of ship arrivals could not be heard over the bells, yet the bells had never before interfered with the signals. The larger bell weighed only four or five arrobas, and the smaller bell one arroba at the most, so their clamor was hardly overwhelming. The guardhouse had one sentry and the Castillo had four, one in each turret (Leturiondo, [1700]: 169), in addition to the patrols who made the rounds of posts up to a quarter of a league from the city. The bells were unlikely to deafen all the sentries at once. In any case, the sentry at the guardhouse had a bell almost as big as the larger one at the church[2] with which he rang the watch throughout the night,[3] and he had no trouble hearing the shots fired. If the bells did not interfere with signals in the daytime, over the noises of gristmills and people and traffic, how could they do so in the silence of the night? Finally, when it came to pirates, the bells were a protection, for they showed that the town was awake.

The true reason why the governor wanted jurisdiction over the bells, Leturiondo continued, was that the gobernadora had taken fright at the sound of the bells one night, and her husband did not want her to receive further shocks (Leturiondo, 1689b). Although this reference to "*susto*" suggests that the governor's lady was pregnant, the parish book of baptisms give no evidence of a birth (Parish Records, 1594–1693).

It was four years before the fiscal of the Consejo found time to address the problem. He proposed that at night the priest should ring the church bell once to signal the departure of the viaticum, then content himself by having someone walk in front of him and ring a handbell. This would not reduce the sum of reverence, the fiscal reasoned, for corsairs were mostly heretics. If they gained entrance into the city they would profane the temples, the sacred vessels, and the Sacred Host itself (Consejo de Indias, 1693).

By then, the tempest had long since calmed itself and Father Leturiondo was embroiled in a different dispute, this time a conflict with the Franciscans over mission secularization. He wrote to the Crown:

> Bishop Diego Evelino de Compostela gave me the faculty of examining the Franciscans who live in the doctrinas and minister to the Indians in the capacity of priests, an examination required by the Council of Trent, the bishop, the king, and, at their command, me. But the padres will not present themselves, and continue to minister as priests without a license. And their resistance has become a personal enmity toward me. . . . (Leturiondo, 1690).

He gave three examples of their particular enmity, told in reverse order of occurrence.

> This city had two comedies prepared for the celebration of Corpus and its Octave, a feast ordered by Your Majesty. Since it is the custom to present these at the door of the parish church, Governor Quiroga asked me to move a portable cross that is in front of the door so that they could set up the stage in order to present the comedies.

Agreeing with the governor that it was "more decent" to remove the cross than to present comedies in front of it, and understanding that this was what had been done on other occasions, the priest had the portable cross lifted out of its place and leaned against the wall of the church for the week of Corpus.

To his surprise, at two o'clock on the afternoon of the Octave, Pedro de Luna, acting

in his capacity as comisario of the Inquisition and "in his haste confusing and upsetting the whole pueblo," summoned the notary and bailiff of the Holy Office to serve the priest with a written demand that he put the cross back in place, "imagining it to be cast down or thrown in the dirt and exposed to many irreverences." The bailiff found Leturiondo in his sacristy waiting to sing "*las completas*," or High Mass, before the procession. Although the demand "mentioned no crime of heresy, apostasy, or infidelity—the only matters known to the Holy Tribunal"—Luna ordered the stage torn down and the cross put back in place. This was done immediately and "publicly, in front of all the people of the town who were gathering to view the comedy and setting up seats to hear it" (Leturiondo, 1690).

That scandal had been preceded by another one. Two members of the elite—Captain Matheo de Sartucha and doña Juana de Avila, wife of former governor Hita Salazar—had died a few days apart and been taken in turn to the Franciscan church for burial. On the second occasion, the friars, forewarned, forbade parish priest Leturiondo to accompany the bier across their threshhold, insisting that he deliver the body to them at the church door. They cited an apostolic brief that, said the priest, was "never approved by Your Majesty and not generally observed in the Indies." Governor Quiroga's ruling on the matter had supported Leturiondo as the minister of the parish church in the "lawful and ancient possession" of his right to conduct a funeral from start to finish.

"Before that," the priest continued, the Franciscans "tried to take away my privilege of the sacraments in this place." One of the friars

> left the convent to go to the house of a certain woman to cure himself, and there he fell gravely ill, and the guardián, without license, carried forth the viaticum in my territory. I censured him, and they excommunicated me (Leturiondo, 1690).

Not only did they excommunicate the parish priest "with bells," but they placarded him on their door and, ignoring his injunctions, continued to confess and preach as usual. Father Leturiondo wanted redress.

> Sire, the religiosos should stay in their convents and not be going out to private houses, and they should keep their profession and not be in women's houses, which does not look right for friars. Please tell the friars not to disquiet the place with their pretensions and scandals. It is the bishop's business to publish their rights, not theirs (Leturiondo, 1690).

The mendicants were infringing parochial monopolies of sacraments and services in St. Augustine, reducing both the parish priest's lawful income and that of the bishop, who was entitled to 25 percent of it (Leturiondo, 1690; Tibesar, 1967: 455). But the crises were manifestations of the deeper secularization conflict, for which both sides were pawns. With difficulty, Governor Quiroga patched over the quarrel and made peace between the religious leaders in St. Augustine (Quiroga y Losada, [1697?]b).

The dispute did not come to the attention of the fiscal of the Consejo until 1695. By then, Father Pedro de Luna, regarded in Spain as "the cause of all these disturbances and scandals," had been "sent for to return to these kingdoms for other reasons." The Franciscan Comisario General de Indias was asked to "relay orders to the religiosos of Florida to contain themselves within the bounds of their Order and avoid this kind of innovation" (Consejo de Indias, 1695a). Three years later, the Crown reemphasized its authority by ruling that the friars in Florida had to be certified by the royal treasury officials in order to receive their stipends (TePaske, 1964: 178–179).

April 25, the Day of Saint Mark, patron saint of the Castillo de San Marcos, was a major feastday in St. Augustine. The eve was marked with solemn vespers in the chapel of the Castillo, decorated for the occasion. In the morning, major litanies were sung in the parish church and a "great concourse of people" walked in general procession from the church to the Castillo to be greeted with salvos of artillery and muskets. They carried the saint about the bastions, attended a solemn Mass in the chapel, and after another gunfire salute, returned in procession to the parish church.

When the feastday came around in 1697, the presidio was enduring the famine to which Jonathan Dickinson and his party were wit-

nesses (Dickinson, 1699). Governor Laureano de Torres y Ayala implored the principal vecinos, Father Leturiondo included, to lend part of their stored maize to the presidio so that the soldiers at the sentry posts, at least, could receive a minimal ration of 1 arroba per month. A relief shipment of 919 arrobas arrived from Havana, enough to ration the sentries through April and leave 400 arrobas for May, if the governor did not pay back the vecinos. Out of the shipment, the treasurer gave the parish priest only 3 arrobas of maize against the 25 arrobas that he had advanced. The two clerics got 2 arrobas apiece, and the boy who rang the bells, 1 arroba.[4]

On the eve of St. Marks Day, after attending a party at the governor's house, Leturiondo sent a *negro* with a note demanding that his maize be repaid in full. When the governor answered that he did not have it, the priest abandoned his post and left for the woods, taking the church keys and forbidding the chaplain and the chief sacristan to say Mass in his absence. St. Marks Day dawned with the church doors locked and the bells silent.

The priest's decision to cancel a royally ordered feastday could not have come more inopportunely. "The day is Saint Mark's Day, and the presidio is afflicted by a lack of provisions," wrote Governor Torres. "If ever we needed to make the said supplication and solemn festival it is now." Expecting the case to end in court, he ordered depositions taken.

Matheo García, a soldier, testified that while on patrol the evening before he had heard two "*doblas*" of the church bell and was starting to recite the prayers for the souls in purgatory when he realized that the bell had stopped ringing. He supposed that the rope had broken, but at the church door he met Diego Caravallo, who said that the priest had told him to stop ringing and lock up. Diego, an illiterate soldier on assignment as assistant sacristan, testified that he had started ringing "las ánimas" at eight o'clock, as usual, when a "*negrito*" arrived with a message from the *padre vicario* to stop ringing the bells, lock up the church, and bring him the keys. When he did so, the padre told him that he was leaving in the morning "to dig roots, because he had nothing to eat." The governor himself testified that at six o'clock that morning he had received a note from the chief sacristan offering to say his morning Mass in the shrine of La Soledad "without ringing it," because he did not have the keys to the church.

Within four days, Leturiondo was home from the woods and writing the Crown a long letter. Despite the poor harvests, he said, he had managed to put by a little maize from his fields to sustain himself, his brother the chaplain, their sister and her five children, and four slaves. He had already shared part of his cache with the poor, but when the treasurer asked him "in the governor's name" for more in order to ration the soldiers manning the sentry posts north and south of the presidio, he again "threw open the doors" of his house to relieve them. Even this was not enough.

> The necessity grew with the lack of situados from New Spain, this presidio having received no aid whatever for two years, and it reached the extreme that many from the place and of the vecinos—some retired to their farms to endure their scarcities, and others to the woods to dig roots for their sustenance. All of my maize ran out and I ate roots myself for several days, in straits enough, and then could not even find roots, either to borrow or to buy, in all the place. They come from the swamps, and are so much work [to dig] and then to process for eating that those who go out to dig them will make only enough to sustain their own houses (Leturiondo, 1697a).

He sent to the governor for aid—having lent his maize reserve to the presidio on condition that it be replaced with the first shipment—and was told that the maize that had come was for the soldiers.

> At this answer, Sire, I grew heated. . . . With one of my slaves . . . I went out on foot to the woods to seek a remedy among the wild beasts, having found none among men. If I was absent from my duties, have I not also a duty to stay alive and bear the burden of the confessions and communions of Holy Week (Leturiondo, 1697a)?

Many of his parishioners were in the woods themselves, postponing their Easter duties without censure. St. Marks Day was not a feast of precept, when one was obliged to attend Mass under pain of mortal sin. The faithful were only obligated to attend the lit-

anies, which could be celebrated at any time. Saints days were often moved for various reasons. "Yet," he said,

> what I was forced to do will be a nail in my heart for the rest of my life, for I am one of the most loyal and conscientious priests there ever was here, since Florida was founded, spending the inheritance of my fathers and all the obventions of the curacy.
>
> Although they may say they have already paid me the primicias—which are what the parishioners are obliged to bring me—of the agricultural products and of the maize, which I acknowledge, . . . I have spent them all, and a large part of my own plantings, on the poor, this house being the common recourse of all the pueblo, which is why I myself ran out of that which is essential (Leturiondo, 1697a).

He had a secondary grievance. The governor had not sent Treasurer Joachín de Florencia to invite him to the feast of Saint Mark, but a lesser envoy, although the royal treasurer was

> the proper channel to act as solicitor and agent for the feasts of Your Majesty. This courtesy has always been extended to the priest, and although it matters nothing to me personally, the honor of this office does. As the priest of the parish church, who must be informed of the feasts to be held in it, I should have been invited and notified at my house, as is done by everyone who is planning a feast (Leturiondo, 1697a).

Returning to the subject of the situado and what was owed him, Father Leturiondo continued:

> It has not gotten here in two years, nor have the ecclesiastical rentas been paid, nor the cofradías, nor many legitimate overdue bills. . . . I serve without ration, stipend, obventions, or pié de altar. I spend the winters in a silk soutane I had made for me in Havana from some Masses I was given there, without a cape in which to shelter myself when I am called to go out at night or at daybreak. My brother the chaplain goes about in a coat of Bordeaux flannel which had to be dyed black in order for him to use it, being unable to have a soutane made against his renta. Lastly, the chief sacristan, . . . wrapped in a cape without a hood, goes about through swamps in water up to his knees, with a basket on his shoulder, gathering ache. In all these miseries we are not helped nor cared for (Leturiondo, 1697a).

As a result of this contretemps, the Consejo sent out three cédulas: one to the viceroy of New Spain telling him to remit the situados promptly, one to the bishop telling him to discipline this "*párroco*" severely, and one to the governor telling him to distribute the situados equally so that the *señores* of the Church could receive what they were owed (see addenda to Leturiondo, 1697a).

Bishop Evelino y Compostela had already written a peacemaking letter to the governor:

> Don Alonso de Leturiondo has always governed himself with modesty and consideration, and on this occasion [his temper] got the best of him. He wrote to me giving necessity as an excuse, but with the arrival of the situado all that labor will have ceased. In times of hunger all men quarrel and all have reason.
>
> I think he is sorry. Your Lordship, as his compadre, should overlook this mistake and refrain from reporting his error to the Consejo, which will only end in their telling me to correct him, and it is unseemly to go on writing, first one, and then the other. You have run the course of your governorship with great credit; still, when it comes time to answer for it, one can never have too many friends (Evelino y Compostela, 1697).

Don Alonso, less contrite than the bishop supposed, fired one last shot. In a letter to the Crown he remarked that lately "the governors" had started to use a "parasol" during religious processions, next to the pall of the Sacrament. Given Charles II's well-known and singleminded decrees about the proper public veneration of the Sacrament, this was no offhand comment. When the Body of Christ went forth, it alone was entitled to the dignity of a canopy. At its approach, coaches stopped and great men alighted to fall on their velvet knees in the mud. The Consejo's response was therefore gratifying. The governor of Florida was to "desist forthwith from the arrogant custom of carrying a parasol beside the pall of the Holy Sacrament. This [practice] is irreverent, and there especially it sets a bad example to the Indians" (Leturiondo, 1697c).

CROWN CATHOLICISM

Important as it was, the parish church was not the only center of Crown Catholicism in St. Augustine. Two reports that city notary

Juan Solana filed in the spring of 1702 show that the Acclamation of Philip V took place largely on the "*plaza de armas*" (Solana, 1702a), while the Obsequies of Charles II (Solana, 1702b) were observed at the Franciscan church.

A year after Charles II plunged Europe into the War of the Spanish Succession by willing his throne to a grandson of Louis XIV, the provinces of Florida finally rang out the Spanish Hapsburgs and rang in the House of Bourbon. Governor Zúñiga proclaimed the news on the evening of the day it arrived, and that night in the city, bells tolled and cannons fired until the late hour of ten o'clock. St. Augustine would formally acclaim its new sovereign on January 6, six weeks later. The governor signed a proclamation

> convoking all the vecinos and residents of St. Augustine, whatever their estate, quality, or condition, to gather on the Day of Kings . . . in the plaza de armas, festively dressed, and on the 5th to make illuminations in the streets before their houses and on their balconies and windows, . . . cleaning the streets and adorning the balconies and windows with hangings, each one as splendid as possible, because that was the day to raise pennants and acclaim don Phelipe, the fifth of that name, our king and lord.

By the evening of the 5th, "vesper to the function," the "noble and loyal city was ready and all its vecinos eager to offer due vassallage with loyalty and cordial love." The cannons of the Castillo opened the festivities.

> The first echo of the bronze beginning the royal salvo had barely resounded, around half past six in the evening, when the bells in all the churches and convents started to peal and the bonfires in the entrances to the streets [began] to be lit, along with many lanterns in the balconies and windows of His Lordship's house and those of the other ministers.

Adding to the general enjoyment, a masque of mounted reformados and vecinos galloped through the streets and the plaza de armas in fancy dress disguises.

At daybreak the rejoicing resumed with a second salvo and another ringing of bells. At three o'clock the sergeant majors and captains of infantry and artillery on active duty or in the reserves, with their companies, marched into the plaza de armas and drew up facing a theatrical stage built for the occasion in front of "the royal houses." The platform was draped with brightly colored hangings and had a rich backdrop and a canopied dais on which stood a canvas painting of the king, surrounded by filigree and jewels. On the floor, which was covered with rugs and pillows, was a cushion with a pedestal and a "curiously decorated" base for the multi-hued and gold-filigreed standard bearing the royal coat-of-arms.

The plaza was crowded with people.

> Beside the squadron of soldiers, [there were] españoles, Indians from all the provinces who ordinarily come to this city, and *negros* and *pardos*, both free and slave; and on benches and seats and at the oriels and other windows of houses on the plaza, a great number of ladies of the families of the principal ministers and other ladies, well adorned.

At four o'clock, persons of importance appeared at the governor's house, where the balconies and galleries had been "arranged and decorated and covered with precious hangings." His Lordship, Governor Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda, was gallantly turned out in a Turkish dresscoat with gold galloons, matching stockings, a hat with a snowy plume, and a finely engraved dress sword and staff. The two "first ministers" and officials of the royal treasury, don Matheo Luis de Florencia and don Juan de Pueyo, also appeared in "grand, expensive clothes." They were accompanied by several "*republicanos*" of high standing, the "*señor cura y vicario*" of the city with his clerics, and the "*muy reverendo padre provincial de San Francisco*" with the definitors and other "grave religiosos," meaning important Franciscans. All of them had been invited to watch the ceremony from the galleries of the governor's mansion.

When the banners of all the companies had been put in place next to the steps to the stage, and a corporal with six musketeers with lit fuses had been stationed at each of the entrances to the plaza, and all the señores and clerics and religiosos were in full view, and the governor and notary and two royal officials had ascended the stage, the notary "in a loud and intelligible voice" called three times for silence. When the drums and fifes were quiet, Treasurer Florencia, holding the

royal standard in his right hand, called out: "Castilla Florida! Castilla Florida! Castilla Florida! For the Catholic king don Phelipe, fifth of the name, God save our king and natural lord, *que viva*!" And while he held the standard aloft, the people shouted as one: "Viva! Viva! Viva!" The infantry volleyed, the banners waved, the artillery in the Castillo salvoed a third time, and all the bells rang out in all the churches.

This united act of acclamation, performed three times, was followed by a joyous scramble, as the treasurer threw commemorative silver coins into the crowd. Descending from the stage, the notables climbed to the upper salon of the governor's house. The governor received the royal standard, positioned it on the gallery overlooking the plaza, and threw more coins and "cascades of different sweets" to the crowd in the patio below. The same were distributed to the guests inside, with "many sweets and chocolates and different drinks."

When the squadron was dismissed, many festively dressed republicanos entered the plaza to "run the ring," throwing a lance through a suspended ring from a galloping horse. This entertainment lasted until evening prayers. Beginning at seven o'clock the stage was put to use for "theatrical performances and panegyrics"[5] by torchlight, "attended by many persons of both sexes and His Lordship," and these "went on until nearly ten at night."

The people of St. Augustine hailed their new king several months before they mourned their old one, preferring to have their ceremonies out of order than out of style. The royal officials deliberately postponed the obsequies for Charles II until the arrival of the situado ship, because the presidio was completely out of the kind of fabric appropriate to drape the catafalque and dress the town in mourning, "being so poor," said Notary Solana, "that it has no shop for drygoods."

Official mourning began on the morning of March 28th. At eight o'clock the governor and officials of the royal treasury left the governor's mansion together, "all three enveloped in deep mourning, with the trains of their capes trailing as far as they could behind them." All "the city—vecinos, reformados, soldiers, captains, and sergeant majors"—turned out with them, "everyone in mourning, with the greatest decency and demonstrations of sentiment." The procession, all male, walked together to the Franciscan church, which had had the honor of being chosen above the parish church for the services. Its nave was dramatically decorated,

> with the catafalque draped with mourning, and many lights on the pillars of the holy church, all its gradas with garlands of gold and silver galloons. And high up on the finial of the catafalque, close to the peak of the church roof, a table was arranged, and on it an urn covered with a cloth of red silk, with its galloons, to serve as a bier, and on that a finely decorated cushion of purple velvet, with its decorations, on which were placed a silver crown and scepter to represent the royal person of our Catholic monarch. Around the catafalque were several large tapers of white wax, like those on the catafalque, to which were fastened many skulls with their imperial crowns on their heads.

The gentlemen took their seats on chairs and benches "covered with black baize, and the vigil began, the offices being performed by many religiosos who came to the function from the nearby doctrinas." The chief sacristan of the parish church was in attendance, but not the parish priest, who pled illness. After the vigil, "with its lessons," the padre provincial sang the Mass, assisted by deacons, and a definitor read the Evangel. The padre predicador preached the funeral sermon from a pulpit swathed in mourning.

To continue the "honors," the Franciscans, singing responses, processed to the center of the nave, incensed the catafalque, and sprinkled Holy Water on its eight sides. At the same time, the bells of the churches and the friary resumed their tolling. The artillery at the royal fort and on the two ships in the harbor were fired at intervals from vespers until noon the next day, when the obsequies concluded with a final response in the upper salon of the governor's house.

The parish priest who did not grace the Franciscan function was still the bachiller Alonso de Leturiondo, who after his quarrel with Governor Torres had gone to Spain on parish business. While there, Leturiondo wrote his long and informative "Memorial to the King of Spain" (Leturiondo, [1700]). In it he dealt with a variety of subjects: the

Castillo and the state of the garrison, the looming threat posed by San Jorge (Charles Town), the inflated prices of local hogs and imported drygoods, the situado and the elaborate frauds of situadores, the appropriate way to tithe maize and cattle, the wages and medical care of soldiers, the presidio's dispatch vessels, the production of naval stores, the need to resettle the island of Santa Catalina, and finally, a long section of ethnographic and botanical miscellany, including detailed directions for digging and processing edible roots. In a frontier parish, a priest learned a little of everything.

NOTES

1. When the governor returned from Havana and tried to resume his office, Sergeant Major Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda confined him in the very rooms he had prepared for himself in the Castillo (Aranda y Avellaneda, 1687; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 32).

2. This may be the sizeable bell on the list of artillery and other military equipment turned over to Sergeant Major Juan de Ayala when he became warden of the Castillo (Inventory, 1683).

3. According to a spy's report in 1739, the man at the bell rang the watch every three or four minutes and the five sentries on the lines called out to each other all night long (Arana and Manucy, 1977: 46).

4. The governor's side of this story is given in Auto, 1697; Menéndez Márquez and Florencia, 1697b; Torres y Ayala, 1697a, 1697b; Torres y Ayala and Menéndez Márquez, 1697.

5. Additional information about amateur theatricals in Florida can be found in Luna [1682?]; Auto, 1697.

CHAPTER 18. THE REFUGEE PUEBLOS

THE END OF THE PROVINCES

The precarious peace between Florida and Carolina began to fracture early in 1702. Contrary to the governor's expressed orders, some Apalache traders ventured into Creek country in search of English muskets. When the Creeks refused to accept anything in exchange but Spanish horses, a restricted commodity, a quarrel broke out and three Apalaches were killed. On May 20, 1702, 100 Indians attacked the Timucuan doctrina of Santa Fé, killing 12 persons and burning the convent and the church. After rescuing the images and some of the sacred ornaments, the defenders took cover behind the wall of the convent huerta. The enemy fought for 3 hours, then left, taking the scalps and some silver vessels (Agramón, 1702; Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702a).

As after the Chacato raid, the Apalaches volunteered to punish the perpetrators, this time with an army of 800. The St. Augustine junta de guerra supported the proposed campaign with some grenade throwers and 20 Spanish soldiers under Captain Francisco Romo de Uriza (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702a; Arnade, 1959b: 35). The joint expedition crossed into no-man's land in mid-October and made camp in a piney woods clearing near the Pedernales, or Flint River. As luck would have it, a second army of 400 well-armed Creeks under Captain Anthony Dodsworth was travelling south on the same road to raid exposed border towns for female slaves. The Apalaches and españoles were taken by surprise. Their mortars—offensive, siege-type weapons for breaching a palisade—were useless in a forest. The first major battle in the Southeastern theater of the War of the Spanish Succession was an English victory and a Spanish rout.

Governor Zúñiga urged the more exposed towns on the northwestern border—places like Bacuqua, Escambé, and Ocuya—to move in closer to the fort at San Luis and to deposit their sacred ornaments, images, and other treasures in the sacristy of the San Luis church (Romo de Uriza, 1702; Solana, 1702a; 1702b). He appealed to the new monarch, Philip V. The mission provinces supporting the presidio in this maritime periphery that the Bourbons had so suddenly inherited were in grave danger.

> Your Majesty and his predecessors have maintained these conversiones at great cost for over a hundred years. If they take flight, this work will be lost. It will not be easy to attract them back to their pueblos, and if some of them should come back they would find such a mass of churches and convents and their own Indian council houses and municipal government houses lying in ruins that even though they rebuilt some of them, they would never restore everything to its present perfection (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702b).

A week after the Battle of Pedernales a once-Christian Chacata who claimed to have run away from the Creeks appeared in San Luis with a warning. The following spring, she said, when the maize was one palm high, the Creeks were going to return to Apalache to attack the Christians, while a hundred boats descended on St. Augustine from Charles Town. The Chacata was misinformed about both place and time. Only two days after her warning was delivered to the presidio, an expedition of Creeks and Carolinians on their way to lay siege to St. Augustine reached the outskirts of Guale.

The enemy was coming down the coast by land and by sea. The commander, Colonel James Moore, President of Council for South Carolina,[1] traveled in the supply boats, together with 300 Carolinians and 200 Indian mercenaries. Colonel Robert Daniel, head of the provincial militia, was in charge of the auxiliaries, a "multitude of Indians and *negros*" coming by land. Both Moore and Daniel were Goose Creek men, of a faction notorious in Carolina for their dealings with pirates and Indian slavers and their sharp practices in the deerskin trade. Apart from Moore's army, 500 Yamasees from the cacique Altamaha added to the number of Indian fighting men (Sirmans, 1966: 40–54, 78, 81–86; Covington, 1968a: 11).

The teniente of Guale was Captain Francisco de Fuentes, the same officer who in 1680

had fought to save St. Catherines Island and two years later tried to build a tower on Sapelo Island, rationing the builders with Father Uzeda's maize. In 1702, the Guale garrison consisted of 12 men at Santa María and 3 on duty at the watchtower at the bar of San Pedro (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702c).

Around three o'clock in the afternoon of Saturday, November 4, 1702, a weary Captain Fuentes sat down at San Juan del Puerto to pen a dispatch to the governor. It had taken Colonel Daniel's forces barely 15 hours to overrun Amelia Island.

> Last night, about one [hour] of the night, I heard shots from the place of San Phelipe. I sent to find out what was going on, and they came back with people from Tupiqui and told me that the enemy had fired 11 shots into the watchtower, and that the soldiers were dead (who are Terreros, Domingo González, Juan de Tejada), and two indios, and [another] one wounded, and that they were many people. Right away I dispatched sentries to the roads and took myself to the corral of the convent, because the king's house could be set aflame with one arrow. And while I was seeing to the santos, ornaments, temples, and women and small children, word came to me that the enemy had taken Tupiqui and were on their way to San Phelipe. There being so few soldiers, I sent Indian scouts to see if it was true.
>
> At this the caciques said to me: "Señor Teniente, we cannot make a stand here nor guard a corral this size with only nine Indians (and five of them good for nothing, and these children and women) and so few españoles, against such a multitude as these indios say are coming of ingleses, indios, and *negros*." "Sons," I responded, "do not go to the woods, where you will most likely perish. A better reconnaissance has to be made for this to be abandoned." The Ensign don Luis being there with a horse, I sent him to reconnoitre. He ran into the enemy on the other side of San Felipe. They fired a shot at him and he fired back, and although the horse fell, he returned and told me that they were a multitude, many dressed in white.
>
> What with the statement of the caciques and the clamoring of the women, and the few españoles or indios—most of the ones of Santa María having gone, with many women and a religioso, to harvest the plantings they have close to Tupiqui, whom we suppose are also dead—I resolved, so that not everything would be lost, to bring the ornaments, santos, women, and children to safety here in San Juan, with the help of God, who knows what it cost me. And just as they were getting the last boatload across, the enemy reached the landing, firing shots at the piragua and brandishing their cutlasses. It is incredible what a machine they are! . . . May God save [us] all (Fuentes, 1702a)!

From San Juan, the refugees could see three pillars of smoke rise from their sacked and burning towns, all that remained of Guale Province.

As soon as he received Fuentes's dispatch, Governor Zúñiga sent Captain Joseph Horruytiner to him with 20 soldiers and some ammunition. Horruytiner found Fuentes trying to dig trenches and fortify the wall at San Juan, but that town too was nearly deserted, and the teniente complained that he had no one to obey him. When Santa María went up in flames, most of the people of San Juan had been with their friar harvesting their fields at a place called Pilejirigua and they had not come back. The others, together with many of the Guales, had left for the south side of the river without his being able to stop them (Fuentes, 1702a; Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702c).

Fuentes found himself reduced to guarding the church treasure and two friars, Manuel de Uriza and Domingo Santos.

> Through the woods, swamps, and pine barrens I have wandered with the religiosos, with a thousand labors, because it seems to them from the alarms we have heard that they are not safe anywhere, and thanks to God we came out on the bank of this river and they passed to the other side with some people (Fuentes, [1702b]).

At the river bank, he tried to rouse the people of Santa María to

> capture the boats in a creek near the bar, where they have them under 20 Englishmen and 20 Indians, half of them crippled and old, but I cannot do it because I do not have suitable men or enough firearms or munitions. . . . I will put the women and small children on the other bank for greater safety; the ornaments are well hidden. They have killed 5, and 3 are missing (Fuentes, [1702b]).

Governor Zúñiga had hoped that the troops under Captains Horruytiner and Fuentes, together with the fighting men of Guale and Mocamo, most of whom had firearms, might make a stand at the St. Johns bar. At the same time, he did not want the English to capture

any Guales, who "being facile Indians" would no doubt go over to them as guides and informers (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702d; 1702e). On his way to San Juan, Captain Horruytiner had managed to capture two Englishmen and one young Cherokee named Agramón, all three of whom had readily told the governor all they knew.

In the end, the enemy made their way down the coast virtually unhindered, overrunning and burning the town of Santa Cruz and two other places. They captured three friars: Domingo Poze, Domingo Santos, and Manuel de Uriza, who were detained in Charles Town for three years (Geiger, 1940), and a soldier, Andrés Alvarez. Scouts reported that the men Moore left to guard his boats had Alvarez carrying firewood, fastened by the neck—"and all because of going to look for his Indian woman," said Fuentes, ingenuously revealing what most floridanos were at pains to conceal, namely, the commonness of interracial unions in the colony (Fuentes, [1702b]).

St. Augustine prepared itself to go inside the Castillo de San Marcos and lock the door. In all, the governor expected to be responsible for 1500 "mouths," counting the refugees from Guale and Santa Cruz, who had arrived with nothing but the clothes on their backs. Exercising martial law, he ordered everyone with a private store of maize to bring it into the fort. Horsemen rounded up all the cattle within reach and drove them into the dry moat (Arnade, 1959b; Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702c; 1702g).

Secular priests, friars, and cofradía managers rapidly collected and brought to the fort all the images, paintings, vessels, vestments, crosses, and bells from the churches and shrines, although for lack of space, time, or manpower, they left behind the Franciscan library and the parish church organ (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702e; 1702f; [Zúñiga y Cerda] and royal officials, 1702; Pueyo and Horruytiner, 1707). Governor Zúñiga had a personal interest in the safety of the sacra, for some of the costly images, mantles, veils, silver crowns, shrouds, and altarcloths were his own alms to the Franciscans (Leturiondo, [1707]). But concern for objects necessary to divine worship was not limited to the religious and the governor. These outward symbols of Catholic Christianity, Spanish Florida's *raison d'être*, were the chief unifying feature of its caste society. Together, Indians and floridanos had worked to acquire these symbols, and together they would hide them, defend them, and laboriously cart them here and there.

During the siege, which lasted from November 10 to December 30, persons of every racial background and social level found unity and comfort in their faith. They observed all feast and fast days with due solemnity. Over the cries of the wounded they could hear the saints being implored from four in the morning until late at night, with Masses, *salves* to the Virgin, litanies, and the praying of the rosary (Leturiondo, [1707]).

One of the natives who sought a haven in the fort was a Yamás who seemed unusually well armed for a Christian—the same Juan Lorenzo who with his wife, son, and three neighbors had disappeared from Amelia Island in the mid-1690s—had reappeared in the company of a girl and a woman with a nursing child. He was apprehended for being "an indio *ladino* [that is, acquainted with the Spanish language and customs] who has twice scaled this royal fort to escape from it, being confined in it for murders and other offenses, and who has been exiled several years in the city of Havana." Juan Lorenzo would not confess that he had come to blow up the powder magazine in the fort and incite the other Indians to join the enemy. The girl confessed it, to stop the judicial torture of his questioning (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1702h).

Moore had brought only four cannon, and fire from the fort kept them out of range. He sent to Jamaica for longer range artillery, but before it could arrive, four Spanish men-of-war sailed up to block the harbor. Moore burned his eight boats with many of his stores and retreated to Carolina, his men scavenging the ruins of Indian towns for food. Spanish officials calculated that the damage done to St. Augustine totalled 56,520 pesos (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1704; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 42). Some things were irreplaceable. A Protestant clergyman deplored the wanton destruction of the Franciscan library, with its Greek and Latin Fathers and Holy Scriptures (Gannon, 1965a: 74), and historians have long regretted the loss of the Franciscan archive.

The expedition cost South Carolina £4000

more than planned, leading to riots in Charles Town. But the incoming governor, Sir Nathaniel Johnson, shared Moore's concern about the Franco-Spanish alliance and approved a second expedition, predominantly of Creek auxiliaries (Sirmans, 1966: 86–87).

Moore's invasion of Apalache in the winter of 1703–1704 proved more rewarding than his assault on the east coast in 1702–1703. Most of Apalache's sacred treasure had been transferred to its two best fortified towns, the western center of San Luis and the eastern center of Ivitachuco. San Luis was too strong to take, and Moore stopped short of it. Ivitachuco came to terms; don Patricio de Hinachuba ransomed his town with several mule loads of provisions and religious treasure (Bushnell, 1979: 9). The one town that put up a resistance was Ayubale, where the Creeks captured the corral next to the church and convent and set fire to the buildings (Zúñiga y Cerda, 1704). After the Battle of Ayubale many of the Apalaches changed sides. By Moore's count, 300 men and 1000 women and children returned with him to Carolina as free migrants, in addition to the 4000 women and children he took as slaves and the 325 Apalache men he killed or enslaved (Hann, 1988c: 270).

The Creeks returned to Apalache in June, defeating a force from San Luis and taking the two towns of Aspalaga and Patale. Father Manuel de Mendoza, who had once given the poor of St. Augustine a year's worth of his rations, was tricked into opening a window in the Patale convent and killed by a well-aimed bullet. A burial party found his body several days later, beneath the palisade and fallen walls. After the Battle of Patale and the tortures that the victorious Creeks meted out to their captives, both Spanish and Indian, so many more Apalaches changed sides that the guard at the fort at San Luis refused entry to any native without a Spanish companion. Many of the Apalaches took off for Pensacola, French Mobile, or parts unknown, declaring that they would not remain to die with Spaniards (Auto, 1705a; 1705b; Hann, 1988c: 279–283, 393; Jones et al. 1991: 19–22).

In St. Augustine, a junta de guerra voted reluctantly to abandon Apalache Province. Soldiers and Indians together tore down the blockhouses at Ivitachuco and San Luis and spiked and exploded the guns. They had to burn many religious articles, for the port of San Marcos was closed to boats and there were not enough oxen and horses to transport the sacra to St. Augustine (Bushnell, 1979: 11–12). Perhaps, as John Hann suggested, they buried the heavy altarstones and the stone or plaster statues along with the larger bells (Hann, 1986a: 158).

Don Patricio and Teniente Manuel Solana jointly conducted a caravan of 400 survivors out of the province. Solana and a squad of soldiers went first, driving 600 head of cattle. A second squad escorted the oxcarts bearing the silver vessels, vestments, some images, four small bells, and the Spanish baggage. Next came the women and children with the Indian baggage. Don Patricio with other chiefs and warriors brought up the rear. At San Francisco de Potano the Apalache refugees turned southward to build a new town of Ivitachuco at Abosaya, a "place of cattle and wild fruits" (Bushnell, 1979: 11–13). Solana took the treasure on to St. Augustine where it was inventoried and turned over to the Franciscan superior (Solana, 1704; Hann, 1986a).

Moore's invasions of 1702 and 1704 introduced a long war of attrition (Boyd et al., 1951). The people of Ivitachuco-at-Abosaya, after suffering a two-month siege during which none of the ammunition the governor had promised them reached them, gave up and removed to St. Augustine (Bushnell, 1979: 13–16). When an enemy party overran San Francisco in Timucua, Governor Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez retired the troops and auxiliaries from their positions in Santa Fé, La Chua, and Salamototo (Chatelain, 1941: 84). Several "towns" of Timucuans who had wandered with their friars from place to place for three years, unable to find safety "in the deepest woods or most intricate canebrakes," followed (Franciscans, 1707). All together, reported the treasury officials in 1706, 29 doctrinas had been "extinguished," and "in all these extensive domains and provinces the law of God and preaching of the holy evangel [have] come to an end, after more than 150 years of great expenses to the lord kings" (Florencia and Pueyo, 1706).

On or around Christmas, 1707, a "melancholy" 26-year-old Timucuan Catholic

named Lamhatty drew a map for Virginia planter John Walker which revealed the fate of some of the Apalaches and western Timucuans who had left Spanish territory in 1704. Lamhatty and his companions had fled to the Choctaws and Tawasas at the confluence of the Chattahoochee and Flint rivers, near the old mission of Sabacola. There they joined a 10-town Tawasa confederation, which lasted until the Tuscaroras made war on them in 1706 and 1707. Lamhatty's freedom had been a casualty of that war (Waselkov, 1989a: 313–320).

A manuscript map in the British Colonial Office shows the "Province of the Timooquas," a territory "Wholly laid waste being destroyed by the Carolineans, 1706." The camino real from St. Augustine to Apalache is identified as the "Course of Col. Barnwell in the year 1708" (Boyd, 1953: 463–464). Thomas Nairne of South Carolina reported in that same year that

> the garrison of St. Augustine is by this warr Reduced to the bare walls their Casle and Indian towns all consumed Either by us In our Invasion of that place or by our Indian subjects, . . . who in quest of Booty . . . have brought in and sold many Hundreds of them. . . . The good prices The English Traders gives them for slaves Encourages them to this trade Extremely and some men think it both serves to Lessen their number before the French can arm them and it is a more Effectual way of Civilizing and Instructing, Then all the Efforts used by the French Missionaries (Nairne, 1708).

Father Joseph Bullones estimated that of the Christian natives who survived Moore's second invasion, four-fifths were "annihilated" in the later raids (Bullones, 1728). Inasmuch as the raiders seized infieles as readily as Christians, Spanish authorities had no accurate way of knowing how many Florida Indians were being consigned to slavery. Governor Córcoles estimated in 1708 that the number the slave-catchers had already taken could be anywhere from 10,000 to 20,000 (Matter, 1990: 163).

Unable to undertake a campaign against Carolina without outside help and getting no response from the viceroy, Córcoles was delighted when a French captain, Jacques Lefebvre, came to St. Augustine in the summer of 1706 with men and ships from Havana, ready to sail against Charles Town. All he asked for was a few boats for use in shallow water and as many men as could be spared. With the approval of the junta, the governor gave him two canoas, a half-galley, 30 soldiers, and some Indian volunteers. The Lefebvre expedition was a disaster. The South Carolina militia and Indian auxiliaries captured 320 French, Spanish, and Indian prisoners and killed over 30 (TePaske, 1964: 117–120).

UNDER THE GUNS OF THE FORT

The Consejo de Indias essentially wrote off the mission provinces in 1706. The loyal Indians and their priests, confined to the environs of St. Augustine, rapidly shifted from the credit to the debit side of the colonial ledger. Once Spanish Florida's main asset, they were now its main liability. Royal funds to support Indians and missionaries had become alms indeed.

The number of refugees at the presidio gradually increased as first Guale, then Apalache, then Timucua became unsafe places in which to live. By 1708 some 300 Indians lived in the vicinity of St. Augustine (Matter, 1990: 163). To protect presidio and pueblos together, Governor Córcoles constructed a "thick palisade" a cannon's shot north of the Castillo. This developed into the "Hornwork," a 15-foot parapet of sod planted with Spanish bayonets, with artillery along its length and a fortress with 6 cannon on the eastern end, at old Nombre de Dios. The governor also organized a cavalry company and paid the Indians a 25-peso bounty for every enemy they killed or captured (Chatelain, 1941: 84–85; TePaske, 1964: 122).

The tables were turned. Native Christians whose farming mothers and hunting fathers had been feeding soldiers, settlers, and missionaries for generations now let the Spanish look after them. The governor informed the Crown in 1708 that he had assigned the Indians land

> in line of the cannon of this Royal Fort, and we are maintaining them and helping with the best we can at your expense and from the Royal warehouses so that they may not perish until they can till the land and raise a crop to help support themselves (cited in Chatelain, 1941: 84).

In 1711 a count of Christian Indians showed 358, including 163 Apalache and Costa refugees (Deagan, 1990b: 301). Christians and infieles together came to 401, all living within "a pistol shot" of the fort in seven pueblos: Nombre de Dios, Tolomato, San Juan del Puerto, Salamototo, San Luis de Talimali, Santo Tomás de Santa Fé, and Santa Caterina de Guale (Hann, 1989: 182). The semi-siege conditions under which the presidio existed interfered with agriculture, and it also prevented the harvesting of wild foods. When, on top of this situation, situado deliveries were interrupted, the result was famine. The "Great Hunger" of 1712 was remembered for years (Arana and Manucy, 1977: 42).

Queen Anne's War dragged on until 1713. It was followed by the so-called "Yamasee War," a widespread revolt of Yamasees, Creeks, Choctaws, some Cherokees, and various tribal groups from the piedmont and Port Royal district against their one-time British allies, who were demanding immediate payment for the muskets, ammunition, and rum sold to them on credit during the war, and when they could not pay, seizing their wives and children as collateral and selling them as slaves (Crane, 1956: 162). During the war, the Yamasees east of the Savannah River launched an attack on the traders in the expectation of Creek and Cherokee help and were defeated when that did not materialize. Accepting the inevitable, they came en masse to seek safety in the same Spanish colony that their Yamás and Guale mothers and fathers had deserted 40 years before (Consejo de Indias, 1716; Bolton and Ross, 1925: 63–64). Their arrival added 500 people to the population under the guns of the fort. Governor Córcoles welcomed them as potential allies, promised them firearms and food, and persuaded the Crown to increase the Indian situado from 1500 ducats (2063 pesos) to 6000 pesos (TePaske, 1964: 198; Hann, 1989: 184–186).

The arrival of the Yamasees brought about a shuffling of village sites. A census made by cavalry captain Joseph Primo de Rivera in 1717 showed 946 natives living within 5 leagues of St. Augustine in 10 pueblos, 2 of which were identified as "Ibaja." "Santa Catharina de Guale," with Domingo Gaina as doctrinero, don Alonso de la Cruz as principal cacique, 8 principales, and a total of 18 "infieles agregados," was the larger of the two pueblos, with 49 men, 46 women, 18 boys, and 12 girls, making a total of 125 inhabitants. The other pueblo of "the Ibaja tongue and nation" was Tolomato, with 64 people, all Christian (Hann, 1989: 184–186). In 1723 and 1724, 8 children and 7 adults of the "Ybaxa" nation were baptized in the town that preserved the memory and name of Santa Catalina. In 1726, Santa Catharina de Guale, an "Iguaja" town, had 104 inhabitants, and Tolomato, 51 (Benavides, 1724; Hann, 1989: 192, 195).

Although Philip V had nearly tripled the Indian fund in 1716, its new figure of 6000 pesos was still inadequate, because the Lower Creeks followed the Yamasee lead, appearing in St. Augustine to offer their friendship and ask for gifts. Between 1717 and 1721 the cost of servicing Florida's Indian alliances averaged 9516 pesos a year. In an effort to reestablish at least one of the provinces, interim governor Juan de Ayala y Escobar built a fort at San Marcos de Apalache in 1718 that would double as a trading post and distribution center for local Yamasees and Lower Creeks. For all their good intentions, however, the Spanish were unable to sustain the flow of gifts and trade goods necessary to an 18th-century Indian alliance. Carolinian and French traders and agents stepped into the breach. The Lower Creeks learned to court all sides, and Spain was left with no allies of significance in the Southeast except the friendless Yamasees (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 65–71; TePaske, 1964: 125–130, 199–210).

The 1720s were a period of intense warfare among Southeastern Indians. These conflicts were not mere proxy wars, with one European colony pitting its allies against those of a neighboring colony. Although fought with European firearms and ammunition and fueled by the mounting demand for Indian slaves, they represented longstanding enmities among the Indians themselves. Lieutenant Diego Peña's letter to the governor from San Marcos in 1723 is revealing.

> The Talipuses from seven places of the Province of Caveta and many Apiscas [Yuchis] allied with our neighbors of Carolina are descending with four ingleses. . . . In Apalachicola they

killed two Christian Yamases, in Ocone a woman, in Iufala another woman, scalping them and giving the scalps to those ingleses, [who say] that their intention is to wipe out the name of the Yamás, together with their descendants [among the] Apalachinos and Viajas [Yguajas], giving a large prize for every scalp of the said nations. For a Yamás that the *tascaya* Cusapa took in San Luis, the governor of Carolina gave him clothing piled to reach his shoulders, a barrel of rum, a musket, and all the ammunition he wanted, besides gifts to those with him. . . .

They are coming against the [Yamasee] pueblos of Tamasle and Chilacaliche. The [chief of] Chilacaliche told me that he would not abandon that pueblo, although he well knew that he would die. Half an hour later he returned and, influenced by the others, told me to give him the rest of the clothing. When I said no, that he and the [chief of] Tamasle had already taken half, he responded angrily that if I did not give it to him he would take it away from me on the road. I answered that he would do so at his peril. . . . In short, Sire, by the next day the place was totally depopulated and abandoned. . . . Those of the place of Tamasle embarked at the same time. . . . Fear is what keeps them loyal, nothing else (Peña, 1723).

The people of St. Augustine had ample reason to be apprehensive in the 1720s. Chronic Indian warfare kept their city in a state of semi-siege, while in former Guale Province the British built Fort King George at the mouth of the Altamaha and held it despite diplomatic remonstrances from 1721 to 1727. Believing that the best offense was a defense, Governor Antonio de Benavides (1718–1734) built a second set of defenseworks for the presidio: the Cubo line to the north, connecting to the Rosario line on the west and south. The combined "line of circumvallation" was completed in 1721.

No sooner was the Cubo-Rosario line in place than the vecinos began to urge Benavides to reinforce it with a stone wall. At their insistence, he diverted to the project the very funds that the Crown at long last had released to rebuild the parish church and the Franciscan convent: the 40,000 pesos that the viceroy had sent from the Mexico City treasury, plus 13,254 pesos from the St. Augustine treasury's *comisos*, or confiscations fund. When these were not enough, the soldiers of the garrison and 30 vecinos pledged 10,000 pesos against the next situado, to be deducted from their wages or other monies coming to them (Benavides, 1723; Chatelain, 1941: 85–87).

The perils of living on the other side of the city wall were demonstrated on All Saints Day, 1725, when 30 Yuchis surprised the Yamasees of the pueblo of Thama at Mass. The doctrinero escaped, fleeing with his chalice in a canoa, but a number of Yamasees were killed or captured (Bullones, 1728). After this attack, the Franciscans assigned to the various pueblos moved inside the city wall. Governor Benavides called on all the pueblos of Indians to move nearer, at least within cannon range. For months, many natives spent the nights inside the wall and the days in sight of the gates, venturing farther only for food or firewood (St. Augustine Vecinos, 1725).

The next year saw a truce in the Indian wars. A delegation of Yuchi dignitaries came to St. Augustine to sit in the great hall of the governor's house and smoke the peacepipe with Spanish authorities—civil, religious, and military—and the Christian caciques of surrounding pueblos. The Yuchi negotiators stated their case frankly. If their father the king of Spain could provide them with muskets, powder, and clothing they would come over to the Spanish side and would stop selling their deerskins to the English. If not, they would continue as they were (Consejo de Indias, 1724; Benavides, 1726a). It was a fair offer. The governor and his advisors agreed to Yuchi terms and tried to honor their agreement, but Great Britain's flow of trade goods was not to be matched.

Although the pull factor of Spanish trade goods was too weak to hold the Indians north of St. Augustine to a Spanish alliance, the push factor of warfare continued to impel the Indians south of St. Augustine to take cover under the Spanish shield. Raids deep into the "Rinconada" were creating a third wave of refugees to the presidio, this time of "wild" Indians from as far south as Ais. Between 1722 and 1726 the number of these newcomers rose to 480 out of the nearly 1000 Indians in the St. Augustine environs. In 1728 the total number of natives attached to the presidio reached a high of 1350, despite an epidemic in 1727 that came close to wiping out whole villages of the recently arrived (Bullones, 1728; Deagan, 1990b]).



Fig. 18.1. Simplified rendering of the Pablo Castello map of St. Augustine's defenses, showing the city walls and surrounding defenses as they stood in 1764. (After Chatelain, 1941: map 13.)

Wary of missionaries and little affected by 200 years of sporadic contact with Europeans, the "wild" Indians were in effect dumped on the Franciscan doorstep. Bullones, describing the newcomers to don Gerónimo Valdés, bishop of Cuba, was clearly daunted at the prospect of trying to convert them. The "wild" Indians would not confine themselves to any one place, he objected. A doctrinero who happened to learn where they were could try to coax them to stay there with gifts of rum, tobacco, and maize, but soon they would take a fancy to leave it. Communication with them was impossible, for the variety of their languages was so great that nobody even knew how many there were.

Father Bullones identified several groups by name. Most of the Jororos living with the Pojoys and Amacapiras nine leagues to the south, eating alligators and "other unclean animals," had died in the epidemic, and the rest had returned to their ancestral places. The towns of Palica, Casapuyas, and Pozotalaca had, on the other hand, moved in closer. The Costas, he characterized with disgust as a "vile" and "useless nation," "fickle, tran-

sient," and "Carib." They had placed their town under the very walls of the fort; a soldier leaning over the parapet could have fired a pistol into it.

Each of the nine pueblos had its own small church. For the most part, these were sorry structures of "*paja*," or palm thatch. The largest pueblo, called "Little" Nombre de Dios, within musket range of the fort, had one of the better churches, with board walls to keep out the driving rain. Some Timucuans lived there, having moved in from a site two leagues farther away to escape the harassment of the "Chicasaes" and "other nations with whom they are at war" (Bullones, 1728; Beteta, 1738).

A group of Yamasees, mostly Christians, lived mixed with Apalaches at the pueblo of "Moze," three quarters of a league from the presidio. A larger number of Yamasees lived at old Nombre de Dios, also called Macariz, where the alms of the devout had built a church and a convent with masonry walls. Bullones reminded the bishop that old Nombre de Dios was the site of the first Mass in St. Augustine and home of the "most miraculous" and venerated image of Nuestra Señora de la Leche. In 1722 the secular and regular clergy had honored the shrine with one of their periodic scandals. Apparently the Franciscans had tried to take Our Lady out of her church temporarily "to bless a shrine of Nuestra Señora de la Leche" for a doctrina of "Chiluque" converts on their feastday, and the parish priest had rained injunctions on them and demanded that Governor Benavides send soldiers to call a halt to the procession (Benavides, 1722; Bullones, 1728).

All of the Indian pueblos were properly missions, insisted Bullones. Even the Indians who had long been Christian were too poor to support a priest. They paid nothing for their weddings, nuptial Masses, or funerals. Instead, the doctrineros provided them with candles and shrouds out of their own small stipends and said their Masses for nothing, "for they have never known or had the wherewithal to pay any of those obventions, or the tithes either, which have not been the custom in those provinces, nor do they have the fruits with which to do it" (Bullones, 1728).

On March 12, 1728, the illusion of safety under the guns of the fort was shattered. Colonel John Palmer from Charles Town, with an army of 300 Englishmen and 100 Indians, came to St. Augustine to punish Yamasees and fugitive slaves who, with Spanish backing, had been mounting raids on Carolina plantations. For three days, in full view of the Castillo, Palmer pillaged and burned, killing 30 Yamasees and taking 15 prisoner. His men breached the Hornwork palisade at old Nombre de Dios and stole everything used to celebrate Mass and administer the sacraments, down to the crucifix and the censer. To manifest their hatred of Catholicism, they made "bitter ravages to the images" and set fire to the church and convent. Not one soldier was sent out to defend the Yamasees and *negros* who had turned to Spain for protection; the guns of the fort stayed silent.

After the Palmer raid, Governor Benavides ordered the stone buildings at old Nombre de Dios blown up and all the unsightly shacks and maize stalks of Little Nombre de Dios and the other squatter pueblos cleared away from around the Castillo (Benavides, 1728; Bullones, 1728; Geiger, 1940: 132–138; TePaske, 1964: 208–209; Landers, 1990: 321). Native population stood at a more manageable level. The Yamasees and many of their friends had left St. Augustine for good.

NOTE

1. The proprietors never confirmed Moore as governor (Sirmans, 1966: 86).

CHAPTER 19. THE CONTEXT OF SECULARIZATION

A BISHOP IN RESIDENCE

No Spanish colony was patently mature and prosperous until it had a bishopric of its own. Because it lacked the tithes to support its own priests, much less a bishop, Florida took a long time to reach this stage. The yearly episcopal shares of Florida's tithes were so minimal that the diocesan clergy seldom bothered to collect them. Most of the bishops of Santiago de Cuba, to which the colony's one Spanish parish of St. Augustine was suffragan, either donated their Florida revenues to the relief of the poor of the parish or tacitly let them be absorbed by church expenses. The Crown, for its part, routinely assigned the king's share of tithes to local church and hospital construction (Bushnell, 1981: 76–79).

None of this prevented floridanos and royal appointees from lobbying the Crown for a bishopric. As early as the 1640s Governor Salazar and the treasury officials were calculating how soon the tithes of floridanos would be substantial enough to support a bishop, or at least an abbacy like the one Jamaica had. The Indian rebellions of the mid-17th century set the process back. In the 1670s and 1680s, however, the double demand of rations for Castillo laborers in St. Augustine and provisions for the Fleet of the Indies in Havana stimulated the spread of Spanish ranches and interest in a bishopric revived.

In 1691 the bishop of Cuba, don Diego de Evelino y Compostela, hoping to rid himself of a thankless and unprofitable responsibility, lent his support to a plan to make Florida an independent diocese. In the budget he submitted, a bishop would cost 3000 ducats per year, of which two-thirds could come from Florida's tithes and one-third from the Indian fund. The Consejo de Indias consented only to an auxiliary bishop who would reside in St. Augustine but be subordinate to the See of Santiago de Cuba. Philip V presented this idea to Pope Clement XI, who endorsed it in 1703. The honor went to Father Dionisio Resino, the oldest priest in Cuba (Robertson, 1931; Gannon, 1965a: 78; Matter, 1990: 163).

By that time, Colonel Moore's two invasions had reduced Florida's ecumene to a fraction of its former size and its tithes had shrunk correspondingly. Several more years elapsed before the bishop and the Crown could reach agreement as to which of them should make up the difference. Father Resino was finally consecrated and sent to his post in 1709. The new auxiliary bishop was aware that St. Augustine could not offer him a cathedral or an episcopal mansion, but he did expect to find a church and a friary. After completing his inspection and confirmations, he returned to Cuba on the ship that had brought him (Robertson, 1931: 173–174; Gannon, 1965a: 78–79; Matter, 1990: 163).

The Franciscans were not sorry to see him go. Members of their Order were not prone to welcome episcopal attention anywhere. As late as 1730, when the bishop of Durango attempted to establish diocesal authority over the Franciscan Custody of New Mexico within his jurisdiction by making a formal inspection of churches, baptismal fonts, books of baptisms, holy oils and chrism, sacristies, vestments, altar stones and altars, the friars blocked him at every turn and refused to let him enter their churches except to preach and to confirm. The bishop later wrote to the viceroy that none of the Franciscans in New Mexico knew the native languages, and that he had had to post a schedule of fees because they were overcharging the Indians for marriages and burials (Adams, 1971; Kessell, 1987: 326–328, 332).

Joseph Bullones's 1728 letter to the bishop of Cuba, discussed in Chapter 18, was written to emphasize the poverty of the nine Florida missions and make it clear that none of them was in any position to have a "*cura colado*" (Bullones, 1728). A cura colado was a priest who had presented himself to the bishop for the canonical "*colación*," or episcopal seal of approval to administer the sacraments, and who collected from his parishioners the fees the diocese had established and sent a quarter of the amount collected to the diocesan headquarters (Tibesar, 1967: 455).

Father Antonio de Florencia, a floridano, had already informed the Crown that it was not the custom for Florida friars to obtain

the "collation," because the Florida doctrinas "were rigorous administrations, because all of the Catholic Indians with the exception of 300 persons perished in the rebellion that they had in years past when they flocked to the protection of the ingleses of Carolina," and "the pueblos that have started to be formed now were composed of indios infieles who were being converted to our holy faith" (Spanish Crown, 1725b). The Crown sent a précis of the Florencia letter to the bishop of Cuba, who dismissed it with the comment that the Franciscans of Florida had persistently opposed episcopal authority and the exercise of the real patronato (Spanish Crown, 1725a).

During his long governorship, from 1718 to 1734, Benavides did not press the Crown to replace the auxiliary bishop. This may have been partly because he was embroiled in quarrels with the parish priest, the chaplain of the fort, and another ecclesiastic (Spanish Crown, 1725a), and partly because a bishop was likely to investigate what had happened to the building funds for the church and convent, which Benavides had appropriated to build a stone wall on the city's defense perimeter.

A more serious problem, as far as the Crown was concerned, was the rift developing in the ranks of Florida Franciscans between the peninsulars and the creoles, one that replicated the political division endemic to religious orders throughout Spanish America. In 17th-century Peru the conflict became a standoff with the *alternativa*, whereby the parties alternated provincial offices, but the alternativa did not work in Florida. After the destruction of the mission provinces, many of the Spanish-born friars accepted transfers to other colonies, leaving the field to the creoles. The 9 new friars who arrived from Spain in 1719 found them entrenched and unwilling to share their newfound authority. Philip V and the Franciscan Commissary General dispatched another 10 friars, trying to create a peninsular bloc, but the creoles made all 19 Spaniards so miserable that by 1727, 17 of them had taken ship for Havana. In 1732 the king sent 9 more peninsulars to the faction-ridden post. The creoles shifted them rapidly from place to place, which made it impossible to learn an Indian language, and withheld part of their rations (Franciscans, 1735; Montiano, 1739; TePaske, 1964: 181–187).[1]

Governor Benavides tried to calm the waters at the convento by having the treasury apportion the friars' rations individually, through their syndics. He assured the Crown that the ministers spent "most of their alms on their Indians, in particular the orphans whom they gather to their convents and keep with them," and that they were so busy going and coming to the pueblos under their care that they found it impossible to eat together "from a single kitchen and refectory" (Benavides et al., 1733). But the schism had reached the point that in 1735 the peninsulars held a separate chapter election and chose their own provincial (Gannon, 1965a: 81–82). Both factions sent representatives to argue their cases before the bishop of Cuba. Personally, the bishop favored the creoles, but he referred the matter to the Franciscan Comisario General for New Spain, who voided both elections and appointed a third provincial (TePaske, 1964: 187).

Gone were the days of royal absentmindedness. Population and trade were expanding dramatically in Spanish America, and Havana was one of its fastest growing cities—the third largest one in Spanish America by 1778; and its largest port. St. Augustine, recognized by the Junta de Guerra in 1709 as "the first line of defense for New Spain" (TePaske, 1964: 121), was the only presidio between Havana and the British mainland, ideally placed to be a coastguard station, a contraband depot, or both. From 1731 to 1736, most of St. Augustine's illicit trade was with Charles Town; from 1737 to 1739, it shifted to New York. Ships called on the port with cheap English goods and left it with silver and a cargo of sour oranges (Harman, 1969: 12–24).

Philip V had already set the wheels in motion to bring this strategic, wayward colony to order. In 1731 he had nominated don Francisco de San Buenaventura Martínez Tejada, a Franciscan and a Spaniard, Auxiliary Bishop of Cuba for Florida. Martínez Tejada concluded his duties as a professor of theology and guardián of a convent in Seville, sailed to New Spain in 1732, was consecrated at Vera Cruz with the title of Bishop of Tri-

cale,[2] and arrived in St. Augustine, at last, in July 1735 (Gannon, 1965a: 79; Matter, 1990: 163).

In the four years that had elapsed before the bishop was ready to take up his post, Great Britain's move to found a buffer colony between Carolina and Florida under the leadership of General James Oglethorpe, in 1733, had introduced a dangerous new element to the border conflict on the Atlantic coast. Ignoring the treaty of 1670, the Georgia grant took in all the land between the Savannah and Altamaha rivers, and ignoring the boundaries of the grant, Oglethorpe soon began to construct a chain of forts down the sea islands (St. Simons, Jekyll, Cumberland, Amelia, and Talbot) to the St. Johns River. This, and his aggressive Indian policy of gifts and honors, won the Lower Creeks over to his side.

Governor Francisco del Moral Sánchez, a Cuban creole who had risen through the ranks to captain, soon sized up the situation: "The only way to keep the friendship of these inconstant infieles is to supply them with gewgaws for their adorning in return for the skins of all kinds of animals" (Moral Sánchez, 1734; TePaske, 1964: 11–12, 17). To recoup the costs of his appointment, he was ready to trade with anyone, himself. Out of his first year's salary of 4000 pesos, he was expected to pay a 2000-peso "*media anata*," not ordinarily assessed in a combat zone, plus a surcharge of one-third of the 2000 pesos for the emoluments of office, plus a second surcharge of 18 percent of that total for shipping the money to Spain (Moral Sánchez, 1735a). These costs left him with barely more than 10 percent of his first year's earnings.

Bishop Martínez Tejada, too, had reasons for dissatisfaction. The Crown had guaranteed him 2200 pesos in income a year, out of which he was expected to support the chaplains, or canons, who attended him during pontifical services. When he learned that his predecessor had not only been paid a higher salary but had also been provided with six chaplains, he protested that he could not maintain the dignity of his office with fewer than six himself (Moral Sánchez, 1735b). The Franciscans would not attend him simply because he was a member of their Order, at least not the creoles. He did not even have the vestments for pontifical celebrations until they were made in St. Augustine, at a cost of 100 pesos (Gold, 1966: 380–382).

The bishop began immediately to improve the religious life of the city. He reroofed the leaking parish church at the old hospital of La Soledad, reinforced its board walls, and built a stone sacristy. He sponsored processions of the Rosary on feastdays and fine evenings, summoned the "children of Spaniards" to church three times a week during Lent and catechized them personally, and opened a charity grammar school in his own home from which the boys marched, "chanting the doctrine," every afternoon to church to recite the Rosary. He prohibited gambling and lewd dancing in the taverns and heretical preaching by English traders on street corners. He inspected the books of the cofradías and counted four abandoned hermitages: San Sebastián, San Patricio, Santa Barbara, and out on the bar, San Antonio. By April 1736, he had confirmed 630 españoles and 143 *negros*, both free and slave, out of a city population of 1509, counting "men, women, children, and some slaves" (Martínez Tejada, 1736a; 1736b; 1736c; Gannon, 1965a: 79).

The bishop declared that the Indians in the pueblos, who numbered around 250, suffered from a lack of discipline. It was a rare day when one did not see a male or female Indian stretched out drunk in the street (Martínez Tejada, 1735). They argued craftily that drunkenness was no sin for Indians, for "if it were a bad thing to get drunk the King would not give them aguardiente" (Rodríguez, 1736). The peninsular friars feared to correct them, said the bishop, "because here there is a great facility to swear to whatever is wanted." As a result, "these miserable natives are as heathen as if they had not been born in a land of Catholics." The pueblos of Indians were neither missions nor doctrinas—not missions because there were no conversions, and not doctrinas because the creole friars refused to present themselves for examination (Martínez Tejada, 1736a).

With Martínez Tejada's encouragement, the peninsular Franciscans began to catechize in the Castilian language, calling the Indian children by bells to their doctrinas daily at a regular hour. They did not hold classes at the convent, which, said the bishop, "wants to

be a doctrina without Indians, and those that it has it does not care for." His inspection of the convent revealed no "books of marriage or of baptisms" for the natives until the last three or four years, when they began to be allowed to live within the city walls because the convent wished to pass as a doctrina. This breakdown between the Republic of Indians and the Republic of Spaniards had led to "grave damages" and "sins," which he blamed on "the liberty of the indias and their familiarity with the pueblo" (Martínez Tejada, 1736a).

THE MILITARY BASE

Governor Moral Sánchez could present good arguments for his contention that Florida was a combat zone. English "pirates" captured a situado ship in 1735, heralding the resumption of war. Cuban military engineer Antonio de Arredondo, sent to inspect the state of Florida's defenses, confirmed the governor's reports of inadequate artillery and insufficient soldiers to man the many posts: the Castillo de San Marcos, the fort of San Marcos de Apalache, the twin forts Pupo and Picolata on either side of the St. Johns River at the crossing of the road to Apalache, Fort Diego 20 miles north of the presidio, four sentry posts along the coast, and three Indian pueblos.

Arredondo's military recommendation was that the garrison be increased by 800 regular soldiers and 400 sailors, that it be provided with 80 new small boats, and that a supply of rum, tobacco, cloth, and muskets be sent to guarantee Indian neutrality in the coming war. Philip V had something else in mind. He ordered the viceroy of New Spain to send the Cuban governor, don Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, 150,000 pesos and 100 men for the purpose of mounting an expedition from Havana against Georgia (TePaske, 1964: 95, 135–138).

Moral Sánchez did not realize it, but he himself was under investigation. The treasury officials, friars, officers, and principal vecinos of St. Augustine had written to their former governor, Benavides, now Governor of Vera Cruz, accusing Moral Sánchez of conducting commerce with Carolina under cover of provisioning the presidio. Benavides had sent the damning letters to the Secretary of State, don Joseph Patiño, who in April 1736 forwarded them to Governor Güemes with instructions to investigate "this governor" and, if necessary, depose and replace him. The Cuban governor delegated the investigation to the Bishop of Tricale, the one person of authority in St. Augustine who could claim to be an outsider (Güemes y Horcasitas, 1736; Burkholder and Johnson, 1994: 239), and the bishop asked Arredondo, who had the skills of an historian as well as those of an engineer, to take the depositions.[3] Arredondo confided his private opinion of Moral Sánchez to Güemes in a classified letter:

> Business preoccupies his discourse; trafficking in all kinds of materials and goods occupies his mind; and the free commerce with the English impedes him from attending to his duty. More than 60 Englishmen are here, the people of six vessels that are in this river. . . . Yet with all this abundance there are no victuals in the castillo. In fact, most of the vessels bring merchandise to exchange for provisions, and I remit [this] on a brigantine that is going to that city [Havana] with a load of tar (Arredondo, [1736]).

Among the depositions that Arredondo took, that of Father Juan de la Vía stands out for the candour with which he voiced the elite's animosity toward someone they thought of as a common soldier who had risen above his station. "The governor," affirmed Vía on his honor as a priest, was "scandalously living in concubinage in this presidio with a woman he brought here from Havana" and had "made her father an ensign, when it is common knowledge that he is a mulatto." British ships entered the harbor freely with "all kinds of prohibited goods," which the governor bought up "at low prices in order to resell them to the poor, impeding anyone else from buying them." He reshipped part of the British manufactures, dried beef, and Madeira wines to Cartagena or Portobelo and had his servants sell the remainder from shops in the forts of Apalache and St. Augustine. "Instead of building so many castles and forts," the friar objected, "he should first have rebuilt the one castle of this place, which is falling down."

The governor showed no respect for the bishop, Vía continued, and he forced the Franciscans to do as he wanted. He kept the Christian Indians busy logging and sawing

lumber for him to sell in Havana and paid them in aguardiente. Many of them abandoned the provinces to join the infieles, and others would have if their children had been older or if the bishop and the padres had not counseled them to stay. When Father Vía was appointed doctrinero of the pueblo of Santa Catherina de Guale, its blockhouse was in a state of collapse. In view of the danger posed by the infieles, he proposed that his parishioners rebuild it. But the governor, contrary to custom, refused them a ration of maize while they prepared the logs, "without recalling that were it not for the few indios of these pueblos, the indios infieles or the English would have taken Florida many times over." Meanwhile, by systematically shortchanging the natives, the governor kept more than half of the 6000-peso Indian fund (Vía, 1736).

The united "indios and principales of St. Augustine" presented an itemized deposition.

First: They did nothing all year but "work for the Lord Governor in the name of our King and Lord," producing charcoal for the forge and thatch for the galleys and houses, cutting firewood for the outposts, felling trees and making lumber for use at construction sites, and traveling as couriers to the provinces. His Lordship ensured promptness with cudgels and confinements in irons in the castillo for caciques and commoners alike.

Second: The soldiers requisitioned two indios a month from each pueblo to go with them as hunters to the outposts in the provinces. They were absent from home three or four months at a time, during which the governor paid them nothing and there was no one to provide for their wives and daughters. The consequence was "shames and offenses against our God and Lord and against us their husbands," for the women survived "by friending themselves with other indios and by coming to the city to go from tavern to tavern with all sorts of españoles," whereas "none of this would happen if we were not kept to those posts and on those errands, for we would keep them always in our company" and "work to support them."

Third: The governor paid the indios "for the thatch, the charcoal, and the logs" mainly "in aguardiente, in tobacco, in shirts, and in leggings," which he obtained from the English at cheap prices and issued at inflated ones.

Fourth: When the situado arrived in Florida the governor gave each indio 3 arrobas of maize, 2 varas of serge, and an occasional musket in exchange for his old one, which lasted 8 or 10 years. Each cacique received a blanket, and each pueblo a little aguardiente and tobacco to celebrate its saint's day, and that was the sum total of what they were given.

Fifth: The governor invited their "worst enemies" to the presidio. The infieles noted where their pueblos were with respect to the castillo and returned in two or three months to wage war on them with the muskets, powder, and balls that the governor had given them. They were resistant to Christianity, saying frankly that "the reason why they did not wish to be converted or to unite with the españoles" was the governor's treatment of the "Old Christians," that "they in their provinces were free from all that," that "the English gave them whatever they needed" without their having to do any work or pay for it, and that "they were not going to leave these conveniences to come among españoles to be slaves."

Sixth: They wanted a defender to stand up for them and shield them from the governors. They also wanted some consideration shown to them in view of their standing as Old Christians. They had been to the bishop many times asking him as their "pastor" to intercede for them, but he merely counseled them to "have patience" and trust that in the end "God and His Majesty would remedy everything" (St. Augustine Principales, 1736). This last statement may have been added by the bishop, positioning himself as a peacemaker.

Playing the diplomat, Governor Moral Sánchez signed a treaty with Oglethorpe in October, 1736, whereby both sides pledged to restrain their allies from making border raids and agreed to leave the mouth of the St. Johns River unfortified. But Oglethorpe did not speak for South Carolina, safe on the other side of "the debatable land," and Moral Sánchez was about to be ousted from his post. In Spain, he would pace in prison for 11 years, appealing his case, until at last the Consejo de Indias reopened it and dropped all charges

(Bolton and Ross, 1925: 73–74; Chatelain, 1941: 88; TePaske, 1964: 45–56, 136, 209–214).

Reflecting the colony's increasing military importance, the dotación of the garrison, which had been fixed at 355 plazas since 1687, rose in 1737 to 400 plazas. As the omens of war became unmistakable, the new governor, Manuel de Montiano, fortified the approaches to St. Augustine, stationed additional sentries, stepped up cavalry and boat patrols, and sent the Guale Juan Ignacio de los Reyes north to spy on the British fort at Frederica, on St. Simons Island (Reyes, 1738; Chatelain, 1941: 87). Montiano fortified each little pueblo around St. Augustine and gave it one or two pieces of light artillery.

In late 1738 a party of 23 runaway slaves from Port Royal appeared in St. Augustine, drawn by a royal offer of freedom for all fugitives who embraced Catholicism. Governor Montiano treated them much like Indian refugees, assigned a friar to instruct them, and settled them north of town at Mose, renamed "Gracia Real de Santa Teresa de Mosa." There, 38 families of former slaves built a fort and organized themselves into a militia company under a mulatto captain (Petition, 1738; Montiano, 1739; Landers, 1990: 321).

The Cuban expedition against Georgia was cancelled at the last minute, to give the actual diplomats room to maneuver. Governor Güemes shared his surplus with the Florida governor: 400 soldiers, 12 iron cannon, 82 forzados, some engineers and artisans (6 of whom were stonemasons and *negros*), and 6000 pesos. Montiano used the money to build boats and barracks (TePaske, 1964: 139). Oglethorpe used the respite to ready an offense.

When the War of Jenkins' Ear (1739–1742) broke out, the Georgia leader marched into Florida at the head of 2000 British and Indian fighting men, captured the outlying forts, and in the bloodiest action of the campaign, destroyed the houses and fort of Mose. But when, after 37 days and the support of 7 ships, he was unable to breach the city walls, take the Castillo, or blockade the harbor, Oglethorpe withdrew (Sánchez Griñán, 1756; Bolton and Ross, 1925: 86–88; Gannon, 1965a: 79; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 47).

In 1742, two flotillas were assembled to attack Georgia and South Carolina, one of them in Havana and the other in St. Augustine. Under the command of Governor Montiano, the united fleet of 50 vessels and 2800 soldiers and seamen got as far as St. Simons Island, where the men landed and where English forces surprised and defeated them in the Battle of Bloody Marsh. Oglethorpe made a second attempt on St. Augustine in 1743, with no more success than his first. Having shown that they were willing to go on the offensive as well as to stand their ground, Georgia and Florida sat out the rest of the war (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 93–96; Arana and Manucy, 1977: 42).

Floridanos knew how to turn a maritime war to the best advantage. In one year, French and Spanish corsairs brought more than 30 British prizes into the St. Augustine harbor for partition by a wartime court of admiralty. Ships and cargoes had to be sold. Ironically, local merchants and entrepreneurs prospered in wartime off the very goods that in peacetime they were forbidden to handle (Bolton and Ross, 1925: 90).

St. Augustine became a virtual army base, as troops from New Spain and Cuba raised the number of fighting men stationed there to 1000, then 2000 (Chatelain, 1941: 87). Their presence stimulated the local economy by putting extra money into circulation at a time when Florida's own situado was over three years in arrears (Martínez Tejada, 1741).

Martínez Tejada asked the Crown to give some of the soldiers license to marry and settle down. St. Augustine had an excess of single women, he said, because most of the people in town were related, leaving them with no one to marry. Despite his vigilance, there had already been "frequent communication in the houses," with the result that some of the women could now plead "greater cause than a word" of promise to be married. The bright side was that soldiers who were husbands and fathers would be the settlers that Florida needed so badly. "By marrying, they take on a love of country and willingly accept their great labors" (Martínez Tejada, 1741).

THE DOCTRINAS DISSOLVED

In 1737 the Franciscans moved into their fine new coquina friary of 25 cells on the

opposite end of town from the Castillo. Although still plagued by internal discords, they remained united in their opposition to presenting themselves to the Bishop of Tricale for examination and canonical credentials, for it would mean the secularization of the doctrinas. If only the friars were not doctrineros, the problem would solve itself naturally. Martínez Tejada therefore held a hearing and took depositions about the state of the doctrinas, with the object of eliminating them.

The friars, he was told, treated their doctrinas like visitas. The natives stayed away from Mass on days of obligation. When they met a Franciscan or another priest in the streets they did not kneel to ask his blessing (Fernández de Mora, 1738). They did not inform their doctrinero and cacique when they were going out of town, much less ask his leave. They ignored orders to keep their houses of worship "neat and well thatched." The churches were in such a state of neglect that the images and vestments had been removed and services were not held at all in windy, rainy weather. Not one of them possessed a baptismal font or a ciborium. The convents were almost uninhabitable. All but three of them were insubstantial structures of thatch (Auto, 1738).

The Franciscans wanted to

> assign a regular wage to the Indian sacristans for their sustenance and vestments, because they are given a monthly ration for some months but not the whole year and their vestments are not halfway decent. As a result the Indian sacristans pay little or no attention to their duties, and we padres doctrineros have to do the work ourselves (Auto, 1738).

The one exception to the general decay was the church at Nombre de Dios, "to which the faithful show the greatest devotion because of the most sovereign and miraculous image of Nuestra Señora de la Leche venerated there." An Indian sacristan cared for the sacred ornaments that the cofradía of "Our Nursing Lady and Mother" had accumulated since Colonel Palmer's raid 10 years before. The members had not yet replaced everything—they were using a borrowed cross and censer for the Mass—and they had not rebuilt the convent. Perhaps because he was the one who had to use the cramped quarters of the cofradía sacristy, Father Manuel Beteta did not think much of those who called themselves "Old Christians." They lived by their wits, he said, and were "worse than the gypsies of Spain" (Beteta, 1738).

The main convent itself was the doctrina for the natives who lived inside the city. Indian women worked as servants in several of the houses, "and these or the persons who keep them recognize this convent as their doctrina solely for the utility or convenience . . . of being buried for nothing" (Auto, 1738). In addition to these maids, there were 6 Indian households with a total of 24 persons. For the first time, ordinary natives were crossing the line to become ladinos.

> The women whose husbands are soldiers imagine that they are no longer Indians, . . . living without the least obedience or recognition of the convent or of what they are, having gotten above themselves on account of their contacts and familiarity with Spaniards (Sotomayor, 1738).

From a high of 1350 in 1728, the number of Indians in the vicinity of St. Augustine had fallen to 477 in 1736. The next year there were only 276, most of them "Old Christians." The native population rose to nearly 400 at the beginning of the War of Jenkins' Ear, but the new refugees were as impermanent as the old ones. Governor Montiano counted barely 200 Indians in four "pueblecitos" near St. Augustine in 1743.

The Crown dissolved the doctrinas in 1746, making all the Christians in the city—Spaniards, creoles, Indians, mestizos, *negros*, *mulatos*, and *pardos*—members of the parish of St. Augustine. Three small secular parishes survived outside the city walls at Nombre de Dios, Tolomato, and Mosa,[4] but the number of persons in them steadily declined, to 152 in 1752 and 100 in 1759. When the Spanish finally left St. Augustine, only 86 natives would go with them (TePaske, 1964: 215; Gannon, 1965a: 82; Gold, 1966: 386; Hann, 1989: 192–193; Deagan, 1990b; Matter, 1990: 166).

The Franciscans continued to have new occasions to assert their right to offer sanctuary. In the 1750s, when Cuban tobacco smuggling was at its height, the St. Augustine coastguard

arrested a shipload of smugglers, with passengers, and confined them in the Castillo to await sentencing. The passengers managed to escape to the friary, from which they attempted to negotiate terms, appealing to the Consejo de Indias to let their sentences of exile run from the day they accepted confinement in the friary (Auto, [1756]). But the Consejo's legal adviser used their resort to sanctuary against them, stating as his opinion that "their sentences cannot begin until emerging from the *Sagrado* they can be apprehended, for to do otherwise would be an offense against the sacred canons" (Auto, [1756]; Consejo de Indias, 1756).

Two years later, parish priest Juan Joseph Solana and the Franciscans joined hands to reaffirm their right to offer sanctuary (Kapitzke, 1993). The exasperated Governor Lucas Fernando de Palacio y Valenzuela claimed that the ecclesiastics in town were

> seducing the soldiers and *desterrados* under cover of protection, shelter, and piety, into the church, where the greatest and worst delinquents find asylum with impunity; from whence they emerge as out of a fort or a den of thieves to commit further crimes with the same security. . . . [Those who have] taken sanctuary in the churches come to two in that of Tolomato, six in the parish, and the rest of them in St. Francis" (Palacio y Valenzuela, 1758b).

It was more of a walkout than a mutiny. Once the governor promised to hear their grievances, the soldiers returned to duty.

Spain entered the Seven Years' War on the side of France—belatedly, yet with time enough to lose the Philippines and Havana to the British. At the treaty table, Charles III's negotiators were told that they could redeem Havana with one or the other of two colonies: Puerto Rico, of sugar planting potential, or Florida, which (except for the one walled city through which the Crown poured silver) was in the hands of Indians. At a time when France was about to console Spain with the gift of Louisiana, opening up new opportunities west of the Mississippi, Spain sacrificed her interests east of the Mississippi to her interests in the Caribbean.

Spain's colony on the East Coast of North America had endured two centuries of hard lessons in realism. Step by step, Florida had surrendered its 16th-century continental claims, its mid-17th-century sphere of influence, and its late 17th-century ecumene. This time, in the greatest test of their loyalty, the floridanos and their servitors would be asked to relinquish the city itself, with its inner sanctum, the Castillo. The period of the mission provinces was fading from the colony's communal memory. It seemed as though the heathen and the heretics had won.

NOTES

1. The Bishop of Durango reported the same shortsighted temporary assignments in the missions of New Mexico (Polzer, 1976: 55–56).

2. By tradition, the titular diocese given to an auxiliary bishop at consecration preserved the name of an inactive bishopric. Tricale was in Asia Minor (Donlon, 1967).

3. See *Arredondo's Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia* (Bolton, 1925), introduced in *The Debatable Land: A Sketch of the Anglo-Spanish Contest for the Georgia Country* (Bolton and Ross, 1925).

4. Fray Andrés de Vilches claimed to have built a church for the fugitive slaves at Mose, but he did not say when (Vilches, 1757).

CHAPTER 20. A PARADIGM FOR MARITIME PERIPHERIES

Spanish Florida offers a case study of a coastal presidio, of the formation and dissolution of an associated set of mission provinces on a maritime frontier, and of the changing system of royal and native support sustaining that presidio and those provinces.

For strategic reasons, the colony had been located on a contested coast, far from inland centers of population and production. With no immediate source of Indian tribute or labor, it survived on subventions from one of the royal treasuries in the Indies. In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, floridanos improved their political and economic position by annexing Indian chiefdoms, securing subjects for the Crown and converts for the Church and at the same time developing new sources of labor and provisions. Evangelization served both religious and secular purposes; the extension and defense of missions became a cover for private trade.

The mission provinces began to collapse in the late 17th century under a combination of pressures: declining native populations, rising levels of external threat and assault, changes in native expectations and options, and internal demands that were no longer tolerable. Having lost the last of its hinterland in the early 1700s, the colony reverted in the 18th century to a coastal presidio with no official source of support beyond the Crown.

PERIODIZATION

From the founding of St. Augustine in 1565 to the colony's transfer to the British in 1764, Spanish Florida history falls into five overlapping time periods: the eras of the Adelantamiento, the Nearer Pacifications, the Farther Pacifications, the Building of the Castillo, and the Walled City. Each period had its own assemblage of problems and policies.

The Adelantamiento was a form of proprietary government; it recalled the medieval lordships of the marches and resembled the donatary captaincies in Brazil. Philip II's purpose in appointing a new adelantado for Florida in 1565 was to enforce Spain's claim to a stretch of the Atlantic coast which France had lately challenged with a fort and a fortified settlement. His chosen champion was an Asturian seafarer, don Pedro Menéndez de Avilés, who promised to clear the coast of interlopers, establish three towns, and introduce missionaries. In return, Menéndez would receive a heritable title; governorship of the colony for two lifetimes; certain privileges of lordship, lands, and patronage; and certain exceptions from the regulations of the House of Trade. All these provisions were carefully spelled out in a renewable three-year contract.

Menéndez was a man of means and connections, but all of the resources he could command proved insufficient to the task. As military intelligence supplied details about the escalation of French forces, the king himself became a partner in the enterprise, investing during the period of the contract some 200,000 ducats, two and two-thirds' times the 75,000-ducat combined investment of the Menéndez *comuño* of family and business associates.

During the Adelantamiento, conversion came in a poor third behind the Adelantado's priorities of preserving his military gains and restoring the comuño's fortunes. Menéndez concluded military and trading alliances with several chiefdoms, sealing them Indian-fashion by the exchange of gifts and hostages. As promised, he introduced Jesuits, distributing them among the garrisons he had stationed at every deep water port around the peninsula, but these would-be missionaries soon saw that their labor would be fruitless as long as Spanish soldiers were compelled by hunger to raid the native storehouses. Unwilling to give up their missionary calling to serve as military chaplains, some of the Jesuits left to found a mission in Virginia, where members of the Powhatan confederacy killed them. The other Jesuits withdrew.

Menéndez's three small settlements—St. Augustine, San Mateo, and his capital, Santa Elena, in present South Carolina—were plagued by famine, mutinies, and Indian hostility, as his lieutenant governors attempted to progress from gifts and trade to tribute and

services. Two of the three settlements fell by the way. First, the French corsair Dominique de Gourgues destroyed the fort at San Mateo with the help of eastern Timucuans. Then, after Sir Francis Drake assaulted the fort at St. Augustine and the Indians of the vicinity readily sacked the city, the Spanish abandoned, not St. Augustine, but Santa Elena, to concentrate their efforts farther south.

Florida, meanwhile, was making the transition from proprietorship to Crown colony. In 1570, the king institutionalized the situado to support a permanent garrison. Two years after Menéndez's untimely death in 1574, the Crown recovered the position of governor from his feuding sons-in-law.

Philip II's Ordinances of Pacification, issued in 1573, signalled the end of the High Conquest in Spanish America and the dawn of a new era of peaceful advances and voluntary conversions. Missions of Franciscans travelled from Spain to Florida to reopen conversions. Budgetarily, missionaries and soldiers were interchangeable, paid out of the same 300-plaza situado, although out of respect to a Franciscan's vow of poverty his stipend was issued in kind and called alms. Beyond the 115-ducat plaza, a friar received an extra royal allowance for "habit and footwear." If he was a "friar of the Mass," he also got an altar allowance of wine, wheat, and wax.

Under the new system, friars on "flying missions" visited the nearer provinces of infieles to raise crosses and invite the chiefs to visit St. Augustine, where they would receive gifts from the king, confirm "friendships" of trade and mutual defense, and register formal requests for friars. In Spanish eyes, these actions made them and their vassals at once Spanish subjects and Christian neophytes.

Centers of indoctrination consisting of a church and a convent were established in the towns of paramount chiefs, from which the doctrineros, or teaching friars, serviced strings of visitas in the subject towns. The Franciscans took orphans and the sons of chiefs into their convents and raised their own sacristans, musicians, interpreters, catechists, and overseers.

After the preparatory stage of conversión, each doctrina received from the king a 1000-peso baptismal gift of religious essentials, among them vestments, linens, images, sacred vessels, baptismal registers, large bells, and an altarstone holding a holy relic. Periodically, the chiefs received European clothing for themselves and cloth, blankets, and iron tools to distribute to their followers, all paid for out of the gasto de indios, added to the situado for the purpose of "regaling" the chiefs.

For the Spanish, there were decided advantages to having mission provinces. First, the Christian towns provided an early warning system and a buffer zone against invasion. The chiefs and their vassals were St. Augustine's first line of defense. Second, the chiefs included their Spanish allies in the sabana system, the native system for public finance. Each planting season, the commoners of a town planted one sabana of maize for each of their chiefs and principales and another one for the community as a whole. With their new iron tools, they now planted two more sabanas, one to support the church and the doctrinero with his retinue, and the other for "the king's service," to feed those travelling on "the king's business" or otherwise serving the Crown.

Third, the chiefs provided labor to the presidio on occasion. This practice began during the 16th-century wars, when they offered their vassals to the Spanish as auxiliary scouts, baggage carriers, couriers, canoe paddlers, and archers. In 1600, Governor Gonzalo Méndez Canzo drafted natives from Guale Province to rebuild St. Augustine after a fire. After that, he summoned them in relays to work in the soldiers' fields for rations and a minimum wage, paid to them in trade goods through their chiefs. The colony became increasingly dependent on this labor repartimiento.

Technically, a nation "conquered by the Gospel" was not subject to the labor service, only a nation "conquered by the sword." But there was little peaceful about the Nearer Pacifications. It took years of European epidemics, Spanish steel and firepower, and "scorched earth" campaigns to divide and conquer the Indians of the east coast. Those who rebelled against their Spanish overlords, as the Guales did in 1576 and 1597, were reconquered by "wars of fire and blood" and reintegrated under different terms, subject to the labor levy.

The period of the Farther Pacifications began in the early 1630s when Florida extended its boundaries to the Gulf coast, taking in western Timucua and Apalache. This second impulse for expansion came from within the colony; it was not a royal initiative. Spain, deeply involved in European wars and peninsular rebellions, could scarcely maintain the centers, much less the peripheries. During the middle 50 years of the 17th century, Florida's annual situado for soldiers, friars, and caciques was stolen by privateers, sequestered by the Crown, lost at sea, swamped in red tape, and delayed for years together. Although most of the missing situados were in time replaced, the schedule of deliveries was so haphazard that people learned to rely less on royal support and more on their own devices.

European diseases and European demands had worked in tandem to empty the eastern doctrinas. The populous new western provinces of Timucua and Apalache replenished the number of peasant farmers and repartimiento laborers in the colony. At the same time, new ports on the Gulf offered outlets for a flourishing coastal trade with Havana in deerskins, maize and beans, chickens, hogs, and ranch products—one that soon drew Caribbean buccaneers into Gulf waters. That the trade with Cuba was untaxed and unlawful, and that foreign vessels also entered the western ports, did not bother the self-reliant chiefs and floridanos. Even the friars participated in it, selling the surplus of their sabanas to beautify the churches and support the persons attached to the convents.

The governors, who were expected to return most of their first year's salary to the Crown and purchase their offices besides, were particularly short of funds. In the guise of controlling contraband, and despite strong Franciscan opposition, they stationed detachments of soldiers in the main town of each province. These secondary garrisons functioned as covert trading posts, and the lieutenants and soldiers who manned them, as agents for the governors' private enterprises.

During this period of reduced and irregular royal support, Spanish demands on Christian Indians rose. When the situado failed to arrive and the chiefs did not receive the customary gifts for themselves or their vassals, the Spanish pressed them all the more urgently to sell their towns' stored provisions to the presidio on credit. The new secondary garrisons meant that the Indians now had local soldiers and their families, as well as friars, to feed. Settlements of floridano traders and ranchers grew up around the garrisons and these provincial settlers expected their own share of "service Indians" from the labor repartimiento.

From the native point of view, by far the worst abuse was burdening. Because the journey by sea from St. Augustine to the west coast called for sailing against the strong current of the Gulf Stream, and because the narrow waters were increasingly pirate infested, most traffic went by land on Indian backs. The yearly ration for every Franciscan weighed no less than 1800 pounds. As the number of friars and doctrinas increased, and as the supply lines to the doctrinas lengthened, more and more burdener-days were required to take the friars their rations, and, like the heavy, mule-drawn freight wagons that came and went to New Mexico, the burdeners were loaded going and coming. Both of the major mid-17th century west coast rebellions were related to burdening.

The Building of the Castillo de San Marcos marks the fourth period. After pirates out of Jamaica raided St. Augustine in 1668, Queen Regent Mariana ordered the Viceroy of New Spain to catch up the overdue situados, to pay the 43 friars holding plazas out of a separate fund to allow the induction of 43 more soldiers, and to send the Florida treasury 10,000 pesos extra per year with which to build a stone fort. The founding of Charles Town in 1670 underscored the urgency of this defense project.

All told, the building of the Castillo took 24 years and cost the Crown over 138,000 pesos, most of which went for labor. Twice as many native workmen came to the capital as formerly; many of them brought their families and stayed. The influx of money and people caused prices to rise in St. Augustine, stimulating ranching and agriculture. Even so there were times when the maize gave out at the presidio and governors were forced to seize the private reserves of priests and friars.

Convinced that the maritime colony was

in grave danger, the Queen Regent increased the garrison by another 50 plazas. Floridanos, unwilling to form themselves into a militia, reduced the garrison's effective strength by appropriating one-tenth of its 350 plazas as reformados, or officers in the reserves, each one receiving the pay of a soldier.

In the late 17th century, Florida regained its 16th-century reputation as a "land of constant war," as the provinces came under attack almost seasonally, either by pirates or by Indian slave raiders armed with English muskets in the Southeastern version of the proxy war. Yet all of the new royal funds for fortifications were being taken up by the Castillo, with none to spare for the defense of Indian towns. When the viceroy of New Spain sent 6000 pesos with which to build a stone tower on Cumberland Island for the last of the Guales, the Florida governor used it for a seawall in St. Augustine.

North of Apalache, in the province of Apalachicola, traders from Charles Town were taking over the Indian trade. Although Apalachicola was not Christian, it had come within the Spanish sphere of influence since the 1640s. Florida governors countered the Anglo advance with gifts, warnings, and buffer zones of hastily founded "live missions." But the lure of English manufactures proved too powerful to resist. Between 1684 and 1706 most of the Christian Indians of Florida deserted their doctrinas for a life of liberty without chiefs, friars, or soldiers. First the Guales defected, then the Apalaches, then the Timucuans. When Colonel James Moore of South Carolina invaded the province of Apalache in 1704, during Queen Anne's War, he was surprised at the number of mission residents who volunteered to go back with him. The commoners were in rebellion.

In the 18th century, support for the maritime periphery was reduced once more to private enterprise and royal subventions. The once sizeable hinterland had come and gone, leaving St. Augustine a walled city that specialized in prizes of war and illicit trade with English colonies. Colonel Moore had burned the city in 1702. The Crown rebuilt it, refunding homeowners for their losses and authorizing grants for public buildings.

What they really needed, the floridanos decided, were a series of stone walls and earthen defenseworks on the landward sides of the city. On them they spent the money the king had authorized to rebuild the friary and the parish church. Outside the walls, under the guns of the Castillo, stood the thatched huts of a few hundred native hunters, loggers, charcoal burners, drunks, and prostitutes. The steadily increasing Indian fund went, not to them, primarily, but to keep the more warlike Southeastern Indians neutral.

In the postmission 18th century, as in the premission 16th century, Indians were a drain on the royal resources, a negative element in the support system. The Franciscans, deprived of purpose, spent their time in peninsular-provincial conflicts and were eventually secularized by default when their last doctrinas were taken away from them.

THE SPANISH FLORIDA MODEL

The maritime colony of Spanish Florida does not fit the Borderlands Paradigm of self-sufficiency and isolation, characterized by mutually exclusive institutions and castes. What it does fit is a Peripheries Paradigm, to which it contributes a model of mixed support. In terms of that model, the colony's first phase was characterized by a cooperative venture linking private enterprise and royal investment. In the second phase, Crown-supported soldiers and missionaries conquered, converted, and reconquered the eastern mission provinces, adding the new element of Indian tribute and labor to the support system. When royal support faltered, in the third phase, the colony expanded to take in the western mission provinces, acquiring new sources of native support and new opportunities for private trade. In the fourth phase, increased royal investment and increased demands on native support strengthened the presidial center at the expense of the mission peripheries. The latter sloughed away, and in the fifth phase, the colony returned to its early reliance on a combination of royal investment and private enterprise.

Reducing the Florida model to its components, the colony and its elites received support from two main sources: the Crown and the Christian Indians. The sum of this support fluctuated, because the contribution from either source was free to rise or fall in-

dependently as a function of some pressure or opportunity in the colony, the region, or the empire. A moderate level of regional threat from the English of Jamaica and Carolina could, for example, lead to larger subsidies from the Crown and heavier labor demands on the Indians, while the trading options that accompanied the threat could contribute to the drift of native population out of the provinces and to widespread smuggling.

The system worked as long as it did because it was flexible. A shortfall in one source of support could be eased by a transfer from another. A governor who needed a supply of maize in order to ration the builders of a fort on the frontier, or the sentries in coastal outposts, or 1500 refugees under siege, without hesitation sequestered the stores of Spanish individuals. Friars raised Indian orphans in their convents, who then became their assistants. Floridanos in search of income insinuated themselves into the royal treasury and the garrison. Hispanicized caciques desiring protection and gifts acted as brokers, channeling the labor and produce of Indian commoners to the Spanish.

The king of Spain saw himself as the patron of Indian converts, and them as wards of the Crown. Royal alms supported their missionaries, royal subsidies regaled their chiefs, and a royal Protector represented their interests. But wars in Europe, spilling into America, strained the king's resources to the limit. The colony survived the war years by demanding advances of goods and services from persons and groups who had no idea when they would be paid for them. At those times, the system may have survived because it was ideologically reinforced. The "cult of the king" helped to obscure the reality of forced loans, while the "divine cult" taught the Indians that they were natural inferiors and perpetual children. And, as yet, there was no alternative.

To Spaniards, Florida must have seemed like a native Utopia by comparison to other colonies. In this maritime periphery of strategic rather than economic importance, the goals of peaceful evangelism were largely met. Indian slavery was stymied; Indian lands did not suffer alienation; Indian lives were not shortened by service in mines or manufactories. Territorial expansion observed all the forms of the conquest by contract. Cooperative, convent-trained chiefs supplied friars, soldiers, and settlers with plentiful labor and low-priced products. The natives, in turn, received the gifts of heavenly salvation and earthly sanctuary, plus the material benefits of clothing, iron tools, and useful plants and animals. Meanwhile, through private enterprise, provincial elites, both Spanish and Indian, found ways to better themselves.

But Spain's design for the mastery of North America was based on the premise of an exclusive and cooperative relationship between Indians and españoles. When, in the Southeast, the English breached that exclusivity, the common Indians refused to renew the relationship and withdrew their services. In the 18th century, the sabanas were gone and the colony was back where it had started, looking seaward for its support.

APPENDIX

Governors of Florida, 1565-1764

	Dates of Service	
	Beginning	Ending
Pedro Menéndez de Avilés I (died in office)	9-1565	9-1574
Esteban de las Alas (deserted)	10-1566	8-1570
Pedro Menéndez de Avilés II (killed)	8-1570	1571
Diego de Velasco	7-1571	4-30-1575
*Diego de Velasco (arrested)	4-30-1575	2-24-1576
Hernando de Miranda (deserted)	2-24-1576	9-5-1576
Alonso de Solís (killed)	4-3-1576	7-1576
*Gutierre de Miranda	9-5-1576	1577
Pedro Menéndez Marquez (resigned)	3-6-1577	1594
Vicente González	11-22-1577	1578
Thomás Bernaldo de Quirós	1578	1579
Gutierre de Miranda	1582	1586
Francisco de Salazar	1583	1587
Juan de Posada	1588	1589
Gutierre de Miranda (deposed by mutiny)	1589	1593
Rodrigo de Junco (drowned)	1592	1592
Francisco de Salazar (arrested)	1593	7-1594?
Francisco de Miranda	7-1594?	1594
Domingo Martínez de Avendaño (died in office)	1594	11-24-1595
*Royal Officials (Alonso de las Alas, Bartolomé de Argüelles, Juan Menéndez Marquez I)	11-24-1595	6-2-1597
Gonzalo Méndez Canzo	6-2-1597	10-20-1603
Pedro Pertrene	1598?	1598?
Juan García de Naiva	5-1598	1598
Pedro de Ybarra	10-20-1603	1610
Juan Menéndez Marquez I	11-1604	12-1604
Juan Fernández de Olivera (died in office)	1610	11-23-1612
*Royal Officials (Juan de Arrazola and Joseph de Olivera)	11-23-1612	1613
Juan de Treviño Guillamas	1613	8-2-1618
Juan de Salinas	8-2-1618	11-1624
Alonso de Pastrana	11-8-1622	
Luis de Rojas y Borja	11-1624	6-23-1630
Alonso de Pastrana	8-17-1627	
Andrés Rodríguez de Villegas (died in office)	6-23-1630	7-1631
*Contador Nicolás Ponce de León I and Sgt. Major Eugenio de Espinosa	7-1631	7-29-1633
Luis de Horruytiner	7-29-1633	1638
Damián de Vega Castro y Pardo	1638	4-9-1645
Benito Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla (suspended)	4-9-1645	1646
*Royal Officials (Francisco Menéndez Marquez I and Pedro Benedit Horruytiner)	1646	1-8-1648
Benito Ruiz de Salazar Vallecilla (died in office)	1-8-1648	1651
*Contador Nicolás Ponce de León (died in office)	1651	10-1651
Pedro Benedit Horruytiner	10-1651	6-18-1654
Diego de Rebolledo (arrested)	6-18-1654	5-1658
Santos de las Heras	5-1658	1659
Alonso de Aranguiz y Cotes (died in office)	2-20-1659	11-2-1663
*Sgt. Major Nicolás Ponce de León II	11-2-1663	12-30-1664
Francisco de la Guerra y de la Vega	12-30-1664	7-6-1671
Manuel de Cendoya (died in office)	7-6-1671	7-8-1673

APPENDIX
(*Continued*)

	Dates of Service	
	Beginning	Ending
*Sgt. Major Nicolás Ponce de León II	7-8-1673	5-3-1675
Pablo de Hita Salazar	5-3-1675	9-28-1680?
Juan Marquez Cabrera (deserted)	9-28-1680?	4-11-1687
*Sgt. Major Pedro de Aranda y Avellaneda	4-11-1687	8-20-1687
Diego de Quiroga y Losada	8-20-1687	5-15-1693
Laureano de Torres y Ayala	9-21-1693	1699
Joseph de Zúñiga y Cerda	1699	1706
Francisco de Córcoles y Martínez	1706	1716
Pedro de Olivera y Fullana (died in office)	1716	1716
*Sgt. Major Juan de Ayala y Escobar	1716	1718
Antonio de Benavides	1718	1734
*Captain Ignacio Rodríguez Rozo	1726	1726
Francisco del Moral Sánchez (arrested)	1734	1737
*Sgt. Major Manuel Joseph de Justís	1737	1737
Manuel de Montiano	1737	1749
Melchor de Navarrete	1749	1752
*Fulgencio García de Solís	1752	1755
Alonso Fernández de Heredia	1755	1758
Lucas Fernando de Palacio y Valenzuela	1758	1761
*Sgt. Major Alonso de Cárdenas	1761	1762
Melchor Feliú	1762	1764

Note: Governors with royal appointment are in boldface; governors ad interim have asterisks; the rest are lieutenant governors appointed by the proprietor. Adapted from TePaske, 1964: appendix 1; Bushnell, 1981: appendix 1; Matter, 1990: table 2.

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Readers will soon discover that the full citation to a published collection of documents, a document having enclosures, or an edited volume of essays appears only once and that in order to obtain a complete citation they must often look up a second reference. This inconvenience is caused by the constraints of space.

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

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